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1	COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2	COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
3	In re: House Bill 79
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5	Stenographic report of hearing held
6	in Room 140, majority Caucus Room, Main Capitol, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
7	Thursday,
8	February 7, 1991 10:00 a.m.
9	HON. THOMAS R. CALTAGIRONE, CHAIRMAN Hon. Gerard A. Kosinski, Subcommittee Chairman on
10	Courts Hon. Kevin Blaum, Subcommittee Chairman on Crimes
11	and Corrections
12	Hon. Karen A. Ritter, Secretary
13	MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
14	Hon. Frank Dermody Hon. Babette Josephs Hon. James Gerlach Hon. Robert D. Reber Hon. Lois S. Hagarty Hon. Chris R. Wogan
15	Also Present:
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17	William Andring, Chief Counsel Galina Milahov, Research Analyst Ken Suter, Republican Counsel
18	Katherine Manucci, Staff
19	
20	Reported by: Ann-Marie P. Sweeney, Reporter
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CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: I'd like to welcome everybody to today's hearing on House Bill 79.

Today the House Judiciary Committee will focus on comments from the various groups and agencies that have an interest in this legislation, and individuals.

Today we are present to hear testimony on an issue that Representative Lois Hagarty has worked on for several years. Her bill makes changes in the laws governing adoption seeking to facilitate permanent planning for children who need and deserve families, and I wish to commend Representative Hagarty for her thorough redrafting of this bill. I believe that the bill we are looking at today is a better bill than its predecessor, and this is because issues which were highlighted by social service agencies and by private adoption groups were brought into play when this bill was redrafted.

The State's responsibility is to protect its citizens and to provide for their well-being. This bill has endeavored to advocate for children who face the prospect of disrupted care and an uncertain future. This bill does not usurp parental rights to love, care for, and support a child. However, in cases where the interests of an adult and a helpless child compete, the Commonwealth must give primary consideration to the

needs and welfare of the child.

In consideration of the turmoil that parents who involuntarily relinquish their parental rights, this bill seeks to be supportive of every effort they make to retain their rights and to inform and include them fully in the legal procedure. The legal rights of the putative father are carefully preserved and delineated, allowing for a very clear procedure for termination of parental rights. In the past, questions over a father's rights in cases where the man does not claim paternity have considerably slowed and complicated adoption proceedings.

I do not see this as an effort to take poor people's babies from them. Our laws state that "the right of the parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent." This bill strengthens the resources of the State to ensure that those children who need permanent parental care can receive it.

Thank you for your interest in this issue and for your participation in this hearing today.

I leave it to Representative Hagarty to describe the provisions of her bill.

Lois.

REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: Thank you,

Chairman Caltagirone, and thank you for the bipartisan

effort and the cooperation that I have received from

you and your counsel and committee members in

attempting to move forward with this important piece of

legislation for the benefit of children and families.

For the past year and a half I have been working with the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, the American Jewish Congress, Jewish Family and Children Services, Pennsylvania Bar Association, the Jewish Coalition, Pennsylvania Council of Children's Services and family law practitioners to develop a comprehensive bill to discuss a number of deficiencies in our laws regarding adoption. The goal of the legislation is to encourage adoptions in the Commonwealth as well as avoiding adoption disruption. There are a number of key provisions contained in the legislation.

The legislation strengthens the counseling sections of the law to ensure that birth mothers who are considering placing their babies for adoption receive adequate counseling. This prevents disruption of an adoption at a later point which causes turmoil and harm to the child and the adoptive parents.

Second, the legislation requires a

pre-placement investigation and report on the adoptive parents to determine if they would be suitable parents. The pre-placement report will focus on the home environment, family life, parenting skills, and fitness of the adoptive parents. The report must occur before the child is placed in the adoptive home. However, the legislation establishes a mechanism for interim placement where a pre-placement investigation is still being completed.

Third, the bill provides that an intermediary may honor the preference of the natural parents as to the religious faith the adoptive parents intend to rear the adoptive child. This provision provides for religious preference, but at the same time guards against the child being unadoptable because of a parent's preference for an extremely rare religion.

The wording of this provision was developed in consultation with several religious groups who place children with adoptive parents. The language is intended to remedy a possible interpretation of the current law whereby babies can be removed from their adoptive home because the natural parents are not of the same religious faith as the adoptive parents.

Fourth, the bill deletes constitutionally questionable notice provisions of existing law relating

to termination of parental right proceedings for putative fathers.

Fifth, the bill responds to a troublesome Superior Court decision which has the potential of disrupting a great number of adoption proceedings by amending the six-month abandonment grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights, providing that a parent may not take remedial steps to cure the abandonment after the six months has passed and a petition of termination has been filed.

Last, new grounds for involuntary termination are created. The legislation establishes authority to terminate the rights of a putative father who takes no interest in the child until he becomes aware the child may be given up for adoption. A new ground for involuntary termination is also created where the parent is the father of a child conceived as a result of rape.

If adoption is looked at as a triangle, the top of the triangle being the adoptee and the bottom two corners of the triangle being the adoptive parents and the natural parents, the goal of this legislation is to help protect every angle of the triangle. By enacting this legislation, we will continue to support private adoptions in the

Commonwealth but at the same time we will be addressing the need for regulation of private adoptions. The regulation will ensure that adequate counseling, pre-placement investigations, and other procedures are properly followed so that every person involved in the triangle of adoption is protected from the devastating effects of a child being placed in an adoptive home and later removed. This legislation helps to ensure the safety and well-being of our adoptive children.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you, Lois.

I'd like for the record to indicate that the Pennsylvania Jewish Coalition has submitted testimony of which the reporter already has, and I think each member has a copy in front of him or her.

(See appendix for a copy of the submitted testimony from the Pennsylvania Jewish Coalition.)

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: And we'll start with the testifants, and we'll go right to John Pierce, the Executive Director for the Pennsylvania Council of Children's Services.

John, did you have written testimony to share? No?

MR. PIERCE: I'll explain that.

Thank you very much for the opportunity

to appear before you and testify on House Bill 79. I apologize for you not having written comments in advance of this, but we were defeated by technology this morning. It is sitting in a computer and the computer refused to allow it to be printed out, and in working with our consultant on that over the phone, she was not able to help us out with that, so later on this morning we will have those available for you.

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My name is John Pierce, and I am the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Council of Children's Services. The Pennsylvania Council of Children's Services is a statewide membership organization composed of approximately 100 nonprofit agencies which offer a full spectrum of services. These include the traditional services of child welfare, mental retardation, mental health, drug and alcohol, special education, and provided in the whole range of areas. Included in this are 21 agencies that are approved to provide adoption services. This makes up approximately 35 percent of all the adoption, approved adoption, agencies in the State and at least from our records, and as you know, it's difficult to tell how many adoptions actually take place in this State, but based on what we can tell, this group represents somewhere around 40 to 45 percent of all the adoptions done in the Commonwealth.

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In dealing with this piece of
legislation, the process that we went through, so you
can understand the input, is that this was sent out,
and actually it was the previous bill as introduced in
the previous session, to all our agencies for comments
and issues concerning is this consistent with practice?
Is it going to create problems? Is it going to
facilitate that? And we got that input then back from
the practitioners in the field, in working with
Representative Hagarty and other persons and
organizations she mentioned, had our input into it and
with that, we feel very comfortable with the bill and
would support it.

I have a couple issues that I want to highlight because I think they are important for us in terms of practice. And it's that we view, first of all, adoption as a child service, and I think it's very important to look at adoption as a children's service as opposed to an adult service so that when you look at it that way, you ask the question, you put yourself in a position as, from a child's perspective, do these changes make -- what kind of impact do they have on me as a child? And I think that when you look at some of these, you have to answer that in a very positive way

in terms of this bill. So when you look at it from a child's perspective, what we see here I think will help in adoption, will make it in a way safer, it will improve the quality of the adoptive process, and at the same time I think that the amendments or some of the proposals built into this dealing with the technical aspects of it do provide those protections. They are the notice issues, the due process issues that are important for both the adoptive parents and the birth parents in this.

Three areas I'd like to really just very quickly mention in this thing. One of those is dealing with the added ground for involuntary termination. We support this. We have a little difference with the bill as presently drafted. We would prefer, and our group preferred, the three months, and a lot of that was based on the issues around child development and the bonding issues and the time lines involved in that. It's a practice issue, and important from a child's perspective. And I think it's important for adults to realize that for a child, a month is like a year to us. I mean, it is -- a month is a long, long period of time in the development process. And it is important to be dealing with as short a period of time as we can in terms of the placement of the child with the adoptive

family, especially with infants in the very young and beginning piece of this. And the difference between four months and six months or three months makes a big difference in the process, and what we are trying to do is the stability and the bonding involved between the adoptive parent and the child.

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The second issue that is important to us and from practice is the counseling issue. And again, this is one of these that although it is a birth parent issue, in terms of the whole adoptive process and the stability of an adoption, and we put in the context a permanency planning, which is not only the adoption but also in some cases that adoption is not the appropriate alternative, but we need to make sure that the birth parent or birth parents have all the information, have the alternatives explained to them, and can participate in that decision, especially when you get into issues like religious preference and what is going to happen with the child in terms of the adoptive parents. for them to participate in that and for the stability of that is extremely important from our perspective. And we would support that piece and the fee that goes along with that and in dealing with this to guarantee the accessibility of those services for persons who don't have the ability to pay. That's a very important

piece of this thing.

The third part of it, the pre-placement investigation, and I've had a problem with the term "investigation" because that's not really what we do. I can understand using that term when you are take talking about the protection of the child, but really what we are doing in terms of the adoptive process, it's not so much an investigation which looks like a negative, but it's a facilitating piece and it is a critical piece in the whole adoption process and the beginning to work with adoptive parents and the matching issues and preparing families and the stability issues and long-term success of this.

On a protective piece, and I say this, it is unfathomable to us to believe that you can place a child with a stranger without having done this. I mean, we've done all the stuff in the Protective Services Law and all those things to protect children and yet we have a gap where basically you can take a child who cannot protect himself and put him with a stranger without all the work that needs to be done in order to make sure that that is an appropriate, safe environment. On that ground alone it ought to be in there. But you go to the second step of a practice one and it needs to be in there because of the importance

of not only protecting the child but ensuring long-term stability and success of an adoption, in making sure that the adoptive family is prepared and they know what is going to occur and that that working relationship is built there and the process of matching.

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The last point that I would like to make is that although our agencies, and all of our agencies deal with infant special needs, foreign adoptions, and they also provide a lot of the home study background work in the independent adoptions for those when requested by the court, the issue that we have, and this concerns the special needs adoption piece of it, that the Adoption Act as developed was not done at the time that we were talking about special needs adoption, and those of you who are not real involved with the child welfare system, let me back up. That is the piece that really fits with the child welfare system and the permanency planning piece of it and that we have talked about this and talked about it to Representative Hagarty and some other people about a special, separate piece of legislation for special needs adoption that really deals with the permanency issues and I think addresses some of the concerns that I've heard about the lack of support of services for single parents in terms of being able to keep their

children. I mean, we got them into really a no man's land in this situation. This piece, this adoption law, is not the place to address that. We think the place to address that is in a special needs adoption bill that would involve the permanency planning piece of it and needs to be done separate from this. There are some other issues that you get into in the adoption law concerning confidentiality that really don't make any sense when you're talking about a 6-year-old who has a history of knowing birth parents and adoptive parents and all those issues surrounding confidentiality.

And the other part or reason doing this is the adoption law as it is written is a fairly passive piece of legislation. It allows you to do things. We need something in special needs adoptions that makes it a very active process, that it is something we do on behalf of children. So I would like you to keep that in the context of this. This is not the whole ball game in terms of adoption, in terms of what we are doing and what we think needs to be done, but it is certainly a very important step forward in improving the quality of adoption services, in guaranteeing a floor in terms of what are the requirements for best practice.

We encourage you to do two things. One

is to amend the bill and put back in the three months piece of that and report it out of committee.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Members?

REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: Thank you.

BY REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: (Of Mr. Pierce)

Q. Thank you, Mr. Pierce, for your testimony. First, let me just indicate for the committee, we had discussed the special needs legislation piece and are prepared to begin to work on that separate piece of adoption legislation. For those members of the committee who have a particular interest in adoption, I invite any of them to join with us in preparing what we need to do in that case for children.

The one question I wanted to ask you, particularly for the new members of the committee, because this bill was reported out in substantially similar form last session from this committee and so many members of the committee are familiar with it, but particularly for those new members of the committee, when you mentioned the involuntary issue and the three months to four months, I think some background may be necessary. I'd appreciate if you would explain to them, so no one thinks that we're talking in the typical case of three months -- first of all, what an

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1	involuntary termination is, when it occurs, and what
2	the time period is under current law and why we are
3	recommending a shorter time period in the specific
4	instance where the criteria are met that are set forth
5	in this legislation, and perhaps you would explain
6	those criteria?
7	A. I'm very willing to do that but I'll tell
8	you, I would like to defer to the Catholic Conference,
9	who is doing a much broader perspective on this who
10	deals with that in their own testimony.

- That's fine. Q.
- I'm very willing to do, but I'd steal A. their thunder.
- Q. No, that's fine. I just wanted to make sure that there was no confusion. I mean, the adoption law is very technical and there's no way that other members would be familiar with what the normal involuntary procedure is, so I'm certainly happy to wait for counsel to the Catholic Conference to explain that.

Thanks.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Are there any other questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you for your

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testimony.

MR. PIERCE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: We'll next move to Martin Leventon, from the National Adoption Network, Limited. And we do have testimony that has been submitted.

MR. LEVENTON: I want to thank you very much for giving us the opportunity to come before this panel today. We were absolutely thrilled to be invited. Jane Fischer, who is our Executive Director, want to be here along with myself, and because of a medical disability could not travel up to Harrisburg, so regretfully she could not attend and she's asked me to come and basically speak for us both concerning adoption.

First of all, we want to applaud the committee on an excellent piece of legislation, particularly from those of us that practice adoption law on a daily basis and practice adoption law exclusively in the context of a private adoption agency. Over the past 2 1/2 years, our agency has successfully completed almost 150 adoptions, and almost all of those include court appearances and legal work in connection with it. We're also involved in many, many interstate adoptions where certain facets of the

adoption will take place in one State and another facet will take place in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

So we feel especially prepared to comment on Pennsylvania adoption law vis-a-vis other States in the country and how they handle a number of the items that you might be discussing today.

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There are three specific areas that we wanted to talk about in this bill. We also have some general comments about the bill and then I'd be happy to answer any questions that any of you folks would have concerning any of the aspects in here and how it would affect us as an agency that is involved on a daily basis.

The first section that we're particularly very pleased with is 2725, which basically talks about, again, a replacement of language. Before the language read, "Whenever possible, the adopting parents shall be of the same religious faith as the natural parents of the adoptee." The committee has wisely replaced that language with language that reads, "The intermediary may honor the preference of the natural parents as to the religious faith in which the adoptive parents intend to rear the adopted child."

As the law presently stands, the courts are required to match the religion of the birth parents

with that of the adopting parents. We believe, first of all, that the present act violates the First Amendment of the Constitution by mandating that courts apply a religious litmus test to all adoptions. You may ask, why hasn't that been challenged? As a practical matter, most folks simply do not have the financial resources to hire counsel to take an issue such as this up to the appellate levels, and therefore I think most people have just coped with it in general and have sought ways to comport with the law and somehow find exceptions to it.

Again, under the present law, a baby could be placed in the best possible home and solely on the basis of the adopting couple's religion the court could disallow the adoption when the finalization proceedings would be initiated. I think the beauty of the change is it prevents the type of religious discrimination that we don't want to see but still empowers the intermediary or an agency like ours to honor a birth parent's religious preferences with regard to the placement of the child. The amendment also prevents the forcing of a religious match between a birth mother and birth father and the adopting couple.

As a practical matter, what is happening

right now, and I can give you one quick example and then I'll move on. You could have an interstate adoption, and that would be a situation where a child would be placed with a Pennsylvania couple but that child would be born out of State. Termination proceedings would occur out of State, the baby would come back to Pennsylvania, meet the interstate compact requirements, the couple would have a home study and then proceed to finalize the adoption in Pennsylvania. Now, under the present act, again, it does require wherever possible that there be a religious match between the birth mother and the adopting couple. Now, in the particular State where the baby was born there may not be such a requirement. In theory, the couple could petition the court to finalize the adoption and suddenly the court could say, do you have an affidavit from the birth mother indicating that she has no objections to you raising her child of your particular religion? As a result, in theory one would have to go back to the birth mother after she's basically put the matter behind her and simply say, by the way, would you sign this religious affidavit? As a result, the practical effect could be that old wounds would be opened up if the birth mother had to be approached with regard to signing this religious affidavit, and I can

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tell you from personal experience we have had to go through that in at least a couple of instances, and again, something like this is a terrible, terrible situation and I think the amendment, or the change, rather, in 2725 is definitely welcome.

As far as Section 2530, which is the requirement that a pre-placement investigation and report exists, we like to call it a home study in the lingo of an adoption agency. Again, it is not an investigation. And in terms of the home study, it is not a study per se of the home of the adopting couple, although a visit would be made there. There are many, many things that go into the writing of a home study, and so again, I would agree that it is not an investigation.

We like the provision in the amendment about the interim placement. There had been some discussion previously about special needs children. We deal with that peripherally as a private agency, but we do have a pro bono program for special needs and minority placements. In many instances, special needs children and the necessity to find an adopting couple can come up rather quickly and as a result, there are many people that have had home studies done but the home study perhaps has lapsed. That is, it would be

more than a year old. As a result, the child would have to be placed in foster care without the interim provision in this bill. Foster care can run \$50 a day, and there are some people who are willing to adopt a special needs child that cannot afford that. Therefore, the committee in its infinite wisdom I think has done something that is acceptable, it's letting the intermediary or the agency permit an interim placement when various criteria are met. Even in the private sector there are many people who ostensibly have had an approved home study but due to the amount of documentation that has to go into that home study, there may be a letter or something very minute that is missing to a final approval of the home study, and again, it would really be a sin to have to place a child in foster care because their home study hadn't been completely approved by the agency. So we welcome that.

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Again, as far as the overall requirement that a home study be provided, we wholeheartedly agree that the -- it's a danger to place a child in an unstudied home and exposing that child to the "Jack the Rippers" of the world. It's really outrageous to think that a child would be placed in an adoptive home without a home study, yet in the sector that handles

private adoptions that is precisely what is going on and would continue to go on without the bill itself. In theory, a child could be placed in an adoptive home, it could be a private adoption handled by private counsel, and until such time as counsel approached the court to finalize that petition for the adoption, no home study would be required. That child could remain in the home indefinitely without a home study.

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And I'd like to also point out that in the private sector it's been our experience that it takes considerably longer to finalize an adoption as opposed to an agency. That's part and parcel to the fact that we have the availability to do home studies under one roof at our agency. And also, the time period for voluntary relinquishments is a bit shorter in the agency petition than it is in the private petition, so we wholeheartedly agree that it's absolutely outrageous to think that a child would be placed in a home without any kind of home study whatsoever. Even in California, I might add in a State that does not specifically require a home study, they have empowered their Interstate Compact Office to at least make a cursory inspection of the home, even in a private adoption, before a child would be placed in the home. But Pennsylvania not having any requirement

against is totally beyond conception for people that work in an agency context.

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Finally, with regard to counseling, that's a very, very important section as well. One technical point. Initially, the last version of the bill had some language that needed to be changed. we have language that talks about the court being able to make an inquiry of a parent whose rights are to be terminated and is present in court. I think it's very important that that language not be changed, and the reason is this: There are a number of people whose parental rights are terminated by other methodology, either by consent or by a putative father petition. As a result, if the present in court language were not there, it would require people who would not be required under the law to appear in court to have to come into court in order for the court to make an inquiry with regard to counseling.

In a voluntary relinquishment petition, which is precisely where you have that language, it's fine. The court can make an inquiry to the petitioner who's testifying in front of a judge. But to an individual who wishes not to participate in the court proceedings, and there are numerous birth parents that are willing to sign consents but simply do not want to

walk into a courtroom. It would not be a good idea to force them to come before a court with regard to the inquiry insofar as counseling is concerned. And I think there is a safeguard in the bill because under 2531, which is your basically your report of intent to adopt, it does require an agency to list the various dates and times that counseling has occurred, so the court does make an inquiry at that level. But again, the bill does not force the birth parent to come into court to discuss that.

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One general point about counseling. When it comes to counseling, there's a big difference between an agency and a non-agency adoption. agency licensed by its home State is obligated by law to provide quality counseling to birth parents and adoptive parents. We at our agency and in most agencies do not represent a particular side. advocate for the child. Private adoptions are different because generally the adoptive couple has hired counsel, they are paying counsel, and therefore counsel is protecting their interests. They are legally and ethically obligated to do that, but where a conflict will develop between a birth parent and an adoptive parent, these lawyers must side against the birth parents. In our own practice we've avoided that

by simply saying that, myself or Jane Fischer, we represent our agency, we don't represent in a court proceeding the adopting parents or the birth parents. The birth parents are protected because they understand if they chose to they could have brought an attorney to the proceedings. They've had adequate notice and an opportunity to consult with counsel, and that is clear and it is put on the record in front of your judges. But given the circumstances, I think you can see how easily private adoptions can often neglect counseling of birth parents.

One final anecdote. In terms of where we stand as a State with respect to termination of parental rights in general, Pennsylvania's one of the strictest States in the United States. Such States as New Jersey, West Virginia, Indiana, the District of Columbia, Arkansas, Arizona and Nebraska, and after we had written this we forgot about Massachusetts, have provisions where a surrender or a single piece of paper is signed, and that surrender will, in many instances, irrevocably terminate parental rights after a matter of days. Pennsylvania, of course, has the procedural elements that are in the pre-existing legislation, and I think that, coupled with the additional procedural safeguards that you see in 2503 that talk about a

putative father, 2505 that discussed counseling, and 2711 which require a birth parent who wishes to revoke their consent to place that in writing, I think they add additional procedural safeguards to an otherwise relatively strict termination process at least on a national scale.

Again, we find the bill a laudable effort by the committee. We strongly urge the passage of the bill in its form, and hopefully we can all better serve both birth parents, children, and adopting couples in their continued completion of successful adoptions.

I'm open for questions if anybody has any, otherwise, again, I appreciate you very, very much giving me the opportunity to come before you today.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you.

Questions?

Lois.

REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: Thank you.

BY REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: (Of Mr. Leventon)

Q. Thank you for presenting that testimony.

I just had one point I guess I wanted you to expound on. There are going to be witnesses testifying later today who expressed concerns to me, and frankly they are the only concerns that I have heard about this legislation and I fear that they're

misplaced, but I just wanted to make clear, the concern that was expressed was that somehow there was something in this bill that does not protect parental rights to children and that there is something in this bill that may effectuate children being taken away from homes, and so I had, I guess, two questions in that was: The first is, do you think that this bill better protects parents who wish to keep their children or effectuates some speedier removal and taking children away from natural parents?

The process -- there are additional A. procedural safequards in this bill. There is no question about that. It does -- it could be nothing farther from the truth that it expedites the process. If anything, it just basically adds additional layers of procedural safeguards and procedural protections. There are additional procedural safeguards for putative fathers because specifically the bill gives instructions to a putative father to protect your rights. It says, go ahead and do two things that are required - file an acknowledgement or claim of paternity, and the second thing is either write to the court or come to court and express your desires if you are a putative father and there's a chance that your rights will be terminated. The previous bill did not

do that. So there is definitely an additional procedural safeguard that is built in insofar as the putative father is concerned. So if nothing, that would certainly protect a putative father and conceivably slow the process down.

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The counseling amendment in theory could slow the process down. A birth mother could be in court, the court could inquire about counseling, there may be a determination that she would benefit from additional counseling, and the bill so provides for that. So again, another procedural safeguard that did not exist before that does exist now.

Again, the purpose of this bill is to protect people and protect children. It is not to limit or take away parental rights in a faster fashion. As far as I can see, and I've read this bill three or four times over and over again, there is nothing in there, Representative Hagarty, that would do that.

Q. Thank you.

One other question. The other States that you referred to you, you have indicated that Pennsylvania is much stricter in our termination procedures and in fact we require six months for an involuntary termination. For a voluntary termination we require significant information to the natural

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parent, the court proceeding plus the papers being signed, and which in fact can't even be signed until a couple of days after the baby is born. I'm wondering, in some of the States you mentioned, what time periods exist for a termination of parental rights?

A. Okay. Well, to give you an example, in New Jersey, where an agency is involved, they wait 72 hours, as we do, a parental rights surrender is signed, and that is it. Those rights are irrevocably terminated, period. That's it. There is no court proceeding. If the notice is defective, if there's a misunderstanding of what's going on, there is no judiciary that will review that. Those consents are taken and they are put away in a file and if, God forbid, proceedings start to take that child out of a home where that child has been for a substantial period of time, there's no procedural safeguards because the court has not reviewed the process in some of these States that have empowered an agency to simply say, sign this consent and your rights are terminated. Nebraska's is very similar, although and again we're talking about an immediate termination. Now, some of these States where it's relatively fast, the process slows up when you involve a private attorney as opposed to an agency. In the District of Columbia, again, it's

about 10 days. There is no court proceeding.

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There are some States that also have a peculiar process where a surrender is signed but what happens is the parental rights are not terminated until the adoption is finalized. So one gets into a state of limbo because in theory until that adoption is finalized, and that could be perhaps a year, a birth mother in theory could change their mind and set up a best interest of the child hearing. So that Pennsylvania, on the average, on our daily practice on the average, in a voluntary relinquishment proceeding where a birth mother comes to court, at least in the county where we do most of our work, Montgomery County, you're probably looking at at least a month, if not five weeks, and again, the birth mother is coming right into court. In a situation where one files a petition to confirm consent, you have to wait 43 days before you can even file anything, and then thereafter the court has to set a hearing date and again you're probably looking at month. So on the consent procedures at least that we deal with on a daily basis, you're talking about 2 1/2 months, and those are voluntary, those are voluntary proceedings.

Again, the process in Pennsylvania is very tedious and it is nowhere close to at least a

dozen States where a mere signature terminates parental rights. And the bill makes the procedural safeguards stronger. It does not weaken those. There's no question about that.

- Q. Thank you, Mr. Leventon.
- A. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Representative Josephs.

REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BY REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHS: (Of Mr. Leventon)

- Q. Mr. Leventon, I'm concerned about Section 2511, subsection 6, it's on page 10 in what I have in my copy of the bill. Case of a newborn child, the parent knows or has reason to know of the child's birth, does not reside with the child, or the parent, which allows for involuntary termination, has failed for a period of four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition and has failed during the same four-month period to provide substantial financial support. A couple of questions. What do we mean by "has reason to know of the child's birth"?
- A. I think it's abundantly clear. There are many instances where birth parents are aware that a child has been born yet take no affirmative action one

way or the other. It's not a situation where the child is abandoned but it's a situation where there has been no affirmative action taken in terms of supporting the child, giving assistance, attempting to reunite familial relationship, where basically somebody sits passively and doesn't really care.

- Q. I'm concerned about the person who has reason to know of the child's birth and may not have any idea that a child has been born. What do we mean by "has reason to know"? That, for instance if this is a father, that he's had intercourse with the mother? Is that enough reason to know that there's a child having been born? What do we mean by that?
- certainly provide testimony to the court that she has maintained contact with the birth father and has told him that I am pregnant with your child, do you care about the situation? Do you want to do something about it? In most of these instances, okay, and there are some conceivably where a birth father would not know, but the prevalency that I'm seeing is that there is interaction between a birth mother and birth father saying, I'm pregnant with your child and either a reluctance to get involved or to sit by passively. The situations that you're talking about, "have reason to

know," are precisely that, someone says, I am carrying your child, do you care about it? Do you want to do anything about it? Do you want to give me support, emotional support, or do you just simply want to sit by? And I think that would be the situation it would be addressing.

- Q. Do we have any case law that interprets a phrase like that, either in this State or in the States that have similar statutes?
- A. "Has reason to know," the word "reason" is reasonable. It's a reasonable person test. Would the reasonable person, the birth father in that situation, based on the particular facts of that situation, know that he was the father of the child? It's a reasonable grounds test.
 - Q. Um-hum.
- A. And I think the court would look at the totality of the circumstances with regard to that. There is actual notice and there is implied notice, and there are certain factors that would strongly suggest that somebody would be aware of that situation and want to do simply nothing about it. And that's why you have the abandonment section, too, where somebody literally abandons--
 - Q. What section is that, sir?

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A. The abandonment section is the section that previously exists where we're talking about -- counsel can provide me with the particular section.

MR. ANDRING: Page 9, 2511(A)(1).

MR. PIERCE: Page 9, I believe 2511(A)(1). And that would be a situation where someone would literally abandon the family and move to another State or disappear or whose whereabouts could But I think what Section 6 is doing is not be found. that that always is not the case. There's always a kind of a modified situation where a birth father is around, he hasn't abandoned in the sense that he has totally disappeared or totally removed himself but peripherally is there and I don't think he's taken affirmative steps to participate in the family, to acknowledge his paternity, to provide emotional support, where it's abundantly clear that this individual has no interest in the child, the child could be placed with a foster family or a loving couple, and I think at some point a decision has to be made, do you want the child or don't you? There's a loving couple available who's in the process of bonding with the child, who wants that child very much, the birth mother wants the child placed, and it's basically you're acting passively, you're not making any

affirmative attempts to show your interest in the child, and the committee, in its infinite wisdom, has tried to provide an additional set of criteria so that people can get on with their lives and people that are bonding with children can continue to do that and a family will not be disrupted.

BY REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHS: (Of Mr. Pierce)

Q. Okay, I'm concerned about the situation where the parent may or may not know, or may or may not believe what he probably has been told, doesn't reside with the child because the other parent won't permit it, hasn't married the child's other parent because the other parent won't permit it, has failed for a period of four months immediately preceding, et cetera, because perhaps he's in jail or in the Armed Services or who knows, and has failed during the same four-month period to provide substantial support because he's poor, and that's my concern.

A. Well, let me--

Q. I don't -- it's not a question. I just want to put my concern down for the record because I'm probably going to have to leave here before we hear people who have that same concern.

I'm also concerned with Section 7. I'm trying to figure out how we show that the act to

concerve the child was a rape, whether it has to be reported or whether it had to have been prosecuted.

I'm very confused about that.

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- A. In my opinion it does not, under Section
 7. One would elicit testimony from a birth mother
 indicating that she had been raped and under this
 proceeding one could then move over to the involuntary
 process in order to terminate the birth father under
 that context.
- Q. Well, I would suggest that there are probably circumstances in which the birth mother's testimony might be questionable.
- A. May I suggest that with regard to Section 6, a couple of things to point out. One is that going back over to the putative father sections that you find in 2504 and 2503, it still empowers agencies or private counsel to terminate individuals as putative fathers. It's not considered, quote, "an involuntary process," and in so doing, the better practice would be to provide an affidavit from a birth mother indicating where the birth father may reside, his last known address his last known whereabouts, an affidavit indicating that friends and relatives have no idea where this individual may reside. It can be coupled in my practice with a Freedom of Information Act letter to

verify last known addresses. We send certified mail, restricted, ordinary mail, and more often than not the court will require publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the town that he is last known to reside, and I can tell you in the practice, in my practice where we had a putative father who was in Ohio and then there was some belief that he moved on to Florida, that we published in legal newspapers both in Ohio, a paper of general circulation for the State of Florida, the Montgomery County Law Reporter, because it was our newspaper in the county where his rights were to be terminated. So you do have those procedural safeguards, and in an agency practice, more often than not the petition will be under 2503 or 2504, which is a putative father petition.

And, again, with Representative Hagarty's changes in this bill that the putative father would be told precisely that if you wish to make a claim of paternity, file an acknowledgement or a claim of paternity, and if you can't do that or you don't know how to do that or if you don't have a lawyer, then all you basically have to do is file that objection in writing either with the court, if you don't want to show up, or show up. And I can tell you that I believe our judiciary is very sensitive to that and if they do

get a letter, more often than not I believe the judiciary is reluctant to terminate parental rights and will make a further inquiry as to who these people are that are writing to the court inquiring about the termination of their rights.

So what I'm saying to you is that you have those procedural safeguards, they are used every day that we practice. We spend thousands of dollars a year on certified mail, on publications in newspapers, to make sure that those safeguards are there.

I might point out that, again, the last thing that we want to see is a disruption, and the best way to do that is to create an inference that procedural notices were not given. And as an agency. at least as an agency attorney, I am committed to give the best possible notice available, and we will even go beyond what the statute requires again in terms of sending letters, notices, so forth and so on. I have even published, where the court has not required me to do so, just on the one-thousandth of a chance that somebody would see that and be alerted to it.

So again. it's very important that there not be a disruption and at the same time balance that against the procedural safeguards of birth parents.

Q. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHS: Thank you, Mr. 2 Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you.
Representative Reber.

BY REPRESENTATIVE REBER: (Of Mr. Pierce)

Q. I'd like to commend you, first of all, on the manner of your testimony. I've sat in committee hearings, be it on the Judiciary Committee or others, for over 10 years, and it's always very comforting to get someone that has practical hands-on knowledge with the application of what we're talking about when they're speaking to us, and I was extremely impressed with the manner of your responses to Representative Hagarty and Representative Josephs, and I can't recall in 10 years ever saying that to anyone and I felt it important to point that out.

I was very interested, too, the way you discussed in relationship to the voluntary termination language, some of the ramifications of that aspect in other States, and I'm just wondering what other States also do in the way of the religious preference language. The reason I say that, I've always felt there to be some concern, obviously, with the current status as you discussed it with the separation of church and State aspects of the Constitution and the

fact that in my mind, I always thought that the compelling State interest was for the placement of the child into an adoptive setting that was in their best interest, religion or anything else notwithstanding, but for the general welfare of the child being the consideration. What do other States do, if anything, in attempting to embody this religious preference language as we currently have it, and frankly more importantly, how is the language that's in the proposed legislation in balance or out of balance with other States?

bring us more into balance with the general practice of agencies throughout the country. Most agencies in counseling a birth mother will basically particularly we do, just as an aside, we do mostly open adoptions, which are adoptions basically where the birth parents choose the adopting couple that they wish to place their child with, and so in an initial interview, we'll ask all sorts of preferences: Do you want the adopting mom to be a working mom, a stay-at-home mom? Do you want other siblings, so forth and so on? And in that context of the conversation, we would say, do you have a particular religious preference? And the large majority of our birth mothers, while they do practice a

religion, don't say I want a couple of a particular religion. I've seen some people say I don't want a couple of a particular religion, I was raised that way, I didn't like it, so forth and so on.

But to answer your question, I think what we're doing is we're trying to be consistent in that we want to honor birth parents' wishes, particularly in the context of an open adoption that we do, but we don't want a religious litmus test and we don't want to force people to have to like each other, if you will, and a birth mother may not want to place her child with a couple, and a couple may not want to work with a particular birth mother.

The one or two times that we had to approach the out-of-State counsel or agency saying, by the way, we need this religious affidavit, I think they were absolutely outraged. Speaking with an agency in Massachusetts where we had to do that, they were just totally beside themselves. In fact, initially they refused to do it. They said, it's against the law, how dare they do it? I said, as a practical matter, we want to see the child remain in the home where we are, and until such time as the legislature can repeal that section or amend it, then that's the way we're going to have to do it. People simply don't have the financial

resources to take these issues up in the appellate court system.

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So I think to answer your question that I think we are in line with what most intermediary/agencies do, they try and honor religious preferences, but it becomes a pot pourri of other preferences as well. Again, whether it's a working or stay-at-home mom; whether it's a family with siblings, other children; whether they live in the country or the city. It's just one element that a birth mother takes into consideration when she chooses a couple she wishes to place her child with.

- Q. In your two scenarios where the current state of the law was troublesome, would this language, if it was in effect, eradicate that trouble?
- A. Yeah, I believe so because the change from "shall" to "may"--
 - Q. Big difference.
- A. --in my opinion is discretionary. It takes it out of the courts. We don't want these issues before the court. We prefer those to remain issues with regard to how an agency conducts itself, and again the language "may" as opposed to "shall" I think remedies that.
 - Q. You feel there's no further need for any

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additional remediation to obviate any potential problems that this issue could have on a national scale?

In my opinion, it leaves it at the Α. No. discretion of the intermediary. I think the worst scenario is the court may say to an agency, did you, you know, did you inquire with the birth mother if she had any religious preference? And I think the agency would simply respond as part and parcel of their practice that's what they did, period, and I think the inquiry would close. But to have a birth mother submit to further questioning by the court or to sign an affidavit, particularly an out-of-State birth mother where the issue never came out, they were committed to her and that's all she cared about, and suddenly three months later are you aware that this couple is of a particular religion and by the way, do you care about that? You're opening up old wounds and there is absolutely no necessity for that in the scope of adoption.

- Q. Finally, and a very quick answer I hope, religious belief or religious preference as a statutory section or reference in another State, how many States have such, if you know?
 - A. I can't answer that.

Q. Do you have any idea as to a ballpark figure or a percentage?

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- It would purely be a guess that we've A. researched the laws of almost 50 States on about eight or nine issues, and while we specifically don't inquire about that particular issue, we ask if there is anything unusual or particularly significant in the scope of adoptions, and none of our research indicates that there is a sticking point or thorn that I would call this with regard to adoption laws in other States. So I have nothing in my legal research in the office, but we don't specifically ask whether that would be an assue or not because it rarely comes up in the context of dealing with agencies all over the country. Nobody has ever approached us saying, this is the way it's going to have to be done, we need this religious affidavit. So I can't tell you precisely, but I can tell you that it would be insignificant based on the interaction I have with attorneys all over the country. But that's about the best answer I can give you, so.
 - Q. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE REBER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Chief Counsel Andring.

BY MR. ANDRING: (Of Mr. Pierce)

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Q. I just have a couple of questions. I'd like to go back to paragraph 6 and 7 of Section 2511, the new grounds for involuntary termination, just to kind of clear up the context in which these occur. Now, you've indicated that before an involuntary termination occurs there would have to be extensive notifications either to the father whose rights are going to be terminated, I guess, but it's my understanding that after the notice has occurred there still has to be a hearing before the court at which time the person seeking to terminate the rights of the parent has to prove every single element alleged and necessary to meet the requirements of the statute by a clear and convincing evidence standard. Is that essentially correct?

A. Yeah. Again, I was addressing myself to this voluntary scenario where we have a putative father in suggesting that one might not necessarily have to use subsection 6, one could flip-flop, if you will, over to 2503 or 2504, in which case there is notice and these issues really don't come into play. But if one wanted them to come into play, my reading would be that there would have to be some type of evidentiary hearing, as you suggested, to make sure that these

elements did exist.

Again, let me just back up for a second.

We, in an agency context, particularly in the private sector, are dealing with people that want to place their children up for adoption as opposed to people that don't want to. So perhaps in an involuntary context if it was one percent of the time it would be a lot that we are involved in this situation. Our practice as an agency and my practice as an attorney is that once the birth father has come forth and said, I want this baby, I don't want the adoption to proceed, it's our recommendation to the adopting couple that they do not continue to further involve themselves with that placement because, again, absent, you know, very extreme circumstances, the birth father generally is going to prevail.

Now, subsection 6 may set up an evidentiary type of hearing. Our concern is placing a child in a home and then worrying that that child may be taken out of the home because of a particular contest, and therefore if the birth father clearly came forward and indicated that, you know, it was his preference, and again, we're putting the six-month abandonment thing on the back burner, it would be my recommendation to our agency clients that they not

follow through with the placement until the birth father clearly would agree to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights.

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We don't have contest -- it's very, very rare that you would see them in an agency context, where it's a nonadversarial process almost all the time, and where it appears to be getting into the area of adversarial it's not our recommendation that we place a child until it's particularly clear what the position of a birth father is. And again, unless it were a very extreme circumstance, we'd want some clarification from the birth parents whether they were willing to proceed with the adoption before we would recommend that it continue. People simply don't have the financial resources to become involved in adoption litigation, taking cases to the appellate courts and leaving a child in the balance of whether he's going to remain with adopting people, whether he's going to be in foster care, whether he's going to have to be returned to the birth parents.

So to try and answer your question, in the context of a private adoption wherein the private sector this rarely, rarely, rarely happens, and it would be my preference that I wouldn't have to use subsection 6 or subsection 1, that we could in fact use

1	2503 and 2504 in terms of termination.
2	Q. Thank you.
3	CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Ken.
4	BY MR. SUTER: (Of Mr. Pierce)
5	Q. I have just a couple questions regarding
6	subsection 6 as well. Isn't there current case law
7	which provides that a parent's rights cannot be
8	terminated solely because they have failed to establish
9	physical contact with the child? For example, if the
10	father is in jail?
11	A. Yes, that would not be a basis. I mean,
12	that would not be a basis. Obviously, if one were in
13	jail it would be very difficult to make a convincing
14	argument that one could terminate him under subsection
15	6. I would agree with you there, Mr. Suter, that I
16	don't think that would be the type of situation that
17	it's addressing.
18	Q. So it's reasonable efforts under the
19	circumstances?
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. Thank you.
22	CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Any other
23	questions?
24	(No response.)
25	CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you. I

certainly appreciate your testimony.

MR. PIERCE: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: If you'd like to introduce yourself?

MR. FASTIGGI: Yes, I intend to.

Mr. Chairman, my name is Michael
Fastiggi, and I'm an Associate Director of the
Pennsylvania Catholic Conference. We of the Catholic
Conference are grateful for this opportunity to testify
today in support of House Bill 79, and we're also
prepared to offer some comments on the technical
provisions of the bill.

Before I get into the testimony, may I introduce, please, we have some agency representatives, to my left, your right, Cheryl Giesey of the Diocese of Greensburg; Kay Eisenhour of the Diocese of Harrisburg; and to my far right, your far left, Marge Powers of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia. And I believe everybody on your distinguished panel is probably familiar with Phil Murren, of the law firm of Ball, Skelly, Murren and Connell, and he's worked with this committee in the past.

The Pennsylvania Catholic Conference is the civil affairs agency of the Catholic church in Pennsylvania and it represents ten Catholic diocese

throughout the Commonwealth. Whereas the Conference addresses a broad range of issues of concern to the church's various institutions, in this particular legislation, House Bill 79, the Conference represents the Interests of Catholic Social Service agencies and attorneys who are associated with those agencies. There are eight diocesan Catholic Social Service agencies providing services to all 67 counties of the Commonwealth. They provide various professional services to clients, however, adoption service is a significant component of service in those agencies. Catholic Social Service agencies have provided adoption services in Pennsylvania for many years, and they are guided by the highest of ethical and professional standards.

In 1983, the Catholic Conference began gathering annual statewide service statistics from our Catholic agencies. In the seven-year stand between 1983 and 1989, those agencies provided adoption services to more than 8,500 individuals. During the same period, agency adoption personnel placed 2,632 children with adoptive parents. It is quite possible that Catholic agencies have made more adoption placements than any other service entity in Pennsylvania over those years.

Consequently, Catholic Social Service personnel have a great deal of experience and knowledge about adoption matters and about problems in the adoption system which this legislation is designed to correct.

Quoting from a 1983 statement by Nick
Lippincott, who was formally associated with your
committee, "Adoptions in Pennsylvania are of two
types--agency directed and private. Agency adoptions
receive specific statutory recognition and are
regulated by the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare (DPW). Private adoptions, on the other hand,
are not currently regulated by the DPW and are usually
arranged through the efforts of unlicensed adoption
intermediaries--usually either attorneys or
physicians," and that's the end of the quote. For the
sake of this testimony, I will refer to private
adoptions as nonagency adoptions.

House Bill 79 proposes to establish standards for those who act as intermediaries in arranging nonagency adoptions, standards akin to those which exist for social service agencies and are currently implemented through certification and regulation. Just as agencies must follow certain practices in the adoption process, so should those

intermediaries for nonagency adoptions be required to meet prescribed adoption practices.

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Over several years of adoption service, the personnel of our agencies have either learned about or directly experienced problems from abuses in the system by intermediaries in nonagency adoptions. problems differ in terms of type and level of There are unfortunate situations seriousness. involving adoptees placed with adoptive parents as infants by intermediaries who later are nowhere to be found. There are no linkages whatsoever to the persons who arranged their adoptions. On many occasions, these adoptees have called at our agencies requesting assistance in obtaining information about their adoptions. In most instances, those adoptees ended up disappointed and discouraged because there is no information about the intermediaries who might have assisted them with their adoption services.

Another problem is that the parties in nonagency placements may not have received appropriate counseling and education in the issues involved with adoption, as well as in coming to grips with the relinquishment decision, and perhaps unwisely, the present system allows placements to be made by intermediaries before an investigation of the adoptive

parents and adoptive home is completed. These are just a couple of examples of the concerns from our agency experiences which had given rise to the interest in pursuing legislative remedies.

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A more glaring example of a serious abuse in the system for adoptions came to light in New York City in 1987 when an attorney acting as an intermediary in an adoption assumed responsibility for finding an adoptive family with whom to place a female child. The attorney actually kept the child and raised her as his own for a few years, while subjecting her to abuse and ultimately beating her to death. While such extreme cases of abuses of the system are rare, nevertheless, The fact that an intermediary could they do happen. keep the child as his own for so long without affecting a formal adoption raises the question of whether appropriate safequards were in place, and if so, how they could easily have been circumvented. Perhaps we can prevent such abuses with tragic circumstances from occurring in Pennsylvania by enacting appropriate adoption standards for all to meet.

Initially, in developing this legislative proposal, five items were considered essential for improving the quality of adoption practice. These were: Counseling, pre-placement screening,

post-placement evaluation, accurate recordkeeping, and confidential handling of birth and adoption information. A study was made of the laws of several States where standards for nonagency adoptions were in place to determine how each of these items were handled. Insuring the opportunity for counseling of the birth parents was a necessary ingredient to make it possible for birth parents to consider the options open It is important that the birth parents be apprised of their rights to receive counseling. The court should be responsible for enforcing the counseling requirement prior to terminating parental rights. A pre-placement investigation and a report of that investigation to the court was also considered essential because frequently in nonagency adoptions there was not much known about the adoptive parents until after the petition to adopt had been filed and the baby was already in their custody. Once a baby has been placed in a home, the court is not usually inclined to remove the baby from that home. situation needed to be changed to assure that there is a study of the prospective adoptive couple prior to placement. The object is to make certain that the adoptive home would provide a good environment for the child.

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Post-placement evaluations were also considered important for intermediaries and nonagency There needed to be an evaluation of the interactions between the adoptive parents and the child and to ascertain how things were going in the adoptive Recordkeeping and the confidential handling of home. case information in nonagency adoptions were also viewed as important elements. Intermediaries should be required to include in their report pertinent social information that is often lacking in private cases. The intermediary should be held to the same recordkeeping requirements as adoption agencies and the intermediary should complete and file with the court pertinent documentation revealing that the rights of all the parties involved were considered.

In the matter of confidentiality, the intermediary should be required to handle in the strictest confidence all information pertaining to birth and adoption. The information should become part of the court record and be made available only as deemed necessary by the court. The confidential handling of birth and adoption information is important for adoption agencies and should be the same for intermediaries in nonagency adoptions.

Later, in drafting the legislative

proposal, our concerns shifted to relinquishment hearings and to troublesome delays in the adoption process because of uninvolved and uninterested putative fathers who often could not be located or were not available because they were in prison. Pennsylvania law requires that the rights of the putative father be considered in the legal process for relinquishment. Notification of the child's birth and the plan for the child's adoption must be given to the natural father. The natural father has the right to contest the plan for adoption. Our deliberations centered around ways to provide restrictions on the number of instances in which notices of hearings must be given to uninvolved or uninterested putative fathers. And finally, consideration was also given to the existing grounds for involuntary termination and how that section of the existing law should be changed to make it more effective.

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Our testimony today in support of House Bill 79 includes information which our representative, Mr. Murren, provided to this committee last year when it considered House Bill 2133. Appended to the written testimony is a brief memorandum also prepared by Mr. Murren which contains background information on some important points of Pennsylvania's adoption law, and I

would make this aside, it's an available reference document made available as a bonus through Phil's legal research.

The legislative proposal which you are considering today is the product of extensive study by the Conference's Adoption Committee and consultations with legislators and their aides, as well as with the Pennsylvania Council of Children's Services and practicing attorneys. In its formative stages, the legislation was also reviewed for technical conformity to the present adoption law by attorneys of the Joint State Government Commission.

The following is a summary of each of the amendments proposed in this bill, and the explanation follows the numbering of this section of the Adoption Act being added or modified. On page 1, Section 2102, definition of "newborn child" is added as an adjunct to a new ground for involuntary termination of parental rights under Section 2511. Newborn child would be defined as any child who is six months or less of age at the time of the filing of any petition which would lead to termination of parental rights.

On page 2, Section 2313, a provision is added which would require the court to appoint legal counsel for a parent whose rights may be involuntarily

terminated and that parent cannot afford counsel.

On pages 3 and 4, Section 2503 pertaining to hearings. The amendment to subsection (b) would correct a defect in existing law which had failed to require that a person seeking to voluntarily relinquish parental rights be notified of the requirement that he or she be present at the termination hearing. It provides for a 10-day notice of hearings to the natural parents with specific language for the notice including the date, time and place of the hearing, information about obtaining legal assistance, and the right to file personal information for later access by adoptees.

On page 4, subsection (d) of Section 2503, modifies an existing provision relating to termination of the parental rights of a putative father, which in its present form is believed to be unconstitutional. The present ground permits termination of rights for a mere failure to relinquish rights or file certain forms. This ground for termination is amended so as to afford additional due process safeguards for the parent.

On page 5. new subsection (e) under Section 2503, would require a court to advise anyone voluntarily relinquishing his or her parental rights of his or her right to place personal information on file

with the court or with the Department of Health which would assist the adoptee in either obtaining that information or locating the natural parent at some time in the future. This particular amendment is designed to address the concerns of adoptee search groups without eroding the protections afforded under Act 195 of 1984.

On pages 5 and 6, Section 2504, alternative procedure for relinquishment, the amendment to subsection (c) of this section again modifies the current provision for termination of parental rights of the putative father which we do not believe satisfies constitutional requirements in its present form. Similar to the amendment to Section 2503, new language would be added to require a court to advise a parent whose rights are being terminated through a petition to confirm consent of his or her right to place personal information on file with the court or with the Department of Health.

Page 7, Section 2504, confidentiality. A new section is added to the Adoption Act requiring the court to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to assure that the identity of the adoptive parent or parents is not disclosed without their consent in any voluntary or involuntary termination proceeding. This

amendment was occasioned by a situation which arose in Cumberland County in which a natural parent upset an adoption after learning the identity of the adoptive parents.

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Pages 7 and 9, Section 2505, counseling. Extensive amendments are made to the current counseling provision of the Adoption Act. Subsection A would be amended to require maternity patients who are known to be considering relinquishment or termination of parental rights to sign an acknowledgement of receipt of a list of counselors and counseling services prior to discharge from the maternity care facility. Subsection (b) of this section would be amended to require the court to include all adoption agencies on its list of qualified counselors and counseling services and to distribute that list to every adoption agency and maternity care facility within the county. The list would also be available on request to any adoption intermediary or licensed health care professional.

Now subsections (c), (d), and (e) would be added to require a court to ascertain whether a parent whose rights are about to be terminated through voluntary relinquishment or confirmation of a consent has received counseling. If the court believes

counseling has not been provided, it may, with the parent's consent, refer that parent to an agency or qualified counselor at county expense. In addition, whenever a parent has filed a petition to relinquish parental rights and believes himself or herself to be in need of counseling concerning that relinquishment, he or she may apply to the court for a referral for counseling at county expense. Any counseling provided under these subsections would be paid for out of a fund created by levying an assessment of \$75 to accompany the filing of each report of intention to adopt. fee would be waived in cases of financial hardship and would not apply in cases involving adoptions by relatives, since no report of intention to adopt is required in such cases. Nor would the filing fee apply in the case of adoption of a special needs child.

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Pages 9 to 11, grounds for involuntary termination. There are presently five separate grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights. The first of these grounds is the six-month abandonment ground, and the bill proposes an amendment to that ground in response to the Jn Re: Adoption of Hamilton case, which would focus the court solely on the six months prior to the filing of the petition for involuntary termination. The amendment would thus

exclude consideration of any efforts to cure the abandonment undertaken after the filing of that petition. In the <u>Hamilton</u> case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that a termination petition could be defeated by the subsequent remedial steps initiated by a parent who awakens to the fact that his parental rights are in jeopardy. We see in that decision the seeds for disruption of a great number of adoption proceedings.

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House Bill 79 proposes a new sixth ground for involuntary termination in cases involving newborn children where the following conditions are met: One, the parent has actual or constructive knowledge of the child's birth. Two, the parent does not reside with Three, the parent has not married the the child. child's other parent. Four, the parent has failed for a period of four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to maintain substantial and continuing contact with the child. Five, the parent has failed during the same four-month period to provide substantial financial support for the child. ground is intended to provide additional authority to terminate the rights of a putative father who takes no interest in the child until he becomes aware that the child may be given up for adoption. It is intended to

expand the options for dealing with a putative father but within the limits of constitutional tolerance.

Many of our agency professionals further believe, however, that the period of excusable neglect should be lowered even further, from four months to three months.

The bill also proposes the addition of a new seventh ground for involuntary termination where the parent is the father of a child who was conceived as a result of rape. This provision does not include any requirement that the rape be reported or that a conviction had been secured prior to the filing of this petition since, as with all other grounds for involuntary termination, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child was conceived as a result of rape.

An amendment is also proposed to Section 2511 prohibiting the court from considering any efforts undertaken by a parent to remedy any of the grounds for involuntary termination subsequent to the filing of the petition. Also added is a provision which requires the court to advise the parent whose rights are involuntarily terminated of his or her right to place personal information on file with the Department of Health.

Pages 11 to 12, Section 2513, dealing

with hearing, these are technical amendments made to this section.

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Pages 12 to 14, Section 2530, pre-placement investigation and report. A new section would be added to the Adoption Act forbidding the placement of any child in the physical care or custody of a prospective adoptive parent unless a pre-placement investigation containing a favorable recommendation for placement has been completed within three years prior thereto. The pre-placement investigation can only be conducted by a local public child care agency, an adoption agency, or a licensed social worker designated by the court. Contents of the report are also specified in this new provision. This provision is intended to forefend against some of the unfortunate situations which have arisen in the context of nonagency adoptions.

Pages 14 and 15, Section 2513, report of intention to adopt. The report of intention to adopt would be required to include the date on which a pre-placement investigation was concluded. Also required would be a statement as to whether or not parents whose parental rights are to be terminated have received counseling. A copy of the pre-placement report would be required to accompany the report of

intention to adopt.

Pages 15 and 16, Section 2701, contents of petition for adoption. The petition for adoption would be required to set forth that a pre-placement report had been completed.

Pages 16 and 17, Section 2711, consent necessary to adoption. Subsection (c) is amended to allow a putative father to execute a valid consent to adoption at any time he learns of the expected or actual birth of the child. Subsection (d) is amended so as to notify a parent that a consent to adoption may be revoked if done so in writing.

Pages 17 and 18, Section 2725, religious belief. That section was thoroughly dealt with by the preceding the testifant.

Page 18 and 19, Section 2905, impounding of proceedings and access to records. Pre-placement reports would be confidential under this amendment. A natural parent whose parental rights are terminated either voluntarily or involuntarily would be authorized to place personal information on file with the Department of Health. Current law limits that right only to those who voluntarily relinquish their rights.

House Bill 79 aims to bring about changes in the adoption law to promote a higher level of

quality in adoption service and to assure that the best interest of the children who are adopted are being served. We support the bill and we urge your committee to approve the proposal and hopefully to soon put it on the floor for House vote.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Lois.

REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: No questions. Thank you for that very thorough, careful explanation.

Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHS: I have a question.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Representative Josephs.

present statute and on the bill in which you were very active, your organization was lobbying for, a woman who has been raped and wishes to terminate her pregnancy must prove, must show, must have reported that rape to a law enforcement agency or to juvenile authorities of some type, as I remember it; however, if the same woman having presumably been denied her abortion because she did not report it now wishes to give up her child, she merely has to say so that she's been raped, and the court must find that what she says is true. Can you

please reconcile any of this? It makes no sense at all to me.

MR. MURREN: I think I can answer that question for you, Representative Josephs.

In the abortion law context you were dealing with obtaining a surgical procedure from a private agency. As I understand it, the requirement for reporting there was to involve some type of official check on possible abuses. Here in an adoption context, adoption can only take place through an official agency, i.e. the court. So I see the two as perfectly consistent.

REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHS: Okay, thank you.

BY REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHS: (Of Mr. Murren)

Q. Second, I understand, I haven't read the Hamilton case and I can see the problem of disrupting an adoption where a baby has been placed and some sort of bonding has started to take place, but it disturbs me in a situation where perhaps that has not happened, the filing or the notice to, and I guess it would probably again be the father, that his rights are about to be terminated, reminds him or energizes him, makes him realize in some serious new context that he may actually lose forever rights to his child, and it appears the way this bill is set up that that

hypothetical could happen, and I'm concerned that a parent have a great deal of possibility of asserting his right, even if that impulse was prompted by some official action. Do the new amendments, in your opinion, prevent that kind of situation, prevent a father from asserting his right after he's been notified that there's some sort of procedure going to take place to deprive him of that?

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There are a number of things that come A. into play here in these situations, and you're trying to legislate here to cover a great variety of circumstances that can arise. The Hamilton case opened up new tactical vistas for individuals who were trying to frustrate child placements. There had been, in the agency's experience, a lot of instances where the putative father really didn't have an interest in the child, per se, but rather an interest in causing disruption in the life of the mother or disruption in the life of the child. There was revenge involved. The motivation was seldom, if ever, directed toward preserving linkages with the child. The six-month period has been one that has been traditional in the law and had -- and until Hamilton had really not been understood to be extendible after the six-month period had elapsed. And also, it was any six-month period.

It wasn't just that six-month period preceding the filing of the petition. You could take any six-month period within the life of the child and focus on that and terminate the parental rights.

what the amendment to the Section 2511 and the six-month ground is intended to do is to bring some certainty to the process. There is a six-month period, it's certain when it starts and when it ends, and that, we think, protects everybody's rights. It's very difficult sometimes to balance the rights of everybody that's involved here, but we do have to give, and the legislature, for as long as the adoption law has been in effect, has given preeminent concern for the interests of the child, and we think that it is a difficult balance to strike, we acknowledge that, but we think that by creating a period of certainty that we can best strike that balance.

Q. I understand the balance problem is very difficult and I don't know if we can ever actually do it, but it seems to me that, I don't know, there's a lot we take, of course it is before a court, but there's a lot of the word of the mother that we seem to be taking in these amendments as the truth and as very seriously and somehow unbalancing the rights of the father. That's just an observation I think is

accurate. I'm not sure it's a question.

A. I understand your concern, and I think a previous witness had said Pennsylvania really does go further in protecting the rights of the putative parent or the father than any other State around, and well beyond what we think is required by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

But one protection that we have to keep in mind in all of these proceedings is one that Bill Andring pointed out, and that is that the court has to find not just that there is some evidence but there is clear and convincing evidence, which attorneys can tell you is an extremely high standard to meet. It's exceeded only by the standard you have to meet in a criminal prosecution.

Q. I am an attorney. Not to prolong this, I am not concerned about what the good agencies do. They probably don't need a statute. I'm concerned about, you know, people who aren't that careful. I'm absolutely not saying to anybody who's testifying here that you would be guilty of any of the kinds of things that I'm suggesting might happen.

REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Representative

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BY REPRESENTATIVE DERMODY: (Of Mr. Murren)

- Q. I just have one question, I guess it has to do with the <u>Hamilton</u> case. Are there problems with having a judge just consider evidence that a parent has decided or attempted to perform his duties? I mean, this statute prohibits even the judge considering that. I don't think the <u>Hamilton</u> case mandates a result, does it?
- A. The <u>Hamilton</u> case would require the consideration of it, yes.
- Q. Well, what is the problem with the judges having the ability to consider that a parent has taken interest? Because you could present evidence of the other side that he's doing it just to jam up the system, just to harass, just for those type of things that you mentioned. You're still giving the court the opportunity to consider his acts.
- A. Well, <u>Hamilton</u> doesn't require the court to consider why he's doing it. Under the six-month abandonment ground, the courts have developed some tests and some standards that are applied, I won't say purely mechanically, but in many instances it takes on that form. There's a list of certain things that you

look at. And if someone is interested in disrupting the adoption process, they can be advised merely to send Christmas cards, do this, do this, do this, and the court doesn't inquire into the motivation, and Hamilton doesn't require the inquiry into the motivation either.

- Q. Well, if there's going to be a hearing, I would think there would be testimony. What about the parent who isn't doing it for those bad reasons, who's doing it for all the good reasons, has actually got his wake-up call or her wake-up call and wants to be interested and be a parent, and if it happens within that six months, this statute precludes that evidence, doesn't it? Isn't that what it says?
- A. No. Remember that for this six months now the child has been without contact.
 - Q. I understand.
- now has some hope of being placed for adoption. Six months is a substantial amount of time in that child's life. And really, the contact that would have been required for that six-month period is fairly minimal under the court decisions and someone really has to have completely forgotten that he or she was a parent during that six months in order to be subject to

involuntary termination.

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Q. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Bill.

BY MR. ANDRING: (Of Mr. Murren)

- Q. I was just going to ask Mr. Murren, and he did this partly already, if he would expand a little bit on the standards necessary to establish abandonment for six months, because I don't think a lot of people understand the absolute degree of abandonment necessary before you can proceed under this section.
- Well, the statute itself talks about A. evidencing a settled purpose of relinquishing parental The courts have taken that language pretty claım. seriously and they examine all the facts and circumstances of the situation, the amount of contact that's been maintained with the child, and there are a number of cases that talk about there being lack of convincing evidence of settled purpose to relinquish where the parent sent a Christmas card or a birthday card or sent support money to the parent on one occasion during that six-month period. So the courts have been, I think, very solicitous of the rights of the parents, because they're looking for clear and convincing evidence of a settled purpose to relinquish parental rights during that six-month period.

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Q. Another point I think perhaps you should make about this proposed amendment to the law is the requirement that there be counsel provided if it would work a financial hardship on the parent whose rights possibly might be terminated.

A. Right, and that provision in this law goes beyond the requirements of the Federal due process clause.

Q. Thank you.

MS. EISENHOUR: I wonder if I could give an example of how this affected a recent case of mine.

maternity homes. The putative father visited her in the home, harassed her, was placed off the premises, he was notified shortly after the birth of the child who was placed directly into our foster care system from the hospital, we sent him certified letters, regular mail, I left messages on his answering machine, and we finally were able to come to court when the child was eight months old to terminate parental rights. The mother appeared and wished to do voluntary relinquishment, the father was served by personal service notice of the hearing. He had, to this point, for over a period of eight months, had no contact with our agency, had not responded to us in any way. He

walked into the middle of the hearing, I had never seen or heard from the person before, the baby was eight months old, the mother was extremely distressed because she was also present in the courthouse. He did it supposedly for the sole purpose of continuing his harassment of her. She was unable to — the judge would not allow her to proceed on her voluntary relinquishment. He stopped the hearing when the father walked in, after we had been testifying for 10 minutes on our evidence that we had notified him, he ordered our agency to meet with the father and see if something could be rectified.

We did do that, the father was allowed to come in and see the child for the first time when the child was eight months old. He had stated when he walked into the court he was interested in parenting this child. He visited the child one time, he never contacted us again, the court would not give us a court date until the child was then a year old. So the child remained in foster care, and this is a bi-racial child with developmental delays, remained in foster care until parental rights could be terminated when he was over a year old. By that time, the child had become extremely bonded with the foster parent and the transition to the adoptive home was very difficult on

1 the child, and I have never heard from the father since 2 the one time that he walked into the hearing and then 3 the follow-up visit with the child in our agency. So I think that would be a really good 5 example of how this law could have helped that child in the situation. 6 7 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you. MR. FASTIGGI: Mr. Chairman, I had 9 neglected to introduce a student intern who is here 10 seeing how government works. Her name is Lisa 11 Spofford, and she's from Elizabethtown College. 12 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Welcome. 13 MR. FASTIGGI: I'm sure she has enjoyed 14 this opportunity. 15 Thank you very much. 16 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you. 17 MS. HUGHES: My name is Mary Beth Hughes. 18 This is my first time testifying at a public hearing, and if I've learned nothing else it's to go first 19 because much of what I'd like to say and will highlight 20 21 rather than reading my testimony has been amply said by 22 the others before mc. 23 I am the Director of Adoption Services at 24 CONCERN. Our main office is located in Berks County,

Fleetwood, Pennsylvania, however we do have regional

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offices in other parts of the State. I have worked in the private sector of child welfare for almost 17 years and have held different positions in the child welfare field. I initially began my work with foster children. I have provided counseling to birth parents who are considering their options. I have also worked with adoptive families as well as adoptive children. The positions that I have held as caseworker, pregnancy counselor, supervisor, and now director of a large adoption program have offered me different perspectives in terms of working with children and the people who are involved in their lives.

Our adoption program at CONCERN involves infant adoptions, special needs adoptions to a large degree, international adoptions, and also independent adoptions, which I'd like to just speak to briefly in that we do in fact work with families who have entered into a private adoption arrangement, either through an attorney or a physician or an interstate/international type situation. In these cases, either the families themselves or the attorneys or the court involved, for a variety of reasons, are encouraging the families to participate in the preparation process, that being the adoption study process, as well as offering birth parents some opportunity to receive counseling.

I thought it would be most helpful to talk with you about my direct experiences in our practice as we know it in CONCERN, but I would first like to offer that our primary purpose in providing adoption services as one of many services that we provide through CONCERN is to help children become members of a family, and our primary objective is to attend to the child's well-being. We do not do that at the expense of the birth parents' or the adoptive parents' interests or needs. We fully recognize that there are needs and interests there as well, but again, to quote what someone else had said, we constantly deal with striking a balance between all of the needs involved.

hirth parents and I fully support this piece of the proposed amendment. I have found through my own experience that it's extremely helpful not only to the birth parents but ultimately to the adoptive parents and the child to invite the birth parents to fully participate in the decisionmaking, problem-solving process. In our particular agency there are separate programs. We have an unplanned pregnancy counseling program that is staffed by three women who work exclusively with birth parents as part of their

responsibility at CONCERN, and we also have adoption workers who work exclusively with adoptive parents. So when a birth parent comes to CONCERN seeking counseling, and very often we are able to enter into a counseling relationship prior to the baby's birth, that is obviously advantageous to them and us in terms of gaining as much knowledge and understanding of their situation as we can: however, there are cases, of course, in which we don't enter into the situation until after the baby's birth.

During the course of counseling if a birth parents or parent choose to parent the child, we assist them in identifying formal and informal resources, if you will, that will help them to fulfill their parental responsibilities. We see this as a very important component of our pregnancy counseling program because quite honestly, many of the youth who we counsel are in socially disadvantaged situations where they have little or no resources to bring to the parenting relationship. So we support them in their decision but also support them in getting the necessary help that we need.

And if we feel that it is a situation that is at risk, we continue our involvement but also employ the protective services of the county Children

and Youth agency as well. So again, ultimately I fee] that this type of ongoing support is the greatest benefit derived by the child.

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If the birth parent or birth parents, and we do make every effort to involve both in all cases and have made extensive efforts to respond to some of the questions with regard to putative fathers to locate putative fathers, and I could share many stories about going to one of our unplanned pregnancy counselor's clients who said to her that she remembered the birth father lived on the same street as McDonald's in Philadelphia, and that pregnancy counselor went about the business of locating all the McDonald's in Philadelphia and through a course of reading through street addresses she was able the recognize the street address and in fact did locate the putative father in So we leave no stone unturned, and that's that case. an exaggerated example of the efforts that we make to locate the father and involve him in the counseling as well.

I'd like to add also that in many cases the child that we're speaking about is the first grandchild to the extended family, and we offer our services to the extended family as well in that they certainly have thoughts and feelings about placing the

child for adoption or assuming some support or responsibility for the child as well. We do, of course, help the birth parents through the legal process, the process of separating from the child and dealing with the impending grief following the termination of parental rights. We also employ the birth parents as valuable people in sharing medical information, genetic information, psychosocial information, that again is passed along to the adoptive family and will be there for the adoptive child if at some point in their life they need to have that information.

We have also worked with birth parents after the termination process in terms of providing support, but we've heard from them at different times. For example, in a number of cases a birth mother and birth father have contacted us about new medical information that was discovered perhaps 5, or we've only been in existence about 11 years, 5 or 10 years later, and we've been able to pass that information along to the adoptive family. Or it's not unusual for me to hear from a birth mother or a birth father around the time of the child's birthday, and it may just be a phone call to chat for awhile about the situation and so forth. It's that kind of ongoing support that they

are able to re-enlist from our program.

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The other part of the proposed amendments that I'd like to talk about is the termination of parental rights. I support reducing the time line to -- actually, I'd prefer it be three months also, but for this particular bill, support the four months. have worked with CONCERN for about 11 years and when I first started working through the unplanned pregnancy program, we did not place children in a legal risk Rather, we placed children in temporary situation. foster care situations until the birth parents received counseling and actually made a decision to terminate their parental rights and went through the legal process of doing that and either appearing or not appearing in court and having a final termination decree drawn up. In my experience, oftentimes this meant a lengthy foster care placement for the infant, and I think some of the others have spoke about how lengthy that can be and how critical it is in the time of a child's young life.

A turning point in my thinking about legal risk adoptions was, quite frankly, the birth of my daughter in 1989. At about three months of age it was obvious to me that she had an awareness of me as her primary caretaker over and above her relationships

with other people, even in her immediate world, and what happened between three and six months was rather amazing to me in that she could consistently distinguish between family members and strangers, and if you work with children, you understand something about stranger anxiety, and she gave me the opportunity to personally experience what that's like for a child. So it really sent home some very special messages to me, and again, not at the expense of birth parents or adoptive parents, but weighing the factors, making those decisions about is this a situation where maybe we can take some legal risks and place the child before those critical stages of development with the family who ultimately will be the permanent caretaker, whether that be the biological family or adoptive family in this particular case.

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For this reason, I was again disappointed about the change from the previous bill's three months to four months because the termination process can only be initiated at that four-month period. My concern is for the time that it takes to actually do the termination process, given court schedules and the necessary notices and so forth that must be given. I felt that at three months there was more assurances that if a termination were to occur that it could occur

prior to that six-month period.

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The other area that I'd like to address is with regard to the pre-placement investigation and report. In our agency, while we certainly understand and support the need to investigate a family or to study a family prior to placement with the child for reasons which I believe have already been stated and are obvious, our focus in my practice is not only on the investigative part but more on the preparation part. There are special issues with adoption, there are special issues with parenting as well, and through our programs at CONCERN we offer a preparation process.

It's difficult for adopting parents or prospective adoptive applicants to come to an agency and to open themselves up to what initially they perceive as an acceptance/rejection kind of relationship. We are either going to decide that you can be parents or we're going to decide that you can't. That's the illusion, if you will, that's been created by past practices. We actually enter into a partnership with adoptive parents in saying that our reason for wanting to learn as much as we can about your family and our reason for wanting to impart as much knowledge as we can about our experience with adoption, not only from a professional perspective but

also from another adoptive parent's perspective, is ultimately to benefit you in parenting the child who you have chosen to adopt, and that takes on different meanings when you're talking about special needs children, when you're talking about children from other countries, when you're talking about children who may have some special issues in their family background. It's a mutual decisionmaking process. We try to involve adoptive parents in preparing and knowing as much as they can so that they can go into adoptive parenthood in a very knowledgeable kind of way.

So I think the emphasis is more on the preparation, the education, the support of families through our agency and adoptive parent support groups and while not ignoring the fact that certainly families need to meet certain criteria in order to adopt, as per the regulations that we're bound to meet.

we work very closely with birth parents in stating their preferences as part of the counseling process. We feel that it's real important for birth parents to feel that they are participating in the process of adopting or selecting an adoptive family. So the part about religious belief for my practice is very consistent with what we're already doing. We, too, have had situations where religious belief has

1 been very important to a birth parent and other 2 situations where they did not have a good experience 3 practicing their religious belief and have in fact 4 requested another religious belief. We study a wide variety of families, so almost in 100 percent of the 5 6 cases it really doesn't become an issue in terms of 7 looking at a number of families for a particular child 8 and involving the birth parents in that process g whenever we can. 10 Thank you. 11 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Questions? 12 (No response.) CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: No questions. 13 Thank you, Mary Beth. 1.4 MS. HUGHES: 15 Sure. 16 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Larry Beaser 18 17 not going to make it, and what I would like to do then 18 in that case is the testimony that he would be 19 presenting, once we get it we will disseminate it 20 amongst the members and the staff. 21 Okay, how about Anne Vaughn and Carolyn 22 If you'd introduce yourself for the record. Saunders? 23 MS. VAUGHN: Surely. Yes. 24 Chairman Caltagirone and the committee,

we'd like to thank you for the opportunity to be here

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today. My name is Anne Vaughn. I am going to be presenting Josephine Parks' testimony today. She is here with me on my left. She is the Chairperson of the Parents' Rights Organization as well as the Co-chair of the Family Law Task Force of the Pennsylvania Legal Services Center. I will be presenting her testimony because she is ill today.

On my right is Carolyn Saunders, who is a welfare activist, well-known statewide as well as locally in her community. She is here presenting testimony on behalf of, I believe, the Delaware County Welfare Rights Organization. She is going to be submitting her testimony in writing later, 50 copies to the committee, if that meets with your approval

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Sure.

MS. VAUGHN: Thank you.

Ms. Saunders.

MS. SAUNDERS: Hello.

As Ms. Vaughn said, my name is Carolyn Saunders. I am the Chairperson of Delaware County Welfare Rights Organization. I am a life-long advocate for the poor in this State, County of Delaware, and the city of Chester. I thank you for allowing us the opportunity to address the concerns in House Bill 79.

We find the bill to be very harmful in

the lives of the poor in Pennsylvania. We have spent months testifying opposing House Bill 2133, the mother bill of House Bill 79. We would never support or ask you, and we ask you to not support any legislation that would tear families apart for the sake of legalizing baby snatching. We will do whatever it takes to stop legislation that takes us back to the days of slavery when black mothers were forced to have babies for the master to produce more slaves. Poor mothers and fathers will not produce babies so that the adoption agencies and CYS can warehouse babies in this State and this country to some rich couple looking to buy a baby for the right price.

For the right price, these agencies will willingly sell happiness to the rich at the price of grief to the poor. We approached the writer and sponsor of this bill, we left our names, we left our addresses, and we left our phone numbers, in hopes of arranging a meeting. We wanted her to hear from the other side of this legislation, the side she intends that will produce the babies these agencies are asking to legally steal.

We're here today ready to begin round three with this terrible piece of legislation. What we want to say to the creator of this bill is if the

legislative body is truly concerned about the well-being of certain birth right babies, they should create legislation searching within the baby's birth right family roots and allow the families to care for the children. Legislation of this type will allow the babies to remain in the natural roots knowing who and what they are and who they belong to.

On October 11, 1990, testimony 181 pages long was given in Philadelphia to the Health and Welfare Committee of this House of Representatives. We urge you to read and to put yourself and your families in the place of those young mothers who testified before that committee. Their only crime was being rebellious against their mothers and refusing to mend the gap until it was too late. They found themselves 18 and expecting to live their lives with their children and found that the agencies found them unfit, removed the children from one young mother and changed the goal to adoption. One grandmother fought trying to keep her daughter and grandchild, and she won.

I am a mother of four. I birthed five children. My oldest son lived a few hours after his birth. Today, 31 years later, I still wonder how he looked, what he'd be doing, what type of things he'd be like. Would he be married? Would I have

grandchildren? I miss my son, because the four can't replace him in my life. I died a little 31 years ago, but when I took these young mothers and look into their unhappy faces and hear their heart break, they die daily. The only thing keeping them alive is that maybe one day they'll get their babies back.

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They speak of when they last saw the babies, two years ago, dimpled smiles, babies asking them when she'll come to get them and to take them home. I know that this heartache has to be worse than death. Animals won't let you touch their newborns, and human beings won't act any differently. We have welfare rights, we have parents' rights, we have consumer rights, we have people's rights, We got women's rights. We have every kind of protection group in this State, in this country. We will surface a baby rights organization of mothers, fathers, grandmothers, grandfathers, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins and friends to protect poor families, poor parents, from a bad piece of legislation. We battle laws daily that takes away our dignity, limits our privileges, keeps us living in unsafe, indecent, and unsanitary conditions.

Before us today we are testifying against a law that will take away our only God-given gift of

life - our babies, our children. Some babies, the cream of the crop, will be adopted, while unattractive, unwanted, black, Spanish, crippled babies will be placed in newly created legislated orphanages spread throughout the State. The taxpayers will foot the bill at a far greater rate than the foster care payments in the State.

This country at one time prided itself at keeping families together. Nowadays it seems we create more legislation to assure family destruction. House Bill 79 is another one of these bills.

I want to say to you that I have, in the past, when we created the Parents' Rights Group, I had two persons that I want to bring to mind. We have a mother who had six children that was placed in child care, and I heard some of the testimony and they were saying that the parent, you know, will leave the baby, have no contact with their children. When we ran into this mother, this mother wandered into a shelter in the city of Chester that we had created, and when she wandered into the shelter she had not seen her children for approximately four months because she was putting in her mind that she was never going to be able to see her children again, because no matter what she did did not satisfy the child care agency, and they were moving

to terminate some of her rights for the baby twins for adoption. We fought long and hard and we got her her children back, and she has given birth to four more other children.

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We have another person who has a retarded birth defect. She had four children. The agency removed three children. They moved the two oldest children and they removed the baby. They placed the baby into adoptive care in the State of Delaware. When they placed the baby in adoptive care, they let her keep one of her children, and she kept those children for years. We thought we were doing something great by saying if she can mother this one child, she should be able to mother all three of her children. happened at that point was they took the children, put her into CYS care, and we have never been able to get those children out of care. This mother, we finally got payments for her through the SSI, took every dime that she had and purchased a house just to get overnight visits, and those overnight visits were never allotted to her. The first excuse was that she was living in public housing, that it was unsuitable for her to have these other three children to come back and visit overnight, even though she had one child staying with her. We moved her into her own home and then they told us that the neighborhood was too black and they were not going to permit those children to come into the village.

This is just two of some stories, you know, that you need to hear. If you're going to do something with this bill, then we would ask you to go across the State of Pennsylvania and talk to the people that this bill will have effect or some of this legislation has already affected in order for you to really create a good understanding of a bill that can help all people.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you.

MS. VAUGHN: Thank you.

Again, for the record, my name is Anne Vaughn, and the testimony of Parents' Rights
Organization is as follows:

We thank the committee for this opportunity to present testimony on the very important area of children's rights to natural parents and parental rights under juvenile and adoption laws. First, we ask that the 181 pages of testimony submitted on this subject at hearings before the House Health and Welfare Committee on October 11, 1990 be incorporated herein. We did request that that testimony be made

available to everyone that has not been granted that request. We do ask, however, that you review that, that all members of this House, as well as this committee, review that testimony in its entirety. It contains wonderful testimony on behalf of many, many people who support birth parents, who talk about the pain on severing the parental rights, and on parents who have been pressured to relinquish their rights. I would ask, again, that that be incorporated in its entirety.

Like House Bill 2133, House Bill 79 also seriously affects children and parents. We want to address further some of the areas in the legislation we have specific concerns about with proposals for improved legislation.

The following particular problems in the proposed legislation should be thought through with great care to avoid summary terminations of parental rights. Preliminarily, we credit the sponsors for correcting in this legislation some glaring problems by adding revocation language to the consent form and provision of counsel for indigent parents, those were two items that we had great concerns about, and we were glad to see those incorporated herein. However, this bill would continue to foist on families and the

public-at-large very serious provisions. Questions
needing to be answered include:

May terminations be done in each newborn case or is it only to apply where a pre-adoptive family petitions the court? Is the result possibly children without any parent? Will this lead to warehousing of children in foster care or institutions?

Will a State agency be mandated by this legislation to petition to terminate parental rights in these newborn cases? Do State agencies have the resources to process these terminations?

Three, has the cost and process for appointment of guardians ad litem for minor parents been considered, and should it be?

Four, has the legislature considered that the facts in the <u>Hamilton</u> case appear to involve a dispute between parents following a divorce? Does the legislature intend that a custody issue in divorce be resolved by such drastic means rather than by conciliation or mediation?

Five, will the unattended effect on any addicted parent be to discourage recovery rather than encourage recovery so that he or she can parent and be a productive member of society?

Six, is there any evidence that single

parents with support and services will not parent and be productive members of society? This is, of course, in connection with the newborn provision which talks solely about single parents.

Seven, will the DPW minimum visitation, which is the CYS maximum, CYS is referred to throughout our testimony. That stands for Children and Youth Services for the records. CCYSSA refers to County Children Youth Social Services Agencies. Thank you.

Will the minimum visitation, often one hour per two weeks, one hour in agency offices, lead to the conclusion that there is substantial and continuing failure to contact the child?

Eight, if there are delays by CYS workers in developing family service plans with a visitation schedule, will this be an exception to the substantial and continuing failure to contact?

Nine, was there any evidence available to the legislature or to the sponsors that any addicted parent can be cured within four months, or is a longer treatment period needed?

Ten, can paternity be determined within four months and can potential fathers protect their rights under this bill?

Eleven, should pre-adoptive parents be

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permitted interim approval based on the word of intermediary, given the fact of child abuse and neglect, even in DPW regulated foster homes?

Twelve, has the legislature considered developing less restrictive alternatives to this measure that protects children's rights to natural mothers and natural fathers and still reduces the cost of foster care? We have, further on in our testimony, just such proposals.

Thirteen, does the termination of a child born as the result of rape place a tremendous burden on a woman who has just given birth? Must she press charges or testify as to that?

Fourteen, how does this legislation assure the petition and the notice in each case is served promptly on the filing of all petitions on respondents? We question that because we know of circumstances where petitions are filed with the court, stay there in the court not served on the parent until the hearing notice goes to them.

Additionally, we have some concerns about the failure to support and the rape provisions. We believe that both of these are poorly thought out in terms of public policy. The remedy in our present law for neither rape nor support is termination of parental

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rights. Strong public policy supports prosecution of rape and civil action if there is a failure to support.

Children without parents are also without support, and they cost the State if there is no adoptive parent there. We're talking exceedingly large costs potentially of children with no parents placed in care without any support. My understanding is that Governor Casey wishes to expand support efforts to get support to reimburse the State for the costs of foster care, which are the costs of payments in placement maintenance under Title 4E of the Social Security Act. Support reimbursement is a provision there. Why are we not looking to support from parents while we let the children remain in foster care looking towards reunification paying the State for its costs rather than terminating parental rights and having no parent there who can pay support?

On rape, we want prosecution of rape cases, obviously. Why dissuade a woman from testifying to rape if it may hasten a termination of her child's father's parental rights? Or it may tend to bring forth sometimes false testimony if she did want to terminate, as in the Hamilton case. I don't believe that these matters have been thought through at all, and I think that the legislators need to seriously look

at these. Not every woman is necessarily, even if she has been raped, going to want to terminate her child's right to a father. Many women see value in having two parents to parent a child, even if the father was vicious and horrible to her, she may want the child to have the advantages of knowing who his father is, of having some protected contact with that father, and of having support from that father. I don't think that this measure has been thought through.

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To continue, again, the legislation would create a system of lesser rights for newborns than for In the 181 pages of testimony referred older children. to before, one parent, a teenage parent, Dawn Hill, spoke of the CYS coming to her urging her to give up her child for adoption, although there was no dependency. She was not a foster child. There was no plans to bring her before the court as a foster child. We already may be confronted with a public practice of CYS workers to urge upon clients, often young and inexperienced, family disunity rather than the mandated duty of our present law, the juvenile law, and the regulations implemented pursuant thereto, which is to encourage family unity. We don't want the proposed law to be enacted because it disserves that public purpose and does not foster the bonding of newborns with their

natural parents.

In that same testimony, Chisita Cruz, another young parent, age 20, testified that she had two children as a teenager, had seen neither for two years, had been allowed by CYS to have one child with her for only one month. This was, she believed, too short a time to develop parenting skills. CYS was unwilling to provide more supportive counseling and education to her. Those children, I believe, have now the goal of termination. There is a grandmother there who is very, very willing and eager to take home those children and raise them. That is not being allowed.

JoAnna DeHart testified her six children were in placement for over one year due to housing, clearly a poverty-related problem, and CYS wanted to adopt out her children.

Ann Torregrossa, Executive Director of Delaware County Legal Assistance talked at length of the Sarah Lynn Davis case and her involvement with that case. I would ask that you seriously review her testimony, the written draft of her testimony, in detail regarding the tragedy of that case, which illustrates again and makes reference to other circumstances where similar matters did occur.

CYS has become already adoption brokers

and warehousers of children in foster care, contrary to all our law, public policy purposes, and contrary to our Constitution which protects our family. We urge you to review that testimony.

This bill, like its predecessor, would create law from CYS practice, which already exists. Present agency practice needs legislative attention. Now juvenile courts empowered to make only temporary custody orders end dependencies and order children placed with non-parents. Now courts terminate parental rights without any measuring of minimum reunification services and without any real review of the amount of services in terms of time, dollars, frequency or duration. Meaningful agency services are more than referrals. They must be actually provided or arranged for by the CYS agencies.

We urge this body not to look at the problem piecemeal, taking the easiest way out in times of crisis where families are troubled by drug abuse and homelessness. Added to the garden variety dependency factors of poverty, illness and unemployment, shouldn't we look at solving the problem and not at terminating families? The purpose of the Juvenile Act is to provide rehabilitation services to sustain and unite families. As the courts have said, a parent must be

able to seek the assistance of a child welfare service, with the expectations that the agency will exert its best efforts in working with the parent and the child to improve the parent's skill and understanding. "The premature filing of termination petitions by an agency thwarts the trust necessary for the advancement of the purpose of this relationship between agency and parents." That was the Superior Court which said that in the Matter of MLW in 1982. The cite is in the written testimony.

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As to the newborn provision, they can lose their rights to their parents after four months They are, however, as deserving of an opportunity to be with their parents as other children. The standard should be at least the same as it is for other children, which is six months for review, but under the Social Security funding law, up to 18 months or beyond before a permanency planning decision is made. That is the legislative history behind the AAA or the Adoption Assistance of the Child Welfare Act of 1980, which is the funding provision for Title 4E as well as Title 4B services, which serve to fund foster care placements. Four months' time is significantly contrary to present law and unjust when CYS services at present are just not available.

This grounds for termination should not become law. It is vague and we believe unconstitutional as to a parent who knows or has reason to know of the child's birth. It discriminates on the basis of marital status against unmarried parents, and in particular is hurtful policy to apply to poor families who may not have the means to provide substantial financial support or maintain substantial and continuing contact with the child. We'd like to cite in this reference the case <u>Valentine</u>, which does excuse parents who are on welfare from providing support. We believe that this creates a harsher standard than already exits in our law.

Making that marital status distinction? What
justifiable State purpose is served? There is an equal
protection problem caused by the four-month standard
for newborns, the six-month standard for others. Some
of us have experience of judges asking for more of a
track record than 6 months or 12 months in any
addiction dependency case. This new section does not
comport with the Social Security Act's legislative
history, funding States for services to reunite with
reviews each 6 months, and speaking of 18 months before
a permanency planning decision is made.

There should be at least itemized good cause exceptions to define what "reasonable efforts" is as an excuse and must include at minimum the following clarifications. We say this because we have seen such horrible practices in the work that we do for our poor families in trying to keep them together at the local level.

We need to have clarity in the standards. We must look to parents' economic and health circumstances, including employment efforts and participation in rehabilitative care. We would also urge that if a person has applied to be admitted into rehabilitative care and is just wait listed, he's done what he can do. He should not be sanctioned, she should not be sanctioned, by termination of parental rights simply because there are not enough in the way of rehabilitative services available.

parent should also be excused if he's a party to a custody or dependency proceeding. He may be enjoined from visitation under those proceedings.

There may be delays in the court proceeding there. We should not be able to circumvent that proceeding and having a petitioner to terminate parental rights be able to go into the Orphans' Court to terminate if that is ongoing.

If the parent has not been served with a 1 2 petition, and again, although this has been stressed here in earlier testimony on how many procedural 3 safeguards there are in this bill, we do not believe that that is true. If you take a close look at the 5 bill, there is no service 10 days before the hearing, 6 there is no requirement that the petition itself be 8 served at the time the petition is filed. Under any 9 normal rules of Pennsylvania's Civil Procedure that 10 apply in any proceedings, the filing of any papers with 11 the court requires service on the opposing party. That 12 is standard. Some of us here are lawyers and I know 1.3 that we understand that why should we create an 14 exception giving lesser procedural due process here to parents in adoption proceedings than we provide in 15

For financial support, if the parent is disabled, a recipient of public assistance, or would be a recipient but for his transitionally needy status under Act 75, or paternity proceedings are pending.

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another setting.

Just to clarify what Act 75 is, that is the provision that gives assistance to persons between the ages of 18 and 45 as a general rule for three months out of nine months at 65 percent of the standard of need. In other words, that person can receive in

Delaware County \$205 for three months out of the year. That person clearly is unable to make any payment of substantial financial support to this child. Poverty bars that. We are putting into place a law that penalizes poor people to a far greater extent than it does those who are able to make a contribution but for some reason do not.

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As alternatives to this legislation, we would propose something that we have called preferred caretaker alternative. The law presently permits but does not encourage in practice alternatives of community and relative caretaker status including foster care levels of payment to relatives, although we seldom, if ever, have seen that paid where children cannot be with their parents. We suggest alternatively payments at a lesser rate than foster care, which would serve to save the State money from Title 4A, that is the AFDC program, supplemented by Title 4B, which is the child welfare program, both Federal funds, to keep a kid, child, with the extended family to provide financial support and to encourage the family member to care for the child, to save the higher court costs of dependency determinations, and the, we believe, higher costs of foster care, although the Department of Public Welfare has told us in response to a Federal lawsuit

that they do not know what the foster care standards of payments are. It is our belief that they are higher than what would be paid here.

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For example, a child is placed with an aunt who has two children and receives an AFDC payment of \$403. In Delaware County that is what she would receive. The placed child would receive \$205 a month rather than the \$94, which would be the difference between a grant for three and a grant for four, or \$497 minus the \$403. We believe that this is a potential that could be looked at here that would encourage the CYS agencies to develop case plans carefully focussed on reunification, that would reduce the cost of foster care, would reduce the costs of dependency proceedings which in themselves are costly, which would allow and encourage a family member or relative who already knows this child to take this child into his or her home and to care for that child and to work on reunification, to assist maybe the relative, to go into rehab, to get whatever care, whatever education, whatever skills training, whatever housing she may need so that she herself can be a parent. We think that this makes far better sense as public policy from legislators who care about families. We think that that fulfills our constitutional duties and we think that that fulfills

the purpose of the Juvenile Act to a much greater extent than placing children warehoused in foster care and then in an adoption situation without any support, without any parents. We think that that is the worst situation that we could be faced with.

We question, yes, there will be misuses of this system, but there are misuses of every system, and I think that that's why we have departments like the Department of Health and Department of Public Welfare who are empowered to work through and develop these systems that will protect our families.

As to information and referral, I am referring to Section 2505 on the acknowledgement form which parents are being asked to sign in hospitals acknowledging that they have received a copy of information about services. We think that is just not going to suffice and we can see, knowing how these matters play on the court, we can see the acknowledgement being held up by a petitioner's attorney to the court as Exhibit A. This parent knew that she could go and apply for benefits from a lot of different social agencies and did not. We think that we need a lot more in the way of information given to parents so that they may take advantage, may use those social services that are there intended to be used by

parents in times of trouble. For example, if a parent needs help with rehabilitation for a drug addiction, she should be encouraged to go to the Department of Health, she should be encouraged to get herself into rehabilitation, she should be encouraged to have her child screened through the EPSDT, the Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment program, which is there for a Medicaid eligible child so that that child is cured of any resultant problems that child might We think that all of those systems and that have. information should be given clearly to each parent. We should not be making it easy for a petitioner to terminate parental rights simply because a parent acknowledged in the hospital that she was told about these services. That is not the way public assistance informational components are supposed to play out, and the Department of Public Welfare does have an informational component right at the beginning of the manual, under 55 Pa.Code 101.1(b) exists that requirement.

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Among the services the people must be referred to are the county Children and Youth Services, the CYS's. The purpose of the referral is to develop a family service plan to focus on reunification, to fulfill the mandate of that agency; to provide

counseling, day care, homemakers/caretakers and parenting skills education, all of which are listed on page 17 of the Title 4B child welfare plan that this State submits to the Federal government in order to pull down the Federal funding for that program. These also are listed at 55 Pa. Code 3130.34 and 35, I believe. Those are the mandated services. We've got to enable our families to get access to those services.

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We also should, since there is under the child welfare law federally a requirement that there be coordination between the programs, we must have a system that allows for referral to the AFDC and to the General Assistance programs to apply, to the Medicaid program to apply for the benefits there, including the EPSDT and the Healthy Beginnings program so that we have poor families able to raise and care for their poor children, which is what we are all about as a nation after all. Food stamps, WIC, employment and training programs are all developed and a part of what the Public Welfare office is supposed to be doing. do know that Secretary White has taken strenuous efforts to have the employment and training programs to work well. We understand that they are. We ought to be encouraging our parents, single or not single, to get into these programs, to enable them to parent their

children. We should not be severing the parental ties of poor parents to their children by enacting this legislation simply because the State is concerned about, we don't know, saving dollars possibly, a valid concern, but we think there is a far less costly way of going about this.

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As to the court appointed counseling fund of this provision, we have concerns about it may violate the Social Security funding scheme. There is a requirement there -- well, everyone should have the right to access those services. If you limit or make discretionary the power of the court to make a referral, we think that there is a serious problem here. We think that everyone has the right to apply for the counseling services and have the information about applying for that service and have a fair hearing if there is a denial of that service or if you're refused the right to develop a family service plan so that you can get CYS directly provided services or services arranged for through an agency such as CONCERN or one of the other agencies that are around who provide services.

As to the opportunity for re-establishment of the parent/child relationship, this addresses the Hamilton case. We have serious concerns

about implementation of this particular provision. Any provision that changes or eliminates the opportunity to cure a relationship once a petition to terminate has been filed we believe must be abandoned. "Filed and not served," I would again note, is the language of the statute, and again there is a procedural due process problem.

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Somebody here earlier in testifying said that this frustrated adoptions to have the parent go back into court afterwards or to go back into establishing a relationship. It is the parent who still has the constitutional rights to the child up until the time of a final decree. It is his rights that are being frustrated by any effort to terminate those. We are not here to serve the interests of a potential adoptive parent. The frustration at this point does not go against the potential adoptive parent, it goes against the natural parent. We believe that there are circumstances where a child is clearly strongly helped if a father who has been absent returns. We think that's what we ought to be looking at. A child does not necessarily know six months of absence. A child should be able to enjoy the renewed relationship and re-establish that relationship. The court should have the power to consider these factors.

The statutory rejection of evidence of change should be deleted. The benefit to the child of post-abandonment effort would allow the Orphans' Court its power to hear evidence of advance up to and at the time of the hearing on termination. And following, I would say, up to the final decree.

A termination must be based on clear and convincing evidence of the allegations in the petition. The proposed change would substitute for this evidentiary standard a time barrier that deprives the parent of the opportunity to prove and the court of the power to hear this evidence. The child, through his or her attorney, is also deprived of the opportunity to provide evidence of the importance of the continuing parental relationship to the child. We urge that instead of this cut-off of evidence the court consider any curative change behavior. Aren't we glad that even if it is a filing of petition that re-energizes the parent that that has happened? Isn't that what we should be looking to?

Provisions for open adoption should also be included in any law. Testimony at the October 11, 1990 hearings clearly shows that parents do not forget their children because of a paper decree of terminating parental rights, and we believe that children, because

of a paper decree, do not also forget their parents. We'd like to make reference particularly to the testimony at those hearings of Ann Torregrossa, Alicia Giesa Patterson, and Linda Pfaff. It's important that the court be permitted to hear evidence on the value to the child of the continued visitation. It's important that legislators assess whether this continuity may even be an inducement in some cases to voluntary relinquishment.

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We believe that pre-placement investigation by the child welfare agencies is a drain on limited CYS services and we believe that at a time when they're trying to expand their pre-placement services and prevent placement in the first place they are trying to provide services to reunite promptly, that this is just a misuse of their limited staff, their limited funds, to have that sort of system in The court should appoint independently outside of CYS's, and there's also potentially, of course, a very conflictual role if the CYS worker is the one who is to focus on reunification and then puts on her adoption hat and starts to do that sort of work. We think that that creates a problem and also maybe mistrust between the parent and the worker where there should be a system of trust.

Interim placement provisions place children at risk in unapproved homes without procedural safeguards. Why should we rely on the word of an unregulated system, unlicensed system, that the child is safe in this home at a time when, as we said earlier, even foster care homes result in abuse to our children? We ought to have clear standards there and make sure that the home is approved before a child is placed there.

We're also concerned that the child will be moved around without procedural safeguards either to the child or to the parent. Recently, some new regulations were enacted at 55 Pa. Code 3130.68(i) which required that in CYS changes of placement there be a notice and an opportunity for the parent to have that reviewed by the court if there is a change of placement, an opportunity for the child as well to have that reviewed if there is a change of placement. So we question the moving of the child into an interim pre-placement home without these procedures being in place. The section should be eliminated or should be revised.

In conclusion, we want to thank you very kindly for listening to our testimony. Again, we urge you not to enact this law, to seriously consider what

we have said here and to seriously review what has been said at the prior hearing on October 11, 1990.

Thank you so much.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you.

Lois?

REPRESENTATIVE HAGARTY: Just a comment, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to thank you for your input that has resulted in some of the positive changes in this legislation. We view this legislation as providing additional protections in the adoption system. Those changes which you brought forth to our attention which we could incorporate to provide even further additional protections to natural parents we have done so and so I think it makes it a better piece of legislation.

As for your, I guess, additional concerns with regard to this legislation, I can only say that all of us who have reviewed it across the State feel very clearly that we have gone further, further as you have heard, than any other State in providing protections to parents and providing procedural safeguards to parents, and that this bill, if anything, enhances those protections, does not take away from them.

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Where we do disagree, I believe we disagree because this bill places primary emphasis upon the needs of the child, not the needs, while it attempts to balance, and I have worked on adoption legislation since 1980, I have probably worked as hard as anyone to insure a balancing of rights of all those concerned, I believe this legislature believes that the needs of the child must come first.

As for your additional comments and concerns, as I believe most of them are focussed on the present system, how the present system functions, I know that Representative Richardson, in holding the hearing, I know that through my comments, discussions with him, he would certainly be committed to working with you on those alternatives you suggest to enhance and improve the present system. I don't think that those comments and concerns focus on alternatives. Many of the concerns and the problems, deprivations that you believe have occurred under the present system, I feel that you will have to work on with the Health and Welfare Committee. They are not the focus of this legislation. While many of those goals may be laudable, we have attempted to narrowly prescribe specific procedural changes which we feel will improve the adoption process and the rights for children.

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Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Counsel Andring.

MR. ANDRING: I just have one area to I tried to listen very carefully to each address. specific example you gave, both witnesses, and as nearly as I could determine, every specific example dealt with a child who was in the custody of the Children and Youth Service agency pursuant to, I think, the grounds contained in the statute under Section 2511(2) or 2511(5), which have to do with the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of the parent to care for the child, or if the child is in the care of the agency by court order or voluntary agreement under certain conditions which lead to removal or replacement, and there are certain standards in these sections which have to do with proceeding with the termination of rights, and as nearly as I can determine, this legislation isn't addressing those sections at all and I wonder, do you have examples that haven't proceeded under those sections?

MS. VAUGHN: Yes. Is it Mr. Andring?

MR. ANDRING: Yes.

MS. VAUGHN: Thank you.

We do. The Sarah Lynn Davis case which we talked about and which is in the testimony was a

case which was outside the CYS system, and I would ask that you review that testimony of Ann Torregrossa from the October 11, 1990 hearing for further information there. Ann Torregrossa was the attorney of record on that case and there is detail there about that, and about, I believe, similar circumstances.

In response to your question about whether the law does affect cases -- whether this law would affect cases within the CYS area, of course it would. You're creating a totally new substantive standard, despite Representative -- and with all due respect to you, Representative Hagarty, there are clearly new substantive areas here that are being established and addressed. The rape area and the newborn area, both of those could come under the CYS, could petition under those grounds. There is nothing preventing them from doing so.

As a further matter, I would like to say that we believe an increased reference to an agency, a public agency with a duty to provide reunification, that one of the problems raised by the Sarah Lynn Davis case was the lack of ready access to services to an agency that could provide her with assistance and with counseling, with parenting skills education, with referral to the other agencies which would have enabled

her to parent. We believe that there are serious problems if there is relinquishment to an intermediary who then places, in that particular case he placed out of State, without any access to services.

So, yes, I thank you for your question because what we are saying is that CYS should be involved. They should be involved by referral, they should be involved by the opportunity of any parent to develop a family service plan and get services.

MR. ANDRING: So you're saying CYS should be involved in any adoption?

MS. VAUGHN: No, I am not saying -- well, I am saying that CYS, at the request of a parent, should be -- each parent should have the opportunity to contact and apply for Children and Youth Services reunification services, as well as counseling, which would help her decide as to whether she indeed wanted to relinquish the child or not. But that is all part of the planning that goes on through a CYS placement, which takes place over, well, it's reviewed every six months. This review takes place regardless of whether the case is in the dependency system or outside of the dependency system and done as a family service plan case only. The Children and Youth Services provide services, works towards reunification, and ultimately

ourt that the placement — that she is establishing stability so that she can or he can parent the child, then the Children and Youth Services agency may petition the court to change the goal to adoption in the juvenile court and may then go to the termination court. But what we are saying is, yes, that parents should have the right to this sort of assistance and that that makes sense in terms of public policy, that we should have a system that tracks parents, gives parents the opportunity. Now, obviously, we're not talking about there are going to be cases where parents want to voluntarily relinquish—

MR. ANDRING: But, in fact, doesn't this bill substantially increase the likelihood of that happening and increase and improve the opportunities for counseling and notification therefore more than what we have in existing law?

MS. VAUGHN: No, I don't believe it does.
MR. ANDRING: Okay.

MS. VAUGHN: I don't believe it does, Mr. Andring, for the reasons addressed in testimony, and I don't want to take more of the committee's time, but I think that there is serious problems with access, lack of access to the services, and I think that the

suggestions that we make as far as information and referral should be considered. Every parent should have the right and the opportunity, if they wish, to get into development of a family service plan and services towards reunification, that we wouldn't be seeing these horrible tales of Sarah Lynn Davis where the parents are just, you know, torn apart, did not know those services were available. You know shortly after the birth of a child when things are not going well, give up a child. That's what we want to prevent.

We, too, agree, by the way, that the child is the focus, and we believe, however, that the child has the right to be with a natural family or an extended natural family whenever possible, and that is what we are urging here as better, sounder public policy rather than this bill which allows the State to come in, take the newborns, you know, instead of providing the help, terminating their parental rights and maybe warehousing them and creating all sorts of problems in terms of costs to the State down the line. We're suggesting some provisions that would allow the State to go after support while those children stayed in foster care, would allow for payments to an extended family member while the parent works through.

I grant you, this is not wanted or

desired in all cases. We, though, come from a perspective and see from the community that we come from those cases where the parents are eager to have the child with them and cannot get the child because of limited services basically is the reason because of lack of housing, because of limited income, limited employment opportunities to them, limited rehabilitation potential, and that's what we're saying is much better to protect our families, to not warehouse our babies. Thank you. CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you very much for your testimony. We will conclude the hearing for today.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 1:06 p.m.)

I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me during the hearing of the within cause, and that this is a true and correct transcript of the same. ANN-MARIE P. SWEENEY THE FOREGOING CERTIFICATION DOES NOT APPLY TO ANY REPRODUCTION OF THE SAME BY ANY MEANS UNLESS UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL AND/OR SUPERVISION OF THE CERTIFYING REPORTER. Ann-Marie P. Sweeney 536 Orrs Bridge Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 717-737-1367