HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

In re: A Sunset Performance Review of the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission Pursuant to Act 1981-142

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Stenographic report of hearing held in Room 22-A, Capitol Annex, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on

> Thursday May 14, 1987 10:00 a.m.

HON. H. WILLIAM DEWEESE, CHAIRMAN

MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

Hon. Michael Bortner Hon. Gerard Kosinski Hon. Thomas Caltagirone Hon. Allen Kukovich

Hon. Chaka Fattah Hon. Nicholas B. Moehlmann

Hon. David Heckler

Also Present:

Michael P. Edmiston, Chief Counsel, Majority John J. Connelly, Special Counsel, Majority Mary Woolley, Chief Counsel, Minority

Reported by:
Ann-Marie P. Sweeney, Reporter

Dorothy M Malone Registered Professional Reporter 135 S Landis Street Hummelstown, Pennsylvania 17036

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INDEX Mr. Thomas J. Gentzel, Director of Covernmental Relations, Pennsylvania School Boards Association Ms. Lora Lavin, Common Cause/Pennsylvania Ms. Jean Meitz, Common Cause/Pennsylvania Mr. William Groves, Township Supervisor and member of the Board of the State Association of Township Supervisors Representative Ronald R. Cowell, State Representative Mr. Paul M. Yatron, Esquire, Executive Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Criminal Law Division of the Office of Attorney General Mr. Edward Seladones, former Executive Director for the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Ladies and gentlemen, it's my pleasure to convene the May 14, 1987 meeting of the House Judiciary Committee. We are here to participate in the sunset review process of the Pennsylvania Ethics Commission.

We will have a series of witnesses, beginning with Tom Gentzel of the Pennsylvania School Boards

Association; Sandy Christianson and Jean Meitz, Common

Cause; Representative Ron Cowell; William Groves,

Township Supervisor; Ed Seladones, former Executive

Director for our Ethics Commission; Paul Yatron, Esquire,

Executive Deputy Attorney General and Director of the

Criminal Law Division of the Office of Attorney General;

and we're looking forward to adjournment around noon.

The first guest for the House Judiciary

Committee this morning is Mr. Tom Gentzel, Director of

Governmental Relations, Pennsylvania School Boards

Association. Welcome. Thanks for joining us.

MR. GENTZEL: Thank you. Good morning.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for the record, I am Tom Gentzel, Director of Governmental Relations for the Pennsylvania School Boards Association. On behalf of our officers and members, allow me to thank you for the opportunity to present comments on an issue of special importance to local

school directors.

At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to reiterate our support for the remarks that were presented to you last week on behalf of the Pennsylvania local government conference, of which PSBA is a member. Those comments reflected the concerns of all categories of local officials and I trust was carefully evaluated in the sunset review of the State Ethics Commission that you are now undertaking. We appear today to emphasize those points that have a particular impact on school districts and to discuss some additional issues.

Clearly this sunset process must be more than simply a review of the Ethics Commission itself.

Although we have a number of concerns with that agency's actions over the years, it is quite clear that the enabling act, the Ethics Law of 1978, is the underlying cause of many of the objections raised and concerns expressed by our members.

We also say at the beginning, we do not question the intentions of those who now serve or have served on the Ethics Commission or its staff. We believe their motives have been honorable, arising out of the desire to fulfill what they have perceived to be the intentions of the General Assembly in creating Act 170 in the first place.

Unfortunately, as many of us recall, in the rush to enact the Ethics Law prior to the 1978 election, legislators actually had no clear intent other than to conclude the task as quickly as possible. For the Ethics Commission to contend that its actions over the years were designed to further clarify or advance the will of the General Assembly is to assume that such a will ever existed in the first place, and that appointed officials and bureaucrats who played no role in the legislative debates are qualified to provide the interpretation.

Let us be completely candid. The Ethics Law was a hastily drafted response to an enormous political issue. By nearly any measure it is an ambiguous, imperfect statute. We have witnessed a decade of actions by the Ethics Commission to provide form for that substance, to establish by orders and regulations what it believes the General Assembly meant to say, or perhaps should have said, in that law. Certainly one could argue, if not the Commission, who? Until now we have seen little real interest on the part of legislators to more clearly define the provisions of the Ethics Law.

The Sunset Report of the Ethics Commission notes, for instance, two landmark court cases involving the Ethics Law that effectively reshaped the statute but which have yet to be reflected in the language of the

law. Ironically, both were actively supported by PSBA in our efforts to eliminate confusion about Act 170. The Snider case addressed the law's different treatment of elected school directors and other officials versus those who are appointed. In Denoncourt, financial disclosure of officials' spouses was overturned as a violation of privacy and due process.

The fact that such major cases still are not reflected in the language of the act creates considerable confusion for those who secure a copy of the Ethics Law and presume that what they read is actually true.

A far greater concern, however, is the unbridled tendency of the Ethics Commission to regulate not only those areas left unaddressed by the act, but even those which are clear yet which the Commission believes to be inappropriate. Consider, for instance, that the agency effectively rewrote Section 4(b) of the act, which requires candidates' statements of financial interest to be filed with the Commission, to require that municipalities and school districts house those documents. The Commission reversed the legislature again when it directed by regulation that elected officials file annually their financial disclosure forms, even though the Act only requires such filing by appointed officials.

Do these changes make sense? Some would surely contend that they do. But the debate over substance really is less important than the process, since these regulatory actions reveal a troubling disregard for the expressed will of the General Assembly. If the Commission believed the law to be inappropriate in those areas, it should have recommended that action be taken by the legislature and not as a regulatory action.

We have witnessed a similar lack of constraint in the Commission's advisory opinions as well. Despite the clear statutory mandate for such opinions to interpret actions or questions on the basis of the Ethics Law, the Commission repeatedly has ventured into other statutes in efforts to answer inquiries. We do not believe that the General Assembly envisioned or condones such circuitous expeditions through Purdon's Statutes. Its clear intent was for the Ethics Commission to provide interpretations based on the sole statute that agency is authorized to administer - the Ethics Law. The results often are painful reminders of the agency's lack of expertise, let alone legal authority, to pass judgment on other laws.

You were reminded last week of the case in which the Commission ruled that insurance coverage could not be provided to township supervisors since municipal

law did not authorize it, even though State insurance law

In some instances, we have concluded that the Ethics Commission simply enjoys pontificating even when no significant legal issues are present. In one inquiry brought by a school district, for example, the Commission ruled that no conflict of interest existed if the board were to visit the out-of-State offices of a food service vendor with whom it had had a contractual relationship for a long period of time. Yet that opinion issued by the Commission consumed six pages, offering what we believe to be gratuitous opinions that were largely irrelevant to the Ethics Law question it was answering.

And perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the Commission's activities, and I'd like to focus on for a moment, has been its conduct of investigations concerning alleged improprieties by public officials. Indeed, the procedures established by the agency almost defy common courtesy, if not the Constitution itself. Consider for a moment that:

- -- All persons who file complaints remain unknown to the accused, even if their allegations subsequently are disproved and/or constitute harassment;
- -- Those officials subjected to such complaints are not afforded a full opportunity to respond

and are unable to witness the Commission deliberations affecting them;

-- Respondents are given only a notice of the inquiry when it begins and a copy of the Commission's final order once issued. Along with that order is a directive prohibiting discussion of the order with anyone for 15 days, subject to loss of all appeal rights.

-- Finally, the Commission seems to have ignored some of its own precedents, thereby offering public officials little help in determining whether their actions are or would be a conflict of interest under the Ethics Law.

Add to all of this the findings of the Sunset Report that more than one-thild of all investigations are 1 to 2 years old, that the number of unresolved cases continues to grow, and most disturbing, that only 10 percent of all complaints investigated actually result in sanctions. The message is clear: Although well-motivated, the provision of the Ethics Law enabling citizen complaints to be made without the knowledge of the accused has produced very little in the way of penalties but a great deal in terms of personal distress and anxiety on the part of public officials. This process frankly invites abuse by anyone with an axe to grind. More and more officials are under investigation,

but very few ever will be found guilty of violating the law. We must ask, what public purpose do these witch hunts serve? We have not been told how many complaints are made by the public at large, how many by elected officials honestly seeking clarification of their own job descriptions, how many come from other politicians or discontented public employees? I suspect such data might be revealing, indeed.

PSBA believes the role of the Ethics

Commission in such matters should be carefully reviewed and restructured. No agency should be granted free reign to initiate, investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and impose sanctions for anonymous complaints. No person should be forced to tolerate such suspension of individual due process rights simply because they hold a public office.

We also question the right of the Ethics

Commission to levy fines and impose penalties under the

Ethics Law. The General Assembly must restore to the law
enforcement and judicial authorities some of the

functions which the Commission has claimed as its sole
province.

The school boards have been and remain committed to upholding high standards of ethical behavior for those who hold public office. Our code of conduct of

the association reflects that commitment, and we've attached it for your review. The Public School Code contains dozens of specific provisions governing acceptable practices by school directors, some are far more stringent than the Ethics Law requirements. Given those rigorous requirements, we are not convinced that a separate conflict-of-interest statute is even necessary, particulary insofar as school boards are concerned.

If the primary purpose of Act 170 is the reporting of financial interests, then perhaps the Ethics Commission should simply be reconstituted as the State Financial Disclosure Commission, empowered only to receive and audit those reports. Certainly most of the questions concerning conflicts of interest and violations of law could be answered capably by existing agencies of government. Without question, adjudication of those cases, including the assessing of fines, should be left to the criminal justice system that has served this country well for more than two centuries.

We would support continuation of the Ethics Commission only if the enabling act were modified to restrict the agency's virtually unlimited powers and to clarify those sections of the statute that have given rise to many of the controversies we have cited.

PSBA of course will be pleased to work with

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you and your staff to address these issues, and thank you again for the opportunity to testify. CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Thank you, Tom. On behalf of Chairman Moehlmann, I'm happy that we have your perspective. I'm especially happy, I don't know about some of the other people. Do we have some questions from some of our members? Dave Heckler, from Montgomery County -- Bucks County. REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BY REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: (Of Mr. Gentzel)

- Mr. Gentzel, you've attached with your 0. testimony and made reference to a set of ethical standards or quidelines for school board members. What is the source of that document?
- Α. This code of conduct was adopted by our associations and board and has been in place for a number of years.
- 0. I see. And is that in any way legally binding on any individual school board or member of an individual school board?
- No. I don't mean to suggest that it is, but Α. I think it does reflect the fact that they were adopted

long before predating the Ethics Law, that there was an interest and concern on the part of our membership expressed through our association to establish some standards of conduct.

- Q. But you would agree that both prior to and subsequent to the adoption of the Ethics Act there's absolutely no way of guaranteeing the public that any given member of any given school board will adhere to those quidelines at all. Is that correct?
- A. Well, I think that's an incomplete picture. First of all, they are not binding but they do reflect the will of our membership. That's number one. But the other point I made was that the School Code contains literally dozens of references to prohibitive and restricted activities by board members, some of which are far more stringent than the Ethics Law itself. So as a matter of law, we do have, I think, pretty clear direction in terms of what boards are and are not to be doing, individually and collectively.
- Q. And how are those particular restrictions enforced?
- A. Through the normal criminal justice system.

 If a board member were to be found in violation, for instance, of doing business with the district, in clear violation of the School Code for that, he would be

subject to prosecution, I would suspect.

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Q.

Yes.

- That does have criminal sanctions attached to 1t?
- Α. Yes. I'd be happy to provide the committee with a summary of some of those provisions of the School Code, if you're interested, that pertain to--
- I'd appreciate it. Thank you. CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Tom Caltagirone, from Berks County.

BY REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: (Of Mr. Gentzel)

- Has this law impacted in any way on the Q. number of candidates and/or elected school directors throughout the Commonwealth?
- A difficult question to answer. I've talked to many board members, some of whom have elected -- or that's the wrong word, chosen not to seek reelection, and among the reasons are the financial disclosure requirements of the Ethics Law. But I would not presume to say that that is the reason people have left service. I think it does add one more straw to the camel's back. I don't know if it breaks it or not, but it's a dissincentive for some people to go through not only the disclosure requirement, but I think even more troubling, as I've said in the testimony, is what we've seen as this growing tendency of the Commission to handle anonymous

complaints and elected officials not being told anything about the status of those investigations. A lot of people simply don't want to put up with that kind of grief.

- Q. I happen to serve on the Appropriations
 Committee, it's one of my committee assignments, and with
 our budget deliberations every year, do you realize that
 very, very -- one of the largest chunks out of the
 budget, the Commonwealth's budget, goes to school
 districts. In addition to that, they probably are the
 largest source of taxing funds at the local level to
 maintain local school districts. Do you have any idea
 what that total comes to with all the school districts,
 with the 501 school districts throughout the
 Commonwealth? The local money raised and the amount of
 money that's in the State government system?
- A. I suspect it's in excess of \$5 billion or \$6 billion a year.
- Q. \$5 billion to \$6 billion a year. Probably the largest single expenditure of governmental units that we have in the Commonwealth, correct?
 - A. I would -- yeah, that's exactly right.
- Q. I'm trying to look for a balance. I'm not completely satisfied with all the aspects of the law, as you are, and I share some of the concerns. However, with

the expenditures of such large sums of money on probably the bottom line of what I think we really should be all about in government, and that's educating our children, and getting the most for those dollars that we can, I think you can share the concern that maybe me and some of the other members have about honesty in government and trying to keep those who expend those funds honest so that we do get the most for our money and that we don't have conflicts of interest where somebody's company seems to be getting all of the benefit of certain contracts.

Do you find that that has kept any of the school directors a little bit more —— I wouldn't say honest, but let's say on the straight and narrow?

A. Well, I could give you a standard response about the honesty and integrity of school directors throughout the State, but I'm sure you're all well aware of that, so I don't need to say it. But I do need to say to you that, number one, our testimony did not include a call for the repeal of the financial disclosure requirements. I think it's a burden that many board members don't particularly appreciate, but our membership hasn't said that ought to be repealed, and so I think that does serve a public purpose and we have to recognize that.

But the bigger question in our mind is, if

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we're going to have ethics legislation in this State, what's the proper role for a Commission to perform and what are the limits of that? There is a very real tendency, and I'll just repeat the one phrase from the testimony, to almost suspend individual due process rights in this whole effort to insure the ethical behavior of State officials and local officials. We're troubled by that. Consider again the original law as it was interpreted before the Denoncourt case required that public officials report the income of spouses and certain children. Well, that created some very real problems in terms of professional roles that a spouse may have doctors, lawyers, and others - in terms of revealing We found that many of our members were in very difficult positions in having to choose between serving on a school board and forcing a spouse to report sources of income that frankly reflected some difficulties they had professionally. And now in this whole area of investigations, it seems to be running amuck. very little protection for the elected official who has been accused anonymously by somebody somewhere for some reason of violating the law and never hearing the status of that case as it proceeds. I've talked to a number of local officials who have said, it's not worth it. You volunteer your time to serve on the school board in the

interest of the community. They don't want to put up
with that kind of thing, and I don't blame them.

- Q. You've kept stats, I'm sure, on prior '78 and post '78 enactment of this as far as the act of prosecution of school directors in this State. Has it increased or decreased?
- A. I don't have the data readily available. We have not seen any kind of a significant increase in the prosecution of local officials. And I might say, to set the record clear, the Ethics Law, I don't believe, was motivated by improper behavior on the part of school directors or other local officials. It was clearly a response to some problems at the State level. And so that's perhaps one of the greatest ironies of this whole process. We don't think on a statewide basis local officials have done poorly at all in terms of their job performance.
- Q. But where do you strike that checks and balance with any elected officials, whether they be at the local level or at the State level? Where do you put the checks and balances on their interest as opposed to the public interests which they may be serving at the time?
- A. Clearly anyone who agrees and wants to serve in public life at any level has a responsibility to be

accountable for their actions. One of those ways they can be accountable is through an Ethics Law that establishes some clear standards and offers some guidance, and you'll see, as you look down through many of the opinions that have been issued by the Commission over the years, many of them come from local officials themselves honestly wanting some direction in terms of what constitutes a conflict of interest so they have some direction. I don't think we disagree on that point. We recognize the value of that.

where we have a problem is when precedence that the Commission establishes in one case are changed in another case. That doesn't help local officials understand what's acceptable behavior and what isn't.

And the other problems that we cited in our testimony are clear problems that I think are undermining the value of an Ethics Law in the first place, and this committee, in our opinion, has a unique opportunity to deal with some of those problems perhaps for the first time since the law was passed in 1978.

Q. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Allen Kukovich.

BY REPRESENTATIVE KUKOVICH: (Of Mr. Gentzel)

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Tom, just to make sure that the record's Q. clear, you've made a statement about the incentive for passing the bill, and that it was the result of inappropriate activities at the State level. That's not entirely so. As a matter of fact, the arguments surrounding the bill included the fact, and I don't have the exact statistics, that in the decade preceding the Ethics Act, somewhere around 1,100 or 1,200 local officials were indicted and convicted in this State of wrongdoing. Now, that being the case, it's one of the reasons why the Ethics Act came into being, and I don't have the statistics of the number of indictments and convictions since '78, but it is way down, which makes it arguable that the Ethics Act created an atmosphere which was a deterrent to those individuals who might decide to become candidates for office and come into the system to abuse the system. I think at least that's arquable, that atmosphere that was created. There were a lot of indictments and convictions of local governmental officials.

You talked about your concern regarding the investigatory process, and you're worried about the fact of anonymous complaints, and that is a concern. In drafting the Ethics Act, the concern of the lawmakers was not to unfairly blacken the record or the image of an

innocent official, so there was a tendency to try to keep things out of the press and to keep things confidential.

Now, according to the Sunset Report by the Legislative Budget and Finance, only about 10 percent of those come to action, so obviously the spurious complaints are weeded out, and apparently the Ethics Commission is doing a good job of weeding those out. If you just look at the statistics.

A. Right.

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- Q. The point -- do you want to respond?
- Yeah, I would like to, Allen, if I can very That's one way of looking at it. The other way quickly. of looking at it is of all the hunoreds of complaints that may have been brought over the years, only 10 percent warranted any kind of action. Now, if you're a local who has received a notice that a complaint has been filed with the Commission, if you look at the rest of the data that more than a third of those complaints take a year and two years or more to handle, that person is sitting there for that length of time knowing that he's under investigation for a charge that he may be totally unfamiliar with, have no idea who's involved or what the allegation is, and then the next time they hear from the Commission is when there's a final order and they're told not to discuss it with anybody for 15 days or they lose

all of their appeal rights. People are living and working and trying to perform their duties in that kind of environment and at the very least, that's not conducive to those officials serving well in their capacity. We're very concerned about that.

- Q. How many specific school board members have complained to you about this problem?
- A. I've heard a number of complaints over the years, but I couldn't quantify it now.
- Q. Two, six, three thousand? I mean, a ball park figure?
- A. I've heard probably a couple dozen complaints trom board members over the years both about themselves and about what they have seen happen with other local officials, friends of theirs who have gone through this or acquaintances of theirs. And you talk about the environment that's created, that word gets around, too. And we've seen the average length of service on school boards drop like a rock. It's under four years now, and I have to believe that at least part of that is a concern on the part of some people, they don't want to go through this kind of environment.
- Q. So the last 8 or 9 years you've heard about 24 complaints by somebody or by somebody who knew of another case?

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- Q. Okay. One more thing. The ongoing nature of the complaint investigations, how many school board members, to your knowledge, are currently under investigation?
- A. I know personally of none that are currently under investigation, nor would I. I would have no reason to know that, and the Commission would not tell us.
- Q. According to the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee report, as of the time the report was filed, there were only 208 ongoing investigations.

 That's too many, and I would submit it's because there aren't enough investigators with the Commission. But of those 208, you wouldn't happen to know how many are school board members?
 - A. I have no idea.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: There would be no way you would know.

MR. GENTZEL: No, I would not.

BY REPRESENTATIVE KUKOVICH: (Of Mr. Gentzel)

- Q. But in your position, have school board members come to you within the last two years and said that they're investigation is still ongoing? Has anybody talked to you about that?
 - A. They may have talked to some of the attorneys

not heard that said. I am concerned, though, that if there are 208, there are about 180 to 190 people, based on the historical data that that report revealed, that are ultimately going to be exonerated of any wrongdoing that who are today, as we sit here, believing that they're under investigation and not knowing what that's all about, and that's too many, too.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Chief Counsel, Mike Edmiston.

BY MR. EDMISTON: (Of Mr. Gentzel)

- Q. Mr. Gentzel, you mentioned the inquiry by the school district about whether or not school board members could accept expense-paid trips to a contractor out of State. Do you have the name of that circumstance or that case and can identify the school district that was involved?
- A. Offhand I can't. I could get it for you today yet.
 - Q. It wouldn't be in St. Marys, Pennsylvania?
- A. It may have been. To be honest with you, I'm just not sure.
- Q. Have you read the opinion issued by the Commission in that case?
 - A. Um-hum. Yes.

Q. Can you summarize it? You include the summary in your testimony. You make reference to the relationship being longstanding, you described the opinion was six pages, you characterize it as gratuitous and that it was largely irrelevant. Are there elements of that opinion that come readily to mind as evidence of those characterizations?

A. Well, I think the point we made, on that issue and on others, is a tendency on the part of the Ethics Commission to look to the appearance of a conflict language in the law in terms of rendering advisory opinions and advice on some of these questions. That, in our judgment, does lead to some pontificating. We're conceined about that because the question that a board may ask is, is this proposed action a conflict of interest or not? And the answer is "yes" or "no" to that board, and we're really not interested in going off on tangents in terms of how that might be perceived by the Commission.

- Q. I'd like to ask you to submit a supplementary commentary to the committee identifying the particular opinion you're referring to and citing those elements of the opinion that you've characterized as you have in your testimony.
 - A. I'd be happy to do that.

Q. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Any other questions by any members of the committee?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: If not, thank you very much.

MR. GENTZEL: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: For our next witness, Sandra Christianson and Ms. Jean Meitz, from Common Cause.

I might add as they're approaching the mike and you're leaving, I'm philosophically in agreement with much of what you've had to say and I know if you keep in touch with the chairman and my staff, as we intend to make some substantive changes in the law in front of us. You have been, unequivocally, my favorite witness.

Okay. Next, Sandy Christianson. Oh, Sandy's not going to testify.

MS. LAVIN: I'm sorry. My name is Lora

Lavin. I'm the State Chair of Common Cause/Pennsylvania,

and I thank you for the opportunity to testify today on

behalf of Common Cause. Considering your statement you

just made, I guess I have a hard act to follow.

With me today are Barry Kauffman, who recently joined us as our Executive Director, and I

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thought I would ask him to join me at the table, and Jean Meitz will be helping me out with the testimony and I'll introduce her later.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: We're an informal crew, so make yourself at home.

MS. LAVIN: Okay.

In 1978, Common Cause/Pennsylvania helped influence the General Assembly to pass the Ethics Law, Act 170, that established the State Ethics Commission. As supporters of the sunset law, we welcome review of the Commission. Common Cause believes that openness, accountability, and responsiveness are the principles which are critical to a continued success of a democratic form of government. The Ethics Act supports these concepts by declaring the people have the right to be assured that the financial interests of holders of or candidates for public office present neither the conflict nor the appearance of conflicts with the public trust. In an exhaustive review of the Ethics Commission, the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee Audit Report states the existence of the Commission provides a deterrent to corrupt or unethical practices. Common Cause concurs with that finding and urges the General Assembly to reauthorize the State Ethics Commission.

The Commission has done a good job of

interpreting and enforcing Act 170. Its numerous rulings have prohibited activities which are or appear to be a conflict of interest, and helped public officials avoid activities which could invite public distrust. The Act provides a standard against which those who wish to serve the public in a fair and accountable way can measure their actions.

Fears that the financial disclosure provisions of Act 170 would have a chilling effect on candidates or cause resignations by public officials have not proven to be true. There is no evidence that the act has created a decline in qualified and highly competent candidates for elected and appointed office.

Common Cause has not always agreed with the Commission's actions. For example, we vehemently disagreed with the ruling permitting the use of the Executive Mansion for public fundraising. This was wrong on its face and inconsistent with earlier opinions prohibiting legislators from conducting campaign activities from their legislative offices, even if the State was reimbursed. This sunset process should be used to strengthen the Commission so that future decisions will be more consistent.

Part of the problem is the potential for a lopsided partisan imbalance in the Commission membership.

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This can result from a change in party control of either the Senate or House, or when one party holds the Governor's office for several terms. To insure more balance bipartisanship, the act should be amended so that of the three members appointed by the Governor, only two shall be of the same political party.

The Supreme Court ruling exempting judges from public financial disclosure has created a gaping loophole through which certain public employees who are also attorneys have gleefully leaped. As far as we have been able to determine, among the 42 States requiring public financial disclosure, Pennsylvania stands alone in providing a judiciary exemption. Disclosure is neither burdensome or unduly intrusive. Exempting certain public officials merely on the basis of professional affiliation is unconscionable. For judges who stand for election by the citizens to declare exemption for themselves is an outrage. The General Assembly should take whatever corrective steps are necessary to require public financial disclosure by judges and lawyers who are public employees.

One of the strengths of the Commission is its independence from the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of government, thus making it more capable of rendering partial decisions. With four of its

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seven members appointed by the legislature and three by the Covernor, a reasonable philosophical balance can be attained. However, we are concerned that the recent Commission opinion exempting legislators from the purview of the State Ethics Act regarding certain legislative actions may be a foot in the door to additional exemptions.

The Act should be amended to clarify procedures public officials and public employees should follow when through the course of discharging their official duties they would be required to take action that would directly affect their financial interests or those of their immediate families. We recommend the procedures outlined in the Common Cause Model Ethics Law.

Common Cause believes the following principles are essential to an effective conflict of interest law:

- -- Coverage of elected and appointed State and local officials in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, plus government employees in policymaking positions.
- -- A comprehensive code of ethics that declares holding public office to be a public trust, and prohibits any attempt to realize personal financial gain through public office.

-- Mandatory annual disclosure of economic interests and sources of income by officials and their spouses and dependents.

-- Tough sanctions enforced by an independent enforcement commission.

For the most part, Act 170 meets these requirements. In addition to the required corrective actions already noted, we make the following suggestions.

First, require financial disclosure by spouses and dependents. Financial disclosure provides citizens with the information on which to judge whether their representatives act in the public interest rather than for private gain, and is critical to the enforcement of the Conflict of Interest laws. Exemption of spouses and dependents is a loophole through which public officials can hide assets they do not wish to disclose. Disclosure of spouse's financial interests is now required in 24 States, and dependents are included in 18 of those States.

Prohibit, with certain exceptions, gifts or honoraria to government officials or public employees from people who have business pending before the agency for which the official or employee works. Disclosure alone does not prevent the undermining of public trust that occurs when officials accept money or gifts of

substantial value, other than campaign contributions, from parties potentially affected by their official actions. This provision can be drafted using the exceptions in the Governor's Code of Conduct for Executive Branch Officials.

Clarify requirements as to who should disclose financial interests. It is the intent of the law to cover all public officials, and I think I've made that clear.

Require candidates for local office to file financial interest statements only in their local community. Set the filing deadline for candidates' financial interest statements to conform with the deadline for filing a petition to appear on the ballot. Require local officials to file annual financial interest statements in the community, and provide fines for late or incomplete filings.

By filing locally, candidates' disclosure statements will have the same accountability to citizens as those of incumbent officials. Filing financial statements with the petition to appear on the ballot simplifies the procedure and reduces the potential for inadvertently failing to meet the requirements.

Set uniform rules for public inspection of disclosure statements. Statements of financial

disclosure should be readily available for public inspection, and the process should be free from potentially intimidating requirements that could deter citizens from exercising their right to inspect the statements.

Clarify in reauthorizing legislation the

Commission's authority to interpret Act 170 in the light

of other statutes. The question of such authority has

been raised upon occasion and it is Common Cause's

understanding that the courts have verified the

Commission's authority to exercise such interpretive

powers. The purpose of the Commission is to prevent

conflicts of interest and abuse of public office. This

cannot be done in a vacuum. To insure consistency in the

application of the law, the Commission should have

statutory authority to refer to other laws where

applicable, in issuing its opinions and enforcing the

law, including the power to enforce the Adverse Interest

Act.

We believe the recommendations embodied in this testimony will help insure consistency and equity in the application of the law as it applies to conflicts of interest.

Again, thank you for this opportunity to express the views of Common Cause. With us today is Jean

Meitz, a student in public policy at the Penn State
University, Harrisburg. Ms. Meitz has just completed a
student internship with Common Cause, during which she
conducted a public opinion poll to ascertain citizens'
attitudes about the Ethics Act and the State Ethics
Commission. And with your permission, I would like to
give Ms. Meitz the opportunity to present her findings,
and she can do that now or--

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: It's just a couple pages?

MS. LAVIN: Yeah.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Sure. Go ahead.

MS. LAVIN: Go ahead, Jean.

MS. MEITZ: Chairman DeWeese, members of the House Judiciary Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee to present the results of a study which I conducted as an intern with Common Cause/Pennsylvania. My study utilized a scientifically generated telephone poll of Pennsylvania citizens to measure awareness of and attitudes regarding the Ethics Commission, an understanding of what the Ethics Commission regulates, and opinions regarding the need for continuing the Ethics Commission.

Survey Sampling, Incorporated, of Fairfield,
Connecticut, generated the random sample telephone
numbers. Their survey instrument was reviewed and edited

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by professional pollsters and public policy experts at the Pennsylvania State University. Exhibits of the survey instrument, generated data, statistical comparison, plus explanations of methodology and demographics appear in the Appendix. The entire survey instrument is also contained in the Appendix, however, the data generated from questions 2 through 6 are most relevant to this testimony.

Analysis of the data. Question 2 asks if the respondent was aware that the Ethics Act prohibited public officials from using their public office for personal financial gain. The results showed only 34 percent of respondents were aware that that was one of the functions of the Ethics Commission is to investigate and deter this illegal activity.

Response to question 3 demonstrated a 55percent awareness of the need for public officials to
produce financial statements and make them public. Side
remarks of respondents to this question noted that local
media coverage had made them aware of this requirement
for public office.

83 percent of the total 486 respondents were positive in their response to question No. 4 when asked if they thought it a good or bad idea for all, underlined all, elected and appointed officials should fall within

the jurisdiction of the Ethics Act.

Question No. 5 asked a similar question but substituted the term, "all public employees responsible for making major decisions" for that of the "elected officials". Although there was a slight drop from 83 percent to 78 percent in positive response to Question No. 5, there is still significant public interest in monitoring this level of public employee.

Question 6 asked, and I quote, "Do you think that the legislature should continue the Ethics Commission instead of letting it expire as scheduled at the end of 1987?" end quote. With 87 percent positive response to this question, citizens of Pennsylvania have demonstrated a desire for the continued existence of the Ethics Commission.

Overall, the data contained in this study suggests that the public supports the reauthorization of a strong Ethics Commission to monitor the activities of all public officials and designated public employees.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Thank you very much.

REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: Could I ask a few questions about the methodology?

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Absolutely.

MS. MEITZ: Yes. Certainly.

BY REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: (Of Ms. Meitz)

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- Q. Okay. Could I ask who's teaching you the course in this or who taught you the course in this?
- A. I took a course under Dr. Michael Young, who is a professional pollster.
- Q. Well, the first thing you should learn when giving a poll is never use the words "good" and "bad".

 That sort of skewers the results right there. First of all, I could ask the question, is it bad to get a gunshot? People react strongly to the word "bad".

Also, questions 3 and 2, question 3 should be thrown out because of the change in response, the "yes" and the "no's" sort of skewers it right there. I'm talking political methodology.

And question 6 should have been asked first.

- A. Question 6 was not asked first because we did not feel that the public, and I think it shows this after Question No. 2, that there was an awareness out there of what we were asking a question about, and how can you measure a question when you are not measuring the awareness of the people that are answering the question? And that's why it was situated like that.
- Q. You give them the awareness in the opening statement that you read to them.

I do my own polling, so--

A. Yes, well, I know, and I'm sure if you do your own polling that you're very well aware there are styles of methodology.

O. Yes.

A. This was not meant to be a political poll.

This was meant to be an informational poll, and there is a big difference.

- Q. But it can be skewered to a point toward--
- A. Any poll can be skewered. That's why the questions in full are presented here.
- Q. That is exactly the answer I've been trying to get.
- A. And that's why the questions in full, and we have tried our very best not to make them biased.
 - Q. I wish I was teaching the course.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Representative Kukovich said, and also the remarks of the Chairman, that the word is "skewed", not "skewered".

REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: I'm thinking of shish kebab. There's a lot of Lebanese in my district.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Hopefully they responded to the Common Cause poll also.

REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: They weren't home.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Does anyone on the panel have questions for the ladies or the gentleman?

Mike Bortner, from York County.

REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: I have several.

BY REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: (Of Ms. Lavin)

- Q. The first question refers to some part of your statement, Ms. Lavin, I guess on the second page, where you make a statement that you're concerned with the recent Commission opinion exempting legislators from the purview of the State Ethics Commission regarding certain legislative actions. Would you elaborate on that? I want to understand what you're referring to, or make sure I understand what you're referring to.
- A. That was the recently issued opinion that was issued that stated that, as I understand it, when a legislator is performing their official duties in the introduction of a bill or voting, that they did not come under the purview of the Ethics Commission in that particular function. In other words, as I understand it, the Ethics Commission could not issue an opinion telling them not to vote or introduce a bill, that that was strictly a legislative function and it was the role of the leader of the legislative body, whatever it happens to be, to exempt the legislator from voting if there is a conflict of interest. Common Cause has no argument with that, incidently.
 - Q. I assume that's what you're referring to.

A. Yeah. We don't have any argument with the, you know, the Speaker having the authority to exempt a legislator from voting, but we do feel that the opinion of the Ethics Commission could be relied upon as being more -- perceived by the public as being more reliable or less politically motivated.

- Q. Well, I think the backdrop to that was a previous opinion that was granted -- or maybe opinion isn't the right word --indicating that legislators should not vote on anything in which they might have an interest, direct or indirect, and I think that's what's preceded it. Do you have a view or a position on that?
- A. Well, if the legislator's -- if a bill would benefit a legislator's exclusive financial interest, then that is obviously a conflict of interest, and they should not vote. They should request not to have to vote.
- Q. But obviously you would not extend that so far as to affect them when they're -- as opposed to their individual benefit perhaps as a member of a group?
- A. No. If they're lawyers and it's a tort reform bill, obviously that would be carrying this to an extreme.
- Q. I was particulary interested in one of your recommendations, which was prohibit with certain exceptions gifts or honoraria to government officials.

Do you include within that all elected officials, appointed officials?

A. Yes.

- Q. And you also use the phrase "who have business before the agency". Would you include all lobbyists within that category?
- A. Yes, with exceptions. The Governor's

 Executive Order lays out some exceptions, and I'm sorry I

 don't have the -- I didn't bring a copy of those

 exceptions with me. But they do accept things like

 ordinary -- you know, if the lobbyist takes you out to

 dinner, that would not be considered a gift.
- Q. So in your definition, that would not be considered -- I think in the Ethics statement they use the term "gifts of value" and they have a \$200 limit on the value. You would exempt those kinds of gifts? Do you have an idea on that?
- A. Well, I think that's something for possibly for this group to work out if they want to put a dollar value on it, as well as to other things, because you know better than I do probably, you know, what kinds of problems such a prohibition would raise with regard to your being invited to, you know, speak before a group and being given dinner or being taken out to a dinner by a lobbyist or obviously gifts from your family. That would

not be appropriate to cover that kind of thing.

REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: Under the current law, isn't it true, though, I could get a gift from my family who's not a brother or a paient and still have to report it?

MS. LAVIN: We're not talking about reporting. We're talking about accepting, which is something else again. The law does require you to report gifts of substantial value, but what we're asking here is a prohibition on accepting gifts from people who have business before an agency that you're a member of.

REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: Under the present law, if I am a woman legislator who is single and I get an engagement ring, I must report that engagement ring.

MS. LAVIN: All right.

REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: What in a situation like that? How far do you want to say?

MS. LAVIN: I'm not saying she shouldn't accept the engagement ring. That's why I say with exceptions. I mean, the engagement ring wasn't given to her -- was given to her by her intended and not by somebody who's going to appear before her as a public official, necessarily.

REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: Still not a relative, but still has to report it, just like a wedding

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gift.

MS. LAVIN: Well, I have no problems with that. If I understand correctly, all she would have to do is report that she received a wedding ring or something that's value is over \$200.

BY REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: (Of Ms. Lavin)

- Q. But the reason I'm asking is, you know, to me, you make the law very simple and very understandable by creating as few exceptions as possible. If you have a prohibition, an outright prohibition on government officials accepting gifts, period, I think that's the easiest law to enforce, and that's why I'm curious as to whether you would support those kinds of views.
- A. No, I wouldn't support it. For one thing, it would never get passed.
 - Q. I appreciate your candor.

The last thing, you made a point that I'd like to clarify. You have stated that you, in one paragraph, require candidates for local office to file -- I'm summarizing -- locally set the filing deadline for candidates to conform with the deadline for filing a petition and require local officials -- well, providing fines. Doesn't that already exist? In my experience, my understanding is that when you're a candidate, number one, not the original but the copies are filed with the

local board of elections in every county. And secondly, it coincides with the date that you file your petition, if you're not already serving office. I think the way the law reads is either when you file your petition or May 1, whichever comes first, and of course if you're a candidate, since our date for filing is before May 1, you file it at that time.

- A. Yeah. We just think that the two deadlines should coincide, you know, make it part of the process of filing as a candidate. It simplifies the procedure.
 - Q. Okay.

- A. And we think that the disclosure should be available, you know, should be filed locally. You know, I may be confused about exactly how that process works and I am willing to defer to somebody who might be more familiar with the process.
- Q. Yeah. I'm merely pointing out that I think that that exists. The process for reviewing the forms, there are probably 67 different ways or procedures to review the forms, because every board of elections or every clerk probably has a different procedure, and perhaps that can be standardized.
- A. I think that the simpler you can make the law, to make compliance, the better. It should be easy to comply with, and it should be acceptable to the

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officials that it covers. If not, it's simply going to be resented and it's not going to work properly.

Okay. Thank you. ACTING CHAIRMAN KOSINSKI: More questions? REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: Yes, I do. ACTING CHAIRMAN KOSINSKI: Representative Caltagirone.

BY REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: (Of Ms. Lavin)

- It's interesting that you pointed out in your Q. testimony that Pennsylvania stands alone of the 42 States requiring public disclosure--
 - As far as we know, that is the case.
- -- for the judiciary. What recommendations, 0. and I've been giving this a lot of thought lately, and this is no -- it's not meant to cast aspersions on any of our fine attorney legislators that we do have serving in the General Assembly, and we do have a very large number and they are fine, honest, law abiding people. The thing that really concerns me though is that when attorneys happen to get elected to positions that control the legislature, not the rank-and-file attorney members, but attorneys who are in leadership positions, that really do in fact control the destiny of legislation, whether it moves or 1t doesn't move, and whether or not 1n fact those same attorneys are on retainership to large

corporations, large businesses, large companies in this State where they have absolute vested interests, and how they, you know, weigh those decisions, consciously or subconsciously, as to whether certain pieces of legislation will in fact move or not move, and whether or not that presents a conflict of their own judgment as to whether or not that type of legislation should in fact move forward. What are your suggestions and/or recommendations that we might propose to put a little bit more teeth into this law to prevent those sort of situations from happening?

- A. In the long run, the public has got to be the judge of whether any legislator is acting in the public interest or in--
 - Q. We may never know though, will we?
- A. That's why we have financial disclosure. I, you know, think that it's very hard to ascribe motivations to a legislator, whether it's a State legislator or a local legislator as to, you know, their vote.
- Q. What about requiring that those holdings or those interests or those retainerships that they happen to have be put into a blind trust? If in fact they want to serve the public, then you're going to have to sacrifice something, like many of us have to do in other

professions. Then you're going to have to sacrifice to avoid the appearance of any conflict of interest.

- A. That's a device that has been used, I believe, at the Federal level and in some States, and that is certainly something that we think might be looked at, a blind trust for substantial holdings.
- Q. Do you think that that should be a requirement?
 - A. I'd have to look at it.
- Q. I'm trying to devise in my own mind the kinds of checks and balances that we have to institute in this State in order to make the officials that are attorneys and that are continuing to practice very actively outside of the legislature to avoid an appearance or any type of impropriety with a conflict of interest that potentially could be going on that because of the rules of the court now disqualifies them from being forced to report and we would never know, would we?
- A. That's right. One thing you can do is make reporting a requirement. I didn't know, there may be ways around that law and as you know, it's in litigation now, the blanket exemption for lawyers and, you know, Common Cause is entering that lawsuit. You know, what can I say? Your objectives and our objectives agree, and we just have to see what we can do.

Q. I find it absolutely outrageous that because you would have an "Esquire" behind your name, that you're not covered by the law.

A. lagree.

- Q. And that everybody else who doesn't happen to be a practicing attorney has to report full disclosure. You know, that, to me, is just absolutely outrageous. If you're going to serve in the public, and you know what you're getting into when you get into the fishbowl, then I think you either put your holdings and your interests in a blind trust, or develop the checks and balances that we need in our system, or it's just a sham. I feel that it's an absolute sham that one very large segment of the community that serves the public at all levels of government is excluded from the act. And I would assume you would agree.
 - A. Yes, I agree, as so stated in my testimony.
 - Q. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Any further questions from members of the committee?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: I would just have one, and it would be to ask you to elaborate, if you might, for a moment, on the fifth paragraph of your first page. You indicated that Common Cause has not always agreed with

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the Ethics Commission, and one of the remanent examples that you used was the Executive Mansion fundraising by Governor Thornburgh. Would you give me a few of your views on what happened and why it happened? From Common Cause's perspective, not from a politician's perspective.

MS. LAVIN: Well, in my testimony I state that possibly one of the causes may have been a flaw in the way the Commission is appointed, because you have -because the Governor appoints three members of the Commission and can appoint people of his or her own party for those three seats. If the same party holds the Governor's office for many years, then you're going to have a lopsided membership on the Commission. You're going to have five members of that party as opposed to only two members of the other political party. Common Cause believes that the Commission should be bipartisan to the greatest extent possible, and by making one of the Governor's appointees required to be -- well, only two members of the same party at any one time of the three qubernatorial appointees, you can bring a more bipartisan balance into the Commission membership. So this may be one way to cure that problem.

The Commission was set up to be independent, and I haven't gone through the logistics of the appointments process and, you know, where we are in

reappointments, and so forth, but it may be that the Commission is still too early in the process for it to be truly independent of the people who appointed them.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Okay, thank you very much.

Chairman Moehlmann, any questions from your side?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: If not, we'll go to our next witness. Thank you very, very much for being with us. If we are going to have an Ethics Commission, and I presume that the political climate in our Commonwealth's Assembly will be that we shall have one, it will be our desire to have a strong one, my own personal perspective notwithstanding.

Ladies and gentlemen, our next witness, Mr. William Groves, township supervisor and member of the board of the State Association of Township Supervisors.

Bill Groves, welcome to the House Judiciary Committee and our formal sunset review process of the Ethics Commission.

MR. GROVES: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and members of the House

Judiciary Committee, I am William Groves, an elected

township supervisor for Cumberland Township in Greene

County. I appear before you as a member of the executive

board of the Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors, which represents more than 12,000 public officials serving the Commonwealth's 1,458 townships and their nearly 4.5 million residents, and I am also here today as a private citizen concerned about good government.

We commend the chairman and members of this committee for their leadership in seeking to determine the effectiveness of Pennsylvania's Ethic Law, Act 170 of 1978, and we thank you for the opportunity to speak on this issue.

The purpose of the State Ethics Law is to provide all Pennsylvanians with adequate safeguards to insure that their public officials are above reproach and meet the ethical standards that are and should be expected of them. The State Association of Township Supervisors wholeheartedly endorses the purpose of the Ethics Law. The issue that we believe should be addressed today is not the purpose of the Ethics Law but rather whether the law is serving that intended purpose, whether it is working the way it is supposed to, and whether the benefits the legislature intended in its enactment of the law are being realized. We submit that the operation of the Ethics Law has diverted substantially from its purpose and requires a

redefinition and redirection of that operation. The specific areas that we see as requiring the attention of the General Assembly are the distinction between ethical issues and legal issues and the jurisdictional responsibility of the State Ethics Commission in its administration and enforcement of the Ethics Law.

The distinction between ethical and legal issues can be better understood by relying on Webster's Dictionary to define each of the terms. "Ethics" is defined as the discipline dealing with what is good and bad, and with a moral duty and obligation, an set of moral principles or values. The term "legal", as defined by Webster's, is of or relating to the law, deriving authority from or founded on law. As you can see, there is a clear distinction between ethical and legal matters. Ethical matters have as their foundation the values that society establishes for itself. Legal issues, on the other hand, are those that are found in or related to law.

To recognize more clearly the distinction between ethical and legal issues, we recall the practice of providing health care benefits for township supervisors. For nearly 35 years township supervisors, their legal advisors, and anyone who touched the facts believed that hospitalization insurance for township

supervisors was legal. It was not until recently that a court ruled such practices, in the absence of specific legislative authority, are illegal. The Ethics Commission, however, preceded the decision of the court by ruling that the practice was unethical. The question we must ask ourselves is whether the practice was in fact unethical, and if we conclude that the practice was unethical, what commentary remains for all those who follow the advice and recommendations of their legal advisors?

We believe that those supervisors who did act in accordance with the advice of their legal advisors and participated in health care programs acted reasonably and ethically since such participation at that time was believed to be legal. To say that someone acted unethically when they were acting in accordance with what they believed to be the law is an unreasonable conclusion.

Our intent is not to criticize the Commission for its application of the Ethics Law but rather to substantiate the need to more clearly recognize the distinction between ethical and legal matters.

The second issue that we wish to examine today is the jurisdictional responsibility of the Ethics Commission and its administration and enforcement of the

Ethics Law. In actuality, the Ethics Commission serves as the investigator, the prosecutor, and the judge in all matters that come before it. Consequently, we have seen the Commission, through its administrative and enforcement practices, function as a court of general jurisdiction. And while we are unable to find another parallel to the Commission among any other administrative tribunal, the most obvious question is whether this is the design intended by the legislature when it enacted Act 170.

Assembly for the Ethics Commission to perform as a court of general jurisdiction, then there are a number of reforms that must be considered. In a court of general jurisdiction there is a defined process by which both sides, the accused and the prosecuted, have certain protections. These include the right to face your accusor, the right to legal counsel, the right to cross-examine, and so forth. None of these protections exist when accused in an Ethics Commission investigation. Those who are accused have a right to know the case against them, and if someone is accused of an unethical behavior, shouldn't they have the right to counsel for a legal defense of the charges?

In a court of general jurisdiction, the

answers to both questions would be "yes", but for those public officials under investigation by the Ethics Commission, the answer to each question is "no". Those individuals investigated by the Ethics Commission are not provided with any details of the investigation itself, nor are they able to learn the identity of their accusor. Consequently, the accused is unable to prepare or present a legal defense to the charges brought against them.

It is quite simple for anyone, anyone, to file a complaint and thereby launch an investigation by the Commission, since little, if any, factual representation of a wrongdoing is required. All anyone has to do is file a complaint with the Commission, and the Commission will in turn guarantee anonymity and begin an immediate investigation. Consequently, many local officials have suffered needlessly because of complaints filed against them that were either politically motivated or simply designed to harass them. And once a local official becomes the subject of an Ethics investigation, he is automatically tainted and his ethics are forever questioned. Regardless of whether he is innocent or guilty, he is indeed guilty until proven innocent.

Combining the roles of investigator, prosecutor, and judge in a single entity may be acceptable in certain administrative tribunals, but in

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such instances there always exists a clear and distinct separation of functions. This can be best illustrated by the Public Utility Commission in its judicial administrative regulation of public utility companies. And further contrasts, other administrative tribunals, such as the PUC, have a carefully defined area of jurisdiction that is supported and administered through the development and body of expertise in a particular area.

The PUC relies on professionals trained and experienced in the study of law governing public The Ethics Commission, however, is not bound utilities. to any specialized training or expertise to determine the ethical or unethical behavior of a particular practice. In fact, the Commission has repeatedly issued orders and opinions relating not only to the responsibilities vested under the Ethics Law, but the Ethics violations it perceives under other and not necessarily related statutes. The Commission has chosen for itself the authority to interpret any law, regardless of its relationship or applicability to the perimeters of jurisdiction intended by the legislature in the enactment of the Ethics Law.

We recognize that the Commission must perform some statutory interpretation, but the breadth of

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interpretation given or pursued by the Commission is too broad. Consequently, the Commission acts more and more like a court of general jurisdiction. There is, however, one major exception. The Commission operates without having to provide any protection or safeguards to the accused.

Wouldn't the integrity of the Ethics Act and the Commission be enhanced considerably if there were a good faith effort, such as a bond required of those who allege unethical wrongdoing? In the very least, such a good faith effort would reduce the frivolous and politically motivated investigations. These types of investigations serve only to substantiate the need to establish a clearly defined path of jurisdictional responsibility for the Ethics Commission. If the Commission has been performing in accordance with the intent of the General Assembly, then we must ask ourselves the question, what purpose is served by our established system of courts? We believe when the legislature created the Ethics Commission its intentions were to establish an administrative tribunal responsible for ensuring that the ethical standards and values of society are protected, particulary by those chosen to serve in public office.

Ano while we stand fully in support of the

purpose of the State Ethics law, we also submit that the law must be amended to recognize the inherent distinctions between ethical matters and legal matters as well as more clearly defining the role and jurisdiction responsibilities of the Ethics Commission. The Commission should not be granted the status of a court of general jurisdiction it has assumed. We believe the role of the Commission should be confined to interpretations and applications of the State Ethics Law, not other statutes.

A code of ethics does not stand as an impediment to attract qualified men and women to public service, but the presence of an administrative tribunal having the unlimited scope of authority exercised by the Ethics Commission certainly has a major impact in attracting and keeping qualified individuals in public office.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks.

Before presenting myself for interrogation by the committee, I wish to offer the assistance and resources of myself and the State Association of Township

Supervisors in any effort you may initiate to bring about the needed reforms to the State Ethics Law. Thank you for affording me this opportunity today.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: You're very welcome, Mr.

Groves.

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Questions from the members?

Mr. Bortner.

REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: I have one or two.

BY REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: (Of Mr. Groves)

I missed the beginning of your testimony, but Q. I tried to catch up as I came back in here. And first of all, I'd like to agree with one of the points that you made, and that's the distinction between what is legal and what is ethical. I think we sometimes forget that, and perhaps the Ethics Commission has done that, I don't know. I think sometimes they have been criticized unfairly when they've made that distinction as well, because I think we tend to expect them to condemn anything that we find as bad in government, even if it's not covered by their act, when I think in many cases what's required is for us as legislators to act and give them some instruction and give them some guidance as to what is legal and what kind of conduct they're supposed to be sanctioning, if that's the right word, or police.

The part that I don't agree with is your statements about the jurisdiction of the Ethics

Commission, in particular, whether they act as a court of final jurisdiction, because they don't. As you may know, many of these decisions end up in the courts. I mean,

they are not the final authority. The final authority is
the Supreme Court, and a number of these decisions where
people have objected to the decision or the
interpretation of the Ethics Commission end up in court.
So you do have that as an added protection.

But I do think that you make -- point out in

But I do think that you make -- point out in your testimony some distinctions that probably need to be clarified as we look at this act. Thank you.

A. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Mr. Caltagirone, Berks County.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: None.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Mr. Heckler.

REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: If I may, Mr.

Chairman.

BY REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: (Of Mr. Groves)

Q. Mr. Groves, your testimony and some of the earlier testimony we heard this morning from the school boards raises some issues that we need to look into that I haven't been clear on and I suppose it focuses on the distinction between investigatory activity and adjudication after that investigation's complete. Is it your understanding that, for instance, members of your association or other public officials have simply received a decision from the board, the Commission

rather, telling them that they have acted in some
unethical fashion, in some fashion contrary to the act,
without ever having been given the opportunity to present
their side of the case in some fashion to the board?

A. I can only speak for myself. I received a
letter one day that I was under investigation, that I was
allowed to speak to no one, including my wife, and that I

allowed to speak to no one, including my wife, and that I was under investigation for wrongdoings at the township.

If I talked to anyone or broke the confidentiality of this thing, I could be punished. That's a pretty blunt letter to receive.

- Q. And what was the ultimate conclusion, if there has been, in that matter, if I may ask?
- A. I was cleared and found that there was no wrongdoing.
- Q. Did you ever appear before the board or was there ever a process, a part of the process in which you had input?
- A. I never got to say anything other than they came out, went through our records, which they complimented us on our records. That investigator got transferred in the middle of the investigation. Then we had to deal with another one. The investigation went on for a period of at least six months, the whole time I wasn't even allowed to tell my fellow supervisors. I

only got to answer questions that they asked. They told me they couldn't answer any questions from me, and that was it.

The whole thing that bothers me is how simple is that? If you don't like me, Bill Groves blacktopped his driveway with township equipment, sign your name, get it notarized, I'm on my way. That's too easy. I have nothing wrong with the whole concept of the Ethics law, but that can be a real harassment tool for me. When I was cleared out here, a newspaper man picked it up, put it in the local paper and said that I'd been cleared by the Ethics Commission but the investigation might be continuing. That's not a fair shot.

O. Um-hum.

A. I think to stop these frivolous ones, if the Ethics Commission determined my guilt, they can determine whether or not the individual making that accusation was sincere or not or had grounds. If he has to put up a bond, a couple hundred dollars, he won't harass me with a couple hundred dollars. And \$200 or somewhere near a figure like that won't stop someone who has a real complaint. But it's a real harassment tool on a local level. I know my name has been submitted many times. One individual doesn't like me, out of 7,000. I don't know who the individual is, but knowing the accusations,

I can pretty much determine that.

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CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: You get 6,999 votes?

MR. GROVES: Pardon me?

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: You get all the votes except for that one?

BY REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: (Of Mr. Groves)

- Q. I don't know that I can agree with you about the bond, but I certainly recognize--
- A. Then how do you recommend that it be kept so that someone just doesn't sign their -- I took the lady to my house and she said, where do you live? And I said, well, ma'am, why would I be bringing you here? She said, well, your driveway's not blacktopped. I said, that's my point. You know. That's a real problem.
- Q. Well, I certainly think that one of the things we have to look at is the timeliness of this. I liken it to any other criminal accusation. I don't think we want people who allege -- we recognize that it's preposterous to say if somebody alleges that they've been raped or that they've been robbed that they have to post a bond in order to make that accusation. On the other hand, we expect that that matter will be speedily investigated by the police and they'll either determine to bring a charge, which then brings due process with it, or go on to something else. But I certainly agree with

you that there's a problem with what goes on now. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: I might add one thing, and then I'll accede to the gentleman from York County. But one thing that we might attempt to do is prescribe a prohibition or a certain time before elections - 30 days, 60 days. That would be an improvement upon the situation. It would not satisfy Mr. Groves or his organization, but it would be moving in that direction. that's just one thought.

Mr. Bortner.

make a comment, and I agree, certainly in the position you're in, and it also applies to school board members, you make a lot of enemies, people who didn't get a variance, you know, all kinds of reasons that, you know, you're acting in good faith and people don't like what you did. One of the things that seems to me as we're talking this morning about the Commission, when the Commission was here, you know, we engaged in these sort of broad philosophical discussions and we really didn't have them kind of walk through an Ethics complaint. I mean, what happens when one -- you know, what does the form look like that's sent in? What does somebody have to sign? What do they have to allege? Is there an

opportunity to respond? I would maybe ask the chairman to perhaps arrange for the board to come back sometime and sort of walk us through a complaint from beginning to end.

The other thing that occurs to me-CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Just one quick comment.
Mr. Seladones will be able to do that for us today.

REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: Fine. The only other comment, I would agree with Mr. Heckler. To me, requiring the posting of a bond would be totally unacceptable where we would be imposing a financial requirement for somebody to make a complaint. I don't think we can do that. But the same issue comes up with the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board. Perhaps there ought to be a procedure to dismiss those totally frivolous complaints immediately.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: And to slap somebody in the face for doing it over and over.

REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: Require some sort of a probable cause and a prima facia case requirement so that if somebody comes out and sees that if there's been an allegation that you've blacktopped your driveway and you don't have a blacktopped driveway, that ought to be the end of it right there, period.

MR. GROVES: But there were numerous

accusations, so when she came, she had to check them all.

And this went on for six months.

REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: Well, I don't know what the requirements that we've placed on the Commission. You know, perhaps what they need is a way to ferret out some of the complaints that are almost on the face without merit, but to allow them the opportunity to go on to the complaints that they make a finding at least preliminarily, that there may be some basis for it, and then give them the latitude to pursue those with a little more vigor.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Thank you.

Any other questions from any members or staff?

REPRESENTATIVE MOEHLMANN: Yeah, may I just very quickly?

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Republican chairman, Nick Moehlmann.

BY REPRESENTATIVE MOEHLMANN: (Of Mr. Groves.)

- Q. The suggestion that there be a bonding requirement, is that yours or is that the suggestion of the association?
 - A. That's mine.
 - Q. That's yours. Okay. And it doesn't

necessarily reflect the position of the association?

A. I wouldn't say. It's never been acted upon by the executive board. No, that was one of mine.

Q. Yeah. Okay.

I'm not sure that I like the bonding idea, but I basically agree that perhaps we should pay attention to finding an answer to the problem of the frivolous and harassing complaint done for that purpose. When someone alleges that you -- your example is really a good one -- that you used township equipment to blacktop your driveway and it's not blacktopped, a complaint of that sort has some pretty obvious -- well, it's pretty obviously untrue and it should certainly have been obvious to the complainer, and we really should address that problem.

REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: Well, I think they're made under oath. I mean, that would be an example of where certainly that kind of blatant false accusation could get a perjury charge.

MR. GROVES: Good point. I can't go after him because they won't tell me who he is. Does the Ethics Commission have the power to go press charges against him?

REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: Well, we'll certainly ask about that.

REPRESENTATIVE MOEHLMANN: Yeah.

MR. GROVES: Well, it isn't any fun being investigated, even when you aren't guilty. Six months.

REPRESENTATIVE MOEHLMANN: I would expect especially when you're not guilty.

MR. GROVES: Right.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Well, these are obviously provocative questions and these are the reasons we're having the hearing. Since the law was written in the late '70's, this is the first time the State legislature has had a chance to take a very close, solid, lengthy overview. We're supposed to report back to the Assembly in September. We will keep your observations in mind. We may be back in touch with you from our staff, and there's a possibility that you might be asked to come back and visit us again.

On behalf of the committee, thank you very much for joining with us, and for the record, since I am a politician, unabashedly a politician, I'd like to introduce Bud Shicko and Nick Madish from Cumberland Township in Greene County. Thanks for coming up and welcome, gentlemen.

MR. GROVES: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Okay. Our next witness will be our colleague and one of the prime architects of

this piece of legislation, Mr. Ron Cowell. So for better or worse, welcome to the committee and we look forward to your testimony.

REPRESENTATIVE COWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Judiciary
Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to present to you
my views relative to the sunset review of the State
Ethics Commission. Bill, I am running between three
meetings this morning and so I don't have my written
testimony to share with you right now, but I'll get
something in writing to you as a follow-up to this
particular hearing.

It is not unique but it is perhaps a little unusual for a legislator to be testifying at a hearing such as this, so I especially appreciate the invitation and welcome the opportunity. As the chairman suggested, I have a special interest in this issue since it was about 8 1/2 years, in the fall of '78, that I stood on the floor of the House, with the chairman's encouragement as I recall at that time, and offered a comprehensive amendment to a House bill which had been returned to the House for concurrence in Senate amendments. And rather than dealing only with the Senate amendments at that time, the House decided to suspend its rules so that

additional amendments could be considered.

The amendment that I offered was approved by an overwhelming majority in the House and agreed to by a similarly large majority in the Senate. That amended legislation was then sent to the Covernor for his signature and became the Ethics Act of 1978. The amendment that was proposed that day was essentially the Ethics Law that is now in place in Pennsylvania and currently under review by this committee.

Some members of this committee, particularly the chairman and Representative Kukovich, will recall that in 1978, lawmakers in Pennsylvania, and we were in that category, and lawmakers throughout the nation were still in the midst of the post-Watergate era, which was a time when across the nation there was often deep skepticism about public service, and especially about public servants. We in Pennsylvania saw the fires of public distrust further fueled by wide-spread allegations of improper and often illegal activities on the part of public officials in the Commonwealth. Indeed, there were indictments and convictions, and among some of our own colleagues resignations from the legislature.

Many of us who were new and not so new to public office at that time recognized that all of us were seriously handicapped by the widespread public mistrust

of public officials. We recognized that if we were in fact going to have an opportunity to address the serious challenges confronting government, one of our first priorities had to be to restore the public confidence in the ability of government to function with integrity. If we would fail to begin to restore public confidence in our institutions and in our public servants, then it would be difficult if not impossible to tackle the really tough issues which often demand controversial or unpopular decisions. If taxpayers really believe that public officials are squandering or even stealing tax dollars, it's impossible to ask those same taxpayers to consider paying more for highways or schools or for any of the important functions of government.

Just as importantly, if people continued to believe that waste and corruption would continue to be pervasive in government, we recognize that it would be extremely difficult to attract to public service talented men and women. While we have always had the good fortune to have many men and women willing to make various sacrifices to serve in elected and appointed, paid and volunteer public positions, too many others would choose not to be involved because they would not want to risk having their good names tainted by public or political service.

I want to emphasize my strong belief that exists today and even in 1978 that the perception of wrongdoing was exaggerated far beyond the real problems of misconduct by public officials. But as is often the case, a few cases of wrongdoing give all public officials a black eye and seriously erode public confidence in our governmental institutions.

We faced, as we drafted this legislation, a number of general problems, and I simply would want to remind you of those because again I think the kinds of issues that this Ethics Law or its successor will have to confront are not terribly different from the general issues that we considered back in 1978.

The issue of perception of wrongdoing, it's basically unfair to most public officials at all levels of government, and in my opinion especially to those at the local level. But when we're in an environment where the perception runs rather rampant, it's very difficult to stand as a local official or State official and claim your innocence. If, again, the general perception persists that there is wrongdoing, the same thing with conflicts of interest. If everybody assumes that you've got to be a little crooked or a little dumb to run for public office or to serve in government or that you're in it for some self-serving interest, it's pretty difficult

to convince people that the tough decisions that you make in fact are based on the public good.

There was a need then and there remains always a need to improve the general environment in which we operate. That's conducive to what we label good government, but it's also conducive to some of the effective, tough decisionmaking that is incumbent upon us a responsible public officials. And as I suggested earlier, it's more difficult to make those tough decisions, particularly if they relate to taxes or spending if in fact people believe that you or your colleagues or some of your colleagues in fact are personally benefitting from those decisions at the State level, the Federal level, or at the local level.

we also had the problem that there was really no source of information available to taxpayers or to voters who wanted to know more about candidates, particularly in terms of potential conflicts of interest, unless those candidates on their own would be forthcoming with the information. But there was no consistent, readily available source of information for voters and taxpayers. They didn't have a right to some of the financial disclosure information that subsequently became available.

For all of us as public officials at that

time, there were no good guidelines for us in terms of the ethical or the legal conduct, whichever label you happen to prefer to put on it. You were caught up in an era where in fact I think there were changing expectations on the part of the public. The public was demanding more or different behavior, if you will, on the part of its elected officials, something different than existed 10 or 15 or 20 years prior to that.

I think some of our colleagues who in fact -and I say colleagues at all levels of government -- who
in fact experienced legal difficulties in the '70's were
caught up in a situation where the ground rules were
effectively changing around them, and many of them said,
well, we did this 20 years ago, and the law hadn't
changed, but the public expectation in fact had changed.
But there were no places or there was no single place
where any of us could turn to for guidance, for
information, for an opinion until somebody actually took
us into court, and then for many folks it was a little
too late.

For citizens, there was no place to take a complaint, except to the courts, and there they would have to file the formal complaint and allege in a very formal way wrongdoing, rather than to ask in a more general way a question about the propriety of certain

kinds of conducts. Or to, in a more private way, file a formal complaint about what they believe to be improper conduct on the part of some local official. But those kinds of opportunities, short of the courts, didn't exist. And in fact there was no enforcement mechanism available to us short of the police, short of the courts, and they were already and continue to be overburdened by many of the laws that we have in place.

The bottom line, we had no laws on the books to address some of these kinds of problems or concerns, and we were recognized around the country as having no laws to address those kinds of concerns, and some of the folks, like the League of Women Voters and Common Cause and some of the other opinion makers who were active on a national basis at the time, were right in criticizing us for ranking near the very bottom, or perhaps at the very bottom — that was almost an irrelevant debate, how close to the bottom we were — in terms of the kind of law that we had to protect not only citizens but to protect public officials as well.

We ended up with a law that had three essential provisions. One was financial disclosure provisions. We for a long time talked about how much financial information was relevant. The decision was made, and I think it was a proper decision, that the

information that was most appropriate to require was source of finances type of information. We really didn't care how much somebody was making, but it was important that taxpayers or voters would have access to information about the source of income that was available to a public official or to a would-be public official. And hence we had the financial disclosure requirements of the law.

Standards of conduct. Again, we had standards of conduct found in different boroughs and different local government codes, but we didn't have any kind of uniform provisions applicable particularly to ourselves as well as to local officials. And so the standards of conduct became a second key component of the legislation.

And thirdly and finally, the Commission

itself, somebody to actually enforce the law. Some place
for citizens as well as public officials to turn with a
complaint or with a question about interpretation of the
law. Somebody to be responsible for the maintenance of
the records that came in, the financial disclosure
information.

It wasn't a terribly complicated law when you come down to it. Three key components. As we look back after 8 1/2 years of experience, I think that those three key components still are justified. We still, I think,

have justification for financial disclosure requirements;
we still have requirements for standards of conduct; and
we still need some mechanism, and we call it an Ethics
Commission today, to be responsible for the
implementation of the law.

There are some particular problems that have been identified, I believe, to this committee with which I would agree, things that ought to be considered by this committee. One, the exclusion of attorneys from the application of this law as a result of court decisions I think creates a major gap in the law. It's a major bad example for us to have to explain to other citizens and public officials who are not attorneys. I think that it probably does require a Constitutional amendment. I hope that that's a requirement that we correct that problem would in fact be a part of this committee's recommendations when it is prepared to act on this issue later this year.

There in fact remains some conflicts with other provisions of existing codes in terms of the kind of contracts, for instance, into which a local official may enter without being subject to some type of allegation of wrongdoing. There are inconsistencies from the Ethics Code to the various municipal codes, and we need, I believe, to make those kinds of provisions under

the standards of conduct issue, standards of conduct provisions, more consistent.

The gentleman before me and others who have testified before this committee have correctly identified some other issues in terms of what I would label the investigative procedures. There are some difficulties with that. Although I must note that the gentleman who preceded me said, you never feel good about being investigated, particularly if you're not guilty. Well, that's the whole idea of the investigation, to find out if somebody is guilty. We can't presume that there's no wrongdoing out there at all, and that's why we have an investigation, to make some decision, to make some recommendation where it's a recommendation to perhaps a district attorney.

So the investigation procedure needs to be a part of this whole process, although I would agree that it needs to be cleaned up. I think that there can be corrections, there ought to be corrections in terms of the notice that is given. We put the emphasis -- we, the lawmakers, put the emphasis on the anonymity as part of protection that we sought to provide. That has in fact created some problems, I believe. I think that the anonymity or at least the confidentiality provisions could be improved upon, and I think as has been

suggested, some additional burden should be placed on the person who wants to file the complaint. I think that that person to a greater degree ought to be required to respect the confidentiality of the proceedings as well as the person who was complained against. And I don't think it's always worked out that way. I think there has been inequity in the situation.

The timeliness of investigations certainly has caused a problem. Folks will be investigated.

That's part of the process. But I think that people, those who are complained against as well as those who file a complaint as well as those who are interested observers of a situation, ought to be guaranteed some better timeliness in terms of the investigation procedures and some conclusion of the issues that in fact are raised.

And certainly the issue of frivolous suits has been suggested properly. We need to be doing something about that. I think that there may well be procedures, protections, in the law that have not been fully utilized. I don't think a bond requirement is an answer. I think that that would serve as a disincentive, really a bucket of cold water on those who have, with reason, a need to file a complaint or to raise an inquiry.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Even if it would be de minimis; even if was \$25?

REPRESENTATIVE COWELL: I've never been an advocate of requiring somebody who wants to file a complaint against their neighbor, against their landlord or the tenant or against a public official under these laws, I've never been an advocate of requiring them to come up with dollars. We've all been around and it's token, de minimis, for some, \$25 for a lot of other folks is a lot of money. It's next week's meal budget. And so I think that what we may consider to be token is not so token for others, so I would urge that you not give serious consideration to attaching a dollar figure, but I think that there are other protections, other requirements, that would more fairly be considered outside the realm of dollars.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the issues of public confidence, the need and the right for information about potential conflicts of interest among public officials and would-be public officials, a clearly set of identified and consistently interpreted standards of conduct for all officials, consistent enforcement mechanism, all of these issues are as important today as they were in 1978.

I've got to say, Mr. Chairman, that I have

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been disappointed with the comments that have been made by some members of this committee that maybe we ought to consider doing away with the Ethics Commission at all. I think that this Commission is fair game for criticism, I think that the Ethics Law is certainly fair game for That's the reason for this sunset review tough review. process. But I think it would be a major error and in fact a major disservice not only to general citizens but the public officials also if we would eliminate the Ethics Law or eliminate the Ethics Commission. Modified improvement, yes. I think there's room for that. the basic components that we put into place 8 1/2 years ago I think are still justified. The financial disclosure provisions in terms of source of income and consistent standards of conduct, consistent across the board for all public officials and consistent with other requirements in the other codes, and a commission or a mechanism to be the enforcement agent I think are all justified.

The one thing I would emphasize, for those who suggest that maybe the Commission ought not to deal with legal issues and ought to focus on ethical issues, I really have to disagree with that because the ethical issues we don't necessarily write into law, per se. To the extent that we do write ethical issues into the law,

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they in fact become legal issues then. I would not want to tell the Ethics Commission that we want you to go out and judge the moral behavior or the ethical behavior as defined in Webster's as public officials or public elected officials around this State. Whatever they do I want to make sure is well-ground in the law, in legal issues. I think that we would do a disservice to everybody and create mayhem if we suddenly said, don't worry about the illegal issues, go out and deal with morality or ethics. I understand the point the gentleman was trying to make, but I think the bottom line is whatever the Commission does ought to be well-ground in the law that we write. And when they do something, whatever it happens to be, they ought to be able to point to the law rather than somebody's set of morals or somebody's more abstract set of ethics as a foundation for their decisions to their investigations.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to share some views with you. I will follow this up with some written remarks and I would be happy to respond to any questions that your members may have today or in the future.

BY CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: (Of Representative Cowell.)

Q. What about local government? Would it be possible to have the Ethics Commission deal with State

officials and give the option at the township and the boroughs and the school district and the county level and city level for them to have or not to have an ethics code of their own, but just to have a State ethics code?

What's your opinion about that?

A. Mr. Chairman, the one thing that I emphasized, among others, was the need for a consistent set of standards across the board, and consistent enforcement. I think that that requires that we have one law and that we have one enforcement mechanism at the State level. We debated that issue several times during the two or three years immediately after 1978. You and I were on the same side in those days.

- Q. We were on the same side until I dealt with the Ethics Commission over the past several years.
- A. And the House and Senate, I think, spoke in overwhelming numbers not to exempt local officials from the provisions of the law and not to set up some separate set of standards. I think that folks may be in fact disappointed with one or two or some set of decisions that have come out of the Ethics Commission. I know that you have been, Mr. Chairman. I don't believe personally that that's a reason to dismantle the Commission. All of us have been disappointed with one decision or another that we've seen come out of the courts at one level or

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another. I don't think it would be an appropriate response to suggest that we dismantle the Court of Common pleas in Greene County or Allegheny County or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or the United States because we disagreed with some of their decisions.

0. If we have a bureau in the Department of State that can take care of all of our financial disclosure statements, if we have State Troopers and the Attorney General's Office to take care of illegalities, why do we need the Ethics Commission, especially when the House members and Senate members and most public officials have our own internal rules? And if we could allow with our own guidelines the local governments to have their own codes, your statement about standards and consistent standards, that supersedes any kind of thought you might have to allow this bureaucracy -- and that's why we're here, Ron. We are trying to see whether this Commission needs to go on. That's why other idealistic people decided to go forward with sunset in general a few years ago, the same time we went through this.

You don't think that that would be possible to do, a lot of what you're trying to do with a bureau in the Department of State for our statements and with our ability to allow local governments to come up with their own codes?

- and one of the criteria used by the legislative committee that conducted the sunset review and issued a report to your committee in one way or another, I'm paraphrasing, has to do with the question, can somebody else do it as well? I think that's a legitimate question, and I think the answer is, no, somebody else could not do as effectively, as efficiently, what we have charged this Commission with doing.
- Q. Efficiently, when dealing with a marginal percentage, they're a couple years behind, they're only coming up with 10 percent of the cases that they're charged with?
- A. That may well be a function of the staff and the budget that we have appropriated. And again, that decision rests with the legislature.
- Q. Or it would be with all of the vacuous complaints that are being forwarded and nobody is doing anything about them, couldn't it?
- A. Well, I hear people speak out of both sides of their mouths. Sometimes they complain that the vacuous complaints are being pursued. We hear people complain about investigations, and on the other hand, sometimes you can criticize an agency for not pursuing all of those things. I wouldn't put myself in a place of

speaking for the Ethics Commission, but I think perhaps to some extent they've tried to make some judgments about those complaints that have more merit or seem to have more merit. I think that all of us who try to run an operation, whether it's our legislative office or a larger agency, have to make decisions about within the limited resources we have, particularly the people resources, how quickly we pursue issues and which issues we choose to pursue most immediately.

I suspect that that has been a problem with the Commission. I don't think that we solve that problem or I don't think that we provide for more effective enforcement of the Ethics Laws of this State if we tell each local government, the 2,500-plus around this State, we're going to count on you to establish sets of conduct, standards of conduct, because we basically had that 10 years ago and it didn't work. That message, I think, came through loud and clear. We would be taking a step backward, not trying something new and different, but in fact stepping backward to a time when there was massive complaint, and to some extent, massive problem in terms of the behavior or the perception of behavior around this State on the part of public officials.

I think that what we would do is again not only step backward in time in terms of the standards of

conduct that would be in place, but we would step backward in time in terms of what the public perception would be, because the public would have 2,500 different sets of standards out there, some of them pretty meaningless.

- Q. We can promulgate a guideline and they could adhere to it or not adhere to it or come close to it.
- A. That's basically -- that's what we're doing then when we have the State law, when we have in the Ethics Law standards of conduct. And rather than having them come close to it, I think that the preferable position is to impose it on a statewide basis.

One of the protections that I think we have for local officials in fact under the current law is that we impose on ourselves those same standards of conduct. I think that when in past years we did things a little differently and then we had in our borough codes and township codes some standards of conduct for local officials, we weren't willing to impose those same kinds of things on ourselves. It was only when we put it all under one roof, one umbrella, and had the consistency did we in fact say we'll live by the same rules that we impose on local officials. I think we ought to do that.

Q. I only have one more comment, and I want a couple of other folks to ask a question or two.

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Regardless of how empty or ridiculous and 1 political the Ethics Commission is, has been, or will be, 2 3 you and I both know that the public perception is that you have to be for ethics and you have to be for an Ethics Commission, so I think that any apprehension you have should be arrested. There wouldn't be more than 15 or 20 people like DeWeese and a few people of my aggressive tendency that would opt to move in that direction.

But I really think the Ethics Commission has performed in a lousy fashion, for lack of a better word, over the past several years, and I think that the school boards people, the township supervisors people, as well as people such as myself who have dealt with them personally are disappointed, and I'm very glad that in your testimony you've brought out some areas where you think that we need to improve. That's just an editorial comment.

I don't know if anybody else on the committee has made a comment about doing away with the Ethics I would vote to eliminate it tomorrow, but I Commission. would not vote to eliminate financial disclosure, I would not vote to eliminate the standards that have been set I would try to have them promulgated at the up. statewide level. But the third point in your discussion

today, the Commission itself, is what I would--

A. Mr. Chair, if I could just use an analogy that several of us have discussed in the past too--

O. Please.

--where we had a mechanism, well, we had standards out there or provisions in the law for reporting, but on the other hand, we didn't clearly give to somebody responsibility for specifically pursuing that part of the law. The lobbyist registration provisions that we have in the law are absolutely useless. We have provisions in the law and reports get filed with the Chief Clerk and the appropriate person over in the Senate, but nobody does anything with those things, nobody pursues them, and in fact there's been a lot of discussion over the years that we ought to assign that responsibility to the Ethics Commission. I think that's an example of creating requirements, filing requirements and standards of conduct, if you will, without giving specific follow-up responsibility and enforcement responsibility to an agency.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Questions?

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DEWEESE: Tom Caltagirone.

BY REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: (Of Rep. Cowell)

Q. Ron, you know as I do that we or those of us

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who help write the laws determine the destiny of this Commonwealth and if we are supposed to set the standards and to be held up on high by many of the officials that we throw the cape over, then shouldn't we in our own caucuses set a standard, so to speak? Initiate an action such as the leadership of all four caucuses of the House and Senate, with or without the ability of the law as it's presently being challenged to exclude attorneys, as an example, but especially the leadership, because we know, those of us that have been up here and serving for a number of years, who really calls the shots on the flow of legislation and what's really going to happen and what isn't going to happen, that they put their law practice and their holdings into a blind trust if they want to assume the mantle of Speaker or Majority Leader or Minority Leader so that there could be no question as to the actions that they're taking?

- A. I've not heard that proposal raised before
 - Q. I'm raising it.
- A. --so I don't have an opinion on it, but I think it's a fair issue for consideration by this committee, and if a majority of the members of this committee would choose to make that recommendation, I think that it would be very seriously discussed by all

members of the House and Senate. Certainly, for instance with the Governor. I guess each of the past couple of governors have established a higher standard of conduct and a higher level of reporting requirements for certain key officials of the administration. I think that it would certainly be appropriate for legislators, through our caucus perhaps or through our rules, perhaps more appropriately, so they would be applied equally to members of both caucuses or leaders of both caucuses, if that would be your wish. I think it would be very fair for us to consider that kind of issue above and beyond those standards that are found in the Ethics Law itself.

Q. Thank you, Ron.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Mike Bortner.

REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: Just one quick point I'd like to make. We seem to constantly dwell on this exemption that the courts have cut out for lawyers. I have never been contacted by one lawyer who has expressed to me reservations about filing that statement. I don't know why the two lawyers, and ironically, they were lawyers I guess practicing before the LCB, which if there's probably one group of lawyers that you would think ought to be filing disclosure, objected to this. I mean, I don't see any reason not to, if you want to call

it a loophole, close that loophole. I don't think that you'll find a lot of difficulty or objection for doing that. To me there are an awful lot more -- an awful lot of issues that are going to be more difficult to deal with than that one, which I don't see is as much of a problem.

But in response to my colleague about lawyers who are in leadership positions, I mean, that speech ought to be made to the people that elect them, not the people that are appearing here before this board to testify. And I guess I would be interested to know the difference between whether it's a law practice or insurance business or a real estate business, you know, what difference that makes to the person that's serving in this House. I don't see a distinction.

REPRESENTATIVE COWELL: If I could take that as a question, I would respond by saying that I agree that there ought not to be a distinction. I and others have criticized the exemption for lawyers. I don't think that we ought to impose a special requirement for lawyers, even in our own chambers. I think if we're going to require all of us or some of us as leaders to put holdings into a blind trust or impose any kind of requirements, any set of requirements, then that ought to apply to that category of members or leaders regardless

of their profession. I think, and perhaps, Tom, you misspoke when you mentioned lawyers in particular, because the principle would apply to everyone.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: Only because, let's face the matter of reality, fellow colleagues and general public, it just so happens that every leadership position at the top level in both the House and Senate are controlled by attorneys, and that's a fact.

REPRESENTATIVE COWELL: Well, a major reform started in this committee when Chairman DeWeese was selected, as a nonattorney, so that may occur elsewhere in the House.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Just in reference to Michael Bortner, the Pennsylvania Bar Association, as Counsel Woolley points out, is not in favor of attorneys falling under our act, is that correct?

MS. WOOLLEY: In a letter you were supplied with from Ira Coldren indicates that they're comfortable with the Supreme Court decision.

REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: Well, I mean, that doesn't surprise me that the organized Bar would take that position. I don't think on an individual basis this is a major issue to lawyers, at least not to ones that I deal with.

REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: Mr. Chairman, if I

could just add my two cents, I quite agree. My reaction, and I've done some municipal work in the past and do now, I don't believe that there is a strong concern from lawyers in that position and I don't think the position of the PBA should inhibit us from doing what is right, and I would certainly join in.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Other than your colleague, Mr. Reber, I'm not aware of any vehement protest stations.

Ron Cowell, thank you very much. I do want the record to show that I was at your side when this law was developed. You worked vigorously. I was one of the collaborating people, but I was very involved and I've just changed my mind.

REPRESENTATIVE COWELL: Mr. Chairman, thank you and the members for your courtesy today.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: You're very welcome.

We're going to take a three-minute break for our stenographer, and our next guest -- well, hold on one second. Mr. Yatron, you'll be next. Mr. Seladones said he has a handball match at 5:00 o'clock, so you and I should be able to keep things moving.

So we're going to take about a 10-minute break.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: The hearing will reconvene, and the Chair is anxious to welcome Paul -- Yatron?

MR. YATRON: Correct.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: As a representative of Roy Zimmerman, the Attorney General. We are very happy to have you here as a representative of Mr. Zimmerman and we look forward to your testimony.

MR. YATRON: Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman DeWeese and members of the committee, the Office of Attorney General is pleased to assist the committee in its evaluation of the State Ethics Commission during the sunset review period.

There's been significant interaction between the State Ethics Commission and the Office of Attorney General for a number of years, which consists largely of the referral of reports from the Ethics Commission to the Office of Attorney General for review. We then review the findings of the Commission in each individual case and evaluate the facts as found by the Commission to determine whether any criminal violations of the State Ethics Act may have been committed. After such review, a determination is made as to whether or not a criminal prosecution should proceed. The Ethics Commission turns over to the Office of Attorney General whatever

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investigative materials it might have, and our office then conducts whatever additional investigation it deems to be necessary in each case. This process has yielded several convictions for violations of the act, and there are currently several active investigations underway which have not yet culminated in the filing of criminal charges.

Additionally, the Commission sometimes
identifies payments that have been received by public
officials which the Commission has determined to be
without legal basis. In these instances, the Commission
orders the officials in question to repay the moneys. Up
to now, there has been no mechanism to enforce repayment
if not voluntarily made. The Civil Law Division of the
Office of Attorney General has been working with the
Commission in order to settle upon a procedure whereby we
may assist the Commission in collecting the sums ordered
repaid. This will help insure that the findings,
rulings, and orders of the Commission are in fact carried
out.

It is our belief that the activities of the Ethics Commission have been and continue to be in the public interest. We believe that it is necessary that the agency continue to function in order to insure that there is compliance with the specific provisions of the

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Ethics Act. No other agency in State government is as well equipped to perform this function as the Commission. There are no other agencies that currently perform this same function and it cannot legitimately be posited that there is any overlap or duplication of effort in this area. If one believes, as we do, that the Ethics Act is an important and necessary part of the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, rigorous monitoring of the act is essential.

While the functions of the Commission might be transferred to another agency, it seems unlikely that such transfer of function would result in any savings to the Commonwealth. Obviously, any agency that is given this additional responsibility would have to increase staffing levels in order to perform these functions. If such a transfer were effected, it would take some time for the experience and expertise now vested in the Ethics Commission to be duplicated in the new monitoring agency. It also seems unlikely that the function of the Ethics Commission can be performed in any less restrictive manner without changing the requirements of the act itself. If the Ethics Act as it now exists is to continue to be the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, there does not appear to be any significantly less restrictive way of enforcing its

provisions.

There is yet another reason why we believe the Ethics Commission should remain intact. The Commission exercises quasi-judicial powers and it conducts hearings and issues orders. Judgments as to whether criminal prosecutions should ensue are left to the Office of Attorney General and the district attorneys of the Commonwealth. This separation of functions is both desirable and necessary.

First, the Commission does not have the requisite legal authority to commence a criminal prosecution and probably should not have such authority lest it exercise both a prosecutive and judicial function. If an agency were vested with the current powers of the Commission, as well as the authority and responsibility for enforcing the criminal provisions of the act, serious questions of propriety would be raised. Hence, we believe the separation of these functions is in the public interest and helps to protect the rights of those under the Commission's jurisdiction.

We do believe that some changes in the enabling legislation would be beneficial. We agree with the suggestion made by previous witnesses that the definition of "immediate family" should be changed in order to encompass more blood relationships, and

specifically to include emancipated children of public officials. This would, in our view, eliminate the most serious deficiency of the Act itself.

The Ethics Act has no parallel in the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It was created for a specific purpose, and all in all, it has served that purpose well. Likewise, the Commission has done a good job of enforcing the provisions of the act and bringing to the attention of law enforcement authorities those instances where criminal prosecution for violation of the act is appropriate.

The Office of Attorney General looks forward to continuing its relationship with the State Ethics Commission and assisting in the enforcement of this important legislation.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Thank you, Paul.

BY CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: (Of Mr. Yatron)

- Q. How do we slow down all of the frivolous complaints? I don't' know whether you were here for the Township Supervisors--
- A. I heard part of that testimony, Mr. Chairman.

 I'm not sure that there is a way to slow down or

 eliminate frivolous complaints. I think there are always

 going to be frivolous complaints, just as there are

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frivolous complaints to all law enforcement agencies.

Again, the perspective of the Office of Attorney General vis-a-vis the Ethics Commission has been in how we handle matters that in fact are forwarded to us by the Ethics Commission. The complaints that are ultimately characterized and found to be frivolous are never seen by us, so I don't have any personal idea of what the volume of those complaints might be.

- Q. But it's overwhelming or significant. from a law enforcement perspective, you wouldn't have any suggestion to the committee as to how we might try to amend the law?
- I heard some suggestions that were posited as Α. questions as to whether, for example, filing fees would be appropriate. I'm constrained to agree with the previous witness that a filing fee that is truly token will deter no frivolous complaints and one that will also deter legitimate complaints. I think it's just a fact of It certainly is in the law enforcement business that frivolous complaints are received every day and you just have to deal with them as best you can. I know it's our practice in the Office of Attorney General to give at least a cursory review to any complaint that comes in, no matter how far out or how frivolous it appears to be. Those that are determined to require no response or to be

totally illegitimate are then just filed.

Q. Okay. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Tom?

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Representative Caltagirone from Berks County.

BY REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: (Of Mr. Yatron)

- Q. You had indicated that you had fielded several convictions of the violation of the act.
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Do you have any figures as to total numbers that have been investigated? Just roughly. It doesn't have to be exact.
- A. Representative Caltagirone, do you mean total numbers investigated by the Commission or investigated by us?
 - Q. By the Attorney General's Office.
- A. I looked at some figures before I came here which comprised only the year 1986, which was the last year for which I had figures available. There were approximately 20 cases that were referred to us by the Commission as criminal referrals as opposed to just sending us for information the reports. All of those were looked into, a number of them was decided after further review by our office that they would not make

satisfactory criminal cases. Several criminal charges were filed based on those reports and there are perhaps four or five that are still outstanding and under investigation now.

- Q. Is that -- would you figure that that might be the average for each of the preceding years prior?
 - A. I would say it would probably be close, yes.
- Q. An interesting argument that has been going on with legislators and nonlegislators are the exclusion of the attorneys in reporting because of the court case, and of course being on appeal, it's a gray area and some are reporting and some aren't reporting. As a matter of policy, how does the Attorney General himself handle it with attorneys that are on his staff, and do you have an in-house policy that is enforced or recommended?
 - A. Yes, sir, we do.
 - Q. Could you explain that to us?
- A. I certainly would. Attorney General

 Zimmerman is in complete agreement that attorneys who are employees of the Commonwealth should file disclosure statements as any other Commonwealth employee would.

 There is a requirement in our office that all attorneys file disclosure statements pursuant to the act.
- Q. So there hasn't been any real problem then with any of the attorneys on staff with that requirement?

heard any significant objections raised by anyone to filing the reports. Of course, we filed the reports for several years prior to the court case last year which said that attorneys were to be regulated by the Supreme Court and not by any other body. Even subsequent to that decision I can firmly say that I heard no objections from any of my staff with respect to it and it's simply a requirement of service with the Office of Attorney General, and if you feel strongly enough that you don't wish to file the report, then you can work elsewhere.

- Q. Very good. One other follow-up to that. Do you have any -- either personally or as a representative from the Attorney General, suggestions and/or recommendations to this committee as to what we might be able to do to address that issue as it concerns other elected officials who also happen to be practicing attorneys?
- A. I'm not sure that I have any recommendations that are going to be worth anything. If my recollection of the court case serves me correctly, it was characterized as a constitutional infringement on the power of the courts, assuming that the Supreme Court holds to that view as they have in the case of judges filing under the Ethics Act. It would require a

constitutional amendment to do anything about it, absent a change in decisions by the court.

- Q. Short of that, nothing else really could be done though?
- A. I don't see anything else, given my recollection, again, of the two cases, the one involving the judges, which was decided by the Supreme Court, and the one dealing with Commonwealth attorneys which was decided, I believe, by the Commonwealth Court. I don't see characterizing it as a constitutional issue, and an invasion of the separation of powers is such that I believe only a constitutional amendment could change it.
- Q. Hasn't the Chief Justice issued some kind of -- I wouldn't say an order, but a recommendation or some type of compliance from the judiciary in certain filings?
- A. I believe that there has been established in the Office of the Court Administrator a filing system and a particular form that is submitted to all judges in the Commonwealth that the Supreme Court requires to be filed. The reports, I believe, are similar to the nature to the Ethics Act reporting requirements, although I don't believe they're identical.
- Q. Is that information open to the public? Is there public access to that, if you know?
 - A. I don't know. It would surprise me, frankly,

if it were, but I don't know. I've never had occasion to have to ask for any of it.

Q. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Special Counsel, John Connelly.

BY MR. CONNELLY: (Of Mr. Yatron)

- Q. Paul, in the act itself it mandates the Attorney General make available to the Commission personnel, facilities, other assistance as the Commission may request. Is it your testimony today that your involvement primarily has been referrals to criminal prosecutions as opposed to assistance in the initial investigative process?
 - A. Yes. That's largely the case, yes.
- Q. Are you aware of any situations where you assisted the Commission in investigating any allegations?
- A. There, I believe, if my memory serves me correctly, that there was one instance in western Pennsylvania where investigative personnel from our office may have assisted the Commission during the course of an investigation, but that's the only thing that I can think of offhand.
 - Q. Are you -- do you have the personnel

available to assist them more specifically in the future? Since one of the issues is going to be the quality of the staff and their ability to process these complaints.

- A. If the question is, do we have enough staff now to routinely assist the Commission in the course of its regular investigations, the answer, I think, clearly has to be no.
- Q. So there's going to be a financial impact in any event to expand staff available to the Commission?
- A. Insofar as it is desired that agents from the Office of Attorney General participate in investigations from the very beginning of the receipt of complaint, yes, that would be true. What we do now is after we receive the materials from the Commission, it's reviewed by an attorney in our office and if it's determined that there are further things that should be done either to determine whether or not criminal charges should be filed at all or to firm up a potential criminal case, then it is assigned to investigators from the Office of Attorney General to continue the investigation.
- Q. From a standpoint of a number of people who testified this morning about frivolous complaints that are made and a person merely needs to sign a form, file it, and the Commission will begin that investigation.

 The other problem raised was the confidentiality of that

that concern? How we try to eliminate frivolous claims.

And secondly, the confidentiality of the person that

makes it. Should that be preserved?

A. I can understand the reasons why there is a

individual, that nondisclosure. What is your sense of

A. I can understand the reasons why there is a desire to protect the identity of persons who make complaints at the outset. I think especially, however, when you get to the point where there might be criminal charges actually filed. Insofar as the person has made a complaint as a witness of any sort, obviously there's going to have to be disclosure of that person's name at that time because of the confrontation clause in that any criminal defendant has a right to face his accusers.

I don't know that there's anything that can be done to eliminate the filing of frivolous complaints. I think you have to handle those on a case-by-case basis and try to weed them out early on. Again, as the previous witness remarked, the criticism comes from both directions that if you do that, on one hand people will say, well, you're wasting your time with these things or you're besmirching the reputation of someone who really hasn't done anything wrong if you do something about following on a complaint, and then of course if you don't do something about following up on a complaint, you're always subject to the cry that either you're just no

good, you're not doing your job, or that it's all Political, or things of that nature. I don't think I have the requisite wisdom to recommend to you a solution to eliminate those complaints.

- Q. One last question. In your testimony you indicated you're concerned about the Ethics Commission exercising both a prosecutive and judicial function.

 Given that a complaint is filed, it is investigated and that a ruling is made, isn't that occurring now?
- A. Well, to some extent it is, but that's not unusual under administrative procedures in many different agencies. What I was specifically referring to, and I'm sorry that I didn't make it clear in the testimony, was when you're talking about the institution of criminal charges against an individual, that's where I think the line should be drawn.
- Q. Thank you.

 BY CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: (Of Mr. Yatron)
- Q. What about, on a frivolous complaint, having the good old boy that raised hell with Billy Groves, the township supervisor, for blacktopping his driveway and he didn't blacktop his driveway, it's a gravel driveway, but just say that Billy had incurred some legal costs. Why don't we have the good old boy who made the complaint pay the legal costs on a frivolous complaint? What's your

feeling on that?

A. Well, in principle I am certainly in agreement with it. There are provisions in various types of court cases of course where you can do just that, where you can recover costs. I think that it comes down to a policy argument. The argument that is always made by plaintiffs in those types of actions is, well, you will have a chilling effect on people who have legitimate complaints who will be afraid that for whatever reason later on their complaint will be held to be frivolous instead of serious, and then it will cost them money, and you will deter people with legitimate complaints from making them.

I don't know that there's an answer to that question either, but that's the argument that you're going to be faced with, and I think there's a serious public policy determination that has to be made at that point.

- Q. Well, instead of a bond like he was suggesting, what about setting a penalty? Forget the legal costs, because that could run up into hundreds of thousands of dollars. What if there was a \$50 or \$100 penalty for a frivolous complaint? What's your feeling about that?
 - A. Again, in principle, I have no problem with

it at all, and in fact the courts do have the power to do that and have assessed fines and costs against attorneys who have filed frivolous appeals, for example. This is analogous to that. I think, again, the question that's going to have to be answered ultimately is one of broad public policy to determine whether or not it is believed more legitimate complaints will be deterred by having such a system than frivolous complaints will be prevented.

Q. Sure. Okay.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Dave Heckler, and then Mike Edmiston for one or two, and then we'll go to our final witness.

REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: Thank you, Mr.

Chairman. I wanted to greet Mr. Yatron, who is known to me as an able and vigorous prosecutor, and I wanted to ask a couple of specific questions.

BY REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: (Of Mr. Yatron)

- Q. One, does the Office of Attorney General get referrals in all cases involving both State and local officials where the Commission has reason to believe a criminal prosecution may be warranted?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And then you make a determination as to whether you will pursue this or refer it to the

applicable district attorney?

A. Yes.

- Q. The only other question I have is, it's quite evident from the testimony and I think the disposition of the members of the committee that there's a good chance we'll be looking at significantly rewriting or possibly structuring for the first time a coherent procedure in dealing with complaints in a way that it guarantees that at some point due process guarantees are protected or provided for. Given the fact that you're going to be the ultimate recipient of these referrals where criminal activity is indicated and obviously don't want your cases screwed up before they have a chance to be hatched, to put it inelegantly, would you think it appropriate that the Office of Attorney General have some further opportunity to comment once there is a draft or once there is at least a concept from this committee?
- A. We would certainly be pleased to do that and to assist the committee in any way, and I think we can give the committee the benefit of some expertise in the areas of frivolous complaints and so forth, and we'd be pleased to assist the committee in any way that we can.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Thank you very much.

Mike Edmiston, Chief Counsel.

BY MR. EDMISTON: (Of Mr. Yatron)

Mr. Yatron, the statute has a provision in it 0. that the complaints are signed under penalty of perjury by filing the complaint. If a matter is frivolous and determined as such by the Commission and therefore it doesn't make it for referral to the Attorney General's Office, is it fair for the members of this committee to assume that you don't see material that might be appropriate for prosecution by the Commission of perjury?

- A. With respect to a false complaint having been raised?
 - Q. That's correct.
 - A. I can recall having seen no such materials.
- Q. You also mentioned in your testimony that the Civil Law Division has been working with the Ethics Commission to work out a procedure on the collection of moneys ordered repaid. How long has that effort been ongoing?
 - A. Two or three months, I believe.
- Q. Um-hum. You characterize the nature or the relationship between the Office of Attorney General and the Ethics Commission as one of significant interaction. For 1986, the numbers that you referenced were 20 referrals. It's not clear that referrals for perjury by way -- perjury prosecutions by way of intentional harassing complaints are being considered by the Office

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of Attorney General. The number of investigations ongoing out of that 20 that is being further pursued by the Office of Attorney General appears to be about 4 or 5, and the reference was that there were several convictions. Understanding that you talked about the recoupment of sums ordered repaid as evidence of cooperation with the Commission, is there anything further that your testimony does not reflect on the part of the Office of Attorney General that might enhance our understanding of the term "significant interaction"?

Α. The Commission sends to us not only those files where they believe a criminal charge would be appropriate, they basically send to us a package when any time that they have issued an order that they've had an adjudication. This is tremendously helpful to us insofar as it gives us a file and a background to determine what the Commission has ruled with respect to various types of conduct in the past. For example, a great many of the things that have come before the Commission were, for want of a better term, cases of first impression where a local official or municipal official may have done something that did not absolutely on the face of it appear to be improper or incorrect. The Commission may have determined through its investigation, and so forth, and through its construction of the act that in fact this

was an improper exercise of whatever authority that the local official might have had. Obviously, cases of that nature are not cases that are right for criminal prosecution. However, by virtue of the fact that the Commission has made rulings of that nature and has issued opinions and advisory opinions and things of that nature to local officials who request rulings on certain types of conduct, it's helpful to us in our analysis of the subsequent cases as to whether or not they are appropriate for criminal prosecution.

Q. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: One final question for Paul Yatron.

BY MR. CONNELLY: (Of Mr. Yatron)

- Q. Paul, is it safe to assume that given the difficulty in proving a perjury conviction that this is a very limited sanction on the concept of perjury?

 Enlighten the committee members for those who do not practice criminal law the difficulty in proving a perjury case and how that fits in there?
- A. Yeah, and I think that's an excellent point.

 The fact that there is a jurat at the bottom of the complaint form that says false statements made here will be punishable as perjury or as false swearing or as unsworn falsification to authorities, all of which are

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crimes in the Commonwealth, requires that the 1 Commonwealth meet a certain burden of proof. The most 2 crucial part of the burden of proof is proving that the 3 individual knew the statement was false when he made it. Now, particularly when you get into the area of what are 5 characterized as frivolous complaints, someone on the 6 street may have heard a rumor about a municipal official, 7 may accept this rumor as the gospel, may believe it, with 8 every fiber of his soul may believe this rumor to be 9 true, may go to the Commission, make the complaint, sign 10 11 the report. That person has not committed perjury under 12 the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because the 13 person believed the allegation to be true when he made 14 The fact that he shouldn't have believed it doesn't 15 get you anything insofar as a criminal prosecution is 16 The Commonwealth would have the burden of concerned. 17 proving that not only is the statement false but that the 18 maker of the statement knew it was false at the time he 19 made it. It is virtually an impossible burden on that 20 basis. 21 REPRESENTATIVE KUKOVICH:

REPRESENTATIVE KUKOVICH: Could I ask just one follow-up?

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Sure. Allen Kukovich.

BY REPRESENTATIVE KUKOVICH: (Of Mr. Yatron)

Q. In order to address that, what if we created

a civil cause of action statute that made it clear that some can file an abuse of process action for civil burden of proof against someone who files a false complaint?

One, would that serve to weed out spurious complaints, and two, would you have any problems with that?

A. I would think that it would help to weed out some spurious complaints. If the legislation were very carefully crafted to set forth the specific burden of proof and so forth, you can eliminate, I think, some problems and also come up with a piece of legislation that would withstand judicial scrutiny.

Q. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Thank you very much. I appreciate having you visit us.

MR. YATRON: It was my pleasure entirely.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Please tell Mr. Zimmerman I said hello, please.

MR. YATRON: I will do so, sir.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Our final witness, Mr. Seladones, the former Executive Director of the State Ethics Commission and now a private citizen.

MR. SELADONES: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Welcome, Ed.

MR. SELADONES: Thank you.

Any comments I make today are strictly my

comments. They have no official sanction or relationship to the Ethics Commission.

You may be aware that there are 505 school districts, give or take 1 or 2, approximately 5 school directors in each one, that's 2,500 school directors. The law has been in effect about 8 years, so there's been about 20,000 school director years since this law has been in effect.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Twenty thousand?

MR. SELADONES: Twenty thousand.

Mr. Gentzel said he could remember two or three dozen complaints.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: A couple dozen, he said.

MR. SELADONES: I can get you more complaints than that right in my local school board by tomorrow, and if I weren't playing handball, I could do it by tonight. I could get you more complaints about my township than that by tomorrow, and I don't need eight years to get it.

I sat and listened -- I want to digress, obviously. On page 4 of my statement, I think what you're being asked to do by the representatives of the local government associations, and I want to be sure you understand, I'm not certain you're being asked to do that by local government officials, because as someone here commented, the Bar Association doesn't necessarily

represent the views of all of its members, and I talked
to many, many local officials while I served as Executive
Director and I think that also applies to those
associations.

But they are asking you to practice practical politics as Henry Adams defined it. He said, practical politics consists of ignoring the facts. I sat and listened to them and I thought I had been transposed into a world -- a fantasy world. Some new modern technology suddenly took us all and took us out of the real world. And if those gentlemen ever would cite these tremendous cases and the things the Commission has done wrong and would give me their support for them, I'd be happy to I thought when Mr. McCarthy died we went beyond respond. the kind of testimony they gave - the innuendo, the comments unsupported, and I wish the gentlemen had stayed, and I frankly would be happy to meet with anybody on the committee and any of those members and debate them if they give me some facts to use.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: School boards and townships, or just--

MR. SELADONES: Boards, townships, the whole lot of them.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Okay.

MR. SELADONES: The whole lot of them. I

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think they've all told you things that are absolutely, totally incorrect, misleading, incomplete, and so forth.

And let me start with Mr. Groves. I talked to Mr. Groves during his investigation dozens of times, many times. The complaint did not involve only the driveway. Mr. Groves is a businessman. He has two or three businesses. He has two or three or four different kind of partners. His wife is involved, I think, in one of the businesses. It was a complicated investigation, and I think it is unfair to you, on the committee, to come here and present that investigation as my driveway wasn't blacktopped. If it were that simple, we would have gotten rid of it. And I suggest that you get a copy of the orders to Mr. Groves and you can test my voracity and my memory.

If this Commission were as powerful as they have made us, we wouldn't allow you to have this kind of hearing. We wouldn't have allowed the judges to say they're not included. We wouldn't have allowed the attorneys. If I can borrow a phrase from Paul Smith, years ago he said pretty soon only he and I would be covered by the act. You know, if we were king, we wouldn't allow that kind of nonsense to happen.

The Commission has been involved in about 30 court cases involving dozens or hundreds of issues. In

none of those cases has the court found that the Commission acted improperly, exceeded its authority or didn't allow due process. Absolutely none. We lost to the judges, and a betting person would have said you're going to lose to the judges. We lost to the attorneys, and a betting person probably would have said we're going to lose.

And I'd like to make a layperson comment on the decision on attorneys. I do not think it's truly a constitutional issue. It is a specious issue. The Supreme Court considering checks and balances has authority only over the practice of law. Now, if filing a financial interest statement is the practice of law, I have been practicing law and 20 hundreds of thousands of other people have been practicing law for 7 or 8 years without a license. If I had the money or an attorney who worked free, I would love to challenge the court and to take someone who is not an attorney and say, I refuse to file that statement because if I do, I would be guilty of practicing law. Now, if it isn't practicing law, they don't have jurisdiction. With due respect to the court, I think the case rests on very, very specious grounds.

We lost also on a case dealing with school directors, although I think "lost" is the wrong word, because the court decided that something that the General

Assembly put into law was unconstitutional. I think the Commission had no role in deciding constitutionality.

The court said that the phrased that excluded appointed noncompensated officials was unconstitutional, and they excised it.

We lost the case on spousal information. I think that's another specious reason. One of the points made by the people who filed the complaint was that we were going to demand that the filer would report what he or she didn't know. That is absolutely one of the most ludicrous comments that has been laid over the seven, eight years of the Commission's existence. We obviously can't do that. I'd like also to point out that if these spouse's financial interests are so separated, why do we get into all these divorce battles over who owns what?

I think that you can change the law.

Certainly you can't require someone to file something they don't know, and I think if you put that in the law, that would be one way of helping. There are probably other legal methods which would take away some of the specious basis on which these decisions rest.

We lost one case to CPA's. We said that CPA's who did auditing in local municipalities have to file a financial interest statement. The court disagreed with us. Now, again, I think out of all the cases, out

of all the issues, that's really not a terrible record.

Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, I disagree totally that the Commission has operated very inefficiently. Obviously I have a bias, and I know that you will separate my bias from facts.

A number of -- let me skim quickly through my testimony. I know that all of you are capable of reading and I also know that part of it is not worth reading when you get down to it. If I were rewriting, I'd probably skip parts.

First, I think the Commission should be recreated. I'm retired and that has no effect on me personally, but I think from the public's viewpoint it ought to be recreated. I think that any reading of the newspapers, any listening to television, will show you that the conditions that we try to solve are still not solved. I have at home, and I wish I would have brought it because of the comments made today. We had a newsclipping service in the Ethics Commission and for 1985 I had those clippings typed, brief statements. Now, you're being told that local government officials don't get into any trouble. They're no different than the rest of us. Once you get beyond, as the old saying, me and thee, there's always somebody who becomes questionable.

There are many, many local convictions, there

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are many, many problems with local officials. Just a few from memory: A tax collector in southeastern Pennsylvania embezzled over \$2 million, spent most of it in Atlantic City and traqically committed suicide when it came out. A woman in Zendeniople, and please excuse me, I have trouble with that word, embezzled something like \$100,000 over 15 or 18 years, and nobody missed it. Another woman kept telling her board that your financial controls are bad. While she was doing that, she embezzled \$80,000. There was a tax collector who had his official bank accounts in the bank, and also his mortgage account, and he had direct deposit. The bank paid his mortgage out of his tax collector accounts. And if you want, I'll send you a copy of that. I think you will find that to sit there and claim that local officials are any different than the rest of us is sheer nonsense.

Now, the people who need the Ethics Act are the good officials. They're the ones who need the support of the Ethics Act and those kind of things.

School board members. School board members, if I remember the School Code correctly, are restricted from doing business with their school board. I can give you a half a dozen cases in the Ethics Commission where we were asked, could they do business with their school board?

And the concept of self-policing, one of the biggest cases the Ethics Commission had was a case involving a gentleman from the Urban Redevelopment Authority in Allegheny County. He had structured some company so that those companies were able to get money from the Authority. The name of the case was Panza, P-A-N-Z-A. When the Authority found out about it, they fired him, and that's all they did. When the Commission reviewed it and completed its investigation, the Federal government I think has brought indictments against him, the Attorney General's Office has brought indictments against him. There was another gentleman in Ross Township who has been convicted of playing footsies with the developer. The developer pled no contest, or whatever attorneys call it.

effects. But, I caution you that you do not measure or should not measure the Commission by the number of people it puts in jail. No law in a democracy or a republic is ever passed with that kind of objective. That's what they do in Russia and those kind of places. Our laws are passed to established values, to protect the innocent, to try to make society work the way we want. So the number of people put in jail from the Ethics Act I submit is not a fair way of determining whether the Ethics Commission

has been effective.

There have been a number of comments about
the slowness of investigations. That's a valid
criticism. I probably won't admit all of my mistakes to
you and I don't remember all of them. One of my mistakes
was that I didn't ask for more staff earlier.
Unfortunately, the year I asked for more staff the
General Assembly decided not to give us the money. So
you may be sharing some of that. The investigations are
too slow. There isn't sufficient staff, there ought to
be more.

Frivolous complaints. My guess is, based on memory, there are probably 25 percent and up of complaints that are dismissed. We do not go ahead on frivolous complaints. Now, frivolous is a word, and each of us has a different understanding of what that word means. If I were a public official who wanted to hide something and anyone brought the subject up, I would think they were frivolous. There are frivolous ones we get rid of, anonymous complaints. We don't deal with anonymous complaints. The Commission, as you know, has authority to investigate on its own motion. In all of the years, I can remember having one or two anonymous complaints that I thought might have enough substance for the Commission to consider. They didn't approve either

one of them. So there is a process for this. It's not perfect; nothing is. But there is a process.

People not being able to talk to their attorneys. The Hoak-McCutcheon case went to Commonwealth Court. The Commission held hearings. They had an attorney. In fact, they had two attorneys. Other people have had attorneys. They are given every right to. And I was sorry to hear that evidently we probably caused some divorces because people said to their wife or husband, honey, I can't tell you about that because the Commission wrote me a letter. I think that kind of exaggeration is something that you should not seriously consider in determining how you change the Ethics Act.

You've been given other myths, in an attempt to change it, that somehow the Ethics Commission prevents people from voting. The Ethics Commission has said to certain people, you must abstain from voting, and then you were told that that meant local government couldn't function because one person had to make a decision.

Nonsense. The Commission never made a ruling like that. In fact, if you ask for the Hahalis and the Moyer rulings, you will find a very good discussion of a concept called the rule of necessity, and please don't question me too much about it. It's a legal -- evidently a legal concept, and I don't understand those thoroughly.

But essentially what it says is that you cannot stop a duly elected board from functioning. If it has five members and four of them have a conflict, then the rule of necessity says they have to act, they have to continue to function, and the Commission has put that into their orders and has considered it. So we haven't stopped local government from functioning.

Now, we were told one time that because a supervisor had his daughter as the township secretary and because she also was the chief spokesperson for the union in labor negotiations, he was the chief spokesperson for management, and we said there was something wrong with that, he said, gee, the township can't function if you don't let me have my daughter. One of the other amendments you ought to do is to require that if a public official, public employee, a member of their family is involved in a hiring pool, then there must be an open and public process for that hiring.

I do want to make some responses to some of the specific comments of the Pennsylvania Local Government conference, because I think they were all inaccurate, at best. I wish I could respond to some of the comments I heard this morning, but I just heard them and I'm still quite amazed by them.

The Local Government Conference says that the

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Commission extended coverage to municipal authorities despite unambiguous language of the act. First of all, in the term "governmental body" in the act, authority is included. Second of all, the Commission's initial decision on municipal authorities were that only appointed and compensated members were included. That position was affirmed in a Commonwealth Court ruling on February 10, '81. In September of '81, the Supreme Court ruled that that was unconstitutional, therefore all members were covered. Years later, the Commission implemented that. It took years, quite frankly, because the scope of that ruling was so great that we probably could have had Paul Smith and I and everyone else in the Commonwealth filing a financial interest statement under that. We did not do that.

They said that we were ordering restitution to municipalities despite requirements of 9(c). There's another section of the act which gives the Commission the discretion to say if you make restitution, we will not recommend prosecution. If you look at the Hoak-McCutcheon opinion, you will see that the court doubled that issue and said that the Commission was particularly sensitive to the case in coming up with that sort of solution under the law and that they had the authority to do it.

Another part of the testimony said the Commission by regulation required municipalities to receive and store financial interest statements without a statutory basis for this requirement. Section 4(3)(2) says, any candidate for local office shall file a statement of financial interest with the Commission pursuant to this act and shall file a copy of that statement with the governing authority and the political subdivision in which he is a candidate. It seems to me, even a nonlawyer, that's pretty damn plain English, and I think that anyone that gives you that kind of information with that in the law is misleading you or has lost their ability to read.

They also told you that the Commission ignored the statutory authority in the insurance law and relied solely on the language of the Municipal Code to rule that, in their words, "the traditional practice of providing certain insurance coverages to elected officials was improper," et cetera. That is totally wrong. The Township Association has maintained for years that it was proper for local officials, elected officials, to have the kind of pensions and hospitalization we ruled against.

You also ought to be aware, and I think it's -- when we're talking about conflicts, it's something you

ought to consider when you're considering looking at codes. The Township Association receives about \$60,000 to \$70,000 income a year because they administer insurance that is sold to local officials. Now, you want to talk about a conflict? How can they objectively advise a township on which insurance package is best for them while they get a percentage if they take a certain insurance package as opposed to another?

The other point I think I'd like to make about the Township Association is it was not established by your laws as a lobbying group for currently elected supervisors. The phrase I think used in the code is that they are to work for good government in the township, and sometimes good government means opposing people who are currently in office. That has not happened, and maybe it ought to.

This traditional practice, there were a half a dozen court cases which had ruled under various circumstances. I understand that under the law, each case is very specific and you can't take A and apply the necessary circumstances in B. But in general, there were a half a dozen cases in which lower courts have ruled that this practice which they called a traditional practice was illegal. In one case, the action was brought by a co-supervisor, and it was ruled illegal and

the people were forced to pay back. In Hoak-McCutcheon, the court supported completely the Ethics Commission conclusion that this was financial gain other than compensation allowed by law. There's been a recent case in Muncy Creek Township in which the Commonwealth Court found the same situation and came to the same conclusion involving hospitalization. The Township Association knows that, they tend to want to forget it.

The court also covered, you've heard two or three times about this tremendous authority in the Insurance Code which we ignored. We did not ignore it, and the court didn't ignore it. In fact, Judge Cray took a page or a page and a half in his opinion to comment that while he recognized that gave the supervisors authority to purchase insurance for employees, it did not give supervisors, even when they were employees, authority to ignore the requirement of the Township Code which says you must have auditor approval.

One comment relating to that. I think
there's a current bill in the General Assembly somewhere
which says, do away with the auditors and let supervisors
establish their own compensation. I suggest to you that
if you're interested in restoring the faith and
confidence of the people in government, that won't do it.
I understand the problems with auditors that are not

trained sometimes, the neighbor who's an auditor, he's trained to a point, but even he admits it's very, very difficult.

But there are other options, for example.

Perhaps you can establish auditors at a county level who will be full-time, who will be trained auditors, who could audit the local books. But I would suggest that maybe you want to keep the auditors there or someone there to set compensation other than those people themselves.

and please, again, I want to be sure you understand that my comments do not apply to 95 or 96 or 97 percent of the local officials who work very hard, who have some of the worst problems in the world with some of the lowest amount of authority and probably some of the lowest paid. It applies to those who would take advantage of that situation.

They've said the Commission has assumed the role of investigator, prosecutor, judge, jury, et cetera. That is not true, and I think that a review by the courts in over 30 cases which found none of that is fairly good evidence, or as attorneys I think say, conclusive, or whatever the word is, that the Commission has not done that.

The Commission's scope should be limited to

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interpretations of the Ethics law. It is, except where 1 the Commission must determine what is financial gain 2 other than compensation allowed by law. How else do you 3 know whether this compensation that the supervisor received is allowed by law except to look at the code that allows that, and that's what the Commission has done. I think it's perfectly appropriate. It was done in the Hoak-McCutcheon case and the court had no complaints.

I have a number of recommendations. One, I think you ought to limit the gubernatorial appointments to one, allow the Commission to select one member from names submitted by organizations such as Common Cause and League of Women Voters, allow the Pennsylvania Local Government Conference -- despite my viewpoints on their presentations -- allow them to appoint one member. both cases, though, I think there should be a requirement that those individuals could neither been engaged in active partisan politics for at least two years prior to being appointed.

I think you should expand the definition of "immediate family", provide automatic penalties for late filing of financial interest statements, have candidates for local office file their original statement with their nomination petitions, continue to file a copy locally,

and do not file with the State Ethics Commission. That is a cost currently that does not serve a purpose. There are 100,000-some statements of local candidates on file in the Ethics Commission offices right now which get very little review, except for the Commission initial review. There's no purpose for that, it doesn't serve the purpose of making them available to the public.

I think you should prohibit Commission members from voting in cases involving their appointing authorities. You should place persons serving as full-time attorneys for public bodies under jurisdiction of the act, and I understand the constitutional concerns. Require filers to report financial interests of their spouse. Require a public hiring process when an official, employee, or any of their family is involved. Specify that public officials must file annually. The act does not have that specification in it now. That issue was taken to court, the court decided -- agreed with the Commission that if you're going to require employees to file annually, obviously officials ought to, too. But it's not there specifically.

And specify that statements of financial interests must be made available without impediment or harassment. We have phone calls that some agencies put their financial interest statements in sealed envelopes

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and if a member of the general public wants to see it, they have to go through a number of hoops. We've had situations where we were told that the person wanting to see the forms had to give their name, they were being asked, why do you want to see them? Now, we may be able to take that kind of pressure and insist that it's all right to see them, but if this law is truly for the people, as it ought to be, most people will back off at that point. And one of the concerns I have with the frivolous complaint situation is that don't go so far that you have again decided to protect the system from the people, because I think that what has caused the lack of faith and confidence in the people is their strong feeling they really don't know what goes on. They get left into the entrance hall of government and they can't really go upstairs where the action is. And I think that you have to be careful in drawing that line.

The two last comments I want to make, and one of those I make without trepidation, although some might think I'm being a little foolish, and that is the Commission's investigation of the Governor's Mansion. We did two investigations. They took longer than they should have. They took longer than they should have for two reasons. First of all, lack of staff. And I know all bureaucrats say that. In this case it's true.

Second, they were very complicated cases. There was a Governor Thornburgh Committee, there was an Inaugural Committee, there was a Republican State Committee, money flowed between them. The Republican State Committee kept the books for the Inaugural Committee. I'm not even sure that's proper under the Campaign Financing Act.

Mr. Chairman, you had mentioned putting some of the responsibility under the Department of State. I submit that there was enough information made public in those two cases to raise questions about the activities and the reports filed by those committees. The registration statement of the Inaugural Committee, for example, which I believe said, our purpose is to support the inaugural events. Speaking about auditing forms, I think that should have been rejected out of hand because if I had enough money to support Governor Casey's inaugural, I don't think I would have had to file a form to raise campaign contributions.

I think the Commission must be given credit for investigating. They did investigate. I think it's unfortunate that they received negative public reaction, and some of it was deserved. I think the two commissioners who attended the festivities should not have voted. As Executive Director, that was not my choice or my decision. I had no role in it, but they

should not have voted. I think that the replacement of the chairman shortly after the vote was a ridiculous action and raised major questions about the Commission's credibility.

But I want to remind you with my last comment, there was a Persian poet, Omar Khayyam. One of Omar Khayyam's quatrains, the pot was saying to the potter, you're the one that made me not quite round, you're the one that formed me this way. Now, it's going to be difficult for me to understand why I should be destroyed for that mistake.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Thank you.

Questions?

REPRESENTATIVE CALTACIRONE: Yes, I have.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Tom Caltagirone.

BY REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: (Of Mr. Seladones)

- Q. I don't want you to reveal anything that you feel would compromise you, but I'm curious as to percentages or total numbers of investigations that may have been initiated and/or conducted with State employees as opposed to--
- A. Involving State employees as opposed to local employees?
 - Q. Yeah.

Α.

number. The number would be low, obviously, because the number of -- the proportion is different. My guess is that they would be reasonably related to proportion, but I really can't give you a good answer. It's not that it's confidential, it's just that my memory isn't that good.

Representative, I don't really have a good

Q. The Capitol Complex situation left an awful lot to be desired, and I don't know what's going to come of it, but there certainly were, and I served on that committee investigating it for the years that we were in existence, and there were an awful lot of problems and suggestions that were raised there. I don't know what if anything will come of it with the different agencies that were involved. I'm sure the Ethics Commission was certainly involved somewhere along the line, but too often what some of us, you know, suspect or suppose may be the case, it's kind of difficult not to get responses on some of the things that may be some suspicion on, or you know what I'm talking about.

A. Um-hum. In that particular case, the Commission has, and I would assume still has a policy, that where it's already apparent that the Attorney General or other law enforcement officials, or in some cases an action's already in court, that the Commission

would not normally proceed on a matter such as that because the ultimate result of us finding anything wrong 2 would be to end up in court or referring it to the 3 Attorney Ceneral. We think it would be foolish to spend Commonwealth resources stepping on their toes or 5 duplicating efforts that are already undertaken. 6 Very good summation and very good critique of 0. 7 what we're attempting to do here.

> Thank you. Α.

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Q. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: You're welcome. Any further comments? Mary?

MS. WOOLLEY: Could I ask a question? BY MS. WOOLLEY: (Of Mr. Seladones)

- About the due process concerns that are Q. raised by the local governing bodies.
 - Α. Yes.
- Q. If you could just help me with this process because I'm really not clear.
 - The investigative process? Α.
- Do you only initiate an investigation upon a 0. complaint being filed or upon your own motion?
- Α. We do both. However, there have probably been only half a dozen or so, you know, 1 or 2 percent of all the cases have been on motion.

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Q. Okay. Now, is the next step some sort of preliminary finding that probable cause exists to proceed with a full-blown investigation?

Okay, if I may start kind of from the beginning, and it will take me two steps to get there, okay? First, we receive both sworn complaints and unsworn complaints. Unsworn complaints are reviewed because it is possible that we could get, with an unsworn complaint, enough documentation that it would warrant going to the Commission to ask for a no motion approval. Most unsworn complaints are dismissed very quickly. Sworn complaints are looked at, and they're looked at by the Executive Director, along with General Counsel. Those that are obviously frivolous, obviously unsupported, such as when we receive those that say, please investigate our school board because, well, there's no names, no -- we set up a procedure, for example, or our attorneys set up a procedure where there are certain key things required in each complaint. must have names. The allegations must fit with the name. You can't give us five names and say they're all doing It must be signed and meet all the technical requirements. Those that are not dismissed reasonably quickly are then looked at by contacting the person who made the complaint first, and there are some that are

then dismissed after looking at that.

Some complainants give us information and hold back things. So you go to them to be sure that you have everything before you make a decision on those that are possible. At that point, there are more complaints which are dropped off. Anything that passes those tests will go ahead into a full investigation, and only those are made public. Our reading of the law is that our requirement to make things public is only when we do an investigation. We're not going to make something public that would allow me to smear anyone I wanted, even if it weren't true, because it would be made into a public statement.

- Q. Is there a finding that probable cause exists at some point in this process?
- A. I think you'd have to ask one of our counsel what is in their mind when they review it at a certain process. In my -- as Executive Director, non-lawyer, those we proceed on have sufficient information to at least generally meet that requirement.
- Q. And then what are the options of the Commission in terms of when you end an investigation? What option do you have once the investigation is concluded?
 - A. No violation, violation but of such a minimal

nature that no action would be taken but a kind of youought-not-to-do-this-again, violation and an if-youreimburse-we-will-not-recommend-prosecution, violation
and a referral to the Attorney General with or without a
recommendation. I think that's the general--

- Q. So that you may not impose, the Commission has no authority to impose a penalty upon the person against whom the complaint has been made?
- A. Under -- I think that's correct, but please let me say it in my words because I don't want to mislead you.

Under Section 79(111), the Commission has authority to say, you received \$5,000, in our opinion it was financial gain other than compensation allowed by law. If you reimburse that, that or a penalty, we will not recommend prosecution. However, the Attorney General is given a copy of all cases. So the Attorney General can, if he wishes -- and I would add "she", but we haven't had one yet -- can take a case that the Commission saw nothing in and decide there is something to work with.

- Q. Thank you.
- A. Okay.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: I only have one other comment relative to the Governor's Mansion. To me, and

since I was the State legislator that filed the
Complaint--

MR. SELADONES: I'm not allowed to admit that.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: I read the Ethics Act and it said that any kind of behavior that would enhance one's personal or private situation was not going to be allowed. That's obviously a rough paraphrase. The question was, and with Leroy Zimmerman at the Maverick one night -- you probably were in the next booth, for all I know -- he said, that just depends on what they decide is personal or private. Now, are they going to say that politics comes under personal, politics comes under private? And with a twinkle in his eye, he indicated, visually I'll say, he indicated what he thought it was. But that's all. It was just my own feeling about what was going on.

I talked with a lot of other people and there's no way in the world that what was going on out there on Second Street was for a personal or a public reason. They were raising money for politics, and to me, with all due respect, and again, I realize you were the Executive Director and not the people voting on the matter, it didn't seem like we needed a big investigation, we just needed five or six or seven people

to walk into a room and see if there is politicking at the Governor's Mansion, and where does that fit into this sentence in the law? It's either there or it's not.

So I thought that, to use a word that we've heard before, spurious and specious. I thought all this mingling conversation about the different committees, and with all due respect, sir, you guys took a year or how many months and months and months and months?

MR. SELADONES: A long time.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: To me, you get five or six or seven people in the room, you look in the sentence and you look at what happened, and it's either yes or no. But that's not the way you operated. That was only one of the reasons for my speaking, and I just wanted that to go on the record.

And I also want to say for the record that I had nothing but a cordial, gentlemanly respect for yourself during the imbroglio. And there are other reasons that I'm somewhat like Judas, although I would think you would take a great deal of political intrepidity on the part of members of the General Assembly to question the perpetuity of this organization.

There is no great doubt that the in editorial press they are going to say that this is good government, this is necessary, and my feelings about how empty and

ridiculous some of their activities have been in the past will be marginal and will be peripheral. So I only hope that due to this sunset process, we will have a better Ethics Commission in the late 1980's and the early 1990's.

And as a swan song for you, so to speak, I congratulate you on being a substantive man who has done his best and worked with integrity and given us a little humor today, because that takes some of the acerbity out of my edge. I think that that comment of Mr. Smith that someday you two will be the only ones under its auspices was something special.

MR. SELADONES: Prophetic.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Yes. Yes. So thank you very kindly for being with us.

MR. SELADONES: Mr. Chairman, may I comment just briefly on the Governor's Mansion?

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Sure.

MR. SELADONES: I understand your concern, but I would submit that you need to also consider what the reaction would have been had the Commission said raising campaign funds, even using the Mansion, without a thorough investigation is a violation of law. One of the things that happened to us, every time we got a case that involved campaign funds, we got phone calls. And one of

the big fears was, you guys aren't going to do anything to chill campaign funds, are you? And those calls came from elected officials.

So I think that the Commission would have suffered more grievously and I think that while you have trouble with the Commission because of that, I'd rather have you having that kind of trouble which has some logic to it than the emotional opposition the Commission would have gotten from saying you can't raise campaign funds with any sort of use of a public facility. You know, we had, I think the Auditor General announced -- one of the State officials announced candidacy for another office in his public office. We got phone calls about that. It just wasn't enough to spend resources on.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Okay. Are there any other witnesses? This will be our last public hearing before we go down to our own committee business.

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN DeWEESE: Seeing none, for the record, I want to at least respond to the Pennsylvania Bar Association for not showing up. I would like to quote the final paragraph in the record. It's from Mr. Ira B. Coldren, Jr., President of the Pennsylvania Bar Association when we asked him what he thought about

having lawyers and judges come under the purview of the Ethics Act.

He said, I quote, "In our view, the Supreme Court has fully discharged its obligation to regulate the conduct of lawyers and judges in Pennsylvania and such regulation substantially exceeds the restrictions which would otherwise be applied by the State Ethics Commission." End quote.

Association is meeting today in Pittsburgh, but they, I think, could have vouched safe to allow one of their lowly corporals or sergeants to come down here and share a few observations with us. They are a strong, respected and important entity in this dialogue and I think that many of the lawyers on the committee, and it is certainly the proclivity of the chairman to move in the direction to include lawyers under the provisions of the Ethics Act, and it would have been a vital element in today's proceedings to have had Mr. Coldren represented here with us to expatiate on what I consider to be a very questionable final paragraph, as well as a very dubious epistle all together.

So having no further observations, thank you members and staff and public in general. This hearing is now concluded.

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(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at
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       1:30 p.m.)
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I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me during the hearing of the within cause, and that this is a true and correct transcript of the same.

ann-Marie P. Sweeney

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Ann-Marie P. Sweeney 536 Orrs Bridge Road Camp Hill, PA 17011