

**THE FINAL REPORT
OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO
INVESTIGATE DISTURBANCES AT CAMP HILL
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION**

December 21, 1989

Submitted by

Honorable Arlin M. Adams
Honorable George M. Leader
Honorable K. Leroy Irvis

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TRANSMITTAL LETTER

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FOREWORD.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	3
I. CAMP HILL WAS ESTABLISHED AS A MINIMUM SECURITY FACILITY FOR JUVENILES AND YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS.....	3
II. CAMP HILL WAS OVERCROWDED AND UNDERSTAFFED BEFORE THE RIOTS.....	5
CHRONOLOGY.....	12
III. THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF AN IMPENDING RIOT.....	12
IV. THE FIRST RIOT WAS SPARKED BY A CONFRONTATION AT E GATE.....	14
V. CORRECTIONS PERSONNEL, MUNICIPAL AND STATE POLICE, AND THE PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (PEMA) WERE ALERTED AND RESPONDED QUICKLY.....	17
VI. NEGOTIATIONS ON OCTOBER 25, 1989 EFFECTED RESOLUTION OF THE DISTURBANCE.....	18
VII. INMATES VOLUNTARILY RETURNED TO CELLS AND ALL HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED.....	19
VIII. THE SUPERINTENDENT AND THE DEPUTIES DECIDED NOT TO SEARCH CELLS AND THEIR CONTENTS OR TO CLEAN UP THE CELL BLOCKS.....	22
IX. THE SUPERINTENDENT, THE DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS, AND MAJOR OF THE GUARD DECIDED THAT A COMPLEMENT OF 25 PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE WAS ADEQUATE.....	24

X.	THE SUPERINTENDENT'S MEMORANDUM REVEALS THERE WAS NO SHAKEDOWN AND SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL RECEIVED REPORTS OF SECURITY PROBLEMS ON THURSDAY.....	26
XI.	THE AGREED MEETING WITH INMATE NEGOTIATORS OCCURRED AS SCHEDULED AT 1:00 P.M.....	28
XII.	THE SECOND INCIDENT WAS PROBABLY ORGANIZED AND PLANNED.....	29
XIII.	PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE WERE DELAYED AT THE MAIN GATE WHILE DOZENS OF STAFF WERE TRAPPED.....	30
XIV.	THE PERIMETER WAS SURROUNDED AND NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN SOON AFTER THE SECOND RIOT ERUPTED.....	33
XV.	THE RIOTS DAMAGED CAMP HILL'S PHYSICAL PLANT.....	36
	ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS.....	38
XVI.	AN IMMEDIATE "SHOW OF FORCE" AT E GATE ON OCTOBER 25, 1989 SHOULD HAVE BEEN MOUNTED BY THE INSTITUTION.....	38
XVII.	CAMP HILL SUPERVISORY STAFF DID NOT REPORT SIGNIFICANT SECURITY PROBLEMS ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1989.....	39
XVIII.	THE PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY WAS NOT FULLY UTILIZED.....	39
XIX.	THE SUPERINTENDENT AND THE DEPUTIES SHOULD HAVE ORDERED AN IMMEDIATE SHAKEDOWN OF THE INSTITUTION.....	40
XX.	THE SUPERINTENDENT AND THE DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT STAFFING OR, ALTERNATIVELY, HAVE SUFFICIENT POLICE PRESENT TO PROVIDE A SHOW OF FORCE....	41
XXI.	THE USE OF FORCE WAS REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.....	42

XXII.	THE COMMISSIONER PARTICIPATED IN SOME DECISIONS BUT NOT IN OTHERS AND DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ASSISTANCE TO A FATIGUED SUPERINTENDENT.....	44
RECOMMENDATIONS.....		48
XXIII.	SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS SHOULD RECEIVE PRIORITY.....	48
XXIV.	OVERCROWDING REQUIRES A REASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND CONSIDERATION OF METHODS TO RELEASE SELECTIVE INMATES PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THEIR SENTENCES.....	51
XXV.	THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS IMPROVEMENTS IN STAFFING, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PROGRAMMING.....	53
XXVI.	COMMONWEALTH AND LOCAL AGENCIES SHOULD ACHIEVE A HIGHER DEGREE OF COORDINATION THROUGH PLANNING.....	55
XXVII.	A SATELLITE OFFICE OF THE STATE INSPECTOR GENERAL SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.....	56

EXHIBITS

- A. Executive Order, October 30, 1989, as amended November 28, 1989
- B. Diagram of the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill
- C. Camp Hill Inmate Population, June 1982 - September 1989
- D. Camp Hill Budget Information, 1984-85 to 1989-90
- E. Camp Hill Inmate Participation in Chemical Abuse, Sex Offender and Educational Programs, January 1989 to September 1989
- F. Superintendent's Memorandum, dated September 11, 1989

- G. Photographs of Typical Cell Conditions after the First Riot (taken by the Pennsylvania State Police)
- H. Superintendent's Memorandum, dated October 26, 1989
- I. Commissioner's Memorandum, dated October 26, 1989
- J. Board of Pardons, Clemency Statistics, By Administration, 1967 to 1989

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE DISTURBANCES AT
CAMP HILL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

Room 307 Finance Building
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
(717) 772-2705

December 21, 1989

The Honorable Robert P. Casey
Governor
Room 225
Main Capitol Building
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Dear Governor Casey:

We hereby transmit to you the Final Report of the Governor's Commission to Investigate Disturbances at Camp Hill Correctional Institution. The Final Report contains an Executive Summary, chronology, analysis and conclusions, and recommendations based on our investigation of the events of October 25, 26, and 27, 1989 at Camp Hill.

The Commonwealth's correctional system requires attention to address what the Commission deems to be serious problems. We believe you will find in the recommendations a number of items that, if implemented, could greatly ameliorate conditions created by the overarching problem of crime in our contemporary society.

The Commissioners are available to discuss with you the issues, the recommendations, and facts in the Report.

We were proud to have served you and the Commonwealth in this important endeavor.

Respectfully,

Arlin M. Adams
George M. Leader
K. Leroy Irvis

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Governor's Commission to Investigate Disturbances at Camp Hill Correctional Institution ("Commission") was created by Governor Robert P. Casey, pursuant to Executive Order No. 1989-9, on October 30, 1989, as amended November 28, 1989, to review the events of October 25, 26, and 27, 1989, at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill ("Camp Hill").

The Commission, together with its staff, conducted an investigation which included physical inspections, field interviews, file reviews, examination of evidence, and the taking of sworn testimony. While the Commission focused on the events it was specifically directed to review, the Commission also received and reviewed considerable data on the Department of Corrections operations, the history and conditions existing at Camp Hill, and the interrelationship of other components of the criminal justice system with the correctional system.

With regard to the October 25, 1989 riot, the Commission determined that the Camp Hill staff had information indicating growing unrest among the inmates, which did not receive the attention it deserved. In addition, information that a disturbance was imminent was not pursued. In the Commission's judgment, the failure to react to information about inmate unrest and

to insure that important information flowed through the appropriate channels contributed to a condition of surprise for the staff and management on October 25, and their being lulled into an unrealistic sense of security in the period between the two riots.

Although the Commission did receive circumstantial evidence that the first riot had been planned, it does not conclude at this time that there was a precisely timed plan by inmates to gain control of Camp Hill on October 25. The Commission concludes that there was a lapse in security following the confrontation between a corrections officer and an inmate that appeared to initiate the October 25 disturbance. Specifically, the unarmed "show of force" by a dozen corrections officers in the 30 to 40 minutes after the confrontation was inadequate. An immediate armed contingent of corrections staff and available police would, in all probability, have prevented the retreat by these officers, contained the disturbance and, thereby, avoided the escalation of the disturbance into a riot.

Events and circumstances leading to the October 26 riot are somewhat clearer than those preceding the October 25 riot. A series of critical decisions in the course of these events and circumstances raise serious questions. The Commission concludes that if appropriate action had been taken by supervisory personnel and management in the early hours of October 26 or during that day, the second riot would in all probability have been prevented.

First, the Superintendent, the Deputy for Operations, and the Deputy for Treatment determined that there would not be a search of cells ("shakedown") in spite of the knowledge that cell block keys, radios, tools, weapons and the like were in inmates' hands. Second, the Superintendent, Deputy for Operations, Deputy for Treatment, and Major of the Guard did not assure that all cell doors were secured in spite of reports that damage to cell blocks was extensive and that some security panels housing the cell locking mechanisms were missing. Third, the Superintendent, Deputy for Operations, and Major of the Guard agreed that only 25 Pennsylvania State Police should remain at Camp Hill and that they should on Thursday morning be located outside Camp Hill's perimeter. Although there was ample time to reconsider these decisions, they were not reevaluated.

While the foregoing discussion addresses primarily the decisions of management, the Commissioner of Corrections also made crucial decisions. For example, the Commissioner followed a hands-off approach in responding to and managing the riots. Additionally, the Commissioner testified that he was unaware that there had not been a search of the cells after the first riot, although he did receive the Superintendent's memorandum stating inmates were still in possession of cell block keys, radios, tools, and weapons.

Nevertheless, despite Camp Hill and Department management omissions, the Commission finds that the community was well-protected during both riots and that there was no breach of Camp Hill's perimeter. In addition, during both riots, Camp Hill's double fence was continuously surrounded by Pennsylvania State Police, municipal police, and Department of Corrections personnel who could have acted promptly and effectively had there been a breach of the perimeter.

On October 25, Wednesday, the inmates returned to cells following negotiations. On October 27, Friday, when negotiations failed, the institution was retaken from the inmates by force. The Commission has determined that the risk to the lives of the hostages was too great to mount an immediate assault when the second riot began. The Commission finds that the Department of Corrections and Pennsylvania State Police acted with restraint between October 25 and October 27. The decision not to request the National Guard was not an inappropriate one, although the National Guard could have served as relief for municipal police maintaining perimeter security on Thursday and Friday.

While there were injuries among inmates on October 27, through the discharge of weapons, the Commission finds that the force used on October 25, 26, and 27, 1989 was reasonable under the circumstances. No deaths occurred during the first or second riots. The retaking of the institution on October 27, 1989 was coordinated, although in some respects coordination could have

been improved. With the exception of delays at the rear gate on October 25 and at the main gatehouse on October 26, the Department of Corrections and the Pennsylvania State Police reacted effectively to retake control of the facility.

The Commission recognizes that at the time the riots occurred, Camp Hill was an overcrowded institution straining an antiquated physical plant. While security must be the primary concern of the Department of Corrections, it is in the interest of the society at large that it provide rehabilitative programs and work projects for inmates incarcerated in penal institutions, such as Camp Hill. The Commission, therefore, makes a number of recommendations regarding security, programming, personnel, and other issues of pressing importance. The Commission urges the Governor to consider these recommendations.

FOREWORD

The Governor's Commission to Investigate Disturbances at Camp Hill Correctional Institution ("Commission") was created by Governor Robert P. Casey, pursuant to Executive Order No. 1989-9, on October 30, 1989, as amended November 28, 1989, to review the events of October 25, 26, and 27, 1989, at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill ("Camp Hill"). (A copy of the Executive Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.)

The Commission's staff totally committed themselves to this investigation and the Commission publicly acknowledges their outstanding contribution.

The Commission also expresses its appreciation for the widespread cooperation of many Commonwealth agencies with this investigation. Many individuals, too numerous to mention, offered considerable time to us for repeated interviews. We thank them especially, and all individuals who provided information to the Commission.

Many employees of the Department of Corrections, the Pennsylvania State Police, other Commonwealth agencies, municipal police, and fire and emergency medical teams performed their tasks during the disturbances with extraordinary professionalism and at substantial personal risk. The Commonwealth owes these

individuals an expression of gratitude for their role in quelling the disturbances.

INTRODUCTION

I. CAMP HILL WAS ESTABLISHED AS A MINIMUM SECURITY FACILITY FOR JUVENILES AND YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS.

The State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill ("Camp Hill") was established originally as the Pennsylvania Industrial School; it was referred to as White Hill. Camp Hill was authorized by the General Assembly in 1937 and intended to replace the Pennsylvania Industrial School at Huntingdon, which was then being prepared to house defective delinquents. The General Assembly intended that Camp Hill would deemphasize security and stated, in part, in its Preamble to the regulation establishing Camp Hill:

Whereas, The present Pennsylvania Industrial School at Huntingdon, originally intended as a Middle State Penitentiary, with its high walls and towers has all the aspects of a State Penitentiary, and the addition of a medium security bloc has detracted little from its forbidding appearance; and

Whereas, The internal arrangement of the cell blocs with barred windows and double locked switches contradicts the idea that [Huntingdon] is a school devoted to rehabilitation;

In accordance with the General Assembly's intent, Camp Hill was constructed as a minimum security facility on approximately 800 acres of land five miles southwest of Harrisburg. A perimeter fence enclosed about 52 acres of land. Today, as originally,

housing was primarily in ten cell blocks designed to accommodate approximately 1,400 inmates. (A diagram of Camp Hill is attached hereto as Exhibit B.) The Pennsylvania Industrial School received its first inmates in 1941.

As a replacement for the industrial school at Huntingdon, Camp Hill was designed to house only juvenile and youthful offenders. A board of trustees initially supervised the facility and, in 1945, this board was placed under the Department of Welfare. Until 1975, the institution received inmates from three sources: (1) Juvenile offenders, committed by the juvenile courts, composed the largest group in the inmate population. This group, who were between the ages of 15 and 18 on admission, could not be held beyond the age of majority. (2) Adult offenders, between the ages of 15 and 21 years and who had no known prior incarceration, were also committed to this facility. Their maximum term of incarceration was six years. (3) The population also included a small number of transfers of young adults who, due to their age and potential for rehabilitation, were considered appropriate for the facility.

The board of trustees was transferred from the Department of Public Welfare to the Department of Justice in 1953. In 1959, the General Assembly changed the facility's name to the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. In 1975, the attorney general terminated the use of the facility for juvenile commitments, and the last juvenile was released in 1977.

II. CAMP HILL WAS OVERCROWDED AND UNDERSTAFFED BEFORE THE RIOTS.

The original ten cell blocks were designed to hold approximately 1,400 inmates. Beginning in 1984, modular dormitory housing units were added inside the compound periodically to increase the institution's capacity. In 1989, the modulars had a capacity of approximately 412 beds.

Like other penal institutions throughout Pennsylvania, Camp Hill was overcrowded in 1989. In September, 1989, Camp Hill's population reached an all-time high of 2,656. In October, immediately prior to the first riot, the Commission is informed that it housed 2,607 inmates, approaching double its capacity. (By the end of 1989, in the absence of these riots, Camp Hill's population was projected to exceed 2,700 inmates and by fiscal year-end 1990-91, to exceed 3,000 inmates.) (A table showing Camp Hill's inmate population from 1982 to 1989 is attached hereto as Exhibit C.)

Between fiscal years 1984-85 and 1989-90, budgets for staffing, capital and operational expenses have increased. (A table showing Camp Hill's budgets for 1984-85 to 1989-90 is attached hereto as Exhibit D.) The budget increases reflect to some degree the increasing demands of the prison population.

Although it was originally classified as a minimum security institution, Camp Hill is currently classified as a minimum/medium facility. As of 1989, the perimeter consisted of a

double fence with razor ribbon and an electronic sensing device between the fences.

While designed and built to house juvenile and youthful offenders serving relatively short terms, on October 25, 1989, the prison population consisted solely of adult offenders, many serving long terms for serious offenses. Indeed, 192 adult offenders were serving life terms.

While the number of inmates in Camp Hill has risen from 1,583 in 1982 to a high of 2,656 in 1989, the availability of program opportunities has not kept pace. The Commission was informed that programs were made available on a priority basis to those close to their release dates. Under this arrangement, inmates with long terms were not getting opportunities for rehabilitative programs until the end of their terms, if at all.

Prior to the riots, Camp Hill offered a variety of educational programs. (A table showing the number of inmates participating in programs during 1989 is attached hereto as Exhibit E.) The education staff consisted of ten basic education teachers, eleven vocational teachers, one academic counselor, one vocational counselor, one job placement specialist, two librarians, one library clerk, and two special education teachers. (At the time Camp Hill housed only youthful offenders, as many as 50 staff members provided educational instruction.)

Camp Hill's educational programs included adult basic education, secondary education, post-secondary education, academic and vocational assessment and job placement. The basic skills program included special education classes, such as English as a second language, Adult Basic Education and General Educational Development Tests. Approximately 150 inmates earn their high school diploma annually at Camp Hill. The post-secondary programs were provided by Harrisburg Area Community College. Approximately 30 inmates were enrolled in the Business Management Associate Degree program. Special education students were evaluated by a school psychologist and Camp Hill's Special Education Program coordinator.

Prior to the riots, vocational education included computer science, print trades, carpentry, machinist trades, small gas engine repair, drafting, barbering, meat cutting, bookkeeping, typing and electronics. Vocational assessment was accomplished through the use of Apticom and the Singer Graflex Evaluation System. Camp Hill's job placement specialist prepared inmates for interviews, resume writing and their job placements in the community.

At the time of the riots, program waiting lists were estimated to be as follows: basic education, 180; post-secondary, 75; Time-to-Read, 5; vocational education, 194; literacy council, 12; and special education, 45.

Camp Hill offered a variety of treatment programs. Inmates with AIDS met in a support group, and for counseling. There were programs for inmates interested in anger management/relaxation, assertiveness training, acclimation to prison for those with hearing impairments, relaxation exercise training, preparation for release from the institution, an exercise program for those with special needs, writing enhancement, and orientation to prison life and particular cell blocks. There were special programs for sex offenders. There were a number of programs designed for veteran problems.

The Chemical Abuse Department at Camp Hill was geared to providing a multidisciplinary approach. There were four in-patient treatment programs and four satellite programs servicing approximately 500 inmates. These programs provided services for the needs of inmates along a continuum of care. One of the programs, the New Values Therapeutic Community, begun in 1973, was a structured residential drug and alcohol program. Therapy groups were conducted two to three times a day and the program required about a year to complete. There is evidence that the inmates participating in the New Values program exhibited, at least initially during both riots, a heightened concern for the safety of corrections officers and protection of property. There were approximately 100 inmates waiting to participate in chemical abuse programs at the time of the riots.

Parole violators were often idle because they were not permitted into programs or to work on jobs until their classification process was completed. This process usually took from many months to almost a year.

The Commission learned that at any given time there were at least 800 idle inmates at Camp Hill. This idle group represented almost one-third of the Camp Hill population.

In the month prior to the first riot, the Superintendent of Camp Hill wrote a memorandum in which he addressed the institution's overcrowded conditions, the plans projected to manage overcrowding, and the resources necessary to cope with these conditions. (A copy of the memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit F.) In addition to recommendations regarding expansion of Camp Hill bed space, the Superintendent also emphasized the need to include programs for sex offenders and mentally ill offenders. Finally, the Superintendent stated:

The negative effects of crowding are so pervasive and deadly that it is essential that Central Office [the Department of Corrections] and Camp Hill staff work together to develop a concrete long-term plan of action to address the issue of crowding at Camp Hill by exploring alternatives and incorporating their activation into the long-term approach of the Department of Corrections.

The impact of the two riots now requires a complete review of Camp Hill's approach to overcrowded conditions and overburdened resources.

Camp Hill was significantly understaffed at the time of the first riot. In order to provide a sufficient complement of corrections officers, personnel had to work overtime. In addition, due to the bidding for shifts, the youngest and least experienced corrections officers often were relegated to the 2 to 10 p.m. shift. This time period was one in which inmates were very active throughout the institution. Both the first and second riots erupted during the 2 to 10 p.m. shifts.

During 1988-89, Camp Hill's training programs for staff were found not to be in compliance with the American Correctional Association accreditation standards. Apparently, as of September 30, 1989, Camp Hill was unable to meet minimum training standards for corrections officers, and professional, supervisory, and clerical/support staff.

Given overcrowding and understaffing, the security of the institution was a major concern. The interior of the compound was divided into areas only by single-line chain link fencing topped with razor ribbon. Gates provided the only means of keeping inmates in certain areas. About a month before the first riot, a staff member conducting an inspection reported to the Superintendent and Major of the Guard that there was a staffing problem near the E Gate area. He noted that "if a fight were to break out it could easily turn into a major disturbance" and security was "not enough for the area." In fact, the area

identified by this staff member was the location of the incident that apparently sparked the first riot.

CHRONOLOGY

III. THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF AN IMPENDING RIOT.

Camp Hill staff stated to the Commission that a possible disturbance may have been developing since the beginning of the summer, 1989. Inmates were frustrated by overcrowding, food quality, inoperative and overcrowded showers, inadequate educational and vocational opportunities because of understaffing, and limited law library privileges. Recent management decisions to prohibit visitors from bringing food into Camp Hill on Family Day and to implement a new sick-line policy, which were made to cope with overcrowded conditions, increased tensions.

There is evidence that inmates may have been planning a disturbance for September 23, 1989, when a track meet was to be held at Camp Hill. The threat of a disturbance caused prison officials to postpone and later cancel the track meet. An inmate housed in A Block advised a corrections officer that cancelling the event would not deter the inmates planning the riot, saying, "It's not over, they'll just regroup." Some inmates reportedly told corrections officers that the instigators behind the plan were members of a Muslim sect known as Fruits of Islam ("FOI"). The Commission's interviews with inmates and staff, and information from other investigations, suggest that the FOI had been attempting to organize a disturbance among the general population

for some time. Recent changes in the Family Day and sick-line policies apparently also gave the FOI additional inmate support.

In the two-week period prior to October 25, corrections officers and other staff members were told by inmates that

- o "If you got sick time, you better take a couple of days off."
- o "Something's going down, it's a shame the corrections officers are the ones to be hurt."
- o "You're gonna wish, someday soon, that you would have saved some of your vacation."

The Commission received information that on October 24, 1989, the day before the first riot, more than one inmate told a staff member not to come to work the next day. When a similar report by a counselor was sent to management, the recipient reportedly stated that "I've been getting a lot of reports about stuff happening." Another inmate reportedly told a corrections officer on October 24 that he was going to lock himself in his cell because "it's going to kick tomorrow [October 25] after evening yard and I'm going to stay in my cell." This information was also passed through the chain of command and a written incident report was allegedly filed, although no copy has been found of this report.

Other indications of unusual behavior are obvious in hindsight:

- o Muslim inmates who usually wear kufiyahs or kafis (small round hats) were not wearing them;
- o inmates signed up en masse for sick-line on several days;
- o an FOI inmate slept in and did not attend school, which the instructor concluded was unusual;
- o an inmate informant intentionally committed "a misconduct" in order to obtain a transfer out of the general population and, when transferred, was denied permission to see a captain and warn him of the coming riot;
- o the inmates in the Restricted Housing Unit were unusually quiet and significantly fewer of them did not request a shower or use of the recreation yard.

IV. THE FIRST RIOT WAS SPARKED BY A CONFRONTATION AT E GATE.

On October 25, 1989, at approximately 2:45 p.m., approximately 500 inmates were being led by three corrections officers from the Main Stockade Field to their cells in Groups 2 and 3 to prepare for the evening meal. (A diagram of Camp Hill is attached hereto as Exhibit B.) At E Gate, one inmate confronted the officer stationed at that post. The inmate reportedly struck the officer without provocation and, when other officers and a tradesman came to this officer's aid, other inmates responded by assaulting them as well. The Commissioner testified that he observed the incident from a window in the Department's (Central Office) administration building and notified the Superintendent of the problem.

Shortly thereafter, Control Center, which was Camp Hill's central base for communications and operations, received a call from E Gate stating that a fight was in progress and officers were "down." Corrections officers and staff arrived promptly to remove the injured staff from the area.

During a period of approximately 30 to 40 minutes, about 300 inmates milled around in the yard area between Groups 2 and 3 without apparent leadership. They made no effort to immediately rampage or breach any fences. At about 3:15 p.m., almost a half hour after the initial disturbance, a contingent of about a dozen unarmed corrections officers arrived at E Gate. There were at least three vehicles nearby which officers neither removed from the area nor used as a means to barricade E Gate. These officers remained near E Gate for almost 10 minutes until approximately 3:21 p.m., when inmates approached and sprayed them with a fire extinguisher.

These officers retreated to the Control Center as inmates broke the lock on the pedestrian gate at E Gate. The inmates poured through this gate and ran throughout the compound. During this time, some corrections officers were trapped in the "switch boxes" at the front of cell blocks in Groups 2 and 3. Inmates hammered at the doors leading to the switch boxes and began to destroy the hollow block walls around the switch boxes. Inmates eventually broke through and took the corrections

officers hostage. Other corrections officers were taken hostage in other areas. Eventually, 18 hostages were taken.

At one point, one of the hostages was severely beaten by a group of inmates in the yard below the tower situated in front of the Department administration building. The tower corrections officer fired shots to aid the hostage and drove away the inmates surrounding him.

Within minutes after breaking through E Gate, one inmate commandeered a truck and rammed an interior gate, and then wildly drove toward the Main Stockade Field. The truck was driven into the perimeter fence and succeeded in breaching the inner fence. However, the inmate was unable to drive through to the outer perimeter fence. Another vehicle was also in the compound and driven by an inmate through interior fences and gates, including E Gate.

Inmates looted the Commissary and set it on fire. Other buildings -- E Gatehouse and Dispensary II -- were also burned. Minor damage was done to Modular Units 1 and 2, B Block and C Block basements, Kitchen II, and the Furniture Factory. The culinary manager's office in Kitchen II was destroyed. Two vehicles and a small electric cart were burned.

V. CORRECTIONS PERSONNEL, MUNICIPAL AND STATE POLICE, AND THE PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (PEMA) WERE ALERTED AND RESPONDED QUICKLY.

Staff in the Control Center contacted the Camp Hill Special Emergency Response Team ("SERT"), additional Camp Hill staff, Pennsylvania State Police Troop H (Harrisburg), and the Lower Allen Township Police Department for assistance. The Pennsylvania State Police began to arrive at 3:40 p.m., as fire and rescue personnel were also arriving. PEMA was notified by the Cumberland County Office of Emergency Preparedness at 3:48 p.m., about an hour after the disturbance began. (Neither the institution nor the Department of Corrections ever notified PEMA.)

Initially, Camp Hill management did not give permission to the State Police to enter the institution. The State Police were delayed at the rear gate of Camp Hill for a period of 15 to 20 minutes, during which there was a discussion regarding ammunition. The Commissioner was contacted and he authorized only shotguns loaded with "birdshot" ammunition, the standard issue to tower corrections officers. The State Police and municipal police carried "00-buckshot," a more lethal type of ammunition than "birdshot." After consideration, the Commissioner permitted the Pennsylvania State Police to enter the institution with "00-buckshot."

The Pennsylvania State Police, the Camp Hill SERT team, and municipal police departments formed at the rear gate. When

their ranks were sufficient, they removed inmates from the modular housing units and took them to the Main Stockade Field. They then set up a skirmish line outside of E Gate, thereby keeping inmates in the yard between Groups 2 and 3.

VI. NEGOTIATIONS ON OCTOBER 25, 1989
EFFECTED RESOLUTION OF THE DISTURBANCE.

Inmates obtained radios, cell block keys, and personal property from the corrections officers whom they held as hostages. Almost immediately, inmates began to call on radios and telephones to the Control Center, and negotiations between one inmate in particular and institution representatives began.

At approximately 6:45 p.m., a negotiating table was set up in front of the Education Building. Six Camp Hill personnel, including the Deputy for Treatment, met with six Muslim inmates, headed by an FOI Muslim inmate leader. This inmate leader was the one negotiating over the radio and telephone. The inmates expressed concern about overcrowding, changes in the Family Day and the sick-line policies, medical procedures in general, crowded conditions in showers, inadequate educational programs, limited access to the law library, poor corrections officer attitude, and the need for building renovation. During the negotiations, certain injured corrections officers who were being held hostage were released as a sign of "good faith."

The negotiations lasted approximately two hours. At no time during these negotiations did the Deputy for Treatment agree

to any concessions. Furthermore, there was no discussion of any special security procedures in exchange for inmates agreeing to return to their cells. The inmates agreed to return to their cells upon being assured that a meeting with the Superintendent would be held the next day at 1:00 p.m. to discuss their concerns, and that the Superintendent would issue a press release to that effect.

VII. INMATES VOLUNTARILY RETURNED TO CELLS
AND ALL HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED.

Beginning at 7:30 p.m., on October 25, 1989, all hostages were released and the inmates agreed to return to their cells for "lockdown." An institution is generally considered to be in "lockdown" or "locked down" if all inmates are placed in cells and not permitted out for programs, exercise, jobs, showers, etc. The inmates, in effect, agreed to let themselves be locked into their cells for an indeterminate period of time.

Corrections officers and the State Police then proceeded through each cell block in Groups 2 and 3, to insure inmates returned to cells, although not necessarily to their own cells or cell blocks. In some cells, there were 6 or 7 inmates. At this time, the cell blocks were not well-lighted because it was dark outside and the inmates had destroyed most of the lighting fixtures in the tiers. Other than flashlights, the corrections officers and State Police had little illumination to insure that inmates were in cells and the cell doors were locked.

There were reports of extensive damage in H Block. However, with the exception of K Block, the inmates had done extensive damage to all cell blocks in Groups 2 and 3. In particular, the inmates had damaged the security panels above the cells. Some of the security panels were missing and on the floors of the blocks. Pictures were taken by the State Police on Thursday morning depicting this damage. Three such photographs are attached hereto as Exhibit G. The importance of the security panels is that they house the locking mechanism for the cells. Missing panels permitted inmates either to reach through their cell doors and disengage an exposed latch lever (spring-type device), which, in turn, opened the cell door, or to pull on an exposed rod that would open other cell doors. Thus, a missing security panel could render the entire locking system ineffective.

Switch boxes had been generally damaged during the first riot. In the switch boxes, the corrections officers had post orders detailing emergency cell door release procedures. These post orders explained the above-described methods for releasing inmates en masse. Numerous hand and power tools that inmates had seized as weapons during the riot were lying about on the cell block floors of Groups 2 and 3 and on the ground outside, and presumably in cells as well. Fire damage, combined with perimeter fence damage, rendered sections of the electronic sensing system between the double perimeter fences inoperable.

During the first riot, there were 45 injuries, including injuries to 36 staff, 7 inmates, 1 firefighter, and 1 State Police officer. There were no deaths during the incident.

The Camp Hill press staff announced at a press conference that the institution was secure at approximately 10:00 p.m. on October 25, 1989. Yet, following the 10:00 p.m. news conference by the Camp Hill press staff, media accounts continued to report the incident as ongoing. As a result, the Superintendent announced to the media at 10:50 p.m. that the institution was "under control" and secure, and that "we are now in our phase-down procedure . . . to assess damage." At the time of both press announcements, more than 1,000 inmates, primarily from Group 1 and the modular units, were still on the Main Stockade Field and Field 1.

Almost immediately after the lockdown of inmates in Groups 2 and 3, at 2:00 a.m., there were indications that inmates were able to get out of the cells. Corrections officers heard clicking noises indicative of cell doors being closed. Between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on October 26, 1989, a corrections officer observed four to eight inmates out of cells on both the top and bottom tiers in H Block. There is disputed testimony that during this time period a corrections officer demonstrated to the Deputy for Operations how inmates could get out of their cells by reaching into the exposed locking mechanism above their cells.

Treatment staff was directed to feed the inmates and administer to their physical and emotional needs during the night.

VIII. THE SUPERINTENDENT AND THE DEPUTIES
DECIDED NOT TO SEARCH CELLS AND THEIR
CONTENTS OR TO CLEAN UP THE CELL BLOCKS.

At the end of the riot on October 25, 1989, corrections officers made pat down searches of inmates being returned from the exercise fields primarily to the modulars and the cell blocks in Group 1 (essentially those inmates not involved in the riot). There was no attempt to search cells and inmate property (as is more commonly termed, a "shakedown") in Groups 2 and 3. There was no effort to clean the cell blocks of the debris and weapons strewn on the floors. In addition, except for a few inmates who did not participate in the riot, corrections officers did not search the inmates who returned to cell blocks in Groups 2 and 3 at the conclusion of the negotiations.

In the early hours of Thursday, October 26, 1989, the Superintendent met with the Deputy for Treatment and the Deputy for Operations, the Major of the Guard, and others. One of the issues addressed was whether to conduct an immediate shakedown of the cells. The Deputy for Treatment and the Director of Treatment were against conducting a shakedown because negotiations had effectively ended the riot and a meeting to resume discussion of inmate concerns was scheduled for the next day. They advised the Superintendent to proceed with feeding the inmates and attending

to their medical needs. The Superintendent and Deputy for Operations did not favor an immediate shakedown.

The Superintendent and the Deputy for Operations were apparently influenced by the aftermath of a 1983 incident at Camp Hill. After that disturbance, there were allegations, which were investigated by a Grand Jury, that corrections officers and Pennsylvania State Police had retaliated, during a shakedown, on account of inmates beating a corrections officer. It was the belief of the Superintendent and the Deputy for Operations and Deputy for Treatment that, as a result of corrections officers seeing their colleagues being beaten during the riot, a volatile situation existed between staff and inmates. To them, a shakedown conducted by tired and angry officers could have precipitated serious disturbances if conducted immediately after the inmates were returned to their cells. This potential danger was compounded by the lack of sufficient lighting in the cell blocks to conduct a thorough search.

The Superintendent and Deputy of Operations testified that they believed the institution was in lockdown. Based on this premise and the other considerations, the Superintendent determined that a shakedown should not be conducted immediately.

IX. THE SUPERINTENDENT, THE DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS, AND MAJOR OF THE GUARD DECIDED THAT A COMPLEMENT OF 25 PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE WAS ADEQUATE.

After the institution was pronounced secure, the issue of how many police should remain at the prison needed to be addressed. Municipal police officers were permitted to return to their jurisdictions sometime in the early hours of Thursday. Over 260 Pennsylvania State Police personnel had responded to the request for assistance and now a decision had to be made whether police officers were needed at the institution and, if so, how many should remain there.

Between 1:00 and 3:00 a.m. on Thursday, a ranking Pennsylvania State Police officer and the Superintendent, together with the Deputy for Operations, discussed continuing security for the institution. The Superintendent and the Deputy for Operations and Deputy for Treatment asserted that the institution was secure. The Deputy for Operations or the Major of the Guard may have suggested about 25 police officers. In any event, the Superintendent and the Deputy for Operations agreed that only a small number of officers was needed.

The ranking State Police officer testified before the Commission that he would have assigned as many officers as were requested. Even though this State Police officer expressed concern about the security of the institution during the evening and again in the morning regarding the small number of police

officers on site, the decision was perceived by him to be the responsibility of corrections' personnel.

Initially, this group of approximately 25 police officers was in the staff dining room inside the compound. During the morning of Thursday, October 26, 1989, the police officers moved from the staff dining room to the Manor House outside the institution. This location is outside the perimeter, a quarter of a mile from the institution and prevented inmates from seeing them. The decision to relocate the State Police was made by a ranking State Police officer who was concerned about the safety of the police officers if they were to get trapped on the second floor of an institution building.

During the day, the ranking State Police officer inquired about the continuing needs of the institution for the officers located at the Manor House. Reportedly the Superintendent and the Deputy of Operations decided that the contingent of Pennsylvania State Police could be dismissed at midnight on Thursday.

As the events unfolded on Thursday, October 26, 1989, it is clear that if a second riot had occurred after midnight, there would have been no police immediately on the scene.

X. THE SUPERINTENDENT'S MEMORANDUM REVEALS
THERE WAS NO SHAKEDOWN AND SUPERVISORY
PERSONNEL RECEIVED REPORTS OF SECURITY
PROBLEMS ON THURSDAY.

On Thursday morning, October 26, 1989, based on data provided by the Deputy for Operations, the Superintendent prepared a two-page memorandum summarizing the events of the preceding day and the current conditions at Camp Hill. (A copy of this memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit H.) The memorandum was shown to the Commissioner and also faxed to the Department of Corrections administration building at 7:25 a.m. The memorandum stated in part:

Damage is extensive. Extensive damage was done to the locking mechanism in H-Block and it will be some time before the full extent of all block damage has been determined; . . . however, initial evaluation is that there is major damage.

* * *

Numerous keys, tools, knives and razors have been lost and are assumed to be in the possession of inmates. Count has not yet cleared.

The Commissioner testified that he did not read this memorandum which was submitted to him for his approval and was, therefore, unaware of its contents. He testified that he was under the impression on Thursday that a shakedown had been conducted. However, the Commissioner apparently provided a transmittal memorandum to the Superintendent's memorandum, which was,

in turn, faxed to all superintendents. (A copy of the Commissioner's memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit I.)

During Thursday, October 26, 1989, there were reports of security problems. For example, at approximately 1:00 p.m., one corrections officer trainee reported inmates out of cells in F Block. This report was made to a corrections officer lieutenant. There was apparently no response to this report.

The corrections officers and the captain who reported for the 2 to 10 p.m. shift in Groups 2 and 3 were concerned when they arrived for duty. Their ranks were depleted from injuries the preceding night. They numbered only 15, as opposed to their normal complement of 24 in Groups 2 and 3. When they arrived at the cell blocks, it appeared to them as if nothing had been done during the day. Knives, tools, and handmade weapons were lying in the yard and on the cell block floors. Certain cell blocks could not be locked due to missing keys. Interviews with corrections officers on duty that day reveal that they generally had a feeling of insecurity resulting from the conditions.

Inmates were known to have radios and one corrections officer heard static from a radio in the cell block. Management would not authorize a cell search even after corrections officers believed that they had located it.

The corrections officer lieutenant for the 2:00 to 10:00 p.m. shift on October 26, 1989 learned, shortly after being

informed at roll call that the prison was secure, that there were missing or damaged security panels, missing keys, missing radios, and tools and weapons lying about. He heard reports of inmates out of their cells. The lieutenant reported these matters to a captain. This lieutenant ordered corrections officers to remain in front of the blocks and alert him immediately if an inmate was observed out of his cell. As a precaution, he further directed them to lock and flee their cell block if more than one inmate was loose.

XI. THE AGREED MEETING WITH INMATE NEGOTIATORS
OCCURRED AS SCHEDULED AT 1:00 P.M.

On October 26, 1989, at 1:00 p.m., the same inmates who negotiated with the Deputy for Treatment the preceding night met with the Superintendent and the Deputy for Treatment and Deputy for Operations. At the outset of the meeting, the Superintendent stated that the meeting would be limited to one hour. The inmates essentially reiterated their concerns. They added cramped schedules and a lack of product variety offered at the commissary to their list of complaints. When the meeting ended, it was clear that the inmates' primary concern was the new sick-line policy. The Superintendent did agree to review the sick-line policy and respond in a couple of days. The Commissioner concurred with him not to rescind the policy and communicated to him that the policy should not be changed immediately as a result of the riot.

The inmates were frustrated as they left the meeting, because they believed that the meeting accomplished nothing. Corrections officers overheard inmates making threats, including remarks about burning the institution, as they returned to their cells in the general population in Groups 2 and 3. Corrections officers forwarded this information about the threats to their superiors, but no follow-up measures or precautions were taken.

XII. THE SECOND INCIDENT WAS
PROBABLY ORGANIZED AND PLANNED.

The Superintendent stated on newscasts at 6:00 p.m. on October 26, 1989 that communication between the institution and inmates was the problem. He stated that he had met with six inmates, that the institution housed 2,600 and implied that he had to meet with other inmates. Finally, he reiterated that the institution was still locked down and an investigation of the disturbance would be conducted.

While feeding inmates in cell blocks in Groups 2 and 3 during the evening newscasts, a corrections counselor observed that inmates became vocal and upset as a result of the Superintendent's statements. About the same time, a captain and the Deputy for Operations rode in a service truck to Groups 2 and 3. As the Deputy climbed out of the truck at J Block and looked down the cell block, he saw an inmate out of his cell. This inmate was in the rear of the block and appeared to be climbing up a cell door. It is reported that staff saw a number of inmates

simultaneously reaching through the bars of their cells and up towards the locking devices which had been exposed by the missing security panels. Inmates throughout the blocks almost immediately screamed "turn your lights off" and poured out of the six cell blocks into the yard between Groups 2 and 3 as a roar echoed throughout the institution.

Inmates ran toward E Gate, the gate at which the incident on the first day began. This gate, which is critical to containing a disturbance in Groups 2 and 3, was still damaged from the preceding day. Despite its strategic security position, E Gate had not been repaired during the day. Consequently, inmates in the yard proceeded unobstructed throughout the compound.

From the swiftness with which the inmates released themselves, their decision to do so was probably organized and planned. They poured into the yard and proceeded in groups to what appeared to be preplanned destinations. The damage to E Gate from the first riot assured inmates access to the entire compound. Inmates proceeded to take eight hostages.

XIII. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE WERE
DELAYED AT THE MAIN GATE WHILE
DOZENS OF STAFF WERE TRAPPED.

At 7:00 p.m. on October 26, 1989, inmates left the yard between Groups 2 and 3 and raced toward the Control Center in pursuit of retreating staff. Staff allowed non-hostile inmates

in the Control Center and, by then, were barely able to lock the door before other inmates reached the door.

Inmates began to smash windows and break into offices around the first floor of the Control Center and to beat on the front door. Inmates removed an air conditioner from the window of the office of the Deputy for Operations and entered the building. Staff in the Control Center barricaded the doors and distributed riot batons and helmets to officers both in the Control Center and out in the hall. It quickly became apparent that fires had been set on the first floor of the Control Center as the interior hall of the building began filling with dense, black smoke.

Staff in the control room exited through a small window grill and all staff and the inmates who were with them made their way to the second floor. They tore an air conditioner out of a window to allow fresh air into the smoke-filled room. It is estimated that approximately 40-50 people were trapped on the second floor of the Control Center. By telephone and radio, they contacted the Main Gatehouse and requested immediate assistance; there is contradictory evidence of what happened at the Main Gate at this time.

The Superintendent and Commissioner were in the Main Gatehouse during the time that staff was calling for help from the second floor of the Control Center. The contingent of 25 Pennsylvania State Police, which had been billeted at the Manor

House, had responded to a radio call for help from a Pennsylvania State Police officer who was trapped in the Control Center. These State Police officers and municipal police were present and outside the main gate area. They requested immediate entry into the institution.

Several members of the staff report that neither the Commissioner nor Superintendent made a prompt decision to allow the Pennsylvania State Police to enter the institution. The Commissioner and the Superintendent testified that each promptly gave an order authorizing the police to enter the institution. The Commission cannot determine who ultimately gave the command to open the gate to allow entry of the Pennsylvania State Police, but it is clear to the Commission that there was a delay which may have endangered 40 to 50 lives.

The Pennsylvania State Police contingent entered the institution to rescue those trapped. A municipal police officer, armed with an automatic weapon, also entered the institution at this time. This municipal police officer fired warning shots into the ground and thus deterred inmates from approaching the Control Center.

The Pennsylvania State Police reached the Control Center and, for the protection of those trapped, passed a handgun and shotgun up a rope made of belts. A ladder was then brought in from fire apparatus outside the gate and placed against the building. Staff was rescued through the window. One trapped

staff member was unconscious from smoke inhalation when he was taken down the ladder. A number of others were treated for smoke inhalation at the triage area outside the perimeter or at local hospitals.

XIV. THE PERIMETER WAS SURROUNDED AND NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN SOON AFTER THE SECOND RIOT ERUPTED.

After leaving the Main Gatehouse, the Commissioner set up a Command Post in the Department administration building overlooking the yard between Groups 1 and 2. The Superintendent returned to his office in the institution administration building, where the Deputy for Operations (who had been rescued from the Control Center) soon joined him.

Hundreds of Pennsylvania State Police arrived during the next several hours. Eventually, over 875 State Police officers were at the scene. Municipal police arrived and encircled the perimeter. Firefighters and emergency medical teams were stationed outside the perimeter.

The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency ("PEMA") was alerted at approximately 7:41 p.m. after being contacted by the Cumberland County Office of Emergency Preparedness. After a delay, PEMA confirmed the riot with a Department of Corrections liaison. PEMA then set up an Emergency Operations Center in Harrisburg. PEMA had personnel on site in the institution's command post, as well as other command posts.

Pennsylvania State Police set up an on-site command post on the second floor of the institution administration building, as well as one in Harrisburg.

After being contacted by an inmate by radio, Pennsylvania State Police negotiators began, at about 10:45 p.m., to talk with that inmate from the Highway Tower. The Deputy for Treatment was also in the tower to assist in the negotiations. The negotiators threw a telephone with a long cord over the fence and the inmate continued to negotiate with them from K Block. Negotiations continued intermittently throughout the night with the inmate expressing concern about overcrowding, treatment by corrections officers, food, medical treatment, and shower conditions. At some point, the inmate expressed interest in talking with the Commissioner. At other points, the inmate wanted to talk with the Governor or the Superintendent.

During the negotiations, the inmates released two hostages. During the night, the frequency of communication with the inmates decreased and there were long periods of silence.

Between midnight and 2 a.m., approximately 200 municipal police, who had been on the premises for over eight hours, needed relief. PEMA became involved as a coordinator between the municipal police and the State Police to determine who would supply reinforcements. As State Police reinforcements arrived, a State Police officer coordinated replacement of municipal police

officers. However, both the Lower Allen Township and Harrisburg police departments remained continually on site.

At 4:00 a.m., negotiations appeared to be at a standstill. The on-site commander of the Pennsylvania State Police and troop commanders, together with corrections' personnel, approved a tactical plan intended to tighten the perimeter and pressure inmates to resume negotiations. At approximately 5:45 a.m., the plan was activated. A diversion was created by the State Police in one area of the institution while two contingents proceeded to enter institution buildings. As one of the State Police contingents entered Kitchen II, inmates began to start fires outside its doors. Another contingent of State Police shifted direction to help these police officers. This group entered the yard between Groups 2 and 3 after an airport fire "crash truck" rammed a barricaded fence adjacent to the Gymnasium.

Inmates near Kitchen II apparently saw the State Police advancing and began throwing objects, including firebombs, at the police officers. A confrontation took place in which warning and defensive shots were fired by the State Police. Four inmates were wounded. The remaining inmates retreated to E, F, G, H, J, and K Blocks in Groups 2 and 3. No inmates were killed in the assault by the State Police.

State Police removed wounded inmates for medical treatment and then formed a skirmish line from E Block to H Block.

State Police announced by mobile public address systems that inmates should surrender by coming out of the cell blocks and laying face down in the yard. Inmates were ordered to release the hostages. As each block was announced, inmates were directed to leave that block. By 7:44 a.m., white cloths began to appear. Hostages were released from E and H Blocks. As the inmates lay in the yard, they were frisked and handcuffed. Inmates were then taken to the Main Stockade Yard. The last hostage was located by the State Police in K Block.

At the time of this report, the Commission does not have precise information on the number and extent of injuries. There apparently were less than 100 injuries during the second riot. No one was killed. In addition, emotional injuries from the trauma of the two riots are evident but are impossible to quantify.

XV. THE RIOTS DAMAGED
 CAMP HILL'S PHYSICAL PLANT.

Damage from the riots was extensive. The furniture factory was seriously damaged both nights. Six modular housing units and the office modular unit for the "New Values" drug and alcohol program were totally destroyed. A new modular unit for classification of incoming inmates, which was not yet in service, was destroyed. There was extensive damage to the Modular Units 7 and 8, and the following buildings: the Control Center,

Greenhouse, the Education Building, the staff dining room, H Block basement, the Gymnasium, Kitchens I and II, and Dispensary 2.

Extensive damage also occurred during the riots to the cell blocks in Group 1. Inmates were able to escape from cells by breaking through walls either above cell doors or into plumbing chases. Four inmates did break out of the Restricted Housing Unit cells and were in the process of releasing other inmates when officers took control. Some Group 1 inmates had been placed in the exercise yard near Group 1 and they were not secured until 8:00 p.m. on October 27.

One inmate from a cell block in Group 1 had cell block keys and attempted to let inmates out of A and B Blocks. Another inmate who had been missing from a cell in A Block was later discovered in the plumbing shop in the cell block basement dressed in a tradesman's uniform. This inmate was not discovered even though a tradesman had been in this area at least four times during the day.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

XVI. AN IMMEDIATE ARMED "SHOW OF FORCE" AT E GATE ON OCTOBER 25, 1989 SHOULD HAVE BEEN MOUNTED BY THE INSTITUTION.

In the early minutes of the disturbance at E Gate on October 25, 1989, when there appeared to be disorganization among the inmates, no armed reinforcements were sent to E Gate. Only about a dozen unarmed corrections officers appeared and these officers retreated when inmates grouped and assaulted them with a fire extinguisher. There was a period of approximately 30 to 40 minutes in which the institution could have mounted an armed "show of force" and even barricaded E Gate.

The Commission finds that the absence of security at E Gate permitted inmates to enter other areas of the compound and permitted the disturbance to escalate into a riot. While it may only be speculated what impact a large contingent of armed corrections officers might have had on the incipient disturbance, an armed security force immediately stationed at E Gate may have quelled the disturbance.

XVII. CAMP HILL SUPERVISORY STAFF DID NOT
REPORT SIGNIFICANT SECURITY PROBLEMS
ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1989.

It is well documented that corrections officers reported a number of security problems to their superiors early Thursday, October 26, 1989, as well as later in the day. There was no response to this information. The Commission believes that this evidence of non-performance requires further investigation by the Inspector General's Office. Had the information been forwarded to the Superintendent or had the Deputies reacted to the information they received, the second incident may not have occurred.

XVIII. THE PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AGENCY WAS NOT FULLY UTILIZED.

The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency ("PEMA") was not informed of either riot by the Department of Corrections. It learned of the riots from the Cumberland County Office of Emergency Preparedness. This is a deficiency in the notification process and hindered the agency's assistance.

During the second riot, there were duplicate requests for materiel, inappropriate requests, and questionable authenticity of information and rumor. PEMA could have centralized the output of information and relieved Camp Hill and Department staff of certain tasks.

XIX. THE SUPERINTENDENT AND THE DEPUTIES
SHOULD HAVE ORDERED AN IMMEDIATE
SHAKEDOWN OF THE INSTITUTION.

As previously described, the Superintendent and the Deputy for Operations and Deputy for Treatment considered and decided not to conduct an immediate shakedown of the institution. The Commission, after listening to the reasons offered for the decision, concludes that the decision by the Superintendent was improvident under the circumstances.

The Superintendent was aware that inmates had taken radios, tools, weapons, and keys. Although the Superintendent did not personally inspect the damage throughout the cell blocks, he knew that it was extensive. The Commission finds that the Superintendent did have sufficient information to suspect the integrity of the cell locking devices and did not follow through on that information.

The Commission finds that one and perhaps both Deputies and the Major of the Guard did see security panels missing and on the floors of the cell blocks. No precautionary measures were recommended or taken by the Deputies. The Major of the Guard was informed that inmates were seen out of their "locked" cells and reportedly did not inform his superior or make any response.

Adequate manpower to assist in a shakedown by corrections officers would have been provided by the Pennsylvania State Police if it had been requested. Chains and locks and additional

lighting would have been provided by PEMA if they had been requested.

The decision not to conduct a shakedown could have been reconsidered. For a period of more than 12 hours, when light was more adequate and two refreshed shifts came on duty, there was no reevaluation of the decision not to conduct a shakedown. There is no evidence that a shakedown was going to be conducted in the near future because the Superintendent and Deputy for Operations had made arrangements for the dismissal of the contingent of 25 State Police at midnight on Thursday.

XX. THE SUPERINTENDENT AND THE DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT STAFFING OR, ALTERNATIVELY, HAVE SUFFICIENT POLICE PRESENT TO PROVIDE A SHOW OF FORCE.

The Superintendent and the Deputy for Operations operated under the mistaken assumption that the cell blocks were secure after the inmates were "locked" in their cells on Wednesday. The Superintendent did not request that the Commissioner obtain staff from other institutions. Indeed, the day and afternoon shifts on Thursday were operating below their usual numbers.

Of critical importance, the Superintendent and the Deputy for Operations decided that no more than a platoon of approximately 25 Pennsylvania State Police needed to remain on site. After the first riot, the Superintendent and the Deputy requested only this number of State Police because they believed that any

disturbance would be "cell-oriented" and not institution-wide. In fact, they apparently believed that the likelihood of even isolated disturbances was sufficiently diminished by Thursday night to allow the complete withdrawal of the Pennsylvania State Police. In addition, the Superintendent believed that it was important to restore the impression that the institution was under control of the corrections officers. There was also concern over the costs of keeping the State Police and corrections officers on overtime.

While all these concerns are understandable and can be appreciated by the Commission, it is still not clear why it was necessary to reduce the number of State Police before a thorough assessment could be made of the "extensive" damage to the cell blocks. Nor is it clear why armed State Police were not located inside the compound at strategic visible points to deter the inmates from further disturbances.

XXI. THE USE OF FORCE WAS REASONABLE
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

To the extent that it can be determined, weapons were discharged as follows:

October 25, 1989:

Tower, corrections officer, 3:05 and 4:43
p.m.--shots fired to protect corrections officer
being beaten.

October 26, 1989:

Outside fence at Main Gate, corrections tradesman, 7:30 p.m.-- shots fired as inmates approached the gate;

Main Gate, approximately 7:25 - 7:30 p.m.-- corrections staff fired warning shots as inmates rushed Main Gate;

Control Center, municipal police officer, 7:35 - 7:40 p.m.-- warning shots fired into ground as inmates approached;

October 27, 1989:

Dining Hall, State Police, approximately 6:15 a.m.-- officer shoots out high window while inmates threatened;

Yard in front of Groups 2 and 3, State Police, 6:15 a.m.--officers shoot warning and defensive shots.

At the time of this report, the Commission is aware of only the above instances of discharges of firearms on October 25 through 27, 1989. Of these incidents, only the last shooting resulted in injuries to inmates; no staff or others were injured in these shootings. While the Commission has heard the rumors of deaths of inmates shortly after the disturbances and later in the investigation, no deaths can be confirmed and the Commission has not received evidence supporting those rumors.

In the time that the Commission had to investigate these incidents, it could only conclude that under these circumstances the use of force, including deadly force, appeared to be reasonable. Further investigation by the Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Professional Responsibility, is ongoing and a

final determination regarding the appropriateness of the use of deadly force cannot be made by the Commission at this time. The Commission has no information that the Department is conducting an investigation into the discharge of firearms by staff. Therefore, the Commission urges the Department conduct such an investigation.

In addition, the Commission finds that three staff members not qualified to use firearms in the institution were issued weapons during the riots. One of these staff members allegedly received an order to shoot to kill and commenced shooting at inmates from outside the perimeter fence. The Commission recommends appropriate action should be taken to investigate these circumstances.

The Commission also found that a municipal police officer entered the institution through the Main Gate on October 26, 1989 armed with an automatic weapon. Coordination of responding municipal police departments could have clarified who was authorized to enter the institution and what weapons were appropriate for use inside the institution.

XXII. THE COMMISSIONER PARTICIPATED IN SOME DECISIONS BUT NOT IN OTHERS AND DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ASSISTANCE TO A FATIGUED SUPERINTENDENT.

On numerous occasions throughout the riots, the Commissioner was asked for his opinion by the Superintendent. In some

instances, the Commissioner did become involved in the decision-making process. For example, the decision about the ammunition on October 25, 1989 was thoroughly considered by the Commissioner. While there were no deleterious effects caused by the time consumed by deliberation, the delay may have increased the risk to human life. Prior planning for this type of disaster and considerations of appropriate responses could have eliminated this delay.

On other occasions, in fact the majority of occasions in which the Superintendent asked the Commissioner for his opinion, the Commissioner deferred to the Superintendent. The Commissioner testified as to his philosophy of leadership as the head of the Department and his relationship to superintendents. Indeed, the Commissioner specifically provided the analogy of the relationship of an admiral of a fleet to a captain of a ship to describe this relationship. He follows a hands-off approach and avoids projecting himself into institution affairs. His style of leadership, he stated, is intended to provide the superintendents with control over the institution and to avoid conflicting direction.

However, from the Commission's interviews with the Superintendent and others who observed and spoke with him on Thursday night, it appears that the Superintendent was fatigued and unable to participate to the best of his ability in the management of the crisis. Indeed, the Superintendent initially

conceded loss of the institution to the inmates in the presence of the Commissioner at the Main Gate. Given the policy of the Department that requires a superintendent to consult with the commissioner on significant decisions in certain crisis situations, the Commissioner had the opportunity to provide invaluable assistance to the Superintendent and did not participate to the degree necessary under the circumstances.

On Thursday morning, the Commissioner was shown a memorandum drafted by the Superintendent. The memorandum was intended to be faxed to all superintendents for the purposes of bringing them up to date on the events of the preceding night and the current conditions at Camp Hill. The Superintendent provided a copy of the memorandum to the Commissioner for the purpose of obtaining his approval to send it to all superintendents.

The memorandum, as previously described, acknowledged that damage was "extensive" and that there was "major damage" to cell blocks. In addition, the memorandum stated that "[n]umerous keys, tools, knives and razors have been lost and are assumed to be in the possession of inmates." The Commissioner testified before the Commission that he did not read this memorandum although he apparently provided a transmittal memorandum to the Superintendent's memorandum. When questioned about the transmittal memorandum, the Commissioner referenced his language that he only was "aware" of the Superintendent's memorandum. If the

Commissioner's testimony is taken as correct, the Commissioner did not keep himself informed of the conditions of the facility.

In any event, the Commissioner's testimony that he was unaware that Camp Hill had not conducted a shakedown on Thursday is difficult to understand. A superintendent must request the Commissioner's approval for an institution-wide shakedown and no request was made. In addition, it was reported to the Commission that the Superintendent talked with the Commissioner about missing keys, radios, and knives while staff were gathered for the Governor's conference telephone call in the afternoon of October 26.

As for the incident at the Main Gate on October 26, 1989, the Commissioner was the ranking corrections official at the Main Gatehouse during the incident. Testimony is conflicting regarding who ultimately authorized the Pennsylvania State Police to enter. The Commission finds that there was delay and indecision at this point in time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of all the information it has received regarding the events of October 25, 26, and 27, as well as the broader role of the Department of Corrections in the criminal justice system, the Commission makes the following recommendations:

XXIII. SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
 SHOULD RECEIVE PRIORITY.

Camp Hill management recognized years ago that the cell locking devices were antiquated and that doors and windows were of doubtful integrity. In recognition of this problem, Camp Hill received a cost estimate in July 1988 to upgrade cell block locks, doors and windows. At that time, the estimated cost was \$10 million. The proposal was discussed with the Department of Corrections, Bureau of Facilities Management Director, but it was never introduced as a capital budget item. Upgrading the locking system was apparently determined to be a low priority item, and therefore, the project was not considered further. The Commission recommends that the Department formally review and respond to all security recommendations made by institution management to insure that they receive appropriate priority.

There is information that the institution had a shortage of equipment for a riot situation. The Commission recommends that the Department undertake a statewide comprehensive review of

security equipment, such as keys, handcuffs, batons, weapons, helmets, chains and padlocks, etc. At the same time, the Commission recommends the Department assess its policies with regard to the types of weapons and ammunition which should be used in riots and other emergency situations, as well as routine operations.

As Camp Hill is renovated, consideration should be given to upgrading cell block walls. As is now well-known, Camp Hill's cell block walls were constructed of hollow block. The corrections officer's switch boxes are likewise vulnerable and need reinforcement. The cell locking mechanism should be completely replaced.

The Commission recommends that security measures receive scrutiny throughout the state. There were examples of security problems at Camp Hill that appeared at first glance to be minor, but were serious security deficiencies. For example, the doors leading into switch boxes were difficult to close because of the build-up of paint through repeated applications. This problem led to difficulty in closing and locking some of the switch boxes. Another example was the windows in the Control Center with air conditioners. During the second riot, inmates removed an air conditioner to enter the Control Center building. Finally, frame modular construction units should be totally discontinued as a means of expansion.

The Commission has also received evidence regarding the location of trade shops inside Camp Hill. These trade shops provided inmates on Wednesday and again on Thursday with a variety of tools and equipment, including: a chain saw, an acetylene torch, fuel tanks, screwdrivers, sledgehammers, hedge trimmers, poles, gas cans, and other potentially lethal instruments. Inmates also gained access to utensils and knives from the kitchen and razors from the barber shop. The Commission recommends that the Department reexamine its policies for inventorying and storing such equipment. In addition, inmates under the supervision of a tradesman instructor repaired the cell locking mechanisms throughout the institution. The use of inmates for this task impairs the security of an institution and should be eliminated.

The Commission recommends that the demanning of towers be reassessed in light of the events of October 25, 26, and 27, 1989. Staff and supervisors have expressed concern to the Commission over these policies because demanning the towers reduces visibility throughout the institution, may endanger safety of corrections officers, and creates tower-to-fence distances which exceed shotgun range.

The Commission recommends a review of the use of vehicles inside a prison's perimeter. On October 25, 1989, inmates seized control of vehicles and rammed interior fences and gates and the inside perimeter fence. Vehicles inside the perimeter pose a security danger to the facility. One can only speculate

as to what might have happened if the vehicle that breached the inside perimeter fence had exploded.

The Commission recommends that an investigation be conducted to determine if the Department's regulations were violated on October 25, 1989 with regard to vehicle use inside the perimeter. In addition, the Department of Corrections should reexamine its policies generally regarding the use of vehicles inside an institution.

Minimal interior fencing, single-line chain link of moderate height topped with razor ribbon, separated Groups 2 and 3 from the furniture factory, Groups 2 and 3 from the Group 1 and administrative areas, the power plant, and the Main Stockade Field. The Commission recommends that a review of interior security barriers be conducted at Camp Hill and other institutions to insure that it is adequate to control inmate movement and contain disturbances.

XXIV. OVERCROWDING REQUIRES A REASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND CONSIDERATION OF METHODS TO RELEASE SELECTIVE INMATES PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THEIR SENTENCES.

In 1965, Pennsylvania repealed a law authorizing the diminution of sentences based on inmate good behavior. Since that time, legislative proposals have been made to restore the concept of an incentive which would foster good behavior in the institution and encourage inmates to participate in reha-

bilitative programs. The Commission encourages the General Assembly to consider providing earned time credits, not only as a method of rewarding institutional good behavior, but to help relieve prison overcrowding.

In addition to implementation of earned credits, the Commission recommends a reassessment of alternatives to confining offenders in institutions like Camp Hill. Specifically, effort should be made to review the potential for the Department to confine inmates on unused military reservations and to increase the number of halfway houses.

While it is not a means to reduce significantly the prison population statewide, the Commission recommends a review of the commutation process. Commutations can provide hope to an inmate serving a long term that he might eventually be released. The Governor has the power to commute sentences and issue pardons. The Commission requested and received longitudinal information on patterns of clemency in Pennsylvania. These patterns reveal a decline since 1979 in the numbers of inmates whose sentences have been commuted. (A table showing the clemency patterns from 1969 through 1989 is attached hereto as Exhibit J.)

Inmates with life sentences constitute a small but growing proportion of the prison population. To the extent that lifers feel hopeless at ever being released to the community, they may disproportionately commit institutional misconduct. The

Commission, therefore, recommends that the clemency process be examined with a view to determining its role in motivating good behavior among inmates.

XXV. THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS IMPROVEMENTS
IN STAFFING, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PROGRAMMING.

Staff shortages must be addressed in the very near future. The use of overtime to compensate for staff shortages should be curtailed. As the Auditor General's recent Audit Report for the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill noted, it would be more cost effective to hire a sufficient complement of corrections officers than to rely on overtime.

Communication should be improved throughout the institution. Staff/management communication was not effective prior to the first riot. Corrections officers generally saw the administration as inordinately tilted toward "treatment" and not responsive to security concerns. Indeed, the events on Thursday, October 26, 1989 exemplify this perceived preference. It was the widespread feeling among corrections officers that day that the inmates were not secure. Yet, management claims total ignorance of the problems, except to acknowledge a limited problem in H Block.

There were also deficiencies in inmate/staff communications prior to the riots. The inmate reaction to revisions in Family

Day and sick-line policies illustrates how important it is to consider the inmate perspective on a major policy change.

A communication vacuum also existed between the institution and central office. For example, the Commission has been informed that the sick-line policy has recently been rescinded because it violated Department regulations. The Department and institution should work together to insure that policies are not instituted without Department review.

Recruitment of staff for Camp Hill and other institutions is affected by the geographic location of the facilities. However, the Commission urges the Department to intensify its recruitment program for staff, especially corrections officers. While the inmate population at Camp Hill is 48 percent black and 2 percent hispanic, less than 10 percent of the corrections officers are black and less than 1 percent are hispanic. To address this imbalance, programs should be explored to foster an awareness of employment opportunities in correctional institutions.

In order to attract quality treatment staff, there must be adequate facilities for programs. Because the buildings in which programs were provided to inmates at Camp Hill were, by and large, totally destroyed by the inmates during the two riots, it is important to plan not only for bedspace for inmates, but also for buildings to provide programs.

XXVI. COMMONWEALTH AND LOCAL AGENCIES SHOULD
ACHIEVE A HIGHER DEGREE OF COORDINATION
THROUGH PLANNING.

Coordination among Commonwealth agencies and between Commonwealth agencies and local agencies should be improved.

While the representatives of the institution and State Police were able to communicate effectively with inmates for the purpose of negotiations, the ability of different Commonwealth and local agencies to communicate during a crisis requires improvement. Notification of PEMA, the Commonwealth's agency dedicated to coordinating responses to emergencies, should be assured. It is also important to integrate its organizational ability into the management of the crisis. In emergencies, the Department should maximize outside assistance and resources available by using PEMA. For example, PEMA could have better coordinated communications among municipal police departments, and among the municipal police departments, the State Police, and the institution command post.

Planning, through the development of emergency plans and utilization of mock drills, should be coordinated and improved. Plans in some agencies are outdated and not coordinated with one another. Agency representatives should become familiar with the site through annual mock drills. A mock drill of a riot with the State Police probably would have revealed that the roofs of the buildings were unmarked for aerial identification. A mock

drill with municipal police departments would also establish how these police should respond and assist.

The decision not to request the National Guard for either the first or the second riot was made after consideration by the Commissioner and the Governor. This decision appeared not to be an inappropriate one under the circumstances, even though the National Guard could have been used to provide relief for municipal police departments guarding the perimeter. While there is no formal coordination that would be appropriate for members of the legislative branch, it is clear that the decision to request the National Guard must be based upon the circumstances. The decision, therefore, is for those who are knowledgeable of the circumstances and in command. The Commission concludes that negotiations between the Pennsylvania State Police and inmates on the second day, as well as the efforts of the Pennsylvania State Police to retake the institution, were affected by a member of the legislative branch requesting the National Guard be called out for this incident. This highly-publicized request caused confusion and may have placed the lives of the hostages in danger.

XXVII. A SATELLITE OFFICE OF THE STATE
INSPECTOR GENERAL SHOULD BE
ESTABLISHED IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS.

The Commission recommends the establishment of a satellite office of the State Inspector General in the Department of

Corrections. There are currently satellite offices in six major departments.

Conditions within both the Department and institutions need to be fully investigated by an independent executive branch agency. For example, the Commission has received information from several sources alleging that corrections officers in a number of institutions have retaliated against inmates transferred from Camp Hill to these institutions. It is beyond the scope of the present Commission to investigate these allegations. The Inspector General is an appropriate body to investigate complaints of systematic abuse statewide. Similarly, the Commission received information relating to non-performance of duty by Department staff which should be investigated by the Inspector General.

Similarly, the future will place pressure on the Department and its institutions to manage problems of some enormity. Populations are expected to continue to increase. Staffing current and new facilities will pose a challenge to the Department. Recognition that most inmates will return to society requires continuing creativity to provide alternatives to incarceration and preparation for return to the community for those who must be incarcerated. A satellite office of the State Inspector General within the Department would help to insure integrity in the operations of Department and its institutions.



Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE
EXECUTIVE ORDER

Subject: Governor's Commission to Investigate Disturbances at Camp Hill Correctional Institution		Number: 1989-9
Date: October 30, 1989	Distribution: B	By Direction of: <i>Robert P. Casey</i> Robert P. Casey, Governor

- WHEREAS, inmates at the Camp Hill Correctional Institution managed to gain control of the facility on two successive nights in October of 1989; and
- WHEREAS, it is critically important in the aftermath of these disturbances that a thorough review be conducted in order to protect against future disturbances; and
- WHEREAS, an independent commission can best conduct that review with the level of objectivity needed to reassure the people and to make recommendations for improvements by agencies of state government.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Robert P. Casey, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by virtue of the authority invested in me by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and other laws, do hereby establish the **Governor's Commission to Investigate Disturbances at Camp Hill Correctional Institution** (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"), as hereinafter set forth:

- 1. Membership.** The Commission shall consist of the following three members:
 - a. The Honorable Arlin M. Adams, Chairman
 - b. The Honorable George M. Leader
 - c. The Honorable K. Leroy Irvis

- 2. Functions of the Commission.** The Commission shall review the events of October 25, 26, and 27, 1989, at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill to determine:
 - a. The immediate cause or causes of the inmates gaining control of the facility on October 25 and 26. The Commission shall determine whether or not there were lapses in security procedures on October 25 or October 26 which may have permitted or contributed to the incidents on October 25 or 26.
 - b. The effectiveness of actions taken by the Department of Corrections and the Pennsylvania State Police on October 25, 26, and 27 to guard against any breach of the facility's perimeter, to protect the lives of the hostages, and to retake control of the facility while minimizing the threat to human life.
 - c. The Commission shall conduct interviews, review relevant documents, and examine other relevant materials, and may adopt such procedures and processes as they may deem reasonable and necessary to conduct their investigation. The Commission shall submit its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Governor as expeditiously as possible, but in no event later than December 1, 1989.


3. Compensation. Members of the Commission shall serve without compensation other than reimbursement for expenses in accordance with established Commonwealth policy.

4. Cooperation by Executive Agencies. All Commonwealth agencies, offices, and employees under the jurisdiction of the Governor shall fully cooperate with and assist the Commission in carrying out its duties.

5. Termination. The Commission shall go out of existence and this Order shall terminate on December 15, 1989, unless extended by further Order.

6. Effective Date. This Order shall take effect immediately.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE
EXECUTIVE ORDER

Subject: Governor's Commission to Investigate Disturbances at Camp Hill Correctional Institution - Revision No. 1		Number: 1989-9
Date:	Distribution: B	By Direction of:  Robert P. Casey, Governor



By virtue of the authority invested in me by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and other laws, I, Robert P. Casey, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, do hereby revise Executive Order 1989-9, paragraphs 2c and 5 as follows:

2. Functions of the Commission.

c. The Commission shall conduct interviews, review relevant documents, and examine other relevant materials, and may adopt such procedures and processes as they may deem reasonable and necessary to conduct their investigation. The Commission shall submit its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Governor as expeditiously as possible, but in no event later than **December 21, 1989**.

5. Termination. The Commission shall go out of existence and this Order shall terminate on **December 31, 1989**, unless extended by further Order.

KEY



State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill

Camp Hill Inmate Population
June 1982 -- September 1989

6/82	1,583	*1	1/85	2,172	8/87	2,533	
7/82	1,608		2/85	2,177	9/87	2,547	
8/82	1,623		3/85	2,205	10/87	2,559	
9/82	1,649		4/85	2,237	11/87	2,581	
10/82	1,675		5/85	2,245	12/87	2,559	
11/82	1,696		6/85	2,241			
12/82	1,704		7/85	2,212	*4	1/88	2,573
			8/85	2,214		2/88	2,574
1/83	1,712		9/85	2,231		3/88	2,584
2/83	1,721		10/85	2,255	*5	4/88	2,556
3/83	1,719		11/85	2,272		5/88	2,539
4/83	1,709		12/85	2,274		6/88	2,505
5/83	1,736					7/88	2,546
6/83	1,772		1/86	2,310		8/88	2,570
7/83	1,799		2/86	2,291		9/88	2,565
8/83	1,795		3/86	2,332		10/88	2,543
9/83	1,796		4/86	2,334		11/88	2,509
10/83	1,805		5/86	2,373		12/88	2,506
11/83	1,804		6/86	2,390	*6		
12/83	1,821		7/86	2,450		1/89	2,474
			8/86	2,459		2/89	2,519
1/84	1,836	*2	9/86	2,441		3/89	2,550
2/84	1,851		10/86	2,498		4/89	2,553
3/84	1,898		11/86	2,523		5/89	2,567
4/84	1,921		12/86	2,540		6/89	2,583
5/84	1,941					7/89	2,605
6/84	1,986		1/87	2,541		8/89	2,638
7/84	2,045		2/87	2,562	Peak>	9/89	2,656
8/84	2,073		3/87	2,586		10/89	2,607
9/84	2,107		4/87	2,550		(as of 10/25/89)	
10/84	2,129		5/87	2,493			
11/84	2,121		6/87	2,542			
12/84	2,158	*3	7/87	2,568	*7		

<u>Population vs. Capacity:</u>		<u>Permanent</u>	<u>Modulars</u>	<u>Total</u>
(progressive changes	*1 -	1,470	-----	1,470
in capacity noted	*2 -	1,470	82	1,552
by * above)	*3 -	1,470	104	1,574
	*4 -	1,470	156	1,626
	*5 -	1,470	208	1,678
	*6 -	1,414	368	1,779
	*7 -	1,414	412	1,826

Camp Hill's population in June 1981 stood at 1,342.

Based on the 9/89 and 10/89 figures, Camp Hill was about 140% to 145% above capacity at the time of the disturbances.

EXHIBIT D

Camp Hill Budget Information
1984-85 To 1989-90

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Operating</u>	<u>Fixed Assets</u>	<u>Non-Recurring Maintenance</u>
84-85	\$16,850,000	\$6,393,000	\$160,000	\$77,000
85-86	\$18,825,000	\$7,548,000	\$338,000	\$23,000
86-87	\$18,239,000	\$7,545,000	\$186,000	\$99,000
87-88	\$20,689,000	\$8,382,000	\$244,000	\$78,000
88-89	\$22,150,000	\$8,631,000	\$538,000	\$15,000
89-90	\$24,299,000	\$10,014,000	\$319,000	\$66,000

Department and Select
Institution Budget Data
1984-85 To 1989-90

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Department</u>	<u>Graterford</u>	<u>Camp Hill</u>	<u>Pittsburgh</u>
84-85	\$160,531,000	\$30,372,000	\$24,235,000	\$19,015,000
85-86	\$185,502,000	\$33,539,000	\$26,571,000	\$21,185,000
86-87	\$205,597,000	\$33,822,000	\$25,971,000	\$21,259,000
87-88	\$240,291,000	\$35,539,000	\$29,315,000	\$23,577,000
88-89	\$270,576,000	\$40,000,000	\$31,423,000	\$25,758,000
89-90	\$303,100,000	\$46,213,000	\$34,633,000	\$29,546,000

(institutions listed above, in rank order, represent the Department's largest facilities)

CAMP HILL INMATE PARTICIPATION IN
CHEMICAL ABUSE, SEX OFFENDER AND EDUCATIONAL
PROGRAMS, JANUARY 1989 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1989

PROGRAM	1989									
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Avg.
Chemical Abuse Programs	276	295	271	288	251	251	372	364	531	322
Sex Offender Programs	57	12	61	67	66	59	61	101	80	63
Educational Programs	486	472	482	486	340	338	319	332	386	406
TOTAL ALL PROGRAMS	819	779	814	841	657	648	752	797	997	791
TOTAL INMATE POPULATION	2474	2519	2550	2553	2567	2583	2605	2638	2656	2572



COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

State Correctional Institution
At Camp Hill

September 11, 1989

SUBJECT: Crowding at Camp Hill - Current Status
- Short-Term Contingency Planning - Determination
of Maximum Capacity Figure for Long-Term Planning

TO: David S. Owens, Jr.
Commissioner
Department of Corrections

FROM: *Robert M. Freeman*
Robert M. Freeman
Superintendent

Because crowding is the most severe problem facing the Department of Corrections, I believe the time has come for a thorough review of the potential of the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill for management of the future increases in crowding that will occur if commitment rate continues to exceed the release/transfer rate.

It is the intent of this memo to:

1. Describe the current status of crowding at Camp Hill.
2. Communicate possible short-term and long-term institutional plans of action to effectively manage the problem if the degree of crowding continues to increase.
3. Describe the resources estimated to accomplish these plans of action. Each plan of action will require varying amounts of resources. The continuum of resources will range from in-house, to in-house with some Capital Budget expenditure, to exclusively Capital Budget expenditure.

The personnel resources noted will only be those necessary for the project under discussion. Each incremental increase in population will necessitate an overall review of other support or security personnel needs.

4. Attempt to determine a maximum capacity figure for Camp Hill so that effective decision making can occur if the worse case scenario of rapid population growth continuing to exceed available bed space throughout the Department of Corrections continues into the 1990's.

A. Current Status and Statement of the Problem:

On December 30, 1983, the population at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill was 1,770. The current population is 2,613, a net increase of 843 inmates since the end of 1983.

Crowding at Camp Hill - Current Status
- Short-Term Contingency Planning - Determination
of Maximum Capacity Figure for Long-Term Planning
Page 2
September 11, 1989

The commitment rate for 1989 has been unprecedented:

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>
July	105	91	114
August	55	90	131
Annual Total	1,131	1,130	943 To Date
			1,400 (Projected)

Past efforts to manage this increase in population were documented in my September 1, 1989, memo concerning the need for a B-Block Basement Dormitory. Significant future problems can be anticipated if the current commitment rate is maintained. However, the situation will become more critical if the Legislature passes stiff mandatory drug sentencing laws this fall, but does not legislate alternative sentencing, earned time, and a massive new construction program far surpassing anything seen to date.

Even if the above initiatives are implemented, there will be a significant period of time before they have any appreciable impact on the problem of crowding. Thus, it is probable that Camp Hill faces more years of a commitment rate that exceeds the transfer/release rate.

Therefore, it is imperative to attempt to determine the maximum capacity for Camp Hill and establish a plan of action for achieving it if population demands require the Department to do so. That potential plan of action is as follows:

B. SHORT-TERM INITIATIVES (FISCAL YEAR 89-90)

1. Procedural Initiatives:

- a. Accelerate CSC referrals. The counseling staff has been directed to initiate a minimum of 200 acceptable referrals to CSC's this fiscal year.
- b. Increase DCC transfer potential by reviewing procedures, maximizing efficiency, filling vacancies as quickly as possible, and using overtime as necessary to control backlogs.

2. Housing Initiatives:

a. Creation of Permanent B-Block Basement Dormitory

This unit will house approximately seventy (70) inmates, and be used for the inmates in the DCC who require classification, but have no beds available to them because reception rate exceeds the transfer/release rate.

COST:

Personnel: Two (2) officers on overtime at an estimated annual cost of \$416,000.00, or addition of ten (10) officer positions to the complement.

Renovation: Approximately \$15,000.00

Activation Date: October 1, 1989

*New Maximum Capacity: 2,684

*The current capacity (excluding the infirmary) is 2,614.

b. Temporary use of the Second Floor Infirmary Area Formerly used to House AIDS Inmates

Removal of all AIDS inmates into Camp Hill's population has emptied this area, and it is capable of housing thirty (30) unclassified inmates immediately if the B-Block Basement dormitory is filled and additional overflow capacity is needed on a temporary basis.

COST:

Personnel: One (1) officer on overtime at an estimated bi-weekly cost of \$8,000.00

Activation: Costs would be minimal.

Activation Date: As needed

Establishment of the above dormitories and activation of SCI-Waymart should enable Camp Hill to manage its crowding in FY 89-90.

C. LONG-RANGE INITIATIVES (BY FISCAL YEAR):

FISCAL YEAR 90-91

1. Construction of A-Block Annex:

This project will add thirty (30) cells which will be constructed so they can hold a maximum of sixty (60) DCC inmates.

COST:

Personnel: Overtime costs should be minimal since five (5) C.O. positions have been authorized. However, one (1) additional counselor position will be needed.

Construction: \$242,000.00 in construction funding has been included in the FY 89-90 budget.

Related Costs: The addition of all of the above will create the need for a Modular Unit Staff Dining/Kitchen area if there is to be adequate capacity for feeding in Group I. (This unit can also be used for a Culinary Training Program for eighty (80) non-IV-R inmates per year.) Staff are in the process of developing a proposal for submission for FY 90-91. The estimated cost will be approximately \$700,000.00 and an additional three (3) Food Service personnel.

Activation Date: September 30, 1990 (if there is no DGS delay of the design phase.

New Maximum Capacity: 2,744

2. Creation of Permanent C-Block Basement Dormitory:

Camp Hill currently has its Parole Violators housed in E-Block; however, the number of these individuals continues to increase so significantly that another unit is necessary to handle the overflow. The proposed unit could house approximately seventy (70) inmates.

COST:

Personnel: Ten (10) C.O. I's; one (1) counselor; one (1) PSA; and one (1) clerical person.

Renovation: Approximately \$40,000.00

2

Crowding at Camp Hill - Current Status
- Short-Term Contingency Planning - Determination
of Maximum Capacity Figure for Long-Term Planning
Page 5
September 11, 1989

Activation Date: March 1, 1991

New Maximum Capacity: 2,814

FISCAL YEAR 91-92

1. Addition of 48 Bed Modular Housing Unit (4A) for Sex Offender
Treatment Unit

The number of sexual offenders received at Camp Hill is expected to continue to increase beyond the current total of approximately 600. An additional forty-eight (48) bed modular unit will help service this need as well as add beds.

COST:

Personnel: Seven (7) C.O. I's; four (4) C.O. II's'; one (1) counselor; and one (1) PSA I.

Modular Unit Purchase: \$400,000.00

Activation Date: June 30, 1992

New Maximum Capacity: 2,862

Staff estimate that if the appropriate staff and physical plant modifications are acquired, Camp Hill's utilities are adequate to manage the additional 248 inmates that will be housed in the above new areas. No Capital Budget money will be required to achieve a maximum capacity of 2,862.

FISCAL YEAR 92-93

1. Construction of 52 Bed Mental Health Unit

The Legislature has approved \$2.6 million in Capital Budget money for this project, but the bid for the design phase is not scheduled to be let until May, 1991.

This unit is needed because the population of mentally ill continues to grow at Camp Hill. The unit would function as a State Hospital Unit does and could house the most seriously mentally ill until they stabilize enough for return to population.

Crowding at Camp Hill - Current Status
- Short-Term Contingency Planning - Determination
of Maximum Capacity Figure for Long-Term Planning
Page 6
September 11, 1989

COST:

Personnel: One (1) Director - Doctorate level Psychologist (Psychologist III); one (1) Counselor Supervisor; three (3) Counselors; one (1) Psychologist I; one (1) PSA Specialist; one (1) PSA II; one (1) Nurse Supervisor; five (5) RN's; ten (10) LPN's; one (1) Psychiatric Aide Supervisor; ten (10) Psychiatric Aides; one (1) Clerk Typist II; one (1) Clerk Steno III; twelve (12) C.O.I's; and five (5) C.O. II's. Total: 54 staff

Construction: \$2.6 million

Activation Date: January 1, 1993

New Maximum Capacity: Because of the specialized function of this unit, its beds are not included in the calculation of maximum capacity.

2. Pre-Release Community Integration Modular Units (for the Mentally III)

If the population pressure continues to increase, there is one (1) remaining in-house option. It represents an approach that is very much needed if Camp Hill is to effectively prepare its growing population of mentally ill for parole.

This option is a 120 bed Modular Unit adjacent to the no longer used Main Auditorium which would be used as a Pre-Release Community Integration Unit for mentally ill inmates who otherwise stand very little chance of adjusting to the community. This program is badly needed today because Camp Hill currently has in excess of 400 inmates who do not meet the criteria for State Hospital commitment, but need a housing setting other than the cell block.

COST:

Personnel: One (1) Program Director; one (1) Special Education Teacher; one (1) Occupational/Vocational Therapist; one (1) Recreational Therapist; one (1) Clerk Typist II; one (1) Psychological Services Associate Supervisor; two (2) Psychological Services Associates; one (1) Corrections Counselor Supervisor; three (3) Corrections Counselor II's; four (4) C.O. II's; and eleven (11) C.O. I's. Total: 27 staff

Modular Units Purchase: \$900,000.00

Related Costs: The water and electrical systems at Camp Hill are inadequate to handle this option, and a Capital Budget project of approximately \$200,000.00 for an expanded water system and approximately \$100,000.00 for upgrading of the electrical system are needed. Approximately \$40,000.00 would be needed for related renovations in the main auditorium and approximately \$90,000.00 would be needed for related Fixed Assets.

Activation Date: June 30, 1993

New Maximum Capacity: 2,982

3. Permanent use of the Second Floor Infirmary Area Formerly used to House AIDS Inmates

If all beds were filled, the temporary thirty (30) bed overflow dormitory on the second floor of the infirmary could become permanent.

COST: See page 3.

New Maximum Capacity: 3,012

FISCAL YEAR 93-94

1. Construction of a 250 Bed RHU:

The current RHU is inadequate for Camp Hill's needs, and the addition of more inmates combined with the rapidly changing nature of these inmates creates the need for a more modern RHU. The 126 beds in the current RHU could be used for Parole Violators who have not been classified.

Staff are currently developing a cost estimate for an RHU Capital Budget request for inclusion in the updating of the Five Year Capital Budget Plan for the Department of Corrections.

New Maximum Capacity: 3,262

FISCAL YEAR 94-95 AND BEYOND

1. Construction of a 1,000 bed DCC on Camp Hill property:

If all worse case scenarios come to pass, and the Department of

Crowding at Camp Hill - Current Status
- Short-Term Contingency Planning - Determination
of Maximum Capacity Figure for Long-Term Planning
Page 8
September 11, 1989

Corrections' population is at 40,000 by the end of 1997, then the commitment rate will be such that construction of a new DCC will be the only option available if classification for Camp Hill's catchment area is to be accomplished in an efficient manner.


Camp Hill has the property, and this is an option that could be of great benefit to both Camp Hill and the Department.

The negative effects of crowding are so pervasive and deadly that it is essential that Central Office and Camp Hill staff work together to develop a concrete long-term plan of action to address the issue of crowding at Camp Hill by exploring alternatives and incorporating their activation into the long-term approach of the Department of Corrections.



I and my staff are available to further discuss any portion of this document at your convenience.

RMF/lp


cc: Deputy Commissioner DeRamus
Deputy Commissioner Bernard
Mr. Lorenz
Mr. Tepsic
Deputy Smith
Deputy Henry
Mr. Maeyer
Ms. J. Smith
File



TYPICAL GROUP 2 & 3
CELLBLOCK PRIOR TO
SECOND RIOT



CELL LOCKING DEVICE WITH
SECURITY PANEL REMOVED



TYPICAL GROUP 2 & 3
CELLBLOCK PRIOR TO
SECOND RIOT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
at CAMP HILL, PA. 17001
October 26, 1989

SUBJECT: DISTURBANCE AT CAMP HILL

TO: All Superintendents

Robert M. Freeman

FROM: Robert M. Freeman
Superintendent

RECEIVED
Office of The
Deputy Commissioner
for Programs
OCT 23 1989

Referred _____

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday, 10-25-89, an Officer was assaulted at the E-Gate House as Group II & III inmates were coming in from yard on the Main Stockade Field. A Sergeant and a Tradesmen Instructor attempted to assist the fallen officer. Both were attacked and the disturbance quickly spread from Block to Block until six general population cell blocks and approximately 1400 inmates were involved. The inmates, after taking control of the six cell blocks, gained control of the Main Kitchen and Dining Room, Gymnasium, Auditorium, and Group II Dispensary. Inmates then hot-wired a Maintenance vehicle and broke through the two gates that separate Group II and III from the rest of the Institution. The inmates then took control of the Commissary, Modular Units 1 & 2, and used the vehicle to break through the third gate as they could attempt to take control of the Furniture Factory. Numerous warning shots were fired by tower officers in order to back inmates off fallen officers in the open area between Groups II & III cell blocks.

The Emergency Plan was activated and Camp Hill staff, with the assistance of State Police and local authorities, were able to regain control of Modular Units 1 & 2. Approximately 560 inmates housed in Modular Units 1 through 8 were then moved to the Main Stockade Field for their own protection and 150 inmates in the Education Building were moved to the Group I field. The inmates on the Group I field subsequently broke into B & C Block basements, set fires in the CDCC office areas, and had to be restrained and handcuffed. Group II & III Inmates set fires in the Commissary, Main Kitchen and Dining Room area, the Furniture Factory, E-Gate House, Dispensary II, and Equipment sheds on the exercise fields. Three (3) vehicles were torched and small fires were set in the blocks.

Thirty-six (36) Staff, seven (7) Inmates, one (1) Fireman and one (1) State Trooper were injured. There were no fatalities, but two (2) staff and an inmate are in serious condition at local hospitals. Eight(8) staff were taken hostage and thirty-one (31) staff were trapped in various buildings, some of which were on fire, and could not escape.

The Main Kitchen Tower had to be evacuated when inmates on the Main Stockade Field torched an equipment shed at the base of the tower and the flames and smoke endangered the life of the Officer manning the tower.

At one point inmates on the Main Stockade Yard hot-wired a maintenance vehicle and attempted to breach the double perimeter fence. The vehicle successfully penetrated the inner fence, but became hung-up on the concrete footer as it could not penetrate the second fence. The vehi-

Negotiations were begun, but were made extremely difficult because staff had to deal with different groups of inmates scattered throughout the Housing Units. Approximately 300 police officers and over 100 firemen and ambulance personnel had responded prior to the retaking of the six cell blocks in Groups II & III.

Damage is extensive. The Commissary, Furniture Factory Office Complex, E-Gate House, equipment sheds, Dispensary II, and three (3) vehicles were destroyed. There is fire damage in the Main Auditorium, C-block Basement, B-Block Basement, Main Kitchen, and in the cell blocks. Extensive damage was done to the locking mechanisms in H-block and it will be some time before the full extent of all block damage has been determined; however, initial evaluation is that there is major damage. All fires have been extinguished. The institution was under control at 10:00 p.m. and all inmates were locked down by 1:00 a.m. on Thursday, 10-26-89. Feeding was completed by 5:00 a.m.

Staff have begun the process of evaluating the damage, are initiating a complete investigation of the incident, and psychological debriefing of staff is in progress.

Staff did a magnificent job of containing a disturbance which at one point threatened to involve the entire institution. Community support and assistance was excellent with donations of food and drink by local groups and restaurants. There was constant contact with Commissioner Owens and Deputy DeRamus. Their assistance was extremely helpful. Media coverage was extensive. Institutional staff video-taped the entire incident.

The institution remains in a State of Emergency and locked down. Numerous keys, tools, knives and razors have been lost and are assumed to be in the possession of inmates. Count has not yet cleared.

RMF/clf
cc: file

EXHIBIT I



COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
P. O. BOX 598
CAMP HILL, PENNSYLVANIA 17001-0598
(717) 975-4860

OFFICE OF
COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS

VIA FAX
Thursday
October 26, 1989

To: All Superintendents

I am aware of Superintendent Freeman's memorandum to you stating what happened recently at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill.

Please evaluate the climate of your facility and report to me by 1:00PM this afternoon.

(Please use fax no. 717 787-0132)

I also would be interested in any special concerns you may have pursuant to the climate, and operation, of your facility.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David S. Owens, Jr.", written over the word "Sincerely,".

David S. Owens, Jr.
Commissioner

DSO:ras

BOARD OF PARDONS CLEMENCY STATISTICS
BY ADMINISTRATION, 1967 - 1989

<u>ADMINISTRATION</u>	<u>HEARD</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>	<u>GRANTED</u>
Shafer (1967-1970)			
Life	363	94	94
Minimum	613	43	43
Shapp (1971-1978)			
Life	733	267	247
Minimum	1,439	313	278
Thornburgh (1979-1986)			
Life	375	75	7
Minimum	517	36	8
Casey (1987-11/27/89)			
Life	112	60	4
Minimum	22	10	3