1	COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
2	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
3	
	In re: Blood Alcohol Content Levels
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7	Stenographic report of hearing held in Room 418, Minority Caucus Room,
8	Main Capitol Building, Harrisburg, PA
9	Monday,
_	August 3, 1992
lo	1:00 p.m.
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L 2	HON. THOMAS R. CALTAGIRONE, CHAIRMAN
	MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
13	Hon. Kevin Blaum Hon. David Heckler
4	Hon. Gregory Fajt Hon. Gerard Kosinski
15	Hon. James Gerlach Hon. Frank LaGrotta
L6	<u>Λ1so Present:</u>
17	
18	David Krantz, Executive Director Galina Milahov, Research Analyst
9	Paul Dunkelberger, Republican Research Analyst Mary Beth Marshik, Republican Research Analyst
	Suzette Becmer, Republican Staff
20	
21	Reported by:
22	Ann-Marie P. Sweeney, Reporter
23	
	ANN-MARIE P. SWEENEY
24	3606 Horsham Drive Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
25	717-732-5316



1992-105

<u>PAGE</u>

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2	INDEX
3	
4	Kathleen A. McDonnell, Esq., Acting Chief of Legislation, Philadelphia District Attorney's Office
5	George Leon, Esq., Appellate Unit, Philadelphia
6	District Attorney's Office
7	Hon. Jeffrey K. Sprecher, Judge, Berks County Court of Common Pleas
8	
9	William Tully, Esq., Chief Deputy District Attorney, Dauphin County
10	Dr. Charles L. Winek, Director, Allegheny County Department of Laboratories
11	
12	Curt Barnes, Assistant District Altorney, Berks County
13	Corporal James Adams, Upper Allen Township Police Department
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15	Sherry Walker, Executive Director, M.A.D.D., Pennsylvania Chapter
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1 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: The hour is here. 2 We might as well get rolling. 3 I'm State Representative Tom Caltagirone. 4 Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. We're going 5 to take testimony today on the public hearing dealing 6 with the blood alcohol content levels and some of the 7 controversy that has resulted from some of the rulings 8 dealing with that particular issue. There are other 9 members of the panel here and there will be other 10 members joining us, but I'd like for them to introduce 11 themselves, if you would, to my left. REPRESENTATIVE LaGROTTA: Representative 12 13 LaGrotta from Lawrence County. 14 MR. KRANTZ: Dave Krantz, Executive Director of the House Judiciary Committee. 15 16 REPRESENTATIVE GERLACH: Representative **17** Jim Gerlach from Chester County. MR. DUNKLEBERGER: Paul Dunkleberger, 18 19 Republican staff. 20 MS. MARSCHIK: Mary Beth Marschik, 21 Republican staff. 22 MS. BEEMER: Suzette Beemer, House Judiciary staff. 23 MS. MILAHOV: Galina Milahov, Democratic 24 25 staff.

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CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Okay, we're going to hear from the first testifants, Kathy McDonnell and George Leone from the District Attorney's Office in Philadelphia. If you would introduce yourself for the record and present your testimony.

MS. McDONNELL: Surc. Good afternoon, Chairman Caltagirone and members of the House Judiciary Committee, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Kathy McDonnell. As the Chairman said, I'm from the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, in the Legislation Unit. Both myself and my colleague Mr. Lcone are here to speak on behalf of the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association in support of the proposed amendments to House Bill 355, specifically those that concern the amendments to the DUI law 3731. Mr. Leone accompanied me here today because he is in our appellate unit and has kept a watchful eye both in helping to draft these amendments and also in following recent Supreme Court case law which has forced us into the provision we're here today, so if it's okay, I would like to pass the microphone over to Mr. Leone.

MR. LEONE: Good afternoon. As Kathy mentioned, I'm George Leone, and I appreciate the opportunity both for myself and for the office and for the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association of

testifying before you today. I have some prepared testimony which I will go through and I hope that copies have been given to you.

As you probably know, this bill is a direct response to two Supreme Court cases that have gutted, essentially decriminalized, the Commonwealth's ability to obtain DUI convictions for driving with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit of .10. These provisions pose a direct threat to the public safety of the Commonwealth.

In <u>Commonwealth vs. Luther Jarman</u>, a York County case, and <u>Commonwealth vs. James Lee Modaffare</u>, a Clearfield County case, the respective defendants were tested 59 and 110 minutes after being stopped. The results for both defendants were above .10. One was .114 and one was .108. Both defendants were, thus, over the legal limit of .10 set by the General Assembly, but in both cases the defendants argued that while their blood was over the legal limits at the time of the test, the Commonwealth could not prove that their blood was over the legal limit at the time of driving.

The defendant's theory, which I have turned "chug-and-drive," runs like this: It's generally accepted that alcohol when drunk does not

instantly pass from your mouth to your blood. It takes about 60 to 90 minutes of absorption through your stomach to make it into your bloodstream and for your blood alcohol level to reach its peak level. If a driver drank all of his alcohol immediately before he got into his car, his rising blood alcohol level might still be below .10 at the time of driving, even though it later rose to above .10 at the time of testing. Thus, even though a driver drank enough alcohol before driving to render him legally intoxicated and seriously impaired, if he did his driving quickly enough after drinking, he would not be legally accountable.

The defendant's theory is clearly contrary to the goals of the DUI statute. It was not this General Assembly's goal to encourage people to consume their alcohol by chugging it rather than by consuming it with moderation. It was not the goal of this General Assembly to encourage people to jump into their cars immediately after drinking rather than wait. I mean, one only needs to think of the cards that are issued available to people saying how long you have to wait after consuming a particular amount of alcohol. It's clear you want people to wait and sober up, not rush into their cars and try and race home before the alcohol takes effect.

And not only does this theory encourage you to jump in your car, it does encourage you, in fact, to race home, to drive as quickly as possible so that if anything happens to you, you can't have absorbed the alcohol yet, it's still running through your system. That's clearly not what the General Assembly intended to do. They did not want people to drink enough alcohol to render themselves unsafe and then run to their cars and race to their destinations in the hope of arriving before the alcohol takes effect.

The harm from the defendant's theory doesn't stop there. The defendants in <u>Jarman</u> and <u>Modaffare</u> argued that without knowing what and when a defendant drank — any defendant — that no one could say that a defendant was not still absorbing his alcohol and was still below .10 at the time of testing. And I should point out to you, this argument can be made with any level of alcohol testing, with any test that is not essentially instantaneous. You could have a .30 and you could still make this argument. Yes, I have a .30 thirty minutes after driving, but I just drank a heck of a lot of alcohol right before I got into my car and it hadn't absorbed yet.

Thus, according to defendants, even if a

defendant's blood test result was over .10 and if a defendant, as in Modaffare, who said, no, I didn't do all that drinking right before I got in the car, I did it over a period of time, does not claim to have taken his last drink immediately before driving, the evidence is still insufficient unless the Commonwealth can prove that a defendant has absorbed all of his alcohol before driving.

The burden that the defendants in these cases would pose on the Commonwealth is practically unmeetable. The police officer who encounters a drunk driver encounters him on the road. He does not know where he has come from, he does not know where he drank, he does not know when he drank, he does not know what he drank. The defendant knows, of course, but the Commonwealth cannot compel him to tell them. And if the defendant decides to lie about what he did, the Commonwealth can't disprove it.

Under the theory of the defendants in <u>Jarman</u> and <u>Modaffare</u>, any blood test result over .10 is inadequate evidence to convict any defendant because the Commonwealth cannot know when and what drinks he took and when he took them. This, again, was clearly not the intention of the General Assembly in enacting the .10 provision. This provision was put in there to

provide a scientifically accurate and easily and fairly justicable standard. You didn't want people to get into their cars with enough alcohol in their blood to get them above .10. That was the intent. If you were going to drink that much, you didn't drive. If vou were going to drive, you didn't drink that much. unfortunately, the Supreme Court in these two decisions, accepted the defendant's theory. They ruled that blood test results over .10 were inadequate to convict those defendants because without knowing when the defendants had done their drinking, it was only speculative what the defendant's blood alcohol level was, whether it was above .10 at the time of driving. Essentially, what the Supreme Court did was to say that it would presume that every defendant, as a matter of law, had done all of his drinking before the time of driving and it would be up to the Commonwealth to disprove that.

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Now, in those two cases the Supreme Court cited two things. They cited the 50-minute time lapse between the time the test was taken and the time the driving had ended in those cases, and they said that's one factor in our decision. Unfortunately, given the time necessarily consumed in stopping and questioning an apparent drunk driver, giving him the opportunity to

pass a field sobriety test, taking them into custody, arranging for the safe keeping of his vehicle, obtaining his consent to the test, taking him to a blood testing location and doing the prerequisite pre-test preparation, it is unusual that a blood sample can be obtained in less than 50 minutes.

Now, I speak as an attorney who sees these cases that come to me. I understand that later in the day you're going to be hearing from a police officer and his testimony will be exactly the same. It's very unusual to get anything faster than 50 minutes. It just is not possible — you can't jump into their car and stab them with a needle. It doesn't work that way.

The Supreme Court in <u>Jarman</u> and <u>Modaffare</u> also cited what they called the small amount by which the .108 and .114 blood test results exceeded .10.

Now, this legislature set .10 as the number. It picked the number. The Supreme Court said the leads were only a small amount more than that number. Well, as I understood the General Assembly's intent, it picked a number and it wanted that number to be enforced. But when these decisions first came out there was some hope that, well, maybe the Supreme Court has decriminalized between .10 and .114, but above that we'll still be

1 able to get convictions, and any hope of that was 2 dashed by a Superior Court decision in a Mercer County 3 case. The case name is Commonwealth vs. Tamara Sue Osborne, and they followed the Supreme Court's lead and said -- the Supreme Court said it was constrained. 5 6 That's their word. They felt they were required by the 7 Supreme Court to discharge a driver whose blood alcohol level at the time of testing was .148, .15 essentially. 8 9 That's a high, that's an extraordinarily high blood 10 alcohol level. But they felt they were constrained 11 do that under the Supreme Court's decision, and that 12 essentially they blamed the Commonwealth for not 13 presenting expert testimony to what's called relate 14 back or extrapolate the .15 result back to the time of 15 driving. And that goes back to the basic problem here, 16 the Commonwealth does not know, and its experts do not 17 know, when or what a particular person drank. 18 fact, the Supreme Court in their earlier decision, 19 Commonwealth vs. Gonzalcz, said that expert testimony 20 is inadmissible. If the expert needs to know--and any honest expert would tell you he would--what the person 21 22 was drinking and when he drank it, if the expert says, 23 oh, I don't know that but here's my opinion, his 24 testimony is inadmissible. So essentially, the 25 Superior Court is asking us to do something the Supreme

Court has already told us that we can't do.

Just — even though this is now the law of

Pennsylvania, that even though .15 results are not good
enough, and by the way, in our office it is my
understanding we no longer attempt to prosecute A(4)
prosecutions where the result is .15 or below. It is
clear to us under Osborne and Jarman and Modaffare that
our case will be thrown out. So they've essentially
decriminalized driving in that fairly large range of
fairly intoxicated people.

But any hope that this was just one Superior Court panel's reaction and that another panel might change it, I think that that's a vain hope. Another Superior Court case, Commonwealth vs. Frederick Weiss, which was not cited here, it was decided in June, that case didn't even have an $\Lambda(4)$ prosecution. The defendant was acquitted of $\Lambda(4)$, but on appeal they still have the $\Lambda(1)$, the visibly intoxicated driving clearly under the influence statute prosecution, and there the Superior Court went out of its way, this is a different panel, to say we presume that the Commonwealth is aware of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Commonwealth vs. Jarman and Commonwealth vs. Modaffare and that it will conform its prosecution

of future drunk driving cases accordingly. So both courts have taken the position essentially that under <u>Jarman</u> and <u>Modaffare</u> we just can't bring these prosecutions under $\Lambda(4)$ anymore.

And I should point out that although Osborne dealt with .15, which as I said is a pretty high level, there's no logical constraint to keep going on that scale. There's no reason why point .14, .15 or .2 or .3 are any more a situation where you cannot, where the Commonwealth doesn't have to come back with "relation back" testimony under this statute, and as I said, we cannot. We just don't have that information. It's in the sole position of the defendant, and we have no rights to compel him to give it to us.

In <u>Jarman</u> and <u>Modaffare</u>, two Justices,
Justices Cappy and McDermott, late Justice McDermott,
dissented complaining that it was impossible for the
Commonwealth to procure meaningful expert testimony
because it could not compel the defendant to say what
and when he drank, and that we are imposing an
impossible burden on the Commonwealth to prove its
case. And this majority of the Supreme Court responded
that it was the General Assembly's fault essentially,
that the General Assembly had made Pennsylvania's DUI
statute depend on the time of driving, that other State

statutes differed, that other State statutes might be more responsive to societal concerns about drunk driving, and the Supreme Court concluded: "Such arguments could properly be addressed to our legislature, rather than to this Court, for we are constrained to apply the plain language of the existing statute."

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The amendments to Section 3731 embodied in House Bill 355 correct the Supreme Court's disastrous decisions by making clear that if a defendant, before or during his driving, drinks so much alcohol that his blood alcohol level goes over the legal limit, he is legally responsible for his dangerous mixture of drinking and driving. The House Bill amendments also eliminate the "chug and drive" defense and discourage drinkers from rushing to their cars and racing home in the hope that their driving will be faster than their liquor. Because House Bill 355's requirements are based on the time of testing rather than on the time of driving, it eliminates the impossible burden of knowing what and when a defendant drank in attempting to relate back blood alcohol test results. The amendment also includes a general requirement that the sample be drawn within three hours, with a special proviso, a proviso for additional

time in cases such as where a driver has caused an accident pinning him in his car, or where a driver conceals himself after a hit-and-run where it is reasonable to allow the police additional time to get the defendant and get the sample drawn.

And I should point out here that logically if a defendant is tested, let's take, for example, six hours after the accident and still has a blood alcohol level of .10, remember, he's absorbed all of his alcohol within an hour and a half of stopping driving. If his blood alcohol level six hours later is still above .10, that only tells you that he drank vast quantities of alcohol to keep it up that high that long. If he drank that much alcohol to drive his blood alcohol level eventually that high, you don't want him to be driving.

The association canvassed its members and picked the three-hour limit as a limit that would prevent people from being shocked by what they would term delays in testing, which, as I said, only goes to show the defendant drank more than the defendant who had that same alcohol level three hours before them. That level is in there to create a level of comfort both with you and the courts so that we don't have problems with people saying, well, you waited too long.

1 I want to just close by saying that this 2 proposed amendment specifically addresses the serious 3 damage done by the Supreme Court decisions, damage that essentially destroyed the Commonwealth's abilities to 4 5 hold persons accountable for driving and drinking above 6 the legal limit. It's crucial to future successful 7 prosecutions of individuals who drive our streets drunk 8 and to the safety of our citizenry that these 9 amendments be enacted as quickly as possible, and I 10 thank you very much for giving me an opportunity to 11 comment. And I would be happy to entertain any 12 questions you might have. 13 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: We had some

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: We had some additional members that joined the panel, if they would just please introduce themselves for the record.

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REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: Representative Jerry Kosinski from Philadelphia, fresh in from a vacation.

REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: Representative

Dave Heckler from Bucks County, fresh in from Bucks

County, where it is always a vacation.

REPRESENTATIVE KOSINSKI: Let me tell that to some of your property taxpayers.

REPRESENTATIVE FAJT: I'm not even going to follow that one. Greg Fajt from Allegheny County.

1 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you. 2 Are there any questions from members or staff? 3 4 (No response.) CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: I want to thank 5 6 you for your testimony. We certainly appreciate it. 7 Thank you for having us. MS. McDONNELL: MR. LEONE: Thank you very much. 8 9 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: We do hope to get 10 some action on that bill. 11 MS. McDONNELL: Thank you. 12 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Next we would like 13 to hear from Judge Jeffrey K. Sprecher from my home 14 county, Berks County, and a good personal friend. 15 Judge. 16 JUDGE SPRECHER: Good afternoon, Mr. 17 Chairman. Good afternoon, everyone. My name is 18 Jeffrey K. Sprecher from Berks County, and I was 19 elected judge last year, so I'm new at this position, 20 but I've been assigned the responsibility of handling 21 all of the driving under the influence cases in Berks 22 County, which in the highest volume years has been 23 about 890, but this year we expect it to be perhaps 24 1,000, so we have a large number of cases that we're

handling driving under the influence. And I have a

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prepared statement, if it pleases the Chairman, and I'll very quickly read through this and then perhaps there may be some discussion or question.

Of course, this all has to do with the Supreme Court decisions of Modaffare and Jarman, as well as a Superior Court ruling in the Osborne case, which is the one that has really brought it home, and that has rendered Section 3731(a)(4) of the Vehicle Code virtually unenforceable, and of course what we're concerned about is 3731(a)(1) and 3731(a)(4). And 3731(a)(4), of course, as you well know, is the section that prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle while the amount of alcohol in the blood is .10 or greater.

burden of proving the level of alcohol at the actual time of driving, and that's, of course, the problem that we're dealing with now in Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth's evidence always consists of chemical test results conducted of samples taken at some point after the motorist stops driving, and typically one hour passes before a motorist is tested. Prior to Modaffare, Jarman, and Osborne, jurors were permitted to use their common sense and experience to relate a blood alcohol test result back to the time of driving. Now under Modaffare, Jarman, and Osborne, a jury

presented with a motorist with a blood alcohol level of as high as .15 as determined by a test conducted as quickly as 50 minutes after driving would not, absent any expert testimony, have sufficient evidence to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

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An expert testimony of the requisite quality is, of course, very difficult to produce. To state with any authority what a motorist's blood alcohol level was while driving based on a latter test, the expert must know the amount and time of food and alcohol consumption, and precious few defendants will opt to reveal this information to the Commonwealth, of course. There was testimony previously about the length of time and the amount of this chug-a-lug defense, and one case that was before me where the blood alcohol level was over .2, the expert who testified, and Mr. Barnes is here, and I believe Mr. Barnes had actually prosecuted that case on behalf of the district attorney's office, the expert in that case stated that without knowing the amount of food that was consumed and the time that the food was last consumed, let alone the issue of how much alcohol was consumed. without having that information, there was simply no way that this person could tell what the blood alcohol level might have been, and in our case it was exactly

like Osborne. Our case that I was trying at that time was 50 minutes, and I tried to get the expert to reveal with some certainty that it could not have dropped or it could not have increased that large an amount in such a short period of time so that it had to be .10 or greater, but the expert wouldn't, of course, say that. And when I asked the expert, the expert basically said that it is possible that the person could have consumed so much alcohol before they got into a car that at the time of driving they did not have a blood alcohol level above .10, even though at the time of testing 50 minutes later it might be .2 or .3. So that's the problem that we're dealing with.

A great cloud of uncertainty and confusion has descended upon the conduct of the actual DUI trial. While it is clear that expert testimony is required at the trial of an individual tested within 50 minutes with the blood alcohol level of .15, such certainty diminished as other levels and times are plugged into this equation. The cases indicate that as the blood alcohol level rises and the time decreases between the test, the inference of guilt increases and the need for expert testimony decreases. Now, that isn't something I made up to tell you, that's something that comes out of the appellate court cases, and I'll

repeat it. These appellate court cases indicate that as the blood alcohol level rises, so if it's a higher blood alcohol level, and the time decreases, if it's a shorter period of time, the inference of guilt increases and the need for expert testimony decreases. That's what the cases would have us follow. The problem is that if an expert can't really tell us even with the highest of blood alcohol levels and the shortest period of time that the person was not over .10 at the time of driving, it doesn't really do us much good what the inference is.

The appellate courts have refused to draw any bright lines in this regard, and those of us who work at the trial level must wait perhaps years for enough decisions to determine with any degree of confidence when there is enough evidence to sustain a guilty verdict.

The conduct of recent DUI trials in my courtroom provides examples of the adverse effects of the current confusion. If the prosecutor elects to proceed on charges based on blood alcohol level, defense counsel will rightly request a demurer upon completion of the Commonwealth's case for failure to meet its evidentiary burden. I'm then faced with the difficulty of measuring this efficiency of the evidence

against the standard which the appellate courts have failed to articulate, except in the roughest of outlines.

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In the overwhelming likelihood that the demurer is granted, and I guess we've had four or five cases like that already, the jury is then placed in the difficult and frustrating position of having heard testimony concerning the defendant's blood alcohol level but being instructed that they may not consider such evidence. In other words, if the Commonwealth has charged (a)(1) and (a)(4), then of course there's evidence that's submitted of (a)(4), and that would be the blood alcohol level, but then if there's a demurer that's sustained, in other words, we have to dismiss the (a)(4), then all that goes to the jury is (a)(1), which is driving under the influence to a degree that renders you incapable of safe driving, and then the jury said, well, whatever happened to the blood alcohol? All of a sudden that's taken out, and at best it creates confusion.

One option available to the legislature would be to do nothing and let stand the appellate court's interpretation of the statute. Perhaps in time the uncertainty of which I spoke will pass, but the inability of the Commonwealth to successfully prosecute

motorists on the basis of their blood alcohol level will remain in all but the most egregious cases.

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It's my experience as a judge that the use of blood alcohol levels to prosecute drunk drivers provides an important compliment to (a)(1) of the Vehicle Code, which, of course, as I said prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders a person incapable of safe driving. And just as there are situations where blood alcohol results are not available, there are circumstances where evidence of an individual's actual incapacity is weak. The defendant's injuries in an accident, for example, may have rendered field sobriety tests impossible. There may be sufficient probable cause to request testing, but a jury may have reasonable doubt as to incapacity. In such a case, blood tests may be the only evidence of truth supplied to the jury to determine if the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And juries, in my short experience, really rely and look for this blood alcohol content, and I think that they were conditioned to do that since you enacted this legislation 10 years ago. That's what everybody looks for. A jury that's trying a case wants to know what the blood test results are.

And, of course, tragically, there are

individuals whose tolerance for alcohol is so great that they can function with a blood alcohol level above the legal limits to a degree which gives the jury pause before finding incapacity, and we in Berks County videotape the field sobriety tests and sometimes that comes up before the jury, and I look at this and I see the blood alcohol level and I see that this person is functioning very well because he has such a high tolerance, so I can see where without the blood test that kind of evidence that goes before a jury will convince the jury that probably the person is not driving under the influence to a degree which renders him incapable of safe driving.

In setting the legal limit of .10, you people made the determination that no one above that limit could safely operate a motor vehicle, and in my opinion that determination was wise. New legislation should be drafted to return blood tests to the crucial function they formerly played in fighting the great carnage visited upon the roads of this Commonwealth by drunk drivers. And as I said, in Berks County the numbers are not decreasing. We're going to have a record year. Wow.

I am aware that there is proposed legislation prohibiting the operation of a motor

vehicle with a blood alcohol level above a certain amount as shown or as determined by chemical tests conducted within a set period of time after the person stops driving, and I think that that probably is the way to go. I would very much support that type of legislation. Recently, I went to a school in Reno, Nevada, where it was a school on driving under the influence, and I was very anxious to go to that school because it involved judges from all across the country, and I conducted an informal survey. There were 25 different States and territories represented there, and about half of them have a law that does say that.

In other words, our law, of course, talks about if you're driving at 1:00 o'clock and you're tested at 2:00 o'clock, what was the level at 1:00 o'clock? But the other laws apparently state that if you're driving at 1:00 o'clock, what is the blood alcohol level, and if the blood alcohol level is drawn by 2:00 o'clock, 12:30, 3:00 o'clock, whatever it might be, then of course in other words it's above .10 as determined by a test that is drawn within a certain period of time, and I think that that's really the way to go on this legislation. And I would request that of course the committee and its staff look into some of the case law of these other States. I know that

there's quite a history of this, and if that is the way that the committee feels that we should go, I certainly would welcome that move. And I would welcome it as soon as possible.

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In Berks County, I'm sure Mr. Barnes is going to talk about this a little bit more, but in Berks County the prosecution does commence. It's not just a failure to prosecute if it's .15 or lower, because we try to encourage getting the person into the system somehow, because many of these people, in fact I would said 80, 90 percent of these people have some alcohol problem, and getting them into the system, even if they plead guilty to public drunkenness, which is added on by the district attorney now. When the case comes in from the district justice they add the summary offense of public drunkenness, even if they plead guilty to that and we negotiate something where they will be evaluated for their problem and they will agree to get into treatment, whatever the treatment is, at least we're doing something with those people. that's really a makeshift type situation that we're dealing with now under this situation that we have as a result of these appellate court cases.

So I thank you very much for the opportunity to be here. I thank you for the

invitation. It certainly was a pleasure, and I thank you for the tour that you arranged for us ahead of time. Incidentally, we have an exchange student with us from England who is here, she just flew in last night, and we were discussing this on the way down and she said that that's not a problem in England because they apparently draw the breath from the driver as soon as they stop them, and of course we can't deal with that sort of thing because those field sobriety tests where you draw the breath out in the street is not admissible. Otherwise, I guess we wouldn't be having this meeting today.

I'd welcome any discussion or questions.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you, Judge.

JUDGE SPRECHER: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Any questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Could we next have William Tully? And then we're back to Dr. Winek.

MR. TULLY: Good afternoon. I want to thank you for the opportunity of being here, and I, too, would apologize for I guess not knowing exactly that you were going to deal with House Bill 355 at this particular point as it's amended into the current legislation. It was posed to me that there was simply

an inquiry about possible language to address the issue of whether there should be time limitations placed on the officer in making an arrest before a breath test is administered. Fortunately, I planned on working 355 in there anyway, so I can probably still stick with most of the statement.

It's my understanding that the purpose of today's hearing was to determine whether the General Assembly should place restrictions on how much time an arresting officer can allow to pass between the time of apprehension and the time of alcohol testing in DUI cases. Apparently, someone has expressed concern that an officer could theoretically use such a delay to the detriment of a driver by allowing his or her blood alcohol level to rise above the per se .10 percent level before administering the test. Because of the recent decisions that have already been discussed by our Supreme Court, I would like to address this issue first in light of the current law, and second, in light of the proposed legislation, namely House Bill 355.

Under current law, breath or blood tests of blood alcohol levels of non-commercial drivers are used primarily in prosecutions under the 3731(a)(4) provision which makes it illegal to drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of the movement of a

vehicle while the amount of alcohol by weight is .10 percent or greater. In effect, the law was to make a per se violation to drive at a time when a person's blood alcohol level is .10 or greater without any concern for whether the person appears to be significantly impaired by the alcohol.

On January 22 of this year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued two opinions which appear to require evidence that BAC tests relate back to the actual time of driving, and I've provided the cites. The two cases read in conjunction with each other appear to hold that a conviction based solely upon a BAC of .14 percent or lower taken 59 minutes or longer after driving would not be sufficient to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the court did not indicate what level would be sufficient.

In April of this year, the Superior Court applied <u>Jarman</u> and <u>Modaffare</u> decisions to the <u>Osborne</u> case, which also has been mentioned, and determined that a .148 percent obtained 50 minutes after driving, absent expert extrapolation evidence, cannot satisfy the requisite burden of proof. Currently, under current date of the law, we're unable to imagine a fact pattern where an officer could help a prosecution by

delaying testing. Obviously, any delay certainly works to the detriment of the case at trial currently under the legislation we have as it's interpreted by the Supreme Court.

I'd like to move on then in light of the proposed legislation. Immediately prior to the General Assembly's summer recess, the State Senate amended 355 by adding the contents of House Bill 2566 and sent the bill to the House for its concurrence. Since we anticipate hopefully some action this fall, it would appear to be appropriate to consider that legislation then, which is what I originally thought was the purpose for being here today.

The proposed language would add a subsection (a)(5)(5) to the provisions of 3731, which would make it a crime to drive, operate or be in physical control of the movement of a vehicle if indeed a blood test administered within three hours of the time of driving or additional time under the appropriate circumstances. Essentially, the proposed legislative change would specifically allow for a three-hour window within which a sample of breath, blood, or urine must be taken for sampling. However, there would be provisions for additional time under exceptional circumstances, such as a serious accident

which involved delayed extrication from the car or a hit-and-run where the driver flees from pursuit for more than three hours.

And the reason we put that exception in there, certainly our most serious offenses are those involving the serious crashes many times involving fatalities. In those situations where officers on the scene are tied up with important priorities such as avoiding additional crashes, protecting the people at the scene, and coordinating emergency assistance, it would be unreasonable many times to expect them, especially in rural parts of the State, to get that person to a testing location within three hours. So in those important cases we thought it was important to allow additional time, if, of course, the court determines it to be reasonable under those circumstances.

Putting it in perspective though, in 1982 the General Assembly passed what was then referred to as a new drunk driving law, which included that per se violation of .10 percent. Pennsylvania's legislation was about a part of a national drive to provide an objective standard for the prosecution of drunk drivers. When the law took effect in 1983, it was perceived to have established a strict liability rule

of law which would minimize confusion and provide uniformity and perhaps predictability of enforcement. I used the law review article written by Edward Tompkins, "The New Pennsylvania Drunk Driving Law: Last Call For One For The Road," in 87 Dickinson Law Review 805, wherein it basically spells out that they perceive that to be exactly that workhorse provision that would make it very easy for the cases to proceed on an objective standard where you wouldn't have to get into a great deal of subjective testimony.

Obviously, the Supreme Court's recent decisions in <u>Jarman</u> and <u>Modaffare</u> have proved Mr.

Tompkins' conclusions to be incorrect for Pennsylvania. In virtually every other jurisdiction in this nation, the per se provisions are still in force. In Pennsylvania, our Supreme Court has rendered ours impotent.

Apparently, the defense challenges arose from a concern that someone's blood alcohol content could theoretically be rising while they are driving, and therefore an officer could arrest them with their BAC under .10 percent, and by the time they are tested their BAC would be over .10 percent. At first blush the argument could sound convincing. However, when one views the basis for the .10 BAC limit and the practical

implications in the field, the argument becomes absurd. In order to appreciate the significance of .10 percent level, one must view it historically, scientifically, medically, and legally, but at the same time not lose sight of one's common sense.

For practical time purposes, it would be unreasonable to attempt a detailed analysis here. I understand you may have some expert doctors testifying, which makes it a lot easier to briefly fly over it, but I would like to provide a brief synopsis as I think it would apply to the proposed legislation.

When the nation began to adopt a per se approach to DUI enforcement, the vast majority of States adopted the .10 level as the point after which the majority of drivers are no longer capable of safe driving. However, the States of California, Maine, Oregon, Utah, and Vermont have accepted a .08 percent BAC as their per se violation level. Many nations, including most of Europe, have much lower levels. For example, the legal limit is .05 percent in Sweden, Finland, Norway, and the Australian States of New South Wales and Tasmania. It should also be noted that the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 has established .04 percent as the legal limit for commercial drivers. In Pennsylvania's drunk driving

law, which has been changed in April of this year, has accepted that .04 level. And it's not necessarily, I submit, because tractor trailers are that much more difficult to operate, but instead commercial vehicles, namely those vehicles of high tonnage, of hazardous materials on board or large numbers of passengers, just pose such a great risk to the traveling public that we've decided a .04 level cannot be exceeded to insure that such drivers can drive safely.

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much to support a reduction in Pennsylvania's BAC level but to rather show that the current .10 level is not a border line level. In other words, it cannot be said that a person whose BAC is .099 percent is a safe driver and a person whose BAC is .101 percent is unsafe. Instead, we are concluding that people should not drive if their BACs are over that .05, and if they are caught with a BAC over .10, it is automatically a violation of the law, because the per se level is, in effect, twice the level at which most people should not drive. Such a law would be a reasonable exercise of legislative authority and discretion.

The scientific and medical conclusions are equally compelling. In its 1991 report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation

provided the following results of its comprehensive review of national studies.

One, neuromuscular interference becomes significant at levels as low as .04 percent and .05 percent.

Vision. Peripheral vision, length of fixation, and glare recovery is significantly impaired at .08 percent.

Time sharing and attention. Time shared tasks are significantly impaired at levels as low as .04 percent. And divided attention tasks are significantly impaired at levels between .05 percent and .08 percent.

Reaction time, significantly impaired at levels as low as .04 percent.

Ability to track a moving object.

Impairment becomes evident at .02, and becomes significant at levels as low as .05 percent.

Information processing. Impairment evident at .05 percent; impairment significant at .08 percent.

Vigilance. Significantly impaired at .08 percent. And psychomotor performance, that ability to make fine, highly controlled muscular movement and coordinate movement among several limbs, significantly

impaired at .05 percent.

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Each of the aforementioned abilities are certainly indispensable to the driver of any motor vehicle. After placing this issue in context where most driving skills are significantly impaired at BAC levels as low as .05 percent, it is very hard to be sympathetic to a person who chugs several drinks before leaving a bar and races home in an alleged attempt to reach his or her destination prior to the blood alcohol content reaching or exceeding .10 percent. person just happens to be arrested before his level is .10 percent and is tested after his level exceeds .10 percent, is that the sort of fact situation we should be concerned with? I would submit that anyone who is that reckless and disregards the danger that he and she poses to the general public is not worthy of further consideration, but I'm not alone in that conclusion.

A. W. Jones, a distinguished Swedish toxicologist addressed this consideration in his publication, "Enforcement of Drunk Driving Laws by Use of Per se Legal Alcohol Limits: Blood or Breath Concentration as Evidence of Impairment." He established that acute alcohol tolerance occurs in all individuals, and to contrast it with the other forms, an acute alcohol tolerance allows the body to

eventually adapt to alcohol in his system. For that reason, he concludes that drivers with rising BACs are more dangerous than those who have peaked and their bodies have yet to adapt to the alcohol in their svstem. Therefore, a person whose BAC is lower than .10 but which is rising at the time could actually be a more dangerous driver than an individual who has a level over .10 which has already peaked, or, as Dr. Jones states, the rate of increment of BAC can be more significant than actual BAC achieved. Under those circumstances, the "chug and drive" defense becomes inconsequential, and any person who is arrested for driving under the influence and subsequently tests positive for a level of .10 percent or greater should be subject to the penalties regardless of the rate at which he or she consumed alcohol and/or ate food.

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For these reasons, I would urge this committee to avoid the temptation to legislate an order to protect someone who chugs and drives but rather support the legislative changes which would improve the objectivity and predictability of DUI enforcement. It's essential that the efforts to reduce the carnage on our highways not be dealt a major setback. Instead of making a game out of DUI cases by rewarding clever, sleight of hand defenses, let us renew our citizens'

1 confidence in their criminal justice system. Let them 2 be assured that a person who chooses to drink and drive 3 will be successfully prosecuted if their blood alcohol 4 level is shown to be .10 percent, period. 5 Thank you for your kind attention. 6 would be more than happy to answer any questions you 7 might have. 8 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Any questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you very much.

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MR. TULLY: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Doctor, we'll hear from you next. If you would just identify yourself for the record.

DR. WINEK: I'm Dr. Charles Winek. I am the Chief Toxicologist for Allegheny County and Director of Laboratories for Allegheny County, including the crime laboratory that we need some money for so we can keep functioning. I have no prepared I've been preparing for this for 27 years, statement. and I've testified in criminal court in drunk driving cases well over 2,000 times, and some of the things that go on in court have been addressed here already.

And I would like to say just a few

things, that I agree with some of the changes. I didn't find out about this new bill until last Friday when I met with the M.A.D.D. mothers in Pittsburgh, and I agree with several of the recommended changes, and I have a few additional things I would like to add myself.

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I think what has to be done to eliminate the business of the need for an expert to back extrapolate is to do just what's being suggested, that is to do what other States have done with the philosophy that we're putting drivers on alert that if you drink and drive and up to three or four hours after you drive you're at .10--and that probably should be lowered to a .08 or .07 instead of a .10--with the clarification of the definition of blood alcohol that's in our bodies is in the blood but in the liquid portion of blood called serum, or plasma, and is a serum or plasma alcohol level, which is referred to in hospitals as a medical alcohol, more accurately reflects your actual blood alcohol than does a whole blood alcohol, which takes into consideration the weight of the red cells, the white cells, and the platelets, and the way we do blood alcohol on a whole blood alcohol level gives the defendant a break because it lowers his actual physiological alcohol. It says he is less drunk

than he actually is to begin with.

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So we do have to make that change and not continue to say "blood." That causes lots of problems in court, because most of the test methods today do not test whole blood, they test serum or plasma, and I would strongly suggest that that be included and the language changed to define what we mean by "blood." The State Health Department, the Bureau of Laboratories, licenses laboratories to do blood tests, as well as serum and plasma tests, but it also does not define "blood" as meaning whole blood. I think if we put drivers on a alert that regardless of when their blood alcohol is measured after an event, a stop, an accident, that it removes all of the questions that arise.

Most of the testimony that I give in court cases deals with back extrapolation simply because no one ever has a blood alcohol or a breath test done at the time of an accident, at the time of the stop. It is always a half hour, 45 minutes, an hour, depending upon the condition of the road, the location, where the facility is. It may be two hours. So that it's literally impossible to get a blood or breath sample at the time of a specific event.

Most frequently I testify for the

prosecution. It doesn't do the defense any good to call me. I was asked that last week in a town not too far from here of how many times I've testified for the defense in a drunk driving case, and I said I believe one time, and I proceeded to say why, and he said, I didn't ask that. I was going to tell him why, because I'm an expert and I can't take a fact and make fantasy out of it. But in cross-examination, which I generally refer to as the sobering up part of my testimony, regardless of what the defendant has said, what he has admitted to the police, what he has indicated at the time of trial, it may be totally changed.

depending upon how much food someone has consumed. I was asked that last week already, if I was aware that the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania said that absorption time was 60 to 90 minutes, and the judge quickly shut him up with a sidebar. He's asking me a legal question. I don't care what the Supreme Court says the absorption time is, absorption time can be zero. If you drink on an empty stomach, liquids in the stomach go right through. You get drunk really fast. Absorption times vary simply because people are studied under different conditions. If you eat a pound of mashed potatoes and drink 8 ounces of bourbon, your

absorption curve will be subtle. The slope of the curve will be subtle. If you're eating potato chips and drinking, it won't be quite as subtle. If you don't eat anything and drink, it will go straight up.

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So certainly food in the stomach does something to the absorption of alcohol. It doesn't negate the fact that alcohol does get absorbed. you drink, alcohol goes into your mouth, down your esophagus, into your stomach, and it's in the stomach and you are stomach doesn't empty like a truck, it empties gradually over a period time with your sphincter contracting and relaxing. And if you're drinking a carbonated beverage - beer, champagne, Seagram's and 7-Up, or anything that you put a carbonated beverage into - your stomach empties faster than if you drink bourbon and water, whiskey and water. The absence of gas in the stomach slows the emptying. Anyone that's had a good Italian feast and needs some Brioski can relate to that, that you've got to get some gas in there to facilitate the emptying of your stomach.

Once alcohol gets out of the stomach into the small intestine, that's where it's actively absorbed. Very little alcohol is absorbed in the stomach because you have a thick mucous there that

protects your stomach from the acid that's secreted there, so literally nothing is absorbed in the stomach. It has to get from the stomach to the small intestine. And the emptying of the stomach is what's required. So if you're drinking beer and eating potato chips, you say, well, I wasn't drinking hard stuff, you can't get drunk on beer, that's nonsense. The fact that you have a blood alcohol means alcohol got absorbed. And as I said, I end up being the defense witness because on cross-examination the guy's got a .164. Well, what if he had one drink immediately before the stop? Wouldn't he be higher after he was stopped? Yes.

Let's subtract that then. Let's take all of it away. If it was 10 minutes before, let's take it all away. So I took it all away based on his weight. Depending on your weight, alcohol distributes over the mass of your body, and on a weight basis it takes so many drinks. If you weigh 300 pounds versus 150 pounds and you both drink the same, the 150-pound guy is going to have twice the blood alcohol of the 300-pound guy. So you have to take the weight into consideration, and that's where the expert testimony comes in. If you're doing a back extrapolate, you have to add on what he got rid of during that hour or two hours, and that's a rather narrow amount, .015 to .02 per hour. Fifteen to

20 milligrams per hour. So if someone is two hours after a stop, an accident, has a blood drawn and it's a .12, his blood alcohol, that's two hours, two times 15 and two times 20, so you're adding on a .03 and a .04, and that's his range. Now, if he says, I had one drink 10 minutes before, then you have to subtract that.

I was told that I was putting innocent people in jail, it was Winck's law in Pittsburgh, and that I was making people more drunk than they were and I should resign. They hired a public relations firm to get a lot of attention over it. I think that was maybe to build their law practice. It got them nowhere because the law — I was not making the law, I was simply stating what happened. In that case, I sobered the guy up all the way down to a .077, and it comes down to believability, if it's a jury trial, whether the jury understands it or not and believes if the guy says, okay, immediately before I chugged 8 ounces of bourbon, and that's usually the way it is.

Once the defense attorney understands this, then he starts asking these "what if" questions. Some judges allow it, some judges don't allow it. I usually let the DA's office know in the various jurisdictions that if the individual has not boxed himself in, in just those words, because during a

sobricty test they'll say, were you drinking? Yes. When was your last drink? About 11:30. You got an accident at 2:00 o'clock and he says his last drink was at 11:30. Clearly, he's on the down side. Although some defense attorneys can dig back in the literature and find a statement that says it takes six hours for complete absorption of alcohol. It doesn't take six hours for complete absorption of alcohol. The most recent study on the absorption of alcohol under social settings where people are talking and drinking and snacking says 18 minutes. Difficult to convince a jury. You say it takes six hours for absorption. hours for absorption. Even two hours for absorption. I say, why do people drink? I'm drinking now, I'm going to be drunk two hours later? It takes that long? That's ridiculous. So certainly we do need a law that says, hey, don't drink and drive, but if you're going to drink enough that's going to make you at a given level.

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One other thing I would like to add, just for educational purposes, that most people pay a lot of attention to your vision, depth perception. Alcohol changes the shape of your cornea and lens and things look further away than they actually are. That's one of the signs of visible intoxication, if someone's

sitting at a bar drinking and they go to reach for their drink and they spill. Why? Because it's right here but looks like it's over here and they go through it. The same thing when you're driving, things look further away. The higher your blood alcohol, the lower

your percentage of peripheral vision.

The highest alcohol level I've seen in 27 years was a .60, a gentleman that drove through the Liberty tubes. And that's one of the questions defense attorneys will ask me, well, how did they get all the way from here to here without an accident? There was nothing to — they had the whole road. They had four lanes, and the guy did make it through the Liberty tubes, but he had no peripheral vision, he had tunnel vision, so it was easier for him to get through the Liberty tubes, but he wrecked on the other side and died; killed himself.

The phenomenon of tolerance is brought up in defenses and I should point out also that tolerance doesn't equal immunity. People say, oh, he's got fantastic tolerance. Sensory and motor functions go. That's sight, hearing; people start talking louder, they lose control over their musculature as generally measured in reaction time.

But the first thing that goes with

everyone is your judgment. Your judgment. Alcohol depresses your brain, the central nervous system, and in so doing removes your normal control mechanisms and you begin to do and to say some things that you would not do nor say in your normal sober state. Like, I never liked you anyway. That's an ugly tie. You're ugly. And you say things that you would not normally say and do. And once those control mechanisms are gone, and they go at .07 and .08, people lose the understanding that they shouldn't get in that car and drive. They shouldn't get in that car. Their risk-taking attitude increases. Damn it, I pay my taxes, this is my road and I'm going to use all of it. Not to worry about the sensory functions and the motor functions, it's that judgment that goes first. judgement that goes first. If you didn't lose your judgment, you wouldn't be in that car driving. one of the main reasons why I have been in favor for a long time of lowering the level, as they have in other countries. We pay too much attention to the sensory function - depth perception and reaction time - as opposed to the brain up here that's running everything, that you're not thinking in your normal sober state. You're doing things that you wouldn't normally do and saying things that you wouldn't normally say. I think

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they're both very important.

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Certainly absorption time varies.

There's no such thing as an absorption rate, because as you're absorbing alcohol, the upside of a blood alcohol curve, you're drinking and absorbing, but as the alcohol gets into the bloodstream it goes to the liver, and the liver begins to immediately metabolize it, to break it down into carbon dioxide and water. It goes to the sweat glands, where it's excreted. It goes to the kidneys, where blood is filtered, and alcohol ends up in the urine, so the body immediately gets rid of it. And there's a good rule to follow: You will never become legally intoxicated if you have only one drink per hour. One drink per hour. And that's good as a social host or an employer or a bar owner to remember, one drink per hour and you won't have any problems, because the individual will get rid of it faster, and one drink is defined as one 12-ounce beer, of all beers except Straubs, I guess, because it has more alcohol It's good beer up from St. Mary's. And one generally. ounce of 100-proof whiskey. And just for your information, there's more alcohol in a 12-ounce can of Iron City beer than there is in a 1-ounce shot of Scagram's 7. Seagram's 7 is 80 proof. There is more alcohol in a 12-ounce can of Iron City than there is in

a 1-ounce shot of Scagram's 7, or any 80-proof alcoholic beverage. So when people say they can't get drunk on beer, they're getting more alcohol in beer and the alcohol is getting into their bloodstream faster.

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One other thing, the judge mentioned the videotaping and that some people have tolerance but you don't show judgment generally on those videotapes. People do develop tolerance, and that simply means it takes more for them to get intoxicated. When we were having all kinds of problems in Allegheny County with serum versus whole blood, with the ratio that our instruments are set at in the United States, our ratio of alveolar air to blood is 2,100 to 1, and the actual is 2,280. In Europe they're 2,300 to 1. We, again, with our breath tests give them a lower reading. would simply go back to the old system, say we are not going to present a breath test or a blood test and we're going to go on a sobriety test. And you get about 66 to 67 percent convictions on sobriety tests alone. If all else fails, we still have sobriety tests. It is nice to have a blood alcohol, but we've become too reliable on the magic of the .10. certainly we have to do something about the magic of the .10, lower it, clarify serum versus whole blood, and a time element that permits the police officer to

get to a facility, to get a blood sample in time and have a piece of useful evidence to gain more convictions.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Very good, Doctor.

Questions?

REPRESENTATIVE FAJT: Dr. Winck is the only representative here today from Allegheny County. I would just like to say publicly that I found your testimony to be very, very informative. I learned a lot just listening to you, and I guess in 27 years of public service that that's a natural cause of somebody with your experience, but we're very proud to have you as an employee of Allegheny County, and what you do is a tremendously valuable service.

I also recently started a substance abuse caucus here in Harrisburg to bring members of the legislature—a number of the members of this committee, as a matter of fact, are on that caucus—to make education, drug—related education an important part of what we do here, and also to work in funding for the prevention of substance abuse, and perhaps you and I can sit down sometime and talk about those issues.

But thank you, again. I found your testimony to be outstanding.

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DR. WINEK: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you, Doctor.

We will next hear from Curt Barnes,

Assistant District Attorney from Berks County.

MR. BARNES: Good afternoon, Mr.

Chairman, members of the committee. My name is Curt I'm an Assistant DA with Berks County, and Barnes. I've been with the Berks County District Attorney's Office since January of 1990. However, since that time I've only been in Judge Sprecher's courtroom actually handling DUI cases since about April of this year. So although my experience is somewhat limited, nevertheless I think I've had enough experience in these four months handling these cases to relate to you or give you an idea just how frustrating it can be trying to prosecute these DUI cases, especially now in light of the cases of Jarman, Modaffare, and Osborne.

So what I thought I would do is basically go over a couple of cases that we've had recently and try and point out a few of the difficulties that we've had while going through them.

The very first case that I had in the courtroom that actually went to trial was a case by the name of Commonwealth vs. Michael Stout, and this case went to trial on May 28 and 29 of this year.

Basically, we had one witness testify, it was a prosecuting officer whose name was Vincent Phillips of Bern Township, and he testified that back on May 5 of 1991, he was out patrolling in Bern Township on a stretch of roadway called Palisades Drive, and about 4:30 in the morning he was traveling westbound on this section of road. Now, the point that he was at he described as being a long distance of roadway, and it was a two-lane country road. As he was driving westbound he encountered another vehicle coming from the opposite direction, and as the two vehicles got closer and closer, eventually the eastbound car, driven by the defendant, Mr. Stout, swerved completely into the officer's lane of travel and actually forced him off the road. As a result of that, he decided to turn around and pursue this vehicle and did so, and he testified that while he was following the vehicle he watched it swerve over the double yellow lines numerous times, and then for that reason decided to pull the car over.

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Once he got the vehicle stopped, he went up to him again to speak to Mr. Stout, and immediately he noticed all the standard indicia of intoxication — the strong alcoholic odor on his breath, bloodshot eyes, et cetera. So based upon his observations, he

asked Mr. Stout to get out of the vehicle and to conduct some field sobriety tests, which he did. I believe he testified that the defendant did the heel-to-toe walk down the straight line, he did the finger-to-nose test, and also did the one-leg stand, all three of which he failed. Because he failed these tests, Officer Phillips placed Mr. Stout under arrest and then transported him back to Reading to the basement of the courthouse where we have a DUI processing center set up.

Now, it was interesting in this case because the facts of this case really did parallel Osborne somewhat in that the defendant was brought to the processing center within 50 minutes, his blood was tested and the results of it was a .148. It was exactly the same as Osborne. And based upon all that we had, we went to trial, and of course we presented our case and at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case, after we rested, the defense asked for a demurer, basically suggesting that the evidence was insufficient to support the charges and should therefore be dismissed.

When we went back into chambers with the judge, I thought to myself, well, this is going to be real quick and easy and will be over before we know it.

My problem was, though, the <u>Osborne</u> case came out on April 23 of this year, and by the date that we had gone to trial in this case, the <u>Osborne</u> case had not made it into the advance sheets in the Pennsylvania Reporter.

This is where we go to find the most recent law. So I was actually going into the case not even aware of the <u>Osborne</u> decision.

Now, unfortunately for me, the defense had access to an electronic research, I don't know if it was Alexis or West Law, one of those types, and he did have a copy of the case and he presented it to the judge and to myself, and after we reviewed the case the judge was constrained to dismiss the (a)(4).

Well, even though the (a)(4) was gone, I wasn't happy about this, of course, but I figured, well, we've got a strong case on the (a)(1), that he was driving, that he was apparently intoxicated to the point that he could not safely drive, and I figured, okay, we'll go out and we'll argue the (a)(1). We did. And at the conclusion — well, let me back up. The defense took the stand, the defendant did, and he said basically in his testimony when he was asked by his attorney, did you cross over the double yellow lines?

No, I didn't. Did you run anyone off the road? No, I didn't. He said, do you have any reason why you were

stopped that night? No, I don't.

So at the end of the defendant's testimony, in closing arguments I suggested to the jury, now you have quite a job before you because you have two very divergent stories. And I said, you want to take into consideration the various interests that the parties have and weigh the credibility. And I said, you know, in my opinion it would be that you're certainly not going to be able to find the defendant not guilty, but you guessed it, they found him not guilty. So that was a very frustrating first case in Judge Sprecher's courtroom.

The following week, on June 1, we had another trial, and this one involved a Richard Allen Sabet was the defendant. Basically, Officer William Wyant of the Kutztown Police Department, which is in a small college town about 15 miles north of Reading, testified that he was patrolling on Main Street on the night in question, which was August 18, 1991. He said that while he was patrolling he observed the defendant driving a gray Chevrolet Camaro without his lights on. This was at 1:30 in the morning. As the result of that, he decided to follow the car and followed it a short distance and noticed it was weaving over the line, that it was tailgating another car, and again,

for all these reasons, he stopped the vehicle. Again, the standard field sobricty tests were taken and they all were failed and the defendant was then arrested and taken down to the DUI processing center back in Reading.

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I believe that the results of his test was at 2.0, and that was approximately one hour after he was stopped. Now, in this case, I think this is the one that Judge Sprecher was referring to, we had our expert witness, the phlebotomist from St. Joseph's Hospital in Reading. She had done the actual testing of the blood. And unfortunately, though, when she came in she took the stand and we had briefly discussed what I wanted her to do was to relate the information back. I think she was assuming, of course, that I would have the various elements that she needed to put into her equation to extrapolate the BAC back to the time of the Unfortunately, of course, we didn't, and this has already been mentioned by several of the speakers, a real problem with the case law as it now stands by requiring us to put on evidence relating the BAC back, because the defendant, of course, has a Fifth Amendment right not to testify or provide evidence against himself. So that leaves us with, unless we're lucky enough to have a guy make an admission as to what he

was drinking, when he last drank, what he ate, et cetera, we really have no way to give the information that the experts need to make an opinion, even on a hypothetical question. And that's one of the real problems that we're facing right now.

As a result, as Judge Sprecher testified earlier, the (a)(4) charge was dismissed, and of course on the (a)(1) we argued it, but I was not quite so surprised when they came back not guilty on that one, because it was a rather somewhat standard routine type of case.

One thing I would point out that I have noticed, I think it is very difficult to prove an (a)(1) case especially when you don't have the support of an (a)(4) charge along with it. And I think jurors, for some reason, it's been my experience—again, as I say, it's been brief—but jurors seem to sympathize with the defendants when you have no serious injury or damage of any sort, and I don't know whether it's because they consider it to be a victimless crime, but they don't seem to approach it in the serious outlook that we do. Now, that's not to say in all cases, but when you have no injury or damage, that seems to be the way things are going.

The last case I wanted to mention was a

case by the name of Commonwealth vs. Timothy Duane Butts, and this one I think was interesting. It has a neat procedural history to it. This case actually began back on April 3 of 1990 when a police officer in the Borough of Topton stopped Mr. Butts. The reason he stopped him was because he had clocked him doing about 55 miles an hour in a 35 zone. What happened then, he had the signs of intoxication, failed the tests and was placed under arrest. What the officer did though at the scene was to issue a speeding citation to Mr. Butts and then later filed a complaint for DUI on the (a)(1) and (a)(4). Mr. Butts then went into the district justice for a preliminary hearing and the district justice actually acquitted Mr. Butts on the speeding charge. Then he went ahead and bound in the (a)(1) and (a)(4) and DUI charges. And the problem that we faced then was in a pretrial conference the defendant's attorney argued that because of the double jeopardy grounds, the DUI charges should be barred, and his reasoning was because we would have to present testimony regarding the poor driving and the speeding in order to show the (a)(1) offense.

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We appealed this case to the Superior

Court because the judge did, in fact, grant his motion

and dismissed the charges. We appealed it and the

Superior Court sent back a 50-50 split decision, basically. They agreed with the defense that the (a)(4) was barred — or excuse me, the (a)(1) was barred because of double jeopardy grounds, but they said, Commonwealth, you're free to go ahead and go to trial on the (a)(4) because you have other evidence independent of the speeding violation to support it, specifically the blood alcohol test and what not.

Now, the only problem was when they sent that case back to us, remanded it back, the defendant then tried to petition to the Supreme Court. However, his petition was denied. Now, what actually happened, we just got the case back, I think, about five or six weeks ago, and unfortunately this was post—Osborne so here we are, we're left with an (a)(1) charge that Superior Court found could not go, and we were left with the (a)(4) charge only, and of course without the testimony that we needed to present or the evidence we needed to present to the expert, we really had no case to go on.

Now, I was to the point where I was just about ready to dismiss the case, but for some reason, and I still really haven't figured it out, the defendant went ahead and pled guilty to the (a)(1) charge. And, you know, I was talking to his attorney

afterwards and he said basically that since this thing has been going on for two years, his client wanted to just get this case behind him. And that might well be the case, but also my more cynical side would think that perhaps he didn't have the money to keep going on with the fight.

These are just three cases I wanted to mention, and if you have any questions, I'm happy to try and give you a response.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you.

Questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you.

MR. BARNES: Thank you very much on behalf of the DA's office. It has been a pleasure and an honor.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: We will next hear from Corporal James Adams from the Upper Allen Township Police Department.

CPL. ADAMS. Good afternoon. My name is James Adams. I am a full-time police officer with the Upper Allen Township Police Department located in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, which is just across the river. I also am a chief deputy with the Cumberland County District Attorney's Office in the DUI

department, and we run the central processing videotaping centers, and also oversee the operation of the DUI sobriety checkpoints, which we run on a countywide basis in Cumberland County.

I also am a deputy coroner in Cumberland County, specifically to provide accident reconstruction work in fatality accidents. Unfortunately, a majority of those are alcohol-related. I also am an instructor for the Municipal Police Officers Education and Training Commission, and I teach in the police recruit school under the Act 120 program, also in the mandatory police in-service. I'm also a faculty member at Harrisburg Area Community College where I teach on a part-time basis in their criminal justice program.

More specific to the information ahead of us today, I'm also an instructor with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and Department of Education for the improved field sobriety testing and DUI detection program. In the classes that I've taught so far, I have been directly involved in the dosing of approximately 176 drinking volunteers so that the members of the class can see in a controlled drinking situation blood alcohol concentrations of .10, and also knowing the amount of alcohol consumed.

As far as police officers in

Pennsylvania, as you well know, the recent Pennsylvania State Supreme Court decisions in Commonwealth vs.

Jarman and Commonwealth vs. Modaffare, followed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Commonwealth vs. Osborne, as they relate to the time lapse between the actual time of driving and the collection of breath, blood, or urine for testing purposes has placed a very heavy burden on law enforcement, specifically the police officer. You've heard testimony from attorneys and from the judge, and these are the cases that make it that far. Unfortunately, I have to deal with the ones that don't even get that far.

Many defense attorneys are convincing the district justices that the police officer must be able to prove the blood alcohol concentration of the defendant at the time of driving at the preliminary hearing stage of the case due to the current language of our driving under the influence law and the recent line of appellate court decisions. It is impossible for a police officer to obtain an accurate test immediately upon stopping a defendant. It is ridiculous to require the police officer at every DUI preliminary hearing to bring in toxicologists and/or medical experts to relate the alcohol testing back to the exact time of driving. This requirement is very

time consuming and very costly and should not be required.

Most police officers must assume the role of the prosecuting attorney at the preliminary hearing level. Defense attorneys are successfully utilizing Osborne to prohibit the admission of chemical testing that occurred more than 50 minutes after the time of driving. This is very frustrating to those of us who are trained in DUI protection and know that a person who was a .148 when tested was also under the influence of alcohol 50 minutes earlier. Research has shown that at a .03 blood alcohol concentration, a person's reaction time has doubled, the peripheral vision has been reduced, and other factors have been affected to reduce a person's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.

It routinely takes a police officer 50 minutes or more to secure a breath, blood, or urine sample from a DUI subject, even when there are no extenuating circumstances involved. I speak from the perspective of a an Upper Allen Township police officer who has the luxury of having three available testing sites — one being the West Shore Cumberland County DUI Central Booking Center, which is anywhere from 5 to 12 miles from Upper Allen Township, depending on the

location of the arrest; Holy Spirit Hospital, which is anywhere from 7 to 14 miles from Upper Allen Township; and Harrisburg Hospital, which is anywhere from 8 to 15 miles from Upper Allen Township.

The 21 DUI arrests that I have made so far this year have taken, on the average, 1 hour and 33 minutes from the time of driving until the submission of a test. The shortest time period was 39 minutes; the longest time period was 3 hours and 40 minutes. The case in which it did take 3 hours and 40 minutes was a vehicle crash with injuries in which the operator still had a blood alcohol concentration of a .11 3 hours and 40 minutes after the crash. This case was dismissed at the district justice level due to the time lapse.

A routine DUI arrest—which I hate to use the term "routine" because there is no such thing, every DUI arrest is unique—can be broken down in the following time periods to show why there was such a time delay after the traffic stop is made. First of all, we have a personal contact with the operator. This, on the average, takes from two to five minutes. This is the initial interview with the operator by the police officer. The operator is requested to exhibit his driver's license, registration, and insurance

cards. The operator is given an explanation as to why he was pulled over. Usually, the operator is given is the opportunity to provide an explanation. If the police officer suspects DUI, the operator will be asked questions concerning his alcohol consumption.

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Field sobriety testing. On the average, this can take anywhere from three to seven minutes. police officer suspects an operator to have been consuming alcohol and/or drugs, the operator will be asked to exit his vehicle for the purpose of field sobriety testing. A police officer trained in DUI detection will usually use the standardized field sobricty test battery of three tests. The first one being the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which is a simple check of the eyes to check the manner in which they follow a stimuli. A walk-and-turn test, which is a balance and coordination test in which a person is asked to walk heel-to-toe nine steps, turn in a specific manner, than walk an additional nine steps. Then a one-leg stand test, which is also a balance and coordination test in which a person is asked to stand on one leg for 30 seconds.

Prior to any of these tests being conducted by the suspect, they are explained and demonstrated by the police officer to assure that the

suspect understands what this police officer wants them to do.

Post-testing conversation. This can take anywhere from one to three minutes. A police officer who is trained in DUI detection will repeat several of the questions asked earlier looking for inconsistencies in the person's responses.

Arrest, handcuffing, and search. Average time, one to two minutes. Upon the police officer making the decision to arrest, the DUI suspect must be told that he's being placed under arrest for DUI. He is handcuffed and he is searched. His person is searched. He then is secured in the police vehicle.

We then have the vehicle search and securing of the defendant's vehicle. The police officer will search the vehicle incident to the lawful DUI arrest. Any evidence such as alcoholic beverage containers must be properly collected as evidence, along with any other contraband found. From the time of driving until the time the police officer is ready to leave the scene of a traffic stop with a DUI prisoner will routinely take from 10 to 22 minutes, depending on how cooperative a person is.

The DUI prisoner is now transported to the testing site. The drive to the testing site will

take an Upper Allen police officer anywhere from 10 to 20 minutes. If the prisoner is taken to a hospital for a blood test, the hospital requires a minimum amount of paperwork to be completed. Although it is a minimum amount, it must be completed before the phlebotomist is summoned from the laboratory to the emergency care unit to actually draw the blood. Assuming the hospital is not busy, this will take anywhere from 10 to 20 minutes from the time the DUI suspect arrives at the hospital until the blood is drawn.

If the DUI prisoner is taken to a DUI central processing center, it is mandated by Pennsylvania regulation that the breath test operator observe the subject for 20 minutes prior to him submitting to a breath test to insure that nothing has been consumed orally.

In a best case scenario DUI arrest, it routinely takes an Upper Allen Township police officer 50 minutes from the time of the traffic stop until the submission of the chemical test.

Some of the situations the police officers commonly encounter that take additional time:

Uncooperative or confused subjects that require everything to be explained two, three or more times.

Passengers that have been drinking and continually interfere with the process. Even if they do not interfere, arrangements must be made to transport them somewhere. We cannot leave intoxicated people out along a highway unattended. One DUI arrest that I made this year was a mother with her three children. Their ages were 2 through 9 years of age that she had with her. In this situation, I felt it necessary to contact a family member, not just transport them to a convenience store or something like that, so it took additional time to contact a family member to come and get these children.

Securing the defendant's vehicle to maintain the safety and security of the vehicle and its contents. If the traffic stop is at a dangerous location or there are valuables in the car, a wrecker will be summoned to tow the vehicle to a place of security and safety. If a second police officer is not available, the arresting police officer must wait for the wrecker to arrive.

Collection and preservation of other evidence and/or contraband that is found requires additional time. This year so far one person that I have arrested for DUI had a concealed handgun in his vehicle, and three persons had illegal drugs concealed

in their vehicle. The proper collection and preservation of this evidence requires time.

A DUI arrest resulting from a collision.

They easily take anywhere from an additional 15 minutes to even an hour more due to the on-scene accident investigation. A police officer cannot leave the accident scene unprotected or before collecting the accident report information.

Test availability many times creates a time delay. It is common for hospitals and DUI booking centers to be very busy, especially on Friday and Saturday nights. Depending on how many people are waiting, there may be an additional 45 minutes or more time delay.

I could go on for hours telling you personal stories of people who have jumped out of their cars and ran. Some of them run into the woods, some of them run into their house and slam the door in my face. Stories that all show how some DUI arrests take time. These are just a few of the more common situations the police officers have little or no control over. The police officer must still deal with these situations when arresting DUI suspects.

The point is, a DUI arrest does take time. Keep in mind that I speak from the perspective

of an Upper Allen Township police officer. Many police
officers do not have the luxury of three test sites
within 20 miles of their respective municipality. Many

have an hour or more drive to the nearest testing site.

I have seen a dramatic increase in DUI arrests over the past several years. More and more police officers are becoming trained in DUI detection and they are taking the time to make good, solid DUI arrests. The recent court decisions are placing police officers in a dilemma between taking a reasonable amount of time to collect and document the evidence, thus risking the 50-minute Osborne case argument, or rushing through the initial steps of a DUI arrest and risk overlooking valuable DUI evidence and appearing to be overzealous to the DUI suspect in the hopes of getting a chemical test within 50 minutes.

It is obvious the way to return some common sense to the area of DUI enforcement is through legislation by making a test of .10 percent or greater within three hours of driving a per se conviction. This will allow police officers to go back to the business of making good, solid DUI arrests and detection and enforcement.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Questions?

MR. KRANTZ: Yes.

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Sir, when do most drunk driving stops happen? Is it during the day or in the evening?

CPL. ADAMS: I would say the majority is

the Friday, Saturday nights into Saturday/Sunday mornings. However, I have made DUI arrests basically 24 hours of the day, 7 days a week. There are people out there 24 hours a day driving under the influence.

MR. KRANTZ: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you.

We will next hear from Bill Shiner,

Pennsylvania chapter of M.A.D.D.

MS. WALKER: I'm Sherry Walker.

I first just want to thank you very much. We appreciate the opportunity to give testimony here, specifically about the amendments as they pertain to DUI testing times in House Bill 355. My name is Sherry Walker, and I'm the Executive State Director of Mothers Against Drunk Driving in Pennsylvania.

Mothers Against Drunk Driving's mission is to stop drunk driving and to aid the victims of this violent crime. In the recent Supreme Court decisions Commonwealth vs. Jarman and Commonwealth vs. Modaffare, the Justices have demonstrated a profound lack of understanding of what it means to be a victim of a DUI

crash or what it means to try to enforce a law rendered unenforceable by their legal machinations. M.A.D.D. is concerned that many judges who hear drunk driving cases and appeals have a limited understanding of something we call statistical morality. Statistical morality refers to the fact that we make decisions which benefit the many, even though a few will be harmed. For example, when whooping cough vaccine is given to 1 million children, about 100 will have serious side reactions; however, no doctor in his right mind would stop giving the vaccine to the many because of the few who react. To do so would risk a major epidemic.

We are on the verge of a major epidemic of DUI offenses and ineffectual prosecution of these offenses in the State of Pennsylvania unless we can rectify the serious mistake in the original wording of the law and the Supreme Court's interpretation of that law in a very narrow way. The Supreme Court's limited interpretation of the DUI law sends a clear message to every would-be drunk driver, that they can flaunt the law and get away with it on a technicality. This unwarranted leniency toward DUI offenders is a slap in the face to every innocent victim of DUI and the hardworking law enforcement personnel who are the first line of defense in the war against drunk driving.

Leniency toward drunk drivers is frequently justified with the rationale, well, nothing we do here can bring the victim back, so let's not be too hard on the drunk driver. If you are courageous enough, put yourself in the shoes of a grieving mother or father whose child has been brutally killed by a drunk driver. Hear those words. Do they make sense? In fact, everyone already knows that nothing can bring the victim back, so we continue to be amazed at how many times a judge or a defense attorney spews out the words as if it were a new revelation.

The legislative and judicial systems were never developed to bring back victims, but they do exist to deter future criminal acts. Most reasonable people believe that swift, sure, and uniform punishment does deter future crime. If we respond to convicted offenders in such a way as to discourage them from committing further acts of violence, we must require just consequences for their wrongdoings. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has removed the threat of swift, sure, uniform punishment from the DUI law. How can we expect anything but an increase in the perpetuation of this violent crime?

We have before us today the means to restore sanity to the justice system for DUI offenses.

This pending legislation deals strictly with the core of the Supreme Court's argument, overturning the convictions of <u>Jarman</u> and <u>Modaffare</u>. Specifically, that the law as currently written can only result in a conviction that the alleged perpetrator is determined to be intoxicated while driving a vehicle. M.A.D.D. supports wholeheartedly the proposed changes to the DUI law which would, in essence, redefine the DUI offense in terms of the blood alcohol content of the offender at the time of testing, not while driving the vehicle.

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M.A.D.D. earnestly seeks your support of this legislation. Your swift adoption of this measure will send a message of hope to all victims who look to you and the courts for true justice. Don't let them look in vein. Don't let them be revictimized by a system which defies logic. Victims are not an amorphous mass of statistics quantified and juggled in search of an irreducible minimum. Each victim is a unique and irreplaceable individual with a name, a family, and dreams which must now go unfulfilled. Each represents far more than a faceless number to his or her family and friends caught in a tragic ripple effect set off by each crash. We hope that you will recognize your responsibility to give a voice to these victims and to assist them through the trials and tribulations

that follow these tragedies.

I was supposed to have Bill Shiner or Blaine Mears join me today, and I'm really sorry that Blaine could not be with us. He would have brought a real unique piece to this important testimony that I'm giving today. Blaine himself is a retired Pennsylvania State Police officer with over 20 years of experience. He also lost his only daughter in a DUI crash in which the offender ended up not having any charges brought against him because of the testing time factor. Unfortunately, he could not join us because of health reasons.

But I do want to — I would be remiss without saying that there were some things stated here today that I just want to emphasize that M.A.D.D. is very supportive of. First of all, we're very glad to hear people like Bill Tully and Dr. Winek emphasize again the need for our BAC in general to be lowered. As you know, the original piece of this legislation did bring it down to .08, and M.A.D.D. is very hopeful, it's one of our prime goals for this legislative session, and next if we don't get it this time, to see the BAC lowered to .08. When you have people like the American Medical Association saying that with as little as .02 and .03 people are significantly impaired, I

don't think it's too much to ask.

In addition, we do want to reiterate Dr. Winek's concern to be able to have a true definition of blood in this State. It is really the other important piece to that that is needed for the DUI law to make it comprehensive and make it as tough as what we would like to see it.

And I would like to just add, when I heard the testimony by the Philadelphia District Attorneys Association that they are not even prosecuting people with BACs of .15 because they are going to lose it, I just can't help but feel how many people are we going to lose, either through their death or through their serious injuries, by not having these drunk drivers stopped before they do injure someone? I think it's very important that we realize that DUI is a violent crime not only when someone is killed or seriously injured, but also from the fact that the potential of it to be a violent crime later is very real. I just wanted to add that.

Thank you. I would be happy to take any questions.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Questions?

REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.

BY REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: (Of Ms. Walker)

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Q. One difficulty, and we heard it from at least one of the prosecutors who testified today, in the best of all possible worlds, the remaining sections of the driving under the influence law should be sufficient at least where there have been sufficient indicia observed by the officers upon which to base a case to begin with. I think one of the reasons we went to the per se offense, and I certainly agree with you, one of the reasons we've got to move forward with this legislation and get back a genuine per se offense again, is that juries simply show a great reluctance to use what I, at least, would think of as common sense. A police officer's attention is called to a vehicle by the manner in which it's being operated, he smells alcohol, observes other physical indicia and performs a coordination test which the subject fails, that ought to be enough to convict in and of itself.

I am finally getting to a question.

Certainly, Mothers Against Drunk Driving over the years has done a great deal to raise the consciousness of the public as a whole to the fact that drunk driving is a crime. It's not a there-but-for-the-grace-of-God-go-I kind of thing. Are you folks these days doing anything in particular, and what might we all be able to do to

1 ducate and sensitize jurors, the public from whom jury
2 panels are ultimately drawn, to the proposition that
3 this is unacceptable behavior?

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- We don't have any particular program aimed right at juries, but we do our best through our public awareness and our prevention campaigns. We have about 250,000 members and supporters in Pennsylvania, and we have 23 chapters around the Commonwealth, and through that we're trying to educate the people, the public, that drunk driving is a crime and try to give them the training that they need so that when they are called for jury duty they can do something that is the right decision instead of one that is perhaps colored a little bit by some of the individual rights concerns that they have. I would welcome the opportunity, though, to work with someone on doing some kind of program with the jury system or again with the judicial system, but I don't think you're in a position to do that.
- Q. Let me hasten to say, especially since we have a judge present, yeah, certainly once people are drawn as part of an overall venire, or group of people from whom juries would be selected. I don't think that would be legally permissible to have one of you folks come in and speak to them just before they're

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- A. We'd love to. I don't think we can.
- --before someone appears for a drunk Q. driving case. Certainly, I was addressing myself to jurors in their generic sense. The public, I've had this hope over the years, that we could succeed in getting people to think of drunk driving the way somehow or other in my youth I got to think about littering. One of the things I don't think I could bring myself to do is throw something, at least not biodegradable, out of a car window, and I think I'm bipartisan and assume maybe it had something to do with Lady Bird Johnson or my mother or something. would really be helpful if at least a substantial part of the population thought of drunk driving as simply something completely irresponsible and unacceptable, and that that was reinforced throughout their peers within society.
- A. Well, I think we're seeing a lot of that now. There is, just to give you a brief overview, there is a lot of it. When you hear from small children when they get in the car with their parents, it's not just "don't smoke," or not just "buckle up," you're beginning to hear loud and clear, "don't drink and drive, Mommy and Daddy." We have a lot of amusing

stories that get sent in to us from parents who are drinking a can of Coca Cola and their 3-year-old or their 4-year-old says, Mommy, don't drink and drive. So I believe we are making a difference.

And the kind of education and training I was talking about to do with the judicial, because not everyone is as committed, I think, to the DUI issue as some of the judiciary are, but we would really welcome the opportunity to work further with them. I certainly did not mean that we would educate the jurors as they were going in the band box, but that would be very nice if we could.

We have some judges who literally ask people if they are a member of M.A.D.D. and if support M.A.D.D., and if they say "yes," they are removed from jury duty by the judge himself, and we have that documented in at least 20 or 30 cases. So that's the kind of training and education that we are moving towards.

Thank you for the opportunity.

- Q. If I could, one more. Do you have programs in the schools? Do you get into the public schools?
- Λ. We have programs geared toward underage drinking. Definitely. We have an underage drinking

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brochure that tries to help youth and teenagers work with their own peers that are having some kind of a drug or alcohol problem.

REPRESENTATIVE HECKLER: Thank you.

BY MR. KRANTZ: (Of Ms. Walker)

- Q. Along the lines of Representative Heckler, you have no statistics as to the young people in the schools who have heard your message, whether or not they drink less or anything?
- Λ. Well, we're not Students Against Driving Drunk, we're Mothers Against Drunk Driving, but the best that I could do with that is say that we just participated with Pennsylvania Aware in a youth conference where over 500 young people from around the State were brought together to educate and teach them about not just drinking and driving but drugs in general, and these kids are going back to their schools and helping to work with their peers. So there are some statistics. I think, that you're beginning to see that while underage drinking arrests may indeed still be very significant and very high, there is beginning to be, from what we can see from listening to the young people themselves, a new education about the fact that drinking and driving, or taking drugs and driving, is something that can get them in trouble. The biggest

thing is their loss of a driver's license. They're not afraid of death or even serious injury, but the loss of that driver's license really has a heavy impact. MR. KRANTZ: Thank you. CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you very much. We'll adjourn the hearing for today. Thank you. (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:00 p.m.)

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2	and evidence are contained fully and accurately in the
3	notes taken by me during the hearing of the within
4	cause, and that this is a true and correct transcript
5	of the same.
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