COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1 \* \* \* \* \* 2 3 In re: House Bill 319 4 Stenographic report of hearing, held in Room 418, Main Capitol 5 Building, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on Tuesday, 6 February 22, 1994 10:00 a.m. \* \* \* \* \* 8 9 10 HON. THOMAS R. CALTAGIRONE, CHAIRMAN HON. KATHY M. MANDERINO, SECRETARY 11 12 MEMBERS OF JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 13 Hon. Peter J. Daley, II Hon. Frank LaGrotta 14 15 ALSO PRESENT: 16 Ken Sutter, Esquire, Minority Counsel Karen Dalton, Esquire, Minority Counsel William Andring, Esquire, Majority Chief Counsel Galina Milonov, Search Analyst Michael Carroll, Assistant Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Transportation 19 20 21

> Reported by: Nancy J. Grega, RPR



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CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: This is the House 1 Judiciary Committee. 2 I'm Chairman Tom Caltagirone. We are going to be taking testimony on House Bill 319, and 3 4 it's basically going to be workshop. Members of the staff who are present, if 5 you would like to introduce yourselves for the 6 record. We'll start to my left. 7 REPRESENTATIVE LaGROTTA: Representative 8 LaGrotta, Lawrence, Butler, Beaver Counties. 9 MR. SUTTER: Ken Sutter, Republican 10 Counsel. 11 12 MS. DALTON: Karen Dalton, Republican Counsel. 13 REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Representative 14 Daley of Washington and Fayette. 15 16 MS. MILONOV: And my name is Galina 17 Milonov, Research Analyst for the Judiciary 18 Committee. CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: And we do have 19 PennDOT representatives here today. Would the 20 three of you like to introduce yourselves for the 21 22 record?

MR. HEATON: My name is John Heaton, Chief Counsel, PennDOT.

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MR. MUSTIN: Bob Mustin, Director of Legislative Affairs, PennDOT.

MR. CARROLL: I'm Michael Carroll, and I'm Bob's assistant for Legislative Affairs.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you.

If you'd like to start with your presentation.

MR. HEATON: Good morning.

"I am here this morning in support of House Bill 319, Printers Number 346.

The Department favors this provision and believes that it is necessary to increase the effectiveness of traffic safety measures contained elsewhere in the law.

In addition to supporting the change to Section 5553(e) of the Judicial Code, to increase the period within which summary proceedings under the Vehicle Code must be completed from two years to four years, I would also today like to urge this body to consider two additional Amendments to Section 5553(3) of the Judicial Code that will make the enforcement much more effective.

These two changes which I have appended to the exhibits I presented with my testimony

would, number one, add language to Section 5553(e) so that it is absolutely clear that the proceeding intended to be completed within the two or four-year period would be before the issuing authority only, and not including its continuation through a statutory appeal to the Court of Common Pleas or an Appellate Court.

And, two, adding language to the effect that the serious traffic violations enumerated in Section 6503 of the Vehicle Code are excluded even from the four-year limitation, I have appended hereto draft language to accomplish not only these two objectives, but also the objectives set forth in House Bill 319 in the draft language I have appended.

I can speak with some experience about the enactment or the creation of Section 5553(3) of the Judicial Code.

This was enacted as part of the Vehicle
Code of 1976, and at the time I was an
Assistant Attorney General with PennDOT and
was working with the then Department of
Justice concerning hearings all over the

State of Pennsylvania.

The genesis of this provision is that at those hearings a number of District Justices came forward, particularly District Justices located along the interstate highways, complaining that they had old Citations and what am I going to do with them?

There was no provision anywhere in the law that allowed them to purge old Citations and, essentially, these were speeding tickets issued to people out of state.

And I might also add that this happened prior to the Non-Resident Violator Compact which was just at its beginning in the mid-'70's.

I don't think that tickets to out of state motorists are nearly the problem now that they were then because of the Non-Resident Violator Compact, which I don't know if the Committee is aware of this, but under the Compact, if a resident of another state is issued a ticket in Pennsylvania and ignores it, we contact the Motor Vehicle Department of the state of residence and they suspend that person's license until they come

to Pennsylvania and pay the Citation, which really has been very effective in not only bringing in revenue to this state, but also to cutting down the problem of these unresponded to, out of state Citations.

So just going back to the '70's again, as I recall, the Vehicle Code Revision Project at the behest of District Justices, and they were the only persons pushing for this, didn't include a discretionary provision in the draft project that came out of the Department of Justice that then went to the Legislature, and it included a provision which was then 6302 of the Vehicle Code which was discretionary rather than mandatory.

So the District Justices had the discretion to purge old tickets without being required to.

Now, somehow or other that discretionary provision became mandatory in the final enactment and all these years we have had a mandatory provision which sort of -- it's not really a statute of limitations in the traditional sense.

A statute of limitations says a

prosecution must be commenced with "X" period from the date of the offense. This is an outside limit which says that the prosecution must be completed within two years of the date of this offense and earlier cases from the Superior Court construed it absolutely consistently and strictly. I mean that's it, no proceedings can be held at all after that two years.

Now I want to make another point because I think it's relevant.

When the Vehicle Code Revision Project was convening hearings back during the mid'70's, they were also besieged by people from the courts who felt that too many vehicle code cases were in the Common Pleas Court and that a lot of offenses which really should have been summary offenses or misdemeanors were clogging the courts.

So there was a movement at the same time to take a lot of offenses, and I have six in particular that are right in front of my mind that are listed in Section 6503 of the Vehicle Code. They are enumerated in there.

And they all carry a fine of not less than

\$200 nor more than a thousand dollars, and imprisonment of not more than six months, or both. And there are six offenses listed there. These offenses, at least second offenses of these, were all misdemeanors under the old Vehicle Code.

What we did was we made second offense of driving without a license, driving while license is suspended, racing on the highways relating to fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and relating to driving with lights out to avoid identification, we made these summary offenses for the first time in the mid-1970's and even for second and subsequent offenses, although we provided for fines up to a thousand dollars and up to six months in jail, or both.

Never prior to that had Vehicle Code offenses of this gravity been summary offenses in Pennsylvania.

It was sort of ironic that the
Legislature at the same time, and I'm certain
that this body didn't realize that it was
creating a whole lot more summary offenses
and much more serious summary offenses, yet

at the same time putting this outside limit on when prosecutions can be completed.

So even with these serious offenses, driving under suspension, fleeing and eluding an officer, if the person could somehow or another avoid the authorities for two years, they had an absolute defense and they would get off.

That may be good policy when it comes to speeding, red lights, et cetera, for the purpose of cleaning out the Courts, but I don't think it's good policy when it comes to some of these more serious, intentional offenses.

So that's something to keep in mind, and it goes to the recommendations I have made.

Now the Vehicle Code Revision Project when it entertained this back in the '70's, and I was involved in those discussions and I know that it was contemplated that 5553(e) was only contemplated to apply to District Justices, if the thing wasn't completed in font of the District Justice within two years, it would be thrown out because it was the District Justices who wanted this

amendment.

It was never contemplated that somebody could take an appeal from a District Justice up to Common Pleas Court and if it isn't completed in the Common Pleas Court or a subsequent appeal to Superior Court, or a subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, and keep the thing going until two years is up and then come in screaming after he took the appeal that this two-year statute limitations quote, unquote, is intended to get him off the hook.

But that is exactly what happened when the Superior Court decided Commonwealth v. Jannenga, J-A-N-N-E-N-G-A, in 1984.

The Superior Court held that the language of 5553(e) concerning the two-year limitation applied to summary appeals to the Court of Common Pleas as well as to proceedings before the issuing authorities.

Now in that case, the Judge was responsible for the delay.

The Defendant took a timely appeal from conviction by the Magistrate to the Common Pleas Court about a month before the two

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years was up and the Judge heard the case within the two-year statute and then took it under advisement and didn't do anything for about a year and a half.

The Superior Court held that that delay by the Court was chargeable against the Commonwealth because the Commonwealth's attorney knew the status of that case and could have requested the Court to rule on it or have it listed at any point in time.

That case of Jannenga was reaffirmed in Commonwealth v. Markley several years later where it was a very serious offense. A person was convicted of driving under suspension during an alcohol-related suspension and there is a penalty of a thousand dollars and imprisonment of 90 days which was involved.

He was convicted in front of the District
Justice within the two-year period and filed
an appeal, a timely appeal to Common Pleas
Court and, once again, was convicted within
the two-year period before the Common Pleas
Court.

Markley then filed post-trial motions

which were not disposed of until after the two-year period and the Superior Court held that because he had not been sentenced within the two-year period by the Court of Common Pleas, that the charges had to be dismissed.

That was Commonwealth v. Markley.

The Court felt constrained to reach that result, although they said in the last paragraph of their Opinion, "The mischief which is being caused by 42 Pa. C.S. 5553(e) may suggest to the Legislature that the provisions thereof should be repealed, or at least amended so as to prevent a dilatory Defendant from benefitting from his or her own delay.

So throughout the 1980's, this provision was being very strictly construed against the Commonwealth and any effort to pursue prosecution after two years, whether it was the Defendant's fault or not, was resulting in prosecution being terminated.

Now I must tell this body that the Superior Court has backed off of that strict interpretation and within the last two or three years here, we have two decisions

coming out of the Superior Court which arguably overrule Jannenga and Markley, at least to the extent that the period of delay directly attributable to the accused doesn't toll the limitation found in 5553(e).

The first case is Commonwealth v. Quinn, which was decided in 1991, which was appealed to the Supreme Court and the appeal was denied.

It's still unclear, though, as to which delays are directly attributable to the accused.

In Quinn, the Defendant failed to timely appeal the summary conviction for over five months and then he was convicted by the Magistrate within the two-year period. Then he waited five months and didn't do a thing. Then he comes in and files a nunc pro tunc appeal to Common Pleas Court after five months elapses and the County Court allowed the appeal nunc pro tunc, subsequently set a hearing, found him guilty, and at some point in time after the nunc pro tunc appeal was allowed, the two-year period expired.

At that point in time he goes to Superior

Court and he says I want the whole thing thrown out.

In that particular case the five months he waited between the conviction in front of the Magistrate and the nunc pro tunc appeal, it was the crucial time period and the Superior Court had just been pushed too far on that one and they said that this is crazy, to allow somebody to take a nunc pro tunc appeal and beat this thing that way because, number one, it's going to discourage Judges from allowing nunc pro tunc appeals because what they are going to be doing is signing a not guilty by allowing the nunc pro tunc appeal because it will be too late to hear the case.

In Quinn, the Court held that any period of delay directly attributable to the accused tolls the statute of limitations and in that case it was a nunc pro tunc appeal where the Defendant obviously was negligent in not filing an appeal for five months. They did not get into, and we still don't have any guidance on what directly attributable to the accused means, and it's a total morass at

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this point in time and it creates a situation where when these appeals are taken to the Court of Common Pleas in order to address this issue, you are going to have the Defendant and the Commonwealth pointing fingers at each other over whose fault it was that it was delayed.

Every continuance is going to be scrutinized for who caused it, who requested it, and you are also going to have the complicity of the Judge, because how many times is it going to be his fault because of a calendar problem or whatever that the case has to be continued.

I think it's just an absolutely untenable situation to have, whether or not somebody is prosecuted under the law depending on whose fault and whose blame the delay is.

Now if the Defendant does file a timely appeal and the two-year statute or the two-year deadline expires before the matter is completed, as I said, the Court is now forced to assess blame for the delay among the Defendant, the Commonwealth and itself.

Only if the delay can be blamed on the

Defendant and it used solely and attributable to the Defendant can the matter proceed.

I would submit to this body that the assessment of blame for Court delays is not a productive exercise or one that this body should sanction; it's a complete waste of time.

In Commonwealth v. Marr which is a case that came down in 1993 subsequent to Quinn, it did reaffirm Quinn and went on to say that mere collection of the fine or payment under a schedule entered into before the two-year deadline does not constitute a proceeding or an action taken under Section 5553(e).

So, it is consistent with Quinn and this body may say to me in light of these two recent cases, what do we need to amend this statute for. And I would say I still think we need to amend it because it's on the books and in the past many, many, many people have evaded writ servers and police officers for a period of two years and then come in to District Justices and say you can't prosecute me, you can't do anything further, I want this charge dismissed.

District Justices all over the State have done that and just because of the two Superior Court cases, I'm not sure that the District Justices are going to be aware enough to say no, there are two cases which say you have been evading the police.

And how do you prove that they've been evading the police? They're likely to come in and say I didn't know about it, so we don't want to get into a situation like that.

So I think this statute still needs to be addressed. And it is respectfully submitted that both HB 319 and the alternative which we have suggested, would essentially eliminate the finger pointing of blame for delay and, instead, substitute a sensible, rational way to terminate prosecution for minor summary offenses within a fair time frame.

So to summarize here, what we are suggesting here is the four-year outside limit that is contained in House Bill 319 is a sound idea. Two years is too short; that's been proven. Four years I think we can, with some confidence that if somebody hasn't been brought before the Bar of Justice and

convicted within four years, he shouldn't be.

There's something wrong with the system;

either with the police officer, with the writ

service -- there is something wrong if

someone hasn't been brought before the Bar of

Justice in four years.

I have no problem in saying let's dismiss minor summary offenses under the Vehicle Code; speeding, red light, et cetera, after four years. But let's just put a couple of limits on that.

Number one, let's make it absolutely clear that that applies only in front of the District Justice, because four years isn't an unreasonable delay when you consider going all the way through the Appellate Courts, and it's possible to do that.

Under Jannenga, those four years are going to count against the Commonwealth.

That's not right. It was never the intent -it was always the intent that it only apply
to proceedings in front of District Justices.

The second thing that we are suggesting, let's take the four serious offenses that used to be misdemeanors, the six serious

offenses that are enumerated in 6503 of the Vehicle Code, which are serious offenses that somebody should not be able to be excused of just because of a delay, regardless of whose fault it is. Because they are serious offenses and let's just eliminate them from its scope.

I have captured all three of those points in the proposed draft language that I have submitted with my testimony. I think the Bill is necessary and a good idea and will be even better if we attach those two amendments to it."

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Excuse me.

If we could, that packet --

MR. HEATON: It's not attached, it's right here. There is the existing 319 with my proposed language appended to it.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Questions from the Committee? Representative Daley?

BY REPRESENTATIVE DALEY:

Q How many cases are we talking about total? I might have missed that. How many cases are we talking about that are out there in this precarious situation?

Representative Daley. Perhaps we could find out through the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts that they may with their new computer system, may have some way of referencing cases that are over two years old that are still in front of the minor Judiciary, but it would include also cases that have been appealed up to the Common Pleas Court for a de novo appeal, and cases that are in Superior and Supreme Courts.

I don't know that there is any accurate way on getting a handle on all of them that are involved.

Q My concern is, you know, we are not sure of the number of cases out there, nor the number of cases that have been adversely impacted by the two-year threshold.

My concern is really prolonging this process by two more years.

In essence, you are going to put a greater glut into the courts because you are going to have more time to prosecute; you are going to have more time to adjudicate and go through the process. That is one of my concerns.

My other concern basically is -- I mean

do we know exactly how many are falling through the cracks here; do we know how many cases are falling of the two-year edge and, quite honestly, this is a statute of limitations I think to some degree in terms of prosecution.

I mean the Court, the Legislature, has very succinctly stated in the Code what statute of limitations are for various offenses, and I really don't believe that four years is really necessary here unless it can be shown to me that we have a lot of cases out there that are falling through the cracks; a lot of people are falling off the edge.

Four years is a long time to extend the period.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Counsel tells me that she does have some answers, some figures that she could give us.

MS. DALTON: That is, if you don't.

MR. HEATON: I'd like to defer to you for the answers, but may I just address the first point about burdening the Court with a lot of extra cases?

As I think I made clear in my testimony, Commonwealth v. Quinn does, in fact, undo this provision to a large extent. It says that any

delay which is caused by the Defendant does not toll the statute of limitations.

So the Commonwealth could raise that.

Any time somebody came in and tried to have the prosecution thrown out, if indeed it was his fault, like he ignored the Citation or evaded the writ server for two years, then he can't get credit for it under Quinn.

What we are doing here is we are just recognizing the way the Superior Court has already interpreted it. And I don't think it's going to add any more cases that shouldn't already be in the pipeline; I don't think these cases should be dismissed any more under Quinn.

This will ensure that they won't be dismissed and it will ensure that they are treated equally all over the State, not just by District Justices who are aware of the Quinn case, which I think is very bad to have the law say one thing and a Superior Court case say just the opposite and have total confusion out there.

#### BY REPRESENTATIVE DALEY:

Q Well, the threshold may be two years and there's going to be another Quinn, Quinn II somewhere when we are at the four-year threshold,

and they are going to say the same thing.

I mean this thing could go on and on and on for six, seven or eight years maybe; I don't know. I'm just offering this as an argument.

Let me ask you a question. Let me ask you the question then, counsel.

MS. DALTON: I have some statistics.

According to the Philadelphia Inquirer who I love to quote, 87 percent of all drivers ticketed in Philadelphia never pay. This amounts to \$75,000,000 of uncollected fines over the past two years. \$43.5 million would go to the State. Those are for people not responding within two years.

MR. HEATON: But that includes parking.

MS. DALTON: I'm reading from a co-sponsorship memo dated January 6, 1993.

REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Is that traffic citations, moving citations, all moving citations?

MS. DALTON: And I have --

MR. MUSTIN: Philadelphia Parking
Authority does the adjudication of parking
violations.

Am I correct with that, Representative Manderino?

REPRESENTATIVE MANDERINO: That's 1 correct. 2 MR. MUSTIN: So traffic violations, 3 moving violations, are solely adjudicated by 4 Traffic Court? 5 REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: You are saying \$75 6 million? 7 MS. DALTON: Yes. I just gave my 8 material to --9 CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: She's going to 10 make copies for us. 11 MR. MUSTIN: That's dollars, I think. 12 MS. DALTON: \$75,000,000. 13 REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: \$75,000,000 of 14 fines which would parking tickets? 15 MR. MUSTIN: No, no, strictly moving. 16 REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Strictly moving 17 citations. 18 Doesn't it seem like there is an 19 enforcement problem here in terms of --20 MR. MUSTIN: If I could just tell you, 21 Representative Daley, we suspend somewhere in the 22 neighborhood of about 200 to 225 to 250,000 people 23 every year for failure to respond to citations here 24 in Pennsylvania. Of that, probably 75 percent of 25

those come from Philadelphia.

REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: And probably of that, 90 percent of those people are still driving without their license, probably.

I know I can't prove that fact, but I read somewhere where there is a tremendous amount of people driving without a license.

MR. MUSTIN: We believe that 75 percent of the people who get suspended drive anyhow.

MR. HEATON: You are correct about the enforcement problem.

I view this as the criminal side of it and the civil side of it.

The criminal side of it involves what happens in front of the District Justice, and they're issued a Citation and they ignore it.

Now as soon as they ignore it, that's transmitted to PennDOT, who suspends the license for 1533, failure to respond to a citation.

But that doesn't help that Citation get responded to a lot of times. They are just going to drive under suspension and continue to ignore it.

At that point in time the criminal process should be following up and there should be

 Constable or a Sheriff or somebody should be going out and serving process on these people and dragging them in front of the District Justice.

a warrant issued and there should be either a

Because of the busy nature of the Police Departments, the Constables, et cetera, it just isn't happening.

REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Well, I don't see how this legislation is going to fix that.

I mean I don't see how this legislation is going to put more punch into the enforcement aspect because our problem is, number one, in Philadelphia you have \$75,000,000 out there being uncollected. You're suspended 250,000 people in Pennsylvania, of which approximately 190,000 of those are Philadelphia, of which approximately 150,000 are still driving.

By making this four years or forty-five years, you are still not enforcing the law.

MR. HEATON: It will give the police and the Criminal Justice System two more years to catch up with these folks and get the money, whereas now the two years comes awfully quick and then the people are in front of the Magistrate asking that the case be dismissed.

There would be two more years that the warrant could be served and the persons could be dragged in. It would also coincide with the four-year renewal of the license.

These people are driving under suspension but they have a license in their pocket because it only comes up for renewal once every two years. If we could keep this going for four years, the renewal would come up. PennDOT would not renew the license and they wouldn't have an actual physical license in their pockets to drive with and show the police officer.

And most police officers when they stop a violator are satisfied to look at a license; they don't run everybody up on the tube to find out whether they are under suspension or not. People know that. As long as they have a license in their pocket, they are comfortable going out to drive.

Now if we extend this to four years, you are going to have half the people out there driving under suspension who won't have a license in their pocket because they can't get it renewed and can't get the actual physical license in their possession.

So I think there are ways that this is

effective and will go at the problem.

The criminal side needs to throw more effort at it, you're right.

REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: I'm not trying to throw mud on your proposal here, but I was Mayor for eight years and my cops had more important things to do than to continue to chase around people that really in essence -- I mean the way you catch them is you pull them over for another citation, you run a check and then you've caught them.

The police officers today on the street, especially in Philadelphia, have more important things to do than pull people over for traffic citations, quite honestly, and I really don't believe by adding two years you are going to have better enforcement.

I think you are just going to have more problems. I'm not saying I'm opposed to the proposal; I'm just offering some arguments here that need to at least be heard and discussed.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Do we happen to have a counselor from the City of Philadelphia?

REPRESENTATIVE MANDERINO: I'm just

listening.

t

and --

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Just listening.

How about counsel for the Committee

REPRESENTATIVE MANDERINO: However, if you help us solve our insurance problem in Philadelphia, we can probably help get those numbers down on people driving without licenses, because I think -- I mean with suspended licenses, because I think that's where a lot of it comes from.

REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Annexation?

REPRESENTATIVE MANDERINO: Pardon me?

REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Annexation.

#### BY MS. DALTON:

Q Mr. Heaton, if I understand you correctly, what the law currently says is if we don't have the adjudication in its final disposition within two years the person goes free; is that right?

A It says no action shall be taken or proceeding held more than two years from the date of the offense.

Q Isn't it fair to say that the practical effect is if we get somebody before a District Justice within two years and they appeal it and

they don't go into court, Court of Common Pleas within that time frame, they are off the hook; is that right?

- A That's when the Jennanga case says, yes.
- Q Then the language --
- A But that's not what the Quinn case says.

The Quinn case says if that delay in the Common Pleas Court is attributable to them, that it tolls the statute.

Q Okay, okay.

And the language that you are proposing to add, an additional two years to four years, I just want to be clear that -- what effect that would have.

Would that mean that if a person got into court, if we caught somebody within four years, would that toll the statute, or would we have to have the disposition final?

A You would have to have the disposition final within four years.

Now it may well be that --

- Q It means all appeals have run?
- A The Quinn case might be invoked there by the Commonwealth to say that even the four years isn't an absolute bar because the delay was the

Defendant's fault.

Q Okay.

But in other words there has to be a final disposition within four years; all appeals must have run?

A It doesn't say that.

Q No, but under the language you are proposing?

A It doesn't say that.

I would think that four years should be enough time, and you may well feel that you want to amend it again.

Q Right.

I guess where I am confused --

MR. MUSTIN: It says the four years only apply to the issuing authority who is the District Justice. It doesn't apply to any Appellate Courts.

MS. DALTON: Okay.

MR. HEATON: Under my proposal, if it comes out of the District Justice's office by an appeal to Common Pleas Court within four years, then the statute is met.

MS. DALTON: Which is the normal way the statute of limitations is tolled, say on the civil side, as long as you serve process within a certain

amount of time?

MR. HEATON: Yes.

### BY MS. DALTON:

- Q So this does change the law, then?
- A Yes.
- Q Okay.

## BY REPRESENTATIVE MANDERINO:

Q I'm just confused.

If the problem is with the statute as currently being written, completion within two years, why are we still staying with the completion type of language?

Why aren't we just saying commenced within two years, which then keeps the burden on the Commonwealth to act timely but doesn't catch you on the rear end if somebody else delays?

Why are we still staying with the notion of completion if that's where the catch 22 is?

A Well, that's where the catch 22 is, but the only reason in answer to that, the only reason I can think of for leaving this in is we are still going to have the District Justices out there who are going to have these more than two year old, or more than four year old citations piling up in their files and they want some mechanism to be able

to purge them or terminate them.

As it stands right now, this is the only method of doing it.

Q All right.

So you are saying the completion date allows the purging of old and not timely cases but right now a two year purge is too short?

A Yes.

- Q In your estimation?
- A Yes.
- Q Okay.

MR. ANDRING: I can understand why you would have such a concern about this two-year period being applied to an appeal to Common Pleas Court. I mean that is unreasonable I think on its face to complete the D.J. proceedings and then go into Common Pleas Court on a de novo appeal and get that all done within two years is really pressing it.

On the other hand, there apparently is a problem in Philadelphia.

In most of the rest of the state that I am familiar with, if you get a traffic ticket and you don't pay it, the District Justice sends out the Constable and they come and arrest you.

I can't understand why that can't be done within three years. I mean I think it's rather ridiculous that four years after getting a Citation you can be sitting in your living room and a Constable comes knocking on your door to take you to the District Justice after they let it sit there for four years.

I really can't reconcile that in my mind.

If there is a problem in Philadelphia, I don't know how they handle these in Traffic Court in Philadelphia; they don't have Constables. I don't know if they are using all of the police officers or what, but if there's a problem with the system there, then maybe that ought to be addressed. Maybe they ought to use Constables; I don't know.

MR. MUSTIN: They historically do not use Constables in other parts of the state. Very rarely are they used.

What is happening is when the Vehicle Code was enacted back in '76, it provided for as Mr. Heaton says, the provisions of Section 1533, failure to respond to a citation, what happens is the District Justice notifies the Defendant that he hasn't responded to this Citation according to

court rules, general rules, and he is supposed to give the Defendant fifteen days in which to respond. If he doesn't respond within those fifteen days, he then sends a Notice to the Department to initiate suspension of the license.

They feel that that works better in getting a hold of the person rather than having a Constable going out knocking on doors looking for somebody, because the Constable knocks on the door, asks for the person and they say nobody lives here.

I mean people become attuned in how to avoid Citations.

MR. ANDRING: That is done to enforce parking tickets.

One article even mentions Philadelphia is collecting 70 or 80 percent of their parking tickets and Constables are used all the time to collect parking tickets.

MR. MUSTIN: They don't use Constables there, they use Parking Authority --

MR. ANDRING: I don't care if there aren't Constables in Philadelphia. In the rest of the State they use Constables to collect tickets.

MR. MUSTIN: They don't use them -MR. ANDRING: They come out to your

house. They have all of their warrants and they say you owe \$600 in parking tickets; you pay it now or we go to court.

MR. MUSTIN: If they can actually find you.

MR. ANDRING: They do.

MR. MUSTIN: Well, people historically when you knock on the door will say I'm sorry, he doesn't live here.

We find that when the State Police go out to get a driver's license.

MR. ANDRING: But I'm saying this one newspaper articles makes it clear. They are collecting the parking tickets in Philadelphia. What they aren't collecting are the moving fines.

Now apparently they have a system that works for parking tickets.

You know, I think Pete had a point. I don't see where you are going to really solve anything by doing this. You are just going to drag it out for another two years and you are not going to collect any more than you were collecting before.

If the problem is these people are just ripping up the tickets, you obviously need a new

system to bring them in. Your suspension system isn't working.

MR. MUSTIN: Well, on the parking violations, one reason they are able to collect those is they boot the vehicle or they tow it. I mean they have some incentive to make sure that you pay up. There is no similar incentive on the driver licensing side.

MR. ANDRING: Well, maybe that's what we need then is a similar incentive. I mean if you are actually serious about collecting the money.

I just don't see where you are going to get any significantly increased amount of money by stretching this out to four years.

What's the difference going to be? I just can't --

MR. HEATON: You are eliminating the incentive for people to avoid the Constable or avoid the police officer with the warrant for two years.

MR. ANDRING: They would just avoid them for four years.

MR. HEATON: Well, they have become very successful in avoiding them for two years and then they are going in and having the Citations

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dismissed, and that is not a proper result.

MR. ANDRING: No, but I suspect they are not avoiding them so much as just nobody is making any effort to go out after them.

MR. HEATON: It's a combination of the two.

MR. ANDRING: And if they are not going after them in two years, they are not going out after them in four years.

I mean I certainly understand your point, but if the idea is to increase the enforcement and get more revenue, I think you have to address the reason as to why you are not collecting them right now.

And obviously, at least in Philadelphia, there doesn't seem to be much effort to collect these, and I don't think increasing to two years across the board is going to result in more money coming in.

MR. HEATON: The intent of this provision in the very first place going back to 1976, was to allow Magistrates, J.P.'s, a means of terminating prosecutions which had no chance of being completed and the money collected. That was the intent of it. It wasn't to allow people a safe haven if they

could avoid a writ server for two years.

That's what it's evolved into and I think that's what this Bill has the ability to terminate, particularly in the case of the serious offenses.

I mean we have a traffic safety interest here. People who race on the highway and elude a police officer and driver under suspension and the like shouldn't be able to completely walk away from that. And not only the conviction and the fine up to a thousand dollars, but the license suspension.

These are all serious offenses that go into the Habitual Offender Act. I mean they shouldn't be able to walk away from that just by avoiding the criminal authorities for two years; it's just not right.

MR. ANDRING: I agree with you they shouldn't, but I also think there is an obligation on the criminal authorities to attempt to process these things in an expeditious manner. And I suspect that is more of your problem than it is that you have all of these people out there dodging the law enforcement authorities.

MR. HEATON: That's the problem.

The documents are being transmitted to PennDOT and we are suspending the license and people are ignoring it and driving under suspension.

Why don't you give some incentive to the Constables, perhaps giving them more of a fee, or more of a share of the money collected to go out and find these people?

Maybe that's a way of doing it.

MR. ANDRING: I think that might be a good idea.

MR. HEATON: Maybe you should get some more Constables into the system. Maybe that's what -- why don't you talk to Philadelphia Traffic Court and ask them why the parking violations are being treated more seriously than some of the serious moving offenses?

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: If I could interject here, I understand you don't have Constables in Philadelphia like they do in the rest of the State.

Is it writ servers or Sheriff's Deputies?

REPRESENTATIVE MANDERINO: That do what?

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: That do the service in Traffic Court.

REPRESENTATIVE MANDERINO: Traffic Court is the wretched computer.

MR. MUSTIN: The Parking Authority has their own enforcement personnel that go out for parking violations.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: With the City of Philadelphia parking violations?

MR. MUSTIN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Does it cover the State?

MR. MUSTIN: No, they are strictly City of Philadelphia parking violations.

MR. HEATON: So you can ignore them with impunity except for PennDOT suspending your license.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: And evidently from what Counsel Andring is saying, they are doing a pretty good job at collecting that money for the City of Philadelphia but not for the State of Pennsylvania as it applies to State violations.

MR. MUSTIN: Well, for the State and the City of Philadelphia they get half the money.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Yes.

And I just noticed this one article that said --

MR. MUSTIN: That's money they are not getting today.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Parking tickets, they have -- I think it said a 76 percent collection rate on the parking tickets.

MR. MUSTIN: I mean if you look at the one article here, they talked to the computer liaison at the Traffic Violations Bureau in Chicago and he says that a two-year statute of limitations, and he's quoted, wow, I think I'll move to Philadelphia.

I mean he seems to feel that that is ludicrous, two years.

What Mr. Heaton said about the fact that at least it should be limited to the issuing authority, surely it shouldn't apply to appeals.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: You feel that this is going to be one of the tools that would better equip you at least to try and go after it, but I think Counsel Andring's point is even with the additional time, how do we get, or who do we get to go out and really make the collections and do the enforcement?

And what inducement do we add to it? I mean if we can patch this area of the law that you are addressing here today, we also have to take a look at how do we patch the other part that Bill

brought up.

MR. HEATON: You can't do one without the other.

I mean with a two-year statute, you are wasting your time empowering people and giving them a cut of the take and all of the rest because they are not going to get there in two years.

These people have an incentive to avoid them.

Four years I don't think it's that easy.

If they are here in the State, you could get them in four years.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: We are talking about graded offenses?

MR. HEATON: And I also think that if they didn't have a driver's license in their pocket, whether it be suspended or not suspended, they would be more likely to come forward and pay because they'd pay the fine in order to get their driver's license back.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Do you have any suggestions on how to improve this system of collection?

MR. HEATON: I haven't thought about it, but I'm thinking that perhaps the Constables --

Philadelphia Traffic Court probably needs some incentive to hire Constables, number one, and then the Constables need some incentive in order to go

out and collect the money.

Now I'm not sure what amount of money that is owed is good versus what is bad, but assuming there is a certain amount of it there that is good, perhaps the Constable needs to get a fee based on total collections, not just on an individual ticket because if it's based on an individual ticket, then all his effort if he doesn't succeed, is down the tubes.

You know, you need to make an incentive which is more in tune with how difficult it is to collect.

chairman caltagirone: Maybe what we really need to do is sit down and talk with some of the people of Philadelphia Traffic Court.

We had taken a tour down there a year or two ago. We were very impressed with their operation, with their computerization, brand new building and the way it looked like it was supposed to function.

They were a little short of staff. That was one of the problems at that time. I don't know

if anybody here was with us on the tour. It was a very impressive tour and we looked very closely with the Traffic Court Judges down there and we had a pretty decent relationship with the folks down there.

Maybe what we need to do is communicate with them to see exactly what thoughts they have of improving that system of collections.

MS. DALTON: Mr. Chairman, it might be a good idea to try to get them on the witness list.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: That's an excellent idea.

If you would -- I'm sure that they would cooperate with us. They have given us very good cooperation in the past on issues that we have dealt with, so we can certainly address that issue.

Are there other questions, comments?
(No response.)

Gentlemen, thank you very, very much. I thought this was a very good exercise in getting the air cleared on this particular issue and we'll take these thoughts into consideration.

MR. HEATON: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Counsel is going to talk to the prime sponsor of the Bill.

time.

I imagine you worked with Matt initially in addressing this issue?

MR. MUSTIN: We did not.

This I understand is his own initiative.

I understand he may have talked to somebody in the

Department, but I'm not clear at this point who he

talked to?

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: All right.

What we would like to be able to do is talk with Representative Wright and see if he would agree with your suggestion on the Amendment and at the same time also try to work out something to deal with the collection issue.

MR. HEATON: That's a good idea.

CHAIRMAN CALTAGIRONE: Thank you for your

(The hearing concluded at 10:50 a.m.)

I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence taken by me in the above-entitled matter are fully and accurately indicated in my notes and that this is a true and correct transcript of same.

Nancy J. Grega, RPR/slg