1 2	COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
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4	In re: Senate Bill No. 1
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7	Stenographic report of hearing held in Room 22, Capitol Annex
_	Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on
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9	Wednesday,
10	June 10, 1987 at 9:30 o'clock a.m.
10	at 9:30 0 clock d.m.
11	HON. H. WILLIAM DEWEESE, CHAIRMAN
12	MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
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14	Hon. William E. Baldwin Hon. David Heckler Hon Gerard Birmelin Hon. Lois S. Haggarty
	Hon. Michael E. Bortner Hon. Gerard Kosinski
15	Hon. Kevin Blaum Hon. Paul McHale
16	Hon. Thomas R. Caltagirone Hon. Nicholas B. Moehlmann Hon. Michael Dawida Hon. Robert D. Reber, Jr.
17	ALSO PRESENT:
18	Michael P. Edmiston, Chief Counsel Majority Committee
19	Mary Woolley, Chief Counsel Minority Committee
TA	Robert Priest, Budget Analyst Mike Rosenstein
20	Paul Muench
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	MALONE REPORTING
22	EUGENE W. HOLBERT
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1987-096 HALONE REPORTING (717) 566-3109 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We are going to commence this morning's proceedings, and our first person scheduled to testify is the Honorable James E. Rowley, Chairman of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board. Good morning, sir, and thank you for coming to share some of your observations with us today.

JUDGE ROWLEY: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Judge Rowley of the Superior Court, and I am here in my capacity as Chairman of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board. Mr. Robert Keuch, our General Counsel and Executive Director, is here with me, and we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and this Committee to give some comments and some thoughts concerning the board and its activities.

I know that your schedule this morning is very tight and therefore, I have submitted a statement for the record, and I would like now to provide you with a brief outline of that statement and I'll be happy to try to answer any questions that you may have. As outlined in more detail in that statement, there have been, in the past two and one half years, substantial changes in the board's membership, staffing and location of offices.

(717) 566-3109

The staff is completely changed. We have

closed the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia offices and consolidated them in one operation here in Harrisburg near the State Capitol. The board, itself, is now completely changed in the last two and one half years. There is a totally new membership and the development and institution of specific and detailed procedures for the processing of matters brought to the board's attention has been one of the priorities of the new board.

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A major goal, of course, of the board is to institute methods and procedures that will expedite and shorten the time consumed in processing complaints received or matters brought before the board that is thought to require investigation.

At the same time, the board has tried to, insofar as possible, under constitutional restraints, expand or add to the understanding of the public, that is of the board's functioning in the performance of its responsibilities.

As to the latter, the so-called confidentiality provision found in the Constitution is a critical obstacle, in our view. All papers and proceedings, as you know, before the board are confidential and may not be commented upon by board members or staff unless and until there is a finding of misconduct following the formal hearing, and a recommendation for discipline to the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania.

The majority of our board, as presently constituted, is very strongly in favor of an amendment to the Constitution that would provide for public access to the proceedings once it has been determined that formal charges should be filed.

I recognize that the present proposal before the committee as has been passed by the Senate does not go quite that far in relaxing the confidentiality provision. This Bill, as I understand it, would not provide public access until such time as the board has completed its formal hearings and made a finding and entered an order in the matter. Within ten days after that, the matter becomes public knowledge. At least a part of it does.

On the other hand, we would, the majority of the board and myself, especially --

THE CHAIRMAN: The majority of the board meaning --

JUDGE ROWLEY: The Judicial Inquiry and Review Board.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, but how many?

JUDGE ROWLEY: Five.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

JUDGE ROWLEY: The others, there are a couple that would join this Bill, and there are a couple that would

like to keep it the way it is.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

JUDGE ROWLEY: The majority of us feel that in order to be backed up further and provide public access at an earlier stage in this connection, we would recommend and urge the Committee to propose to the General Assembly and urge the adoption by the General Assembly of a provision containing immunity from liability for members of the board such as has been done in similar situations, to people who are performing governmental services.

As I am sure you are aware, every member of the board serves without compensation. They have other jobs, other responsibilities. They give a great deal of time to this task but yet they are exposed to potential liability and we are, as you know, undergoing a series of Federal lawsuits at the present time, all claiming violations of civil rights. Yet the committee unanimously, the board unanimously urges that a provision for immunity be provided here.

I think under the proposed Bill, it's even more important that such a provision be inserted. You know, this proposed Bill entirely changes the character and the thrust of this Committee's responsibilities and authority. For example, as presently constituted, the board is merely a fact gathering agency and a recommending agency to the

Supreme Court.

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The Supreme Court then reviews the matter on the record and makes a determination on its own. Under this Bill, the board suddenly becomes the adjudicative body. That is, they can order suspensions; they order the final and ultimate sanction. And those decisions of the board are only subject to appellate review which is much narrower standard or responsibility imposed upon the Supreme Court.

As a result, it seems clear to me that this proposed Bill will greatly increase the exposure of board members to potential liability in civil rights actions and other types of actions for their conduct. And in the statement I have presented, I have mentioned a couple of the other boards and executive agencies in the Commonwealth that now have the type of immunity we are talking about, and we would urge your serious consideration of that.

that the Committee's not involved particularly at this time with our budgetary problems, but I think I would be remiss if I did not note that the board is facing, at this time, a very serious budgetary crisis. It is necessary to a proper and effective carrying out of the board's constitutional mandate to have the adequate resources to carry on those responsibilities.

Because of sharp and substantial increase in

the number of formal proceedings and disciplinary recommendations made by the board over the past year, we ended the fiscal year -- we are going to end this fiscal year with a deficit of approximately \$150,000.00.

More importantly, an increase in the budget we requested for the next fiscal year is necessary, and that request was decreased to \$480,000.00 by the Governor's Office.

We recognize that provision, but we would urge the Committee to, in drafting this type of a Bill, to recognize that the ultimate success of whatever kind of a board is created is dependent upon two things. One is the character of the persons who are appointed to the board, but the other is the provision for adequate financing and funding to provide adequate staff, investigators and counsel to carry out the board's functions.

I notice -- and I am happy to see that this constitutional amendment or proposed amendment does recognize the creation on the board of its own in-house legal staff department, which is the direction the board took approximately a year ago when the former director resigned and we were fortunate to obtain the services of Hr. Keuch as General Counsel and Executive Director, and we are trying to develop our own legal department to handle these matters.

I would be happy, with that summary statement, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee to attempt to answer any questions that anyone might have.

THE CHAIRMAN: We have time for two or three questions only. We are constrained rigorously this morning by our floor schedule. However, there will be other opportunities, either through correspondence or additional meetings, to touch base.

So are there a couple of questions? Ms. Haggarty from Montgomery County.

REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: Thank you, Mr.

Chairman. Judge Rowley, you did not comment this morning on the composition of the board, and I wondered do you have any comment with regard to the proposed constitutional amendment that would substantially change the appointments, thereby the composition of the board?

JUDGE ROWLEY: I do. Initially, let me say that the board unanimously -- that's all nine members, including the present two lay members -- believe the that the present number and composition is sufficient and is appropriate.

As I said before, there is no question in my mind that regardless of how the board is structured, the ultimate success of the board will be in the quality of the persons that are appointed to it. However, I understand

that the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers have or are going to propose an amendment to the Bill that would provide for an increase to 15. The board, or myself, would support that amendment if there is to be a change, which I suspect there will be, for several reasons.

will take, that is, this board will impose sanctions. It will impose discipline. It becomes an adjudicative body.

The thrust of all of these lawsuits against the board, one of the principal thrusts is that in our present constitutional system, there are combined in this board, investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. We become the policemen. We become the investigator. We become the district attorney. We become the jury and ultimately, in a sense, with a recommendation, at least, a quasi judge.

It seems to me that the present proposal, by increasing the responsibilities and authority of this board to make it an adjudicative body strengthens the argument of those who are contending that even our present system is a violation of due process as far as the Federal Constitution.

For that reason, I would recommend -- and I am only speaking for myself, now -- I would recommend that the board or the Committee or the General Assembly seriously

1 consider a board of 15, but a two-tier board, a double level 2 board, so to speak. There are some jurisdictions in this 3 country that utilize such a system for judicial discipline. The initial level, initial stage or tier of the 4 5 board receives complaints, investigates them, makes a б determination whether charges should be filed. If the 7 decision is to file charges, they file the charges and they 8 provide the counsel. If that is done, you then go to a second level, 9 10 the second tier of the board. Those are entirely different 11 members of the board who sit as a court or a jury, and they 12 hear the evidence. They listen to the arguments and the 13 charges. 14 In other words, you separate the prosecutorial 15 from the judicial functions in the board and insulate the 16 board from a federal due process attack or challenge. I am 17 truly concerned about combining them in this kind of a board 18 with this kind of authority. But I would support --19 REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: Judge Rowley, can I --20 THE CHAIRMAN: We are going to have to keep it 21 very short. 22 REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: On the same question, 23 just to clarify the question. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Make it very short, please.

REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: The composition of

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Senate Bill shifts the membership to a majority of lay people. You have not commented on that. The composition is actually laid out in Senate Bill 1. I wonder if you would indicate whether you thought that would present problems?

JUDGE ROWLEY: Maybe I could answer that by saying that the present two lay members, non-judge, non-lawyer members of the board feel it would. They are adament that there should be at least a majority of judges or in the alternative, as the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers have or are going to recommend, law trained people. And that's not to say that lay people can't do the job.

As I have said -- and I'll say it again -- I think in the long run, the success of the Committee and the quality of their work has been determined by the quality of the people who are appointed.

REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: Thank you, Judge.

THE CHAIRMAN: Representative Caltagirone from Berks County will ask the final question.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: Concerning the overall budget and request you make; your manpower problem. Would you please succinctly address that issue. I know you are always running short of the funds to do the proper kind of job that irregardless of what system finally is developed, if you don't have adequate funding, you are aren't going to be able to function properly. I want to hit

right at the heart of that. Give us a brief summary on that problem.

JUDGE ROWLEY: Would you like Mr. Keuch -- he's more familiar with the figures. There is no question that we need and are developing an in-house staff, but we need more investigators. We need more counsel. Investigators are the key; trained, professional investigators that can get out and get the evidence and facts for us.

MR. KEUCH: The present staff is two investigators and two legal counsel, including myself and three secretaries.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: The two investigators cover the entire State of Pennsylvania?

IR. KEUCH: Yes, sir.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: That's the point I wanted to make.

MR. KEUCH: We submitted a budget request of \$250,000.00, which would have been a modest increase of \$100,000.00, large in percentage because of the size of our budget. That would have permitted an increase, double the investigative staff to four in this next fiscal year. It would have also permitted some additional law clerk services in support for the legal staff; not an additional attorney, but research and library assistance.

That budget was reduced to \$480,000.00, which

would permit absolutely no increase in staff. We might have a difficult time finding, as we have in the past, we have come off this fiscal year, as the Chairman has indicated, with a deficit \$138,000.00, caused by the increase in formal hearings and increase in formal charges being filed.

The combination of the rejections that have occurred of our \$500,000.00 request having been denied, the supplemental which has taken place, would create a crisis. With the denial of the supplemental, it would be necessary to absorb that have that increased the way we would like to see increased, to 650. That won't permit a modest increase in staff.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: The point I wanted to share with the Members the Committee, you had over 300 some complaints last year, 70 of which you had followup and work that was done on it, with two individual investigators to cover this entire Commonwealth with all the judges, all the district attorneys and with all the DJ's and everybody else, common pleas court, let alone the appellate courts. It's impossible for two investigators to cover this entire Commonwealth.

I think, you know, if were talking about doing the right kind of thing with this body -- and basically, you are an investigative body looking at what the judges are doing -- if there's any infractions or complaints you have

that have to be analyzed, you have to have somebody to collect that information.

You need a battery of additional investigators. If we are going to do the proper job and play watchdog on the judiciary in this state, then I think you need to beef that up with competent, skilled people, and they need the budget and the money to go with it to do that.

JUDGE ROWLEY: I am aware personally of one case, before I got on the board, where the complaint was dismissed with a private admonishment because the board's investigators were spread too thin. They couldn't get enough information and facts about the case.

It was dismissed with a private admonishment, and later on when another state agency got to investigating with a bigger staff and more experienced and trained investigators, they discovered the existence of criminal contact. Since then, the individual involved has been convicted by the Court.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have one followup in reference to the young lady from Montgomery County. Quickly, the Senate says that this Bill is okay. John Stauffer is adament in his insistence that a change in the composition of the board will be unacceptable to him and other Senators on both sides of the aisle have asserted the same thing to me.

1 Would you rather have this or something pretty 2 close to it than nothing at all or would you rather have the 3 same system that you have? 4 JUDGE ROWLEY: The Bill as it's written there. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: With some slight amendment. I 6 don't mean anything overwhelming. I just mean if you don't 7 get the composition factor that you want, will that impede your individual or collective enthusiasm on the board for 8 9 change? 10 JUDGE ROWLEY: I would prefer to have it the 11 way it is now with maybe a few amendments. As to the rest 12 of the Bill, frankly, I like it. THE CHAIRMAN: Thank very much, and thank you 13 14 for joining us this morning. I'm sure that our staff and 15 members would like to share some additional time or 16 correspondence with you in the upcoming days and weeks. 17 Thank you for the opportunity, JUDGE ROWLEY: 18 and we'll be glad to furnish the information. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Our next witness is Bob Surrick 20 from West Chester, Pennsylvania. 21 MR. SURRICK: Good morning. Thank you for 22 inviting me. Before I turn to some preparation, I would 23 like to say that five years ago, when I began to speak out 24 for openness in the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board and

for taking judges out of the majority on that board, I

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sustained a great deal of abuse from the judge members on the board and judges around the state because they considered that an attack on their integrity.

I am glad to hear, and I am gratified to hear people of the stature of Judge Rowley coming here today and saying the same thing for openness on the board. He didn't go as far as I would like with regard to the composition of the board. At least the openness issue has been addressed, and that is gratifying.

I really believe the time has passed for that, and I would like to make some proposals. I am aware of your time constraints, and I'll try and finish within the alotted time.

In 1980 Governor Richard L. Thornburgh asked me to serve as member the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board. I am an active lawyer, having been admitted to practice in 1961, and having been perhaps one the most active trial lawyers in Southeastern Pennsylvania for a number of years, I know my way around a courtroom, and judges is are not unfamiliar with me individually. I have been trained as a lawyer to respect judicial authority and to protect the image of the judiciary.

I firmly believe that the judiciary is the last bastion of a free and democratic society. Stated differently, there is significant distrust in our democratic

society in the Executive and Legislative Branches of government. If the public comes to distrust the judiciary, we border on anarchy.

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That doesn't mean rioting in the streets. It does mean increased disrespect for the law and failure to abide by the law, which degrades the quality of life in our community.

Following my appointment, I devoted significant time, energy and money to try to become an expert in judicial accountability. I attended seminars and symposiums in Denver, New Orleans and Philadelphia and began regular communication with experts on judicial accountability in other states. I established a working relationship with the Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations in Chicago.

It did not take long for me to begin to understand that the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, dominated by judges and acting behind a shroud of secrecy, was frequently a vehicle to obscure judicial misconduct. It was not carrying out its responsibility to investigate complaints and recommend discipline where appropriate.

It was, and to the best of my knowledge, still is a good old boy system where judges will speak no evil, hear no evil, and see no evil concerning other judges unless the conduct is so publicly outrageous as to require action,

such as the Judge Snyder case.

In my four year tenure on the board, I witnessed and fought against numerous instancs where complaints against judges were dismissed without adequate investigation or conversely, where there was clear evidence of misconduct.

As I have previously testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, just by way of one example, if the public could see the record with regard to the Semeraro matter, it would be appalled. I know from firsthand experience that a judicial accountability system dominated by judges and operating in secrecy cannot and does not work.

Because the judicial selection system in

Pennsylvania has broken down, the quality of the judiciary

has deteriorated to the point where many judges in the urban

areas don't know right from wrong or don't care, and when

these judges are placed in positions of responsibility in

the judicial accountability process, the system doesn't

work.

By the way, I completely agree with what Judge Rowley said about quality of appointments. Judge Mirarchi chaired the Larsen Hearings for the board. During the course of the hearings, he went hat-in-hand to the Chairman of the Democratic State Committee for support to run for the Supreme Court.

This chairman was, at the time, the law partner of Larsen's attorney, and never mind that Larsen's attorney had represented Judge Mirarchi as a named plaintiff in a lawsuit just two years earlier. Even the most unsophisticated person on the street can understand that this kind of conduct reflects serious and fundamental flaws in the system.

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I also happen to know something about attorney discipline. It has been reported in the news media that I voted for the removal of Justice Larsen from the Supreme Court at the conclusion of twenty eight months of hearings before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board.

Less than two months following the reported vote in May of 1983, on July 6, 1983, Justice Larsen filed a formal complaint against me with the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Please note that the complaint is by a Supreme Court Justice to the Supreme Court Disciplinary Board. The charges are spurious, without basis in fact or law, and constitute, in my opinion, a political prosecution.

Over two years later, on August 7, 1985, based upon this complaint, the Disciplinary Board filed a Petition for Discipline against me. It has been four years and the complaint remains open. My practice has been ruined. I have spent many thousands of dollars in legal fees in my

defense, not to speak of the staggering number of hours of lost time out of the office. In spite of my demand that the proceedings be open to the public, the news media and public were excluded from large portions of the hearings.

We have gone too far to reverse the process by attempting to replace those in authority who are responsible for the degradation of the judicial and attorney accountability processes. Please don't listen to those who will tell you that by and large, the system works and just needs some fine tuning. Many of those who will pooh-pooh the problems have a vested interest in the system. They are the establishment.

Public disrespect for the law and the legal system is markedly increasing. Our lawyers have abdicated their responsibility, adopting a go-along, get-along approach. Hany Pennsylvania lawyers subscribe to the pragmatic policy that it's good to know the law, but it's better to know the judge. All around us, we see evidence of lawyers, by many means, currying favor with judges, and with many judges being willing subjects. Favors and gifts seem to abound.

Let me give you an example of what I mean when I say that the system is not working and there is little or no likelihood that the problems can be corrected under the present structure. In November of 1983, I met with Justice

Roberts over the need for quality appointments to replace two Superior Court judge members of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board whose terms were about to expire.

Let me give you an example. A lot depends on that and that will be the touchstone for what I am going to say in a minute. Without giving any particulars, I pointed out to Justice Roberts that there were several serious matters before the board and that it was imperative from the standpoint of public confidence that there could be no question with regard to the appointments to the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board.

Several months later, the Supreme Court appointed Judge Hoffman, a senior judge, who clearly, in my oponion, was not eligible to serve as a member of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board and Judge McEwen, a judge of the Superior Court, who even his friends say, is a man who just cannot find fault with other lawyers or judges.

Here we had a situation where a respected and nationally known jurist who had served on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for twenty years either would not or could not do what was required to make the system work.

If the trend is to be reversed and public confidence fostered in the judiciary, it will be necessary to perform major surgery. This surgery requires that lawyers and judges be removed from the accountability

process, and a completely independent disciplinary system be established. While Senate Bill 1 is an attempt to remedy the obvious problems, the laborious effort at passage of this constitutional amendment can only result in more of the same as we are now seeing. It is only the application of a band-aid to the bleeding area of judicial and professional accountability.

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I recommend that this committee give consideration to a disciplinary system which I will immodestly call the "Surrick Plan." The system is simple and it will work. Implementation of this system will result in immediate heightened sensitivity by the Bench and Bar to ethical standards, and in a few short years, will raise the quality of the Bench and Bar significantly.

The constitutional authority for the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board should be repealed. It probably doesn't belong in the Constitution anyway. The Legislature should create an independent body called the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Chief Disciplinary Counsel might be selected by a committee consisting of the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, the Governor and the President Pro Tem of the Pennsylvania Senate.

The office should be funded by the lawyers and judges in the manner in which the lawyers now fund the disciplinary system. The budget for the Office of

Disciplinary Counsel should be recommended by Chief
Disciplinary Counsel to this Committee of the Chief Justice,
Governor and President Pro Tem of the Senate and upon
approval, it would be implemented by Supreme Court rule.
Additional appropriations, as needed, might be supplied by
the Legislature.

Chief Disciplinary Counsel, who would be appointed for a fixed term, and who could only be removed for cause, would appoint a staff to monitor the conduct of lawyers and judges throughout the state, investigate complaints, and conduct hearings before a hearing examiner. The hearing examiners would be full time paid positions and at all times, the proceedings would be open to the public.

The hearing examiners would make recommendations including findings of fact to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would have thirty days to approve, modify or reject the recommendations. Failing to act within thirty days, the recommendations would become final.

At every step in the proceedings, the accused lawyer or judge would have the right of counsel and the right to be heard. I don't suggest for a minute that any of the rights anyone now enjoys should be reduced. I do recommend that we get on with it. I have cited my particular problem with the Disciplinary Board. It is not

unusual.

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The Larsen hearings went on twenty eight months and actually took almost four years from beginning to end.

This is not necessary and not in the best interest of the judiciary, the lawyers or the citizens of Pennsylvania.

As our practice becomes more urbanized and judicial standards as well as ethical standards of lawyers are diluted, we must turn to a system of judicial and attorney accountability that is independent. The politicians won't like this. The judges won't like it, and the lawyers won't like it, which tells me that it is probably right on target.

THE CHAIRMAN: Why won't the politicians like

MR. SURRICK: The politicians, in my opinion, Representative DeWees, favor the present system of both electing judges and all the other things that are going on because they have some access to the judges.

THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.

Ladies and gentlemen, the hemorrhaging must stop. You can sit here for the next one hundred days or one hundred months and debate the legal niceties of modification of the existing system. You can compromise and compromise and compromise, giving everyone a little bit of something, or you can do nothing.

1 Any of these actions or inactions will result 2 in more of the same, and worse. Only if you, the full 3 House, the Senate and the voters of Pennsylvania promulgate 4 an independent accountability system, will the losses be 5 reversed. 6 Please don't make the mistake of listening to 7 those who want to maintain the status quo and who will 8 charge that the system will become unbalanced or that there 9 is room for overreaching, corruption, or fraud with a strong 10 and independent Chief Disciplinary Counsel. The fraud, 11 corruption and the overreaching are here now, and we are all 12 the worse for it. We lawyers and judges have met the enemy, 13 and it is us. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Two quick questions from people 15 who haven't asked. The representative from Philadelphia, Gerry Kosinski, do you have any questions for Mr. Surrick? 16 17 REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: Why don't you let the 18 House have a piece of the action in appointing the Disciplinary Board? 19 20 MR. SURRICK: I have no objection to that. 21 That's just a suggestion. 22 I am getting sick and REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: 23 tired of us not being treated on an equal basis on --24 MR. SURRICK: I want three because two out of

three of anything is a majority.

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1 REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: Two out of three 2 might be republicans out of the --3 MR. SURRICK: I have no fixed feelings. Δ REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: We are certainly 5 faced with a crisis, I agree with that. Something is needed 6 if we are going to maintain the status quo, but your 7 proposal here will take five years to implement. 8 MR. SURRICK: I am aware that what I have 9 proposed is something that would be perhaps difficult to 10 sell because it's taken five years just to get openness in 11 the proceedings and judges out of the majorities. 12 REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: It's not difficult to 13 sell. I have a feeling if we put it up to a vote today, 14 this Committee would approve. I am looking at the 15 constitutional aspects of it. 16 MR. SURRICK: We have to start sometime, sir. 17 I am really gratified to hear what you say, if it's 18 representative, that this Committee would go for something 19 like this. Let me say this. I have stuck my neck out for 20 five years. Let somebody else stick it out. Come on. 21 Let's get going with this and let's get a system that 22 works. I am not here to castigate the judiciary or 23 lawyers. I am trying to improve the system, as you are. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Dave Heckler? 25 REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: Mr. Surrick, I take it from your comments that you would agree with me that appellate court judges, at least, would be better appointed than elected.

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MR. SURRICK: Absolutely. I totally favor merit selection. It's not an elitist way to do this. I point to governors in the past in Pennsylvania who have had their own problems with their aides and legislative assistants an or indictees or what have you. The thought goes almost uniformly to appointed, good judges. The same thing happens on the federal level. The man at the top in the Governor's seat seems to have, while he may be fooling around in some other area, he seems to have a certain respect for judiciary and appointments to the judiciary.

THE CHAIRMAN: McHale for 30 seconds.

REPREENTATIVE MCHALE: Mr. Surrick, on page 4 of your testimony, you state, "In spite of my demand that the proceedings be open to the public, the news media and public were excluded from large portions of the hearings." Why?

MR. SURRICK: Because they said, the representation was made that testimony would involve matters that went before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board and was therefore, constitutionally confidential, and the public had a right to know. I was faced with a situation where testimony would be against me in secret, and I had to try

1	and answer in public. That's not right.
2	REPRESENTATIVE MCHALE: Who's the they?
3	MR. SURRICK: The disciplinary board.
4	THE CHAIRMAN: Was there a formal decision on
5	that?
6	MR. SURRICK: No.
7	REPRESENTATIVE MCHALE: Thank you, Mr.
8	Chairman.
9	THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We'll open the
10	Committee Members to correspondence or to talk with you on
11	the phone. We are going to be moving. You are going to see
12	some action one way or the other.
13	MR. SURRICK: Good.
14	THE CHAIRMAN: Hopefully it will be the way you
15	and I feel. I feel parallel with you on a variety of
16	things. Although I am a politician, I recognize the
17	inherent limitations of what we'll be able to do. I have a
18	quick question to you, yes or no. It's a yes or no. Would
19	you rather have the changes embodied here with some House
20	amendments than the system we have today?
21	MR. SURRICK: Absolutely. It's a problem.
22	THE CHAIRMAN: Next witness, Joe Jones,
23	Esquire. President, Pennsylvania Bar Association. Good
24	morning, Joe.
25	MR. JONES: Thank you Mr. Chairman. We are

pleased to be here. I understand the time and I shall make my prepared statement and be prepared to answer any questions.

The Pennsylvania Bar Association is composed of 26,000 members. It is committed to judicial reform and has been committed to merit selection since 1947.

We are disappointed that the merit selection proceedings are not included in the Bill but recognizing the practicality of the situation, are anxious to move judicial reform ahead, although on a basis which will not compromise the independence of the judiciary, a fundamental principle upon which this Commonwealth and this country is based, although there is much in Senate Bill Number 1 of which the bar association approves, it is our view that the Bill requires substantial amendments. Our comments are initially directed to Section 10, paragraph 2 relating to the Attorney Disciplinary Board.

while it has always been the position of the association that certain rule changes should be made in connection with the board, it was never the position of the association that it should be a constitutionally mandated board.

This elevated status gives rise to another issue, and that's the cost of operation which is presently met by an assessment of the lawyers, but if established as a

constitutionally operated or mandated board, the burden of finance may very well fall upon the Commonwealth.

We favor direct discipline of the members of the bar by the board as proposed in Section 10(d), thereby relieving the Supreme Court of its burden of imposing an order of discipline in every case where one was found to be warranted, rather than endorsing a constitutional mandate which takes a period of time. The DPBA would recommend such change to be made by a simple revision of the present Supreme Court Rules.

In addition, the provisions of 10(d) with respect to appeals procedure raises some questions of a different scope of review for the parties, since an attorney being investigated may have a full appeal, but the counsel for the disciplinary board actually acting as counsel for the public, may not appeal unless approved by a vote of the designated number of members of the board which issued the discipline in the first place, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in such an appeal is limited in its scope of review. The Supreme Court's review should not be a narrow one on such an important issue.

I respectfully submit that Section 10(d) should be deleted from the Bill and the changes with respect to increasing the power of the Attorney Disciplinary Board to discipline directly, attorneys, by reprimand, censure or

other action should be provided by an amendment to the Supreme Court Rules.

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With respect to the Section 10 -- I'll skip over that, but Judicial Council is advisory. We don't have any objection to that but we don't think it should rise to the status of the constitutionally mandated board as just an advisory board.

We are also supporters of the concept of financial disclosure as contained in Subsection 17. We are aware of the substantial media and editorial pressure on the Legislature to amend the present constitutional provisions as they relate to the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board.

The alleged evil to be cured is the domination of the board by lawyers and judges who are said to be too inclined to protect their own. We do not see lawyers and judges having common interests other than achieving the highest level of integrity and quality in the judiciary.

Lawyers are not judges and should be considered as a separate group, not handmaidens of the judiciary.

Judges, although they are lawyers, a separate and distinct constituency from lawyers, the public.

The Judicial Conduct Board, regardless of its size -- and we would favor increasing the size, in the interest of the group it is to serve -- should be composed of an equal number of members from the board's three

constituencies; public, the bar and the judiciary.

Past lack of confidence and the performance of the existing board actually arises, in our view, not because of its composition, but because of the confidentiality which surrounds it. The association endorses the changes in the Bill regarding confidentiality of the board's proceedings and respectfully represents that the removal of the aspects of the confidentiality as described by Senate Bill I would alleviate most, if not all, of the present criticism.

We are opposed to the method presented in Senate Bill 1 for the selection of the members of the Judicial Conduct Board. First we do not agree that the chief justice alone should make an appointment, but that if the present structure of the Bill is maintained, those appointments should be made by the Supreme Court, itself.

Second, we believe that the Senate Bill 1
politicizes the Judicial Conduct Board in that a majority of
the appointees could be selected without any public notice,
without public review of qualifications, and serving on a
purely political basis.

The provision for three appointees by the Governor and four by the leaders of the House and Senate may be useful in having the Bill adopted, but in our view, poses a serious threat to the independence of the Judicial Branch of the government.

Given the particular situation, it would be possible if Senate Bill 1 is enacted, for a combination of six political appointees to remove or directly affect the Supreme Court and the third branch of the government. This is not beyond the realm of possibility. FDR tried to do it for many years.

We continue to believe and advocate that the members of the board should be appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by a simple majority of the Senate. While not removing the appointments from the political arena, they will be exposed to fresh air, open public hearings on their qualifications.

This is a process used for other important offices and one which is generally accepted. In addition, the appointments by the Supreme Court by itself, provided by the Chief Justice, makes the Supreme Court both the appointing authority and the reviewing authority and those functions should be separate.

The provisions of the Bill, Section 16(d) which authorizes the Judicial Conduct Board to consider the conduct of a justice, judge or justice of the peace, district justice, with respect to discipline whether or not such conduct occurred while acting in a judicial capacity or as provided by law should certainly be prohibited by law as it relates to the action of the Judicial Conduct Board.

Section 18(h)(4) gives rise to a possible absurdity, assuming an effort by the board to conceal a serious situation. By ordering a private censure, for example, the board would preclude any review which the Supreme Court on its own motion or on the petition of four or more members of the board.

Because the section referred to prescribes such review only in the event the board does not order suspension, removal, discipline, censure or compulsory retirement. We support the provisions of 19(a) and (b) relating to budgetary and appropriation procedures.

Section 19(c) refers to fees assessed by the Attorney Disciplinary Board. But assessments presently made by the Supreme Court for the functioning of the various boards and our procedures should not be altered since otherwise, there would be no watchdog over the board or agency spending the money. We object to any board having power to assess and spend without accountability.

Section 19(d) empowering the Attorney General to audit the accounts of the Unified Judicial System is a positive step. It is the position of the Pennsylvania Bar Association that Senate Bill 1, in its present form, should not be enacted but should undergo substantial amendment and revision.

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Governor Casey has indicated publicly his

1 intention to appoint a task force on judicial reform. 2 Pennsylvania Bar Association hopes to participate in that 3 task force and perhaps it would be best to wait until this 4 report is issued after a thorough and careful study prior to 5 enacting or approving such far reaching constitutional 6 amendments.

THE CHAIRMAN: With all due respect, I think Mr. Surrick is right. I think we have waited long enough. We have time for one question. One question. No, you have asked one, unless nobody else has one. Gerry Kosinski.

I want to make it known that we MR. KOSINSKI: are the Committee who's been examining this for four years, Mr. Jones, and I think we are ready to make our decision. The Governor could appoint every committee he wants under the sun. We are ready to move. We are going to do it.

MR. JONES: We agree that it's time to move but we do not agree that this Bill should be enacted without substantial amendments.

THE CHAIRMAN: That's why we wanted you to participate, but I am almost insulted by the idea of another blue ribbon panel to discuss these kinds of issues. what Stuart Greenleaf and his folks are talking about, and ourselves and our folks are not incredulous at the idea of another blue ribbon panel. I don't think we need it.

Again, I share that with you.

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MR. JONES: We appreciate that. The suggestion was the Governor's and we don't -- the suggestion was not mine.

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THE CHAIRMAN: We share with the Governor.

REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: Were the Governor here, we could blame him, instead.

THE CHAIRMAN: One last comment. On page 3 of your testimony, quote, "We do not see lawyers and judges having common interests other than achieving the highest level of integrity and quality in the judiciary." Again, Mr. Surrick -- I never saw the guy until today. I don't know him any more than I know Ortega's brother-in-law, and I think this guy is right and you are wrong.

I want to state that for the record, I do not believe that. And that's why I think John Stauffer and his colleagues in the House of Representatives has to move at least in this direction. I say that with all due respect to you, sir.

MR. JONES: I appreciate your comments and I agree with Judge Rowley, and I agree with what Mr. Surrick says. The key, really, is in the qualifications of the people who are appointed. It's the people who are appointed who are going to make this work and if the people who are appointed are under this system, I think it's a serious threat to our third branch of government.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very kindly, and we'll be in touch with you also. We look forward to working with you, at least I do, during the biennium.

MR. JONES: Our facilities, which are extensive, are available to you and to the Committee.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, sir. The next witness and the fourth of five witnesses, Mark Sonnenfeld, Esquire, Philadelphia Bar Association. Mark will have to excuse me about three minutes. Gerry Kosinski wili chair in my absence. Welcome.

MR. SONNENFELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Representative Kosinski and distinguished members of the
Judiciary Committee. I am Mark Sonnenfeld, Chair of the
Board of Governors of the Philadelphia Bar Association.

Philadelphia Bar Association has long recognized the need to strengthen and improve the judicial discipline process and also the need for government selection of our judges, including the appellate judges. As I mentioned to one representative this morning, prior to the hearing, we presently really have two lotteries in Pennsylvania; one to raise funds for the elderly and the other to select our appellate judges.

With respect to Senate Bill Number 1, the matter before us today, the Philadelphia Bar Association objects to the provisions of Senate Bill Number 1, which

would replace the current Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania with a new Attorney Disciplinary Board.

With all due deference to Mr. Surrick's accounts, who I do hold in high regard, the current disciplinary board appears to be functioning well and indeed, despite intense public scrutiny of the entire state judicial process, has largely escaped criticism.

We would urge adhering to the old maxim, if something is not broken, it should not be fixed. Under Senate Bill Number 1, the new Attorney Discipline Board would be empowered with the authority to impose public discipline. Thus the proposed disciplinary board would have only limited accountability to the Supreme Court because the amendments would give the authority to the board and not to the court to impose public discipline.

Pennsylvania thereby would become virtually the only state in the nation whose Supreme Court would not have the final authority to discipline attorneys who are members of its bar.

Senate Bill Number 1 also would eliminate disciplinary counsel's right to appeal to the Supreme Court absent the concurrence of three members of the board from a decision on an attorney disciplined by the board and instead, as Senate Bill Number 1 would permit an appeal only

by the respondent attorney or by the Disciplinary Counsel with the concurrence of three members of the board.

As a result, Senate Bill Number 1 could, indeed, have the unintended effect of lessening the degree of discipline imposed, since, as a practical matter, the proposed procedure would place the sole discretion as to whether an appeal would be taken in the hands of the respondent attorney.

We can hypothesize the situation were the board to impose discipline in the form of a public censure or a discipline of a nominal degree in that instance the disciplinary counsel would not be able to appeal.

As recent as last week's session, the diciplinary counsel had recommended to the board, had recommended to the Supreme Court a lesser degree of discipline and there was an appeal to the Supreme Court which last week recommended the disbarment of a lawyer who had been accused of bribing a labor official.

Under this Bill, the Supreme Court would not have had opportunity to disbar that lawyer and would have been bound, with no ability to review a decision by the disciplinary board, to impose a lesser discipline.

Finally, Senate Bill 1 would subject the

Attorney Disciplinary Board to an audit requirement imposed

by the General Assembly, who appeared to overlook the fact

that the present board is self supporting from fees paid by attorneys, and is annually audited by an accounting firm.

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With respect to the judges, the Philadelphia Bar Association has repeatedly recognized the need to strengthen and improve the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, among other things, by requiring that a majority of its members not be judges and providing a full time executive director, counsel and staff, and as Judge Rowley noted, adequate funding. As far as composition, our recommendation would be three lawyers, three judges and three non-lawyers.

We are concerned that several aspects of the Judicial Conduct Board proposed by Senate Bill Mumber 1 as presently drafted could have the unintended effect of impairing the disciplinary process.

Most controversial, I believe, are the provisions concerning when the proceedings of the board become public. And here, as I read the Bill there twice appeared to me to be a very serious drafting in the Bill which could not possibly have the intended effect that would result.

Section 18(g) of Senate Bill Number 1 provides that the new Judicial Conduct Board or proposed Judicial Conduct Board, rather would file the record of any hearing conducted by it with the Supreme Court, whether or not an it

either disciplines, and that the Judicial Conduct Board would make public the nature of each charge and its finding, an opinion, regardless of whether or not it imposes discipline.

Going on in the Bill, Section 18(h)(5) provides that upon the expiration of 60 days after a request for review by the Supreme Court, the entire record of the Judicial Conduct Board and the Supreme Court would be made available for public inspection at the principal offices of the Judicial Conduct Board. This raises in my mind a number of questions as to when a record would become public.

In the event, for example, that no review is sought by the judge; take, for example, the Judge Snyder situation, suppose Judge Snyder had determined not to appeal from the decision of the board that he be disciplined.

Under Senate Bill Number 1, all that would have been made available for public inspection would have been the conclusion and finding, an opinion of the board, but not the record, that is, not the transcript of the proceedings, itself. Those, that record, that is, the transcript, would only have been public in the event there was an appeal, and upon the expiration of a 60-day period.

From what I understand of the concern before this Committee and the comparable committee on the Senate side, this cannot possibly have been what was intended

because it would shield the very thing from public disclosure that has caused, I think, a lot of concern of this Committee. It also raises the question of what was intended by filing the record with the Supreme Court.

Generally, any document filed with the Supreme

Court is filed with the Prothonotary and becomes public upon

its filing. Here the Bill calls for a filing and public

disclosure at a different location and a different time

subsequent to the filing.

Finally, I have addressed the composition, which we feel is a critical one. The present, the composition proposed by Senate Bill Number 1 having only three judges, only two of them may be trained in the law, since one could be a district justice not trained in the law, could result in a board with only four out of five people trained in the law.

This would be a board empowered to discipline

-- not a recommendation -- a board empowered to adopt its

own rules and regulations as compared to the present board,

whose rules were adopted by the Supreme Court.

For that reason, we would urge the composition of three, three and three as I suggested. I thank you very much for you time and attention and would be happy to answer any questions.

THE CHAIRMAN: I am going to allow one

1 question. 2 (No response.) 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Seeing no questions, thank you 4 very much. 5 MR. SONNENFELD: Thank very much, Mr. б Chairman. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Mundy. Our final witness is 8 Jim Mundy, Esquire, member of the Disciplinary Board of the 9 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, friend of Bob Casey. 10 MR. MUNDY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 11 for the warm welcome. I'll try to stay in my time. I am 12 here in my capacity as a member of the board, Disciplinary 13 Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. I am going to 14 confine my remarks to what is on pages 2 and 3 of this Bili, 15 and that is the proposed change in the Disciplinary Board. 16 I think it's important for this Committee to 17 recognize that the disciplinary system in Pennsylvania is a 18 far more elaborate system -- that system for lawyers -- than 19 is the system for judges. It has to be. There are 38,000 20 lawyers in Pennsylvania. 21 The system for disciplining lawyers, therefore, 22 has to be a great deal larger and more expansive than the 23 judiciary. It is not a simple matter of addressing the

The system is really a three-tiered system;

disciplinary boards. You're addressing the system.

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of the Supreme Court. It was created by the order of the Supreme Court in March of 1972. The three-tier system consists of an independent prosecutorial office, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which consists of the 20 law, full time lawyers, eight investigators and 18 officers who staff four offices across the state by district.

In the second segment in the hearing committee there are 36 hearing committees consisting of volunteer lawyers who volunteer their time to act as the trial court where the accused lawyer brought to the Hearing Committee under charges brought by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, receives his or her trial. The disciplinary board operates above the two as sort of an intermediate appellate court, but also one with procedural jurisdiction over both.

That is the disciplinary system and the way the system works is a lawyer starts at one level, the case is heard there, and an appeal record then goes to the disciplinary board who hears the case the second time together with oral argument, briefs on exceptions from either or both sides, and then the entire record goes to the Supreme Court and it is the Supreme Court that issues the discipline. That's the system that we have in Pennsylvania today. It is regarded around the country as a model system.

It has been responsible for the fact that 25,000 complaints against lawyers have been investigated to their finality in the 15-year existence of this system. 200 lawyer complaints a month are investigated fully under this system.

Over 5,500 lawyers in the 15 years have received some form of public discipline. 8 percent of those received discipline requiring the loss of that lawyer's license to practice either by suspension or disbarment for a period of time.

That's the system that we have. It is, when you compare it to the other professional disciplinary systems that we have in the State of Pennsylvania, not only a more expansive one, but probably the most effective one. You will not find architects, engineers, doctors or anyone else having a record of discipline such as the ones lawyers have imposed upon themselves through this system.

The changes that are proposed in Senate Bill 1 are far reaching. First of all, it focuses on one segment, the board only, the intermediate appellate court, if you will, of the system and suddenly creates that as a constitutional vehicle.

What happens to the rest. What happens to the hearing committee in the Office of Disciplinary Counsel who were proscribed by Supreme Court order if the board is now

the constitutional entity. How does it have jurisdiction, who has jurisdiction over what and what's independent of what?

The whole system is changed by one simple act of making the board constitutional. We have very clever lawyers out there are who represent respondents, and I can think of a number of novel arguments that I would use were I representing one of them if I suddenly had a constitutional vehicle created in the board and I was subject to the jurisdiction of these others who had been created by prior court order, but that is only one of two major changes that this would enact only the system that I think the committee must focus on.

The second and the far more important one is that we would become the only state in the United States that have the discipline of lawyers belonging in some body created other than by the Supreme Court, of the highest court of that state. In every other state, that's the way discipline is done.

We would change that. You would change that in such a way as to give the edge to lawyers. You would be protecting lawyers. And the reason you would be doing that is because if the lawyer were unhappy with the discipline that the board handed out, the lawyer would have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court.

If the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the prosecutor were unhappy with the results, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel would have no such right.

Historically, we on the board have been known to be more gentle with our brethren than has been the Supreme Court.

The Stern case that was mentioned by Mark Sonnenfeld here earlier was an example. There are others. I have spent five years in hearing complaints and another three years on this board. There's 78 years in the system and I can tell you that the system has historically worked that way.

If we do have a record for being a modest state of lawyer discipline and according to the ABA, we do, then most of that credit belongs to the Supreme Court and belongs in the fact that the Supreme Court is the ultimate disciplinary body.

This change, then, would change things in two very sustantial ways; one, by creating a constitutional entity in the middle of a system that is now working very well. It raises questions as to whether the whole system should fall and second, by changing the disciplinary board from the Supreme Court to the board, I think it weakens the system or will have the effect of weakening the system.

It will go to the benefits of the lawyers whose type of practice has been subject to discipline in the past

and that way work against the public, and the only other remark I would make with respect to the disciplinary board is if it is the position of this Committee to address it in a constitutional way, then for the reasons that Judge Rowley mentioned with the JIRB, the expansion of 15 from our present 13 would make sense.

We, too, operate in panels of three as does the JIRB and when that panel operates in a preliminary fashion to determine whether or not an action should be brought, we disqualify those three individuals from final resolution of the matter. So expanding the board in that way would help us.

THE CHAIRMAN: Questions? Lois?

REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: Thank you. Mr. Mundy, you have described what I think most of us who have followed the JIRB and the Attorney Disciplinary Board, accurately as to our perception of the Attorney Disciplinary Board functions very effectively. What do you see as the reasons why that board is so effective and the JIRB is recognized as so ineffective?

MR. MUNDY: We have a far more elaborate system. Judge Rowley was correct. The system, the JIRB would benefit from having a two-tiered system which is really a shortcut and a cheaper way of doing what we have done. By creating an Office of Disciplinary Counsel, we

have a separate prosecutorial arm away from the judicial arm, and we have a three-tiered system.

Judge Rowley's suggestion within the confines of his budget is to try to address that by creating a two-tiered JIRB. In either event, I think if the JIRB is at least expanded to 15 members, they would, at least, have the same option that we now exercise, and that is to have the three members, three-member panels, appear at a matter preliminarily disqualify themselves from hearing the final adjudication.

REPRESENTATIVE HAGGARTY: Just as followup, are there any other suggestions as a result of your serving on the disciplinary board that you could recommend to make the JIRB more effective?

MR. MUNDY: The one I share with respect to that is this. If it is the mind of this Committee that a professional does not have the capacity to judge a fellow professional, that lawyers and judges shouldn't be judging judges or that lawyers shouldn't be judging lawyers, then I think this committee should correspondence with the engineers or architects or doctors --

THE CHAIRMAN: You don't see the difference.

MR. MUNDY: Because the public is subject to the ethics of all professionals, and if we are going to say that only layman or a majority of laymen can effectively do

1	that job, then you ought to do it across the board and you
2	shouldn't pick out one professional and say it should be
3	them, only.
4	THE CHAIRMAN: I don't mean to interrupt. Go
5	ahead, Lois, and I'll respond.
6	REPRESENTATIVE HAGGARTY: That answered my
7	question.
8	THE CHAIRMAN: I don't see the difference
9	between architects and how they impact upon good old boys in
10	Greene County and how lawyers impact upon good old boys in
11	Greene County.
12	REPRESENTATIVE HAGGARTY: How about doctors?
13	THE CHAIRMAN: I am asking the witness, Ms.
14	Haggarty. You don't see any difference? Barbers, real
15	estate people
16	MR. MUNDY: I would be very suspect if the
17	lawyer who represented me in trying to buy the house that
18	was being built treated me in an unprofessional manner. I
19	would probably expect that the architect who designed the
20	house didn't know what he was doing and the House was no
21	good.
22	THE CHAIRMAN: With all due respect, why do you
23	think the State Senate sent us this Bill with such an
24	overwhelming vote and changed it?
25	THE WITNESS: I believe that there has been

justified criticism levied against the JIRB in the past in controversial cases where they have said that judges should not dominate the JIRB. Perhaps there is something to that, and perhaps by expanding the JIRB and giving more lay representation which I would favor. And we have lay representatives on our Disciplinary Board and they function very effectively in that capacity, having more lawyers and fewer judges, more laymen, lawyers and fewer judges would be a more acceptable body to the eyes of the public.

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But when you say the JIRB is from then on going to be the Disciplinary Board, actually issue the discipline and say you are going to put all that in the hands of laymen, majority of laymen and you are going to give them the power to issue their own rules and procedures in addition to that, I think you you have really wakened that system.

It's difficult for a layman to make that transition. They are not familiar with all the nuances of a professional. Those lay people who serve on our board work very, very hard, longer hours than we do, to try to make up for that. It's very difficult for them, and I think it would be putting a burden upon them to put them in the majority.

THE CHAIRMAN: Other questions? Dave Heckler, then and Mike Bortner. We are not going to have time for a

lot.

REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: I would ask the witness just one question. Would it be fair to say that your opinion would be that Senate Bill 1, whatever amendments we consider so far as the JTRB is concerned, the amendment you would like to see is just removing all reference to the Supreme Court Disciplinary Board and let that go as it has under Supreme Court authority.

MR. MUNDY: That's the position of the Disciplinary Board.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mike Bortner.

REPRESENTATIVE BORTNER: I have a number of questions. I won't ask them all. I just hope we have an opportunity to take this subject up again. I think there's a lot of issues raised today that I'd like to get more information on and have discussed among the members of the committee.

THE CHAIRMAN: Any further comments? Jerry Birmelin?

REPRESENTATIVE BIRMELIN: You are going to continue hearings on this Bill?

THE CHAIRMAN: We are going to move forward on this legislation before we leave for the summer recess. I will discuss the logistics of that question with our staff and with Nick Moehlmann and respond to you in a day or two

or three. I have politely requested after each witness, that our members feel free to discuss with our witnesses from the bar association from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Mr. Surrick, Mr. Mundy, and I had mentioned Mr. Jones, Judge Rowley, we have been discussing this for quite some time.

The essence of what we have here is pretty much what Jubelirer sent to us 16 months into the last session.

I don't have much contrition of not bringing that one forward. There are a lot of legislative or political expeditions that have heeded his advance.

That's comething we saw in March of last year. We have really been looking at it for over a year. To specifically get to your question, within the next week or two, we are probably going to have a committee meeting and see what the committee wants to do with this particular proposal.

So in response to you, yes, we will have a meeting. We will have amendments prepared and we will probably have a vote, but I want to move some kind of effort to modify the JIRB and to take care of questions that have been raised. Along with Mr. Bortner, I have other questions and I don't have the answers and I am smart enough to know I only have one vote.

I am not going to live or die on whether this prevails or doesn't prevail. The only thing I feel very

strongly about is what Mr. Kosinski alluded to earlier in his remarks. I don't think we need a gubernatorial commission added, and I think that's our responsibility, along with Mr. Greenleaf, O'Pake, Moehlmann and ourselves among our committee, to send something worthwhile to the floor.

Thank you very much. Meeting adjourned.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN

VOTERS OF PENNSYLVANIA

The League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania is pleased that the House Judiciary Committee has scheduled a public hearing on judicial reform. We appreciate the opportunity to present our views on S1 (805).

The League believes that the issue is accountability. Our perception of public issues and governmental processes has grown out of our conviction that government at all revels must be accountable to citizens.

In Pennsylvania, that is not now the case. The Judicial Branch of government maintains its own rules and regulations and is less accountable to the public than the Executive and Legislative Branches.

We believe it is important to restore public confidence in the judicial system. News reports of alleged judicial misconduct do not destroy trust in the system. But allegations and investigations that are met time after time

with silence, we believe, steadily erode the confidence of the public.

In addition, knowing there is an excellent chance that no public report of allegations of misconduct will be forthcoming does not build public trust nor ensure ethical behavior.

amendment, would make government a more open process by requiring public financial disclosure and ending the domination of the judicial disciplinary board by lawyers and judges. We support the requirement that justices, judges, and justices of the peace provide no less financial information than members of the legislature. The League also supports the provision requiring a lay majority on the Judicial Conduct Board, a provision ensuring more public participation.

We believe that in its expenditure of public funds, the judiciary should be held no less accountable than the other branches of government. We support the provision giving the Auditor General authority to audit the expenditures of the state courts.

Some say there is no public outcry for judicial reform. But the issue is not a simple one. The average citizen, perhaps, is too easily intimidated by what seems a gargantuan task. We believe that a vote for an open,

1	responsible, and ethical government can be easily understood
2	by citizens. As public confidence in the judicial system
3	increases, citizens will be appreciative of lawmakers who
4	took action to build a more accountable and effective
5	judiciary. S1 (805) is an excellent place to begin.
6	(Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the meeting was
7	adjourned.)
8	I hereby certify that the proceedings and
9	evidence are contained fully and accurately in the notes
10	taken by me during the hearing of the within cause, and that
11	this is a true and correct transcript of the same.
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