HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

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House Bill 1320

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House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts

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Room 22, Capitol Annex Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Wednesday, August 30, 1995 - 9:00 a.m.

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BEFORE:

Honorable Daniel Clark, Subcommittee Chairman

Honorable Jeffrey Piccola, Majority Chairman

Honorable J. Scot Chadwick Honorable Stephen Haitland

Honorable Jere Schuler

Honorable Thomas Caltagirone, Minority Chairman

Honorable Lisa Boscola Honorable Gregory Fajt Honorable Kathy Manderino

ORIGINAL

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ALSO PRESENT:

Sally Spang, Majority Adm. Asst. for Honorable Jeffrey Piccola

Karen Dalton, Esquire Counsel for Judiciary Committee

Brian Preski, Esquire Counsel for Judiciary Committee

David L. Krantz Minority Executive Director

Daniel DeLash Minority Committee Secretary

Jennifer Beaven, Minority Research Analyst

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This is the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts public hearing and today we are having a public hearing on House Bill 1320. My name is Representative Dan Clark and I represent the 82nd Legislative District and the 82nd

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Good morning.

REP. PICCOLA: Depending on the traffic.

here on Route 322.

Legislative District is about one hour west of

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Depending on the traffic and the Dauphin Narrows.

My district is in central Pennsylvania and very rural and I represent all or parts of four counties. I am the Prime Sponsor of House Bill 1320 which we are having the hearing on today and this bill provides for geographic representation in our appellate court system and that representation is selected through a merit process. That bill, in its current form, is a culmination of a lot of discussions in the House and in this Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee Committee over the last few years and we are hoping that we will be able to get some additional testimony today on the nuts and

1	bolts of that bill, with an eye towards
2	improving it and having it move on through the
3	legislature.
4	With that, what I would like the fellow
5	house members, if they are in attendance today,
6	to introduce themselves and we will begin over
7	here to my far right.
8	REP. SCHULER: Jere Schuler, Lancaster
9	County.
10	REP. MAITLAND: Steve Maitland from the
11	91st District which is most of Adams County.
12	REP. BOSCOLA: Lisa Boscola,
13	Northampton/Lycoming County.
14	REP. PICCOLA: Representative Jeff Piccola,
15	Dauphin County.
16	REP. CHADWICK: I am Scott Chadwick from
17	Bradford and Susquehanna Counties.
18	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you.
19	The first individual to testify before
20	us today is the Honorable Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr.
21	He is the Chairman for the Pennsylvanians for
22	Modern Courts.
23	JUDGE SPAETH: Good morning.
24	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Good morning.
25	JUDGE SPAETH: May I ask Miss Marks,

who is the Executive Director of PMC, to join me, and with the Committee's permission, she will speak specifically to the problem of regional merit selection. I thought perhaps it would be appropriate if I were to speak for my own experience and explain why I believe so strongly that the time is long past for Pennsylvania to amend its constitution. I should say for the people of Pennsylvania to amend their constitution to provide for the merit selection of appellate judges. That is, specifically Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of the Superior and Commonwealth Courts.

I was a judge of the Superior Court from 1973 to 1986 and I suspect that I have been through as many statewide elections as anybody in this room. I was nominated to a vacancy on the Superior Court in 1973. I ran for election to the court. That required first that I campaign. Of course, as the Committee knows, appellate judges are elected on the statewide basis. I campaigned in the primary. Those days, you could cross-file. So I campaigned both as a democrat and as a republican and did brilliantly because I was nominated as neither, but was defeated in the primary.

As it happened, another vacancy developed on the Superior Court and I was nominated to fill that. In 1975, I again campaigned in the primary. This time I was nominated as a democrat. And, in November, I ran in the General Election and I was elected.

Now, in 1985 when my term expired, I was the President Judge of the Superior Court, had been for three years, and I was eligible to run for reelection on a retention basis.

I loved being a judge. It is one of the greatest privileges that anybody can have.

I was 65. Had I been retained, I would have had five more years in the court and I should have liked that very much. I, nevertheless, declined to run for retention, because on the basis of my own experience and the basis of my observation of how our judicial system works, I was deeply convinced, I remained deeply convinced, that the electing of appellate judges is wrong. It is inconsistent with a qualified, independent judiciary in which the public will have confidence.

And if I may? In the balance of my statement, I would like to explain the reasons for that conclusion.

First of all, it's frequently said that the election of appellate judges is democratic, it's part of the democratic process and not to elect them deprives the people of their vote.

That is the usual way of putting it. It is an easy slogan, but it has absolutely no relationship to reality. A realistic description would be that the election of appellate judges is a politically bossed system that masquerades as an instrument of the popular will.

When I ran for the Superior Court, I often would ask my audiences whether they knew anything about the Superior Court or whether they knew anything about me. It is a distressing sort of exercise to go through, I assure you, because, an occasional lawyer friend was there and they would sheepishly hold up a hand and admit they knew me, but mostly nobody knew me and nobody knew about the Superior Court. At least I had a chance to explain the responsibilities of the Superior Court and its place in our judicial system, and I think, I hope that that was of some useful civic education. But I didn't have a chance to say anything about

myself that would in any way help the audience or anybody who read about the meeting to know whether they should vote for me.

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It is one thing to run as you, ladies and gentlemen, have run. You not only may, but it is entirely appropriate and it is right for you to take positions on political issues. what your constituents expect. They want to know, if they vote for you, how you will vote, what sort of bills you will propose. But the judge can't do that. Somebody running for judge can't possibly do that. It is very regrettable that under the pressure of election campaign, some judicial candidates have come awfully close to doing that, but it's wrong to do it. obligation of the judge is to just basically decide, according to the particular facts of the case, according to the particular principles of law that apply to that case and to say to an audience when you are running for election how you will decide something is dreadful.

One can imagine if you appeared before that judge in a later case and knew that when that individual is campaigning for election, he or she had said, well, if I have a case that

involves X, this is the way I think it ought to be decided and there you are on the other side of X. You are not going to have any confidence in the fairness of the hearing that you are going to get.

Now, in the end, I was elected by a very substantial margin and I would like to think that that meant that after three statewide campaigns, the voters had some idea of who I was and decided that I would be a good judge, but that ... I know perfectly well that that's not the case, that isn't the way it worked at all. If the day after my successful election in November of 1975, voters had been asked -- and there have been poles that do this, exit poles -- who did you vote for for appellate judge? You get an absolute blank. Well, why did you vote for that person? And you get a blank.

The reason I won and the reason that my opponent who was a good judge from Allegheny County lost, was that, by happen stance, there was a wing-ding of a mayoral election going on in Philadelphia and the democratic candidate came out of Philadelphia with a very large

margin and I came out with a very large margin, much too large for my Allegheny County opponent to overcome. So he didn't lose because of the voters thinking that I was better than he and I didn't win because the voters thought I was better than he. We were both either victims or beneficiaries of political chance. So that to say that the election of judges on the appellate and the statewide basis is an exercise of the popular will, not to put too fine a point on it, is nonsense.

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The second point I would like to make is that the election of appellate judges inevitably involves the judicial candidates in a process that either, in fact, compromises their independence or at least has the appearance of doing so.

When I ran for election to the Superior Court, Superior Court, I necessarily appeared before partisan audiences. I was in Adams County, I remember. A very pleasant outdoor picnic. I was in Juniata County and spoke to some college students. And, you know, I was in almost every county in the state and almost every occasion that I attended was a politically partisan occasion. Not quite. There were some that were civic meetings of one kind or

another, but mostly they were occasions sponsored by the democratic leadership of that county.

And I assure you, ladies and gentlemen, if you are running for judge, that leaves you in a very uncomfortable position because, inevitably, there is the appearance that you are running, in my case, as a democrat. In my opponent's case, as a republican.

And there is no such thing, or there should be no such thing, as republican law or democratic law. It is an unhappy fact that our courts are sometimes referred to as a democratic court or as a republican court and what the speaker means is that they have counted noses and there are more republican justices than democratic, there are more democratic than republican and that's not the way a court should be perceived. And the perception is every bit as important as the fact.

But in addition to that, there is another reason why electing appellate judges is inconsistent with the public getting appellate courts that they'll have confidence in. It takes a great deal of money to be elected an appellate

judge. It didn't take nearly as much when I was running, but it still took an awful lot more than I had. And now, it takes well over a million dollars.

That money comes from lawyers,
most of it, or lawyers' associations. Now, I
don't, I don't want to sound harsh. Most lawyers are
perfectly honorable in their approach to making
financial contributions and most judicial
candidates are, too.

I was on the bench, Common

Pleas in Philadelphia, and then the Superior Court

for over 21 years, and I know a great many

judges and some of them are among my closest

friends. There are many fine judges, despite

the fact that they had to go through an

electoral process which required dependence on

partisan political support and required seeking

contributions. Of course, they don't seek

them themselves. You have a committee that does it

for you. But just the same, seeking

contributions from lawyers, some of whom will

appear before them.

And again, it is not whether the judge will, in fact, favor a lawyer who made a substantial

contribution. It is what will the public think? What will individual litigants think? How would you feel if you were appearing before a judge and you knew that the lawyer on the other side, the lawyer opposing your lawyer, was a substantial contributor to the court? To the judge hearing the case? You are not, you are not going to be comfortable. And if the experience of the last several years has shown us anything, it shows the great danger of judges either, in fact, being or seeming to be beholding to those who have supported them with money and with allotment.

Now, sometimes it is said, well, yes, there is a lot, of course, to those criticisms, but merit selection wouldn't be an improvement. You can't get politics out of the process. Merit selection, in fact, would be more political.

I don't propose today to go into any detail in talking about the way the merit selection system should be structured. We have testified before on that. And, in fact, I was rather mortified when I looked at the printed statement to see that, although it is entitled with this Committee's title, it starts out by thanking you for letting me appear before the Senate Judiciary

Committee. Forgive the English, Mr. Chairman, but we have said before how we believe a merit selection bill should be structured.

You will have other testimony on that, and you have heard a lot of it before. The point that I would like to make is a more general one. The fact of the matter is that merit selection is a more democratic process, by far, than the current process. The current process is very undemocratic. The current process is chance and money and political partisanship all rolled up into a wad that comes out with a result that leaves the public right-lacking confidence in the way the courts work.

And to say that we can't do better
than that is defeatism. We most certainly can do
better than that. Most states have done much better than
that. And when I say that merit selection is a
better process from every aspect, I am very
comfortable by referring the Committee to the
experience of many, many other states. To argue
that Pennsylvania mustn't change is like the
mother watching her boy in the parade: everybody
is out of step but my Johnny.

For one thing, merit selection produces

a much more diverse bench, in terms of gender, professional background, race, and geography. Stating it the other way, nobody should be surprised that a process we have now that is so heavily dependent, exclusively dependent upon partisan political muscle and the ability to raise money, produces a Supreme Court that's from the East or the West. All of them without a single woman. That's what you would expect. That's what you get.

If you look at merit selection states, you get a much more diverse bench in every respect: geographically and otherwise. And that's not surprising because the pool of qualified candidates is so much larger. The nominating commission chooses from lawyers, from small offices, large offices, medium offices, every county, single practitioners, a variety of backgrounds, and to say that you can't tell whether somebody is qualified is nonsense.

I have been through the merit selection. A merit selection committee learns a great deal about whether a person would be a qualified candidate. How long has a person been

a lawyer? What sort of practice? What is the person's reputation? What civic and political, charitable activities has the person engaged in? What professional activities? What is the reputation? Now anybody who has enough political muscle and can raise enough money can run. So the experience shows that you get a much more diverse, much more highly qualified bench under a merit selection process.

Furthermore, it is very definitely a democratic exercise. The members of the nominating committee, there are differences of just what the procedure should be. I am not going to go into that, but they are all chosen by elected officials, whether by the Governor, by the Representatives of the House and Senate, some combination thereof, nevertheless, and then the nominees go to the Governor who selects one and the Senate confirms or doesn't confirm. So that the people's electorate representatives have a decisive and the decisive final say.

In concluding, I respectfully express
the hope that the Committee, the General
Assembly that retire will, will recognize that
reasonable people are going to differ as to the

details of what a final constitutional amendment should say, but those can be worked out.

And the time has come, ladies and gentlemen, for something to be done. Experience in this state has shown that it has to be done, the experience of other states has shown that it can be done and you have, the General Assembly has, many important tasks before you. But I do suggest that there isn't any that's more important than restructuring the way our appellate judges are selected so that we will achieve a judicial system that commands the people's confidence.

I do appreciate, very much, Mr.

Chairman, the opportunity to appear before you and express the gratification that the Committee has put this very important subject on its agenda.

If I may ask Miss Marks to supplement what I said? Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Yes, thank you very much. Yeah, I think what we will do --

JUDGE SPAETH: Or respond to any questions? Or however you wish to proceed?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I thought what
we would do, now since we have Miss Marks, who is the
Executive Director to the Pennsylvanians for

Modern Courts, go ahead and give her testimony and then we should ask questions of both of you, if that's acceptable?

JUDGE SPAETH: That's fine, Mr. Speaker.

MS. MARKS: Thank you for inviting us to testify. Judge Spaeth spoke about his personal experiences through the partisan election process and I will confine my comments to our organization's perspectives.

Campaign fund raising will continue as long as judicial elections do. The potential for abuse will never subside unless and until partisan election of appellate judges are eliminated altogether. And this is true regardless of whether judicial elections are held on a statewide or on a regional basis. And I know we are not here to talk about proposals which would divide the state into districts and elect appellate judges from regions, but I would like to take the opportunity now to voice our strong opposition to that approach.

Substituting regional elections in place of statewide elections, we believe would be a major step in the wrong direction. The

fund raising pressure, which Judge Spaeth alluded to and which I am sure you will hear more about it today, rather than receding would escalate. The pressure on lawyers and on special interest groups to contribute and the potential conflict of interest on judges would be that much greater for elections to occur within smaller districts where contributors have personal ties to the candidates.

Moreover, it is really contrary
to the whole concept of a statewide judiciary to
have appellate judges, quote, represent regions.
Judges who sit on statewide courts protect the
rights of each and every county in Pennsylvania
and they cannot and they should not be compelled
to woo votes by promising either explicitly or
implicitly to be mindful of the interests of any
one region over another.

And I would like to, I don't think it can be overstressed, that the role of a judge is different from your role as legislators or from the role of an executive. Your role, obviously when you campaign, is to tell the voters where, where you stand: we vote for you, we vote against you, because of those stands. But the

role of the judge is to decide cases purely based on the facts and the law, not according to anything that that judicial candidate said on the campaign trail.

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And although we reject regional elections as a solution to the problems in the statewide judicial elections, we are nonetheless sympathetic to the sentiment that drives those who bring those proposals and that is the lack of geographical balance on our appellate court. And I would like to, when I purposely say balance rather than representation, because judges should not be representing a particular constituency. The strength of any institution is, in part, dependent on the different experiences of its members and those experiences often result in a unique perspective that are both healthy in and enriching to the deliberative process. And the judicial decision making process, particularly one engaged in by statewide judges, the decision affects every Pennsylvanian, regardless of residence is no exception.

I don't have to tell you that currently every Supreme Court Justice that comes from either Philadelphia or Pittsburgh and that no

candidate from another county has won a statewide election since 1981. Most members of the Superior and Commonwealth Courts also live in or near the state's two largest cities and that's not surprising, considering where the money and votes come from in the statewide election. It is understandable that this lopsidedness troubles a great many citizens and certainly the representatives in the General Assembly.

The critical issue for a discussion in devising any judicial selection reform plan for the appellate court must be how to best provide for a greater balance.

We are not prepared,
today, to support House Bill 1320. This is not
because we oppose regional merit selection as a
means of getting better geographical balance,
but simply because we don't think a regional
plan is necessary to achieve such balance. The PMC
strongly believes that a balance sought by
proponents of regional merit selection can be
accomplished by a statewide merit selection
plan.

National figures show that the experience

of the other states that have statewide merit selection confirms this belief. For example, of the seven judges that sit on New York's highest court -- and that is one of the more respective ones in the country -- in that state, four of the seven come from New York City or the immediate area and the other three come from up state. And, incidentally, two judges on that court, including the Chief Judge, are women; one member is a Hispanic person and one is an African American.

And it is not surprising that
statewide merit selection would result in
more geographical diversity. After all, the
cornerstone of a merit selection plan is the
broad-based and diverse nominating commission.

The 1988 Governor's Judicial Reform

Commission recommended that judicial applicants
be recruited and selected by a nominating
commission composed of nonlawyers and lawyers,
women and men, balanced by political party
background, who reflect the geographical racial
and ethnic diversity of the Commonwealth.

And similar language pertaining to that kind of diversity on the nominating commission has

been a standard feature of all proposed judicial reform plans since 1988, including the one which you have before you: Representative Clark's bill.

But traditionally that kind of diversity applies to language of who sits on the nominating commission, with the expectation that if you have diversity of backgrounds of people who sit on the nominating commission, they would be sensitive to the needs of their area.

But in statewide merit selection plans, not only do they also have a requirement that there be geographic diversity on the nominating commission, but I would like to call to your attention a bill that was introduced in the last Session by Representative Piccola and Representative Evans, which was reported out of the Judiciary Committee, but never came to a vote on the Floor. And that bill would have made Pennsylvania a trailblazer in ensuring to the maximum extent possible geographic diversity among prospective members of the judiciary itself, and that I have listed that language in the foot notes on page six.

And to our knowledge, no other state that

has adopted merit selection has gone to such extraordinary length and, therefore, there is a possibility for a bill with a statewide merit selection plan, leading to greater geographic balance, because of two provisions: that there be geographic diversity on the nominating commission itself and that there be diversity on the Appellate Courts.

But even without that unique provision,
we have great confidence that a diverse and
broad-based nominating statewide commission
would be keenly sensitive to the needs, to the
needs to consider a nominated appellate judge
from the less populace areas of the state. And
certainly that popularly-elected Governor
and state Senate whose respective roles are to appoint
and confirm judicial nominees can be expected to insure
that no county or region dominates the appellate bench.

Moreover. once elections are eliminated, qualified lawyers who live elsewhere will have an equal opportunity to obtain a judicial and appellate judgeship. As the result, the pool of applicants will widen significantly, as Judge Spaeth had talked about.

Now, we recognize that reasonable people may differ on exactly what a merit selection plan

members of the General Assembly, will now meet and hammer out an agreement. And we expect in that process that compromises will have to be made.

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For example, there might be differences of opinion as to how many people sit on a nominating commission and who should appoint those persons. For example, in House Bill 1320 before you, there are 12 members of the nominating commission and the Governor would make all those appointments, though two-thirds would come from lists provided by legislative leaders of both parties. In other plans, such as Senator Jubelirer's Senate Bill 3, which is pending now in the Senate Judiciary Committee, and like the plan which was recommended by the Beck Commission in 1988 that calls for a sixteen-person commission with shared appointments, half by the Governor and half by the legislative leaders of both parties.

If some kind of regional proponent is preferred, there might be discussion as to whether there ought to be separate judicial nominating commissions, as in Representative Clark's plan,

or whether one statewide commission would be less cumbersome with language regarding the importance of regional balance on the nominating commission, and perhaps on the court. Maybe there should be some kind of a requirement that names sent to the Governor should include people from each region or maybe more than five people, like in the plan before you, more than five names should be sent to the Governor. Maybe the Supreme Court should continue to be selected on a statewide basis and the other two appellate courts should be selected on a regional basis. There is precedence in other states for that kind of selection.

This whole debate over election versus appointments of appellate judges has gone on for far too long and we believe it is time to let the people decide how they want appellate judges to be chosen. A vote by you in the General Assembly during this Session and again in the 1997 to 1998 Session could bring this issue to the voters in a referendum by 1997.

If opponents are so convinced that the voters want to retain the current system of partisan elections, they should have nothing to fear. Pennsylvanians for Modern

courts, for our part, welcome the referendum and we urge this Committee to take the necessary actions that will allow this to happen.

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In closing, we commend Representative Clark for wanting to do away with judicial elections and for convening this hearing. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you. One observation. The purpose of providing for regions in the bill was to guarantee geographic diversity on the court. The members of the General Assembly know all too well what ends of the state even control the General Assembly, down to the Appropriations Committee. And how, although there may be Central Pennsylvanians in our leadership, they are a token representation in the overall scheme of how the legislature is run, how people are appointed to commissions, etc. And I think that anything less than a guarantee is a place at the table with no knife, fork or spoon. And that's why, in my endeavors to craft this bill and to convince fellow Central Pennsylvanians and rural Pennsylvanians to support a system like this, is to guarantee them that the courts will be diverse on a geographic basis.

JUDGE SPAETH: We are sympathetic with 1 2 that. 3 CHAIRMAN CLARK: But we live with it. 5 JUDGE SPAETH: But it is a question of degrees of certainty, I think, Mr. Chairman. As 6 7 Lynn has said, we think experience shows that 8 with a properly structured statewide system you get diversity. 9 10 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Experience in Pennsylvania shows that if it isn't carved in 11 12 granite, you don't get it. 13 JUDGE SPAETH: Well, its -- we are not here to 14 oppose your bill. We have consistently been of 15 the view that it should be statewide and merit 16 selection, but as both Miss Marks and I have said, we 17 would expect that if the representatives put their minds to 18 it, they can come up with a bill that will accommodate 19 their respective points of view and still have merit 20 selection and have something far, far, 21 better than you have now. 22 MS. MARKS: Yeah, I agree. And I would 23 just like to say that whether you come up with a 24 statewide merit selection bill or a regional

merit selection bill, the important thing is

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that judges would then be chosen on qualifications, not because of irrelevant factors, such as how much money they can raise, but their name recognition is loyalty to a home-town candidate, political ties and, of course, the bottom line, luck.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you very much.

Any additional questions? Representative
Chadwick.

REP. CHADWICK: Thank you, Chairman Clark.

Just a quick comment. I really have to agree with Mr. Clark. I think that those of us who have served in the legislation for sometime perhaps appreciate more than those who haven't the degree to which regional politics, partisan politics, money, all those other things, enter into almost everything that comes out of this body. If you have the Governor and the leaders of the General Assembly, House and Senate picking the members of a statewide commission, I assure you that that will be a highly political exercise and that when you get done, you still will not have what you sought, which is a commission which would provide for a statewide diversity

and balance. Of all the political pressures that enter into everything else we do will enter into who goes on to that commission and we will not have what we need.

I fully agree with Mr. Clark, if you don't carve this in granite, we are not going to get what we ought to have. I am from Bradford County. If the two Common Pleas judges of Bradford County were Oliver Wendell Holmes and Thurgood Marshall, their chances of a statewide merit selection of being on the Supreme Court wouldn't be much better than statewide election. We simply have to have some sort of regional system. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you,
Representative Chadwick.

Representative Piccola.

REP. PICCOLA: Thank you, Mr.

Chairman. I am glad my brother from Central

Pennsylvania made the remarks because I think

part of the effect of this, of this hearing, is

not only what we receive from witnesses but

some of the frustrations that I think you are

hearing from this table going out to those who

support merit selection, and I, as a firm

supporter of merit selection, wanted to make sure that we can broaden the base and get the support of the folks who really should be supporting merit selection: namely, those of us from Central Pennsylvania.

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I would like to ask Judge Spaeth a specific question. In your experience, and it has been quite extensive, both at the Common Pleas Court level as well as the Appellate Court level, have you ever encountered -- and if you have, would you care to share in the details of that encounter -- either a judge or an attorney who, in your view, would have otherwise been very capable and qualified to serve on one of our appellate courts (considered doing that) and because of the system (the election process) that they would have had to go through, which you so eloquently and agonizingly described that you went through: the prospect of running statewide in a primary, the prospect of possibly losing, the prospect of them running statewide in General Election, the fact of having to go around and raise money and potentially either explicitly or implicitly make the promises that perhaps should not even be made, but for that

process did they decline to seek that appellate court position?

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JUDGE SPAETH: I have not had anybody say in so many words to me, Ned, I would like to run, but I am not going to go through the hassle. Not quite that way because I wouldn't be the sort of person they would say that to. I couldn't give them any political counsel or comfort one way or the other. However, I have no question in my mind, from speaking to lawyers throughout states from -- that I have specifically two very, both retired now, distinguished Common Pleas judges that they were put off and would not have done it and didn't do it. Because they had good practices, they were heads or important partners, at least in a modest sized law firm or they were respected and effective members of the Common Fleas bench and to leave that for so distasteful a process, and so uncertain one, is something they weren't about to do.

Now, if you ask me to say, well, did anybody specifically say to you what

I have just said? No. But you know how

I	people feel from having a drink with them
	and working with them, there is no question
	in my mind that there is a very large pool
	of highly qualified lawyers and some very
	able Common Pleas judges who would be delighted
	to have their credentials considered by a
	nominating commission and would welcome the
	opportunity to give higher service, because
İ	that's what a lawyer or a judge wants, to serve
I	his or her profession, and appellate judgeship is
I	one of the best ways to do it. They would love
I	to do it, but they won't go around the committee
I	meetings, they won't go to ward leaders and they
I	won't go to friends and say, Bill, I need a
I	mullion dollars, how about if you would join a
I	\$2 million luncheon club? They won't do that.
	And you know it from knowing people. And I know
	many people that well enough, so that just on
İ	the basis of my knowledge of them, I know they
	wouldn't do that and they don't do it.
١	REP PICCOLA: Thank you Mr

Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Any additional questions, Representative?

REP. BOSCOLA: One of my friends isn't

really interested or not that merit selection is not the best way to go. What I am afraid of is that the people now have the right to elect their judges. And the one thing about in the election process is the judges that are running for the appellate court get to go around the state and people get to meet them. the opportunity to meet several people that stopped from running. I probably would never ever get to meet them, as a citizen, if there was some kind of merit selection involved. People already feel that they are kind of removed from who their judges are and I think this even removes them even farther from the public. And when you say that a court shouldn't be a democratic or a republican court, I agree with you, but all courts tend to have either liberal or conservative tendencies. And when I vote for a judge and other people in my district or throughout the state, we look to a candidate who represents our interests, whether it be liberal or conservative.

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Now, I happen to look for somebody
that is more moderate because I think that an
ultraconservative and ultraliberal are so

narrowly focused that they probably aren't best to sit on our court. That's a personal belief.

What I am really seriously afraid about is removing the people from their right to decide. And I am hoping that inevitably that this comes out of committee and then a vote upon, but we will be really going to the people in a referendum and showing them exactly what we are doing here, that they are giving up their right to decide their judges. And I hope we handle this in a responsible way. How do you feel about what I just said?

JUDGE SPAETH: Well, my first reaction is that I think a lot of people, voters, feel the way you do, but I think that they are frustrated because they can't really exercise those feelings effectively. Since I have been a judge, many of my friends before election will come to me and say, Ned, who shall I vote for? I don't know anything about any of the candidates.

You are, by virtue, you have demonstrated that you are by virtue of the office that you hold, somebody who probably would make more inquiries than most people, but without being rude, I don't intend it to be that at

 all. I would love to question you about how much you really did know about the last judicial candidates you voted for and I would bet a good deal that I wouldn't have to ask you very many questions before I would have you on the ropes.

REP. BOSCOLA: I have a tendency not to vote for Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in your district.

JUDGE SPAETH: I will tell you, I did very well in Central Pennsylvania because I have a German name. I am not proud of that. And, in fact, I am quite ashamed of it, because the other side of that story is my opponent did not do well because he had a different sort of name, and that's, that's bad.

I applaud any system of government that involves the people but not one that fools the people, not one where they are being manipulated. And they are being manipulated now. They are not getting candidates chosen by merit.

You may have seen that the news accounts of the last meetings of the democratic party where the candidates were selected and it was a

perfectly open: you vote for my guy, we will vote for you guys. Nothing to do with merits. Everything to do with brute political power. And when it goes to the people, that's their choice? Take an exit pole and say, madam, who did you just vote for for appellate judge? Try it in your own district and you will find that the responses are very disappointing.

Now, the people are not taken out of the loop in merit selection. After all, it is the Senate that decides whether to confirm. And the Governor isn't exactly an unelected official and the Governor is the one who decides to nominate.

Will there be politics in the selection of the nominating commission? Of course there will be.

But politics isn't a dirty word. Politics is one of the most honorable careers that any citizen can engage in. Politics is the way the laws get made. And most, many of the very finest judges have had political experience. It is one of the most effective ways to get to know one's community and to understand what matters to people. The problem isn't taking politics out of the judicial selection process, the problem is putting it in in an appropriate

degree.

Now it dominates it and has nothing to do with the merit and the people know this. People don't have confidence in their courts now because they don't think that the court is as independent or as qualified. It's a long answer.

REP. BOSCOLA: Right.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Additional questions?
Representative Schuler.

REP. SCHULER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I do want to thank both of you for your enlightening testimony. I am a novice to this, but I have been here fourteen years. And I guess looking at this panel, Representative Piccola and I are the longest serving members up here. He longer than I. But I have a concern, as the other members have already mentioned, about the selection. When I first came to the legislature fourteen years ago, I felt that election was the way to go. I am changing my mind. I see too many problems under the existing framework that we have developed to elect our judges.

In my area of the Pennsylvania Dutch country, we are very conservative down there.

In my experiences with the people who I speak with regarding judges, the two things that come out most often: I don't know who these people are. And I think, Your Honor, you just mentioned something that lack of knowledge developed some other things that we should not have in our election process, when you mentioned the fact about your name. When people don't know who they are voting for, they look for other things to make their decision and I am afraid that's one of them that they use and that's not the way you should be elected, especially judges.

The second thing that they are concerned about is this geographical alignment. All I hear is Pittsburgh/Philadelphia, Philadelphia/Pittsburgh and that creates a lot of problems with my people back home.

Finance is our problem. However, in my constituency, I don't hear that as much. These two things: knowledge and the aspect of region, are the two big things.

I believe that under the present bill, the 1320, I don't know if that's the solid or the best solution to this problem, but it's a step forward. But I do want to

make certain that when we do, if we go to a
merit selection system, that we do bring
in this regional aspect and address the
issue of our constituents back home.

I know that you disagree with that . . .

JUDGE SPAETH: No.

REP. SCHULER: . . . to some degree. Go ahead. Would you respond, sir.

JUDGE SPAETH: Only to a degree. And as I said to the Chairman, we are not here today to oppose regional selection. We are really, we think of ourselves as engaged in a dialogue with you as to the importance of the issues and of the need for structural change.

Your bench, from Lancaster County, is a distinguished bench. I mean, I, as an appellate judge, I've reviewed decisions from the Lancaster County bench. And the point you make is exactly so because there are, you take a given sort of case, a drunk driving case, a drug possession case, a minor assault case, a Common Pleas judge from Lancaster County will more likely than not handle that case differently than a Common Pleas judge from a large urban county. Not necessarily, but on the average.

Now, the important thing about regionalism on appellate courts is when that decision is reviewed, when the Common Pleas judge's decision is reviewed, it's reviewed by at least three appellate judges, and if in bank, by nine.

What the judges do, of course, is they sit
down and they talk about it. It is very important -- and
Lynn made this point -- it is very important that in those
deliberations on an appellate court that judges of
different backgrounds, of different experiences,
participate because that's where the strength of any
deliberative process comes from. So you
should have a diverse court, an appellate court.
The question is, what is the best way to get
there? And you know that's what you're struggling
with. That's the legislature's job. And if
there is any way in which we can say, have anything,
help to you, we welcome the chance.

I believe on your list of people that are going to testify, you have a representative of the American Judicature Society. She will, I know, give you chapter and verse as to how other merit selection states have handled it, and some do have regional merit selection. This is something that can and should be worked out.

1 REP. SCHULER: I agree with you, Your Honor, in the sense that a Common Pleas Court judge from 2 Lancaster County will have one different frame of reference with respect to a situation, but that's our problem right now, and that's why we're looking at this, 5 because when that case comes from Lancaster County to the appellate courts here in Pennsylvania, 7 we have, as you mentioned, in your remarks . . . 8 JUDGE SPAETH: That is --9 REP. SCHULER: . . . that most of the 10 people who are out of Allegheny or Philadelphia who 11 have a different frame of reference. 12 JUDGE SPAETH: That is the problem. 13 14 REP. SCHULER: And what we are concerned about and even what I have heard from the other members 15 16 is that we are guaranteed that this type of situation did not continue. And I think your testimony, 17 Miss Marks' testimony, and our view, my view, 18 is that we both agree that there should 19 20 be some type of merit as to how we get there. JUDGE SPAETH: That's right. 21 22 REP. SCHULER: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 23 24 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you. Yes, go ahead. 25

MS. MARKS: I just wanted to supplement
Judge Spaeth's response to Representative
Boscola. And I think we share your concern, that
the appellate judiciary is not too removed from
people, from people in your districts. And I
think there is value to judicial hopefuls going
around seeing different people in the state.
From people we have talked to, who although
engaged in that process, they have not thought that
voters could really get a clear sense of who
to vote for, whether they would be a good judge,
from those kinds of discussions.

I think there is value of people going out there that I am not sure that it helps to get an improved judiciary. And don't forget, you are only seeing those candidates who have felt that they have enough either political connections or money, or access to money, to put themselves in that process anyway, so you have a very limited pool.

I think one way, which doesn't have to do with judicial selection, but if you wanted to encourage your constituents to learn more about the judiciary: to participate in the Meet the Judges Program which is sponsored by

the State Conference of Trial Lawyers and League of Women Voters and so forth where judges come out to communities and talk in the communities. And I know at least when Judge Spaeth sat on the Superior Court that they used to go and meet in different places outside of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh and Dauphin County and that's another way that people can learn about their courts.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you very much for coming today and providing us with your insight into these issues.

MS. MARKS: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK:

JUDGE SPAETH: Thank you very much.

The next

individual to testify will be Kathleen M.

Sampson. She is the Director of Hunter Center
for Judicial Selection for the American

Judicature Society. Good morning.

MS. SAMPSON: Good morning. And it is a condition of employment that I couldn't be hired until I could pronounce it correctly and spell it, besides. I am very grateful for the opportunity to appear before the Committee and I thank you for the invitation, you and the Members of the Committee.

Very briefly, I want to tell you that

American Judicature Society was founded in 1913,

as an organization dedicated to improving the

administration of justice. We are national, we

are independent, we are nonprofit and we are the only court

improvement group in the country that includes public

members, nonlawyers as members in our work to improve the

courts.

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My testimony covers much of the ground -- the initial part of my testimony covers much of the ground that Judge Spaeth and Miss Marks talked about. American Judicature is a confirmed supporter of merit selection of judges for the reasons that were articulated by both of the previous speakers. It is the only system that is designed to find people with the qualities that matters, the legal skills, the impartiality, the integrity. It promotes diversity in the courts. It is most suited to the role of the judge, and Judge Spaeth talked about that very eloquently. And it seeks to find the balance between the important need for a judge to be independent in decision making and some accountability to the public through the retention election process.

So I am going to confine my time now to

talking about two things: how other states with merit plans select their appellate judges, because I want you to compare apples and apples; and the other is to give you some comments and thoughts on specific provisions of House Bill 1320 as they compare and contrast with our model merit selection provisions and with what really is going on in the other states.

So on the back page of my testimony is a table that sets out states with plans like those envisioned in HR 1320.

A little bit about terminology. Not every state calls its Supreme Court a Supreme Court so I have gone through the generic term, court of last resort, and they have different names for their intermediate appellate courts so I have just used IAC.

And the quick summary of what you see in this table is that fourteen of these states select their, both levels of their appellate judges statewide. Five of them select both levels of appellate judges regionally. And those five states are Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee.

And four more states have a mix of systems where they elect their Supreme Court justices -- not

elect, select their Supreme Court justices statewide, but they choose their intermediate appellate court judges from districts and divisions. So this is the quick snapshot overview of what other states are doing in this area and you can just plug in what would be going on in Pennsylvania if 1320 were to pass. It would be in the, with the five states that have regional selection.

What I think is interesting, also, is the number of commissions so that you will see that in some of the states where they do have regional selection for both levels of court, they'll only be one nominating commission. As 1320 is structured, you would have three such nominating commissions.

And I should say that American

Judicature doesn't have a policy, we don't have a position on regional selection. As far as we are concerned, 1320 has the basics, which is a limited number of names that go to the Governor, a nominating commission with equal or nearly equal numbers of lawyers and public members and the Governor must appoint from the commission's list. So the basics are there.

These merit plans, as they are implemented in the states, are like snowflakes: they can start with the basics, but as you can see here, just from an analysis on appellate court selection, that there is a great deal of variety out there.

I also thought, even though I didn't know if you would be interested in it, it would be interesting just to dig around and see what the geographic basis for retention would be then. And I know that now you have statewide basis for retention for your appellate courts. So it is interesting to see how that plays out from state to state, where sometimes the Supreme Court is statewide but the intermediate appellate judges are retained from districts. Sometimes both levels of the court are statewide. And in two states, both levels of court are from districts. So there is a lot of comparison and contrast there that you can see where the provisions of 1320 would fit in.

If you don't have any questions about the table, I will go on to other aspects of 1320.

On page six of my testimony, I

compare and contrast the method or who picks the pickers? Which is the big question whenever merit selection is on the agenda. Our model provisions say that usually the attorney members are elected or appointed by the Bar and that the Governor appoints the nonlawyer members. However, there are a handful of states where legislative leaders, sometimes the Attorney General or even the Chief Justice gets involved. This is just another example of that snowflake metaphor that I brought up that the basics are there, but it varies from state to state. There are probably up sides and down sides to any way you choose to deal with that.

I wanted to talk with you about the number of names that would be submitted to the Governor and tell you that, in our model provisions, we recommend a range of two to five names be given to the Governor. And I want to give you an anecdote about Hawaii, where they are required to submit six names for every vacancy. And the nominating commissioners have found that sometimes after the first two or three names, they come fairly easily and then

they wind up having to put people with lower levels of qualifications on the list to make up the six names and so they have gone to their state legislature and gotten a constitutional amendment to allow the nominating commission to submit up to six names. And I just wanted to raise that for you to think about.

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I understand that in the interest of diversity, the larger the list that goes up, the better. But you are also balancing that with quality. And that's supposed to be one of the primary concerns about a merit plan, is that only the people with the best qualifications get nominated. And I think offering a range would allow the commission the discretion to deal with that.

Your Bill 1320 also says that the nominating commissions will have the authority to develop their own rules of procedure and that is also in our model provisions. And I just wanted to point out to you that the two states most like what is proposed in 1320, which are Florida and Nebraska on the table, they have uniform rules for all of those commissions. And the purpose of that is so that all the commissions across the state are operating with the same procedures, these rules are made

public, they are given to applicants for judgeships and it is to give the public a sense that what's going on in the western district is the same thing that is happening in the central and the eastern district of the state so that the rules are uniform and that they're open to the public and they can be discussed.

Another point where our model provisions are silent but where this bill diverts a little bit from common practice is in the length of the initial term for judges. Under 1320, judges appointed would serve a full term of 10 years. And as you will see in my testimony, there are a number of states that also do that. In most of the states, judges serve a two- or a three-year term before they go before the public in a retention election.

There is another point I offered for your consideration that is not in House Bill 1320 that you might want to consider if it goes forward and that is that every state that has a merit plan, has somewhere in their constitution or statute, a requirement that the nominating commissioners themselves may not apply for judgeships during their term of service. And also, usually there is a cooling off period of one to three years after the commissioner leaves

the service.

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And I was thinking that with regional commissions and with a possible total of eight years as a commissioner and then if you put in a cooling off period, that's a very long time and you may want to think of one six-year term. You know, you have to think about what's going to work in your state, but you want to always be sure that you have a good pool of lawyers who will be available to apply for appointment and so if someone was thinking of possible eight years on the commission with two years cooling off period before they could apply for a judgeship, that's 10 years. And you might find that attorneys may not be willing to commit for 10 years like that. They'll resign from the commission, you will have turnover issues to deal with and so on.

So I guess I am raising two things for you. You might want to think of one six-year term and then put in a provision that the commissioners cannot apply for judgeships. I think it would really undermine the credibility of the system if the public saw this, saw service on a commission as an inside track to getting a judgeship.

there, it is in the commission's procedural rules, is that the names that go to the Governor are submitted in alphabetical order. Once the commission has determined that the people that they are recommending are the best qualified people for the position, their role is finished. And I think to send the list in preferential order goes outside the bounds of what the true role of the commission is. Then it is the Governor's responsibility and the Senate's responsibility to confirm. So I would suggest that to you for your consideration.

Another rule that often shows up in

I think those are the main points. I didn't want to sit here and read my testimony at you.

As I said, the bill very much conforms to our model provisions. I am going to leave a copy of those model provisions with Karen Dalton, in case you are interested in them. I also am going to leave a more complete table that sets out the procedures in all the states that have merit plans, what levels of court are covered, who picks the commissioners, how many days they

have to do their work. And I think your 60-day period, in 1320, is adequate. I have done training for nominating commissioners in some states where they have only 30 days and they feel that isn't enough time to check all the references, do all the background checks, conduct thorough interviews with applicants. So 60 days is a good time for them to do that.

So I thank you for giving me this opportunity and I am hoping you will have lots of questions and that I can also answer them.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you very much. Are there any questions from the Committee Members? Representative Piccola.

mentioned it, but I didn't catch it, on the issue of merit retention or retention election, the states that have regional merit selection, how do they handle -- if they handle at all -- the retention issue? Are they retained with only by a vote within that district, or do they retain statewide?

MS. SAMPSON: It varies.

CHAIRMAN PICCOLA: Or both?

MS. SAMPSON: It varies. All of the

above. It is in the last column. I am sorry,

it says geographic basis for retention.

Appellate Courts are statewide courts and I have heard a lot of -- or I heard Judge Spaeth and Miss Marks making those points this morning. And many of the states do require, even if they initially select from districts, they stay with statewide retention. And I am thinking back to the importance of judicial independence and that judges shouldn't be responsive to a constituency and I would see statewide retention as a safeguard of judicial independence.

Just checking over my homework here myself, yeah, they select from districts and then they retain statewide. So I would -- You are trying to balance independence and accountability here, but I think coming down, statewide retention comes down more on the retention side.

CHAIRMAN PICCOLA: I believe the Prime

Sponsor's wisdom in drafting this bill provided for statewide retention.

MS. SAMPSON: I couldn't find any in 1320. Maybe it is --

CHAIRMAN PICCOLA: It is my understanding in talking to staff that there are statewide retention

elections.

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Okay, okay. You know, MS. SAMPSON: another mechanism that is being developed in the merit planned states now, is four of them, five of them now have plans where they have another commission of lawyers and nonlawyers that evaluate judges who are standing for retention and makes information available to the voters. And the standards for retention are linked with the standards for selection: legal ability; integrity; temperament, which often won't show up until the judge is on the bench, is this judge courteous to the litigants and witnesses in the courtroom and so on. And then these groups are making either a recommendation to the voter: retain or do not retain. Or Arizona, for example, says, this judge meets, exceeds or fails to meet performance standards. So this is another way of addressing some of the representatives' concerns about how do voters know what is going on in retention elections.

Alaska has had up to 20 years' experience with this. Arizona just did their first program last fall. But we see it, along with requiring diversity on a nominating commission, as two major

1	trends in merit planned states now.
2	CHAIRMAN PICCOLA: Thank you.
3	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
4	MS. SAMPSON: I told you more than you
5	asked, but it is an important point, I think.
6	CHAIRMAN CLARK: When, on your
7	graph in the back for like the State of Indiana in
8	the last column, you have same as initial selection?
9	MS. SAMPSON: Right. So the court of
10	last resort, the Supreme Court, runs for
11	retention statewide, the intermediate appellate
12	court is sort of like the way your Supreme Court
13	selection is structured in 1320, that some
14	intermediate appellate court judges in Indiana
15	are initially selected from districts but two
16	are selected statewide. And I believe 1320 says
17	three justices will be selected from the districts
18	and four statewide? I am pretty sure that's
19	what the bill says.
20	CHAIRMAN CLARK: That wasn't my
21	understanding.
22	MS. SAMPSON: Okay, I may have misread
23	it.
24	CHAIRMAN CLARK: But when you
25	say same as initial, do you mean they are

retained by election or they are retained by --1 MS. SAMPSON: If they are retained by and -- Oh, I am sorry, I didn't realize that 3 would be ambiguous. It means that they run in uncontested retention elections where the voter votes yes or no on whether the judge should be retained. CHAIRMAN CLARK: So in three of those, they would run just in their geographic districts? 9 MS. SAMPSON: Correct. 10 CHAIRMAN CLARK: The other ones would run for the retention seat? 11 MS. SAMPSON: Correct. 12 13 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Are there any additional questions? 14 Representative Schuler. 15 16 REP. SCHULER: Thank you. The only question I have, in our proposal, or I should 17 say Clark's proposal, twelve individuals would be 18 appointed to these commissions. In your 19 experience of states that have this type 20 21 of arrangement, what's the relationship between these individuals and the constituency 22 23 of the region? Is there any communication between 24 them or are they isolated or . . . ?

MS. SAMPSON: Well, most of the

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commissions for appellate courts are statewide. Florida and Nebraska are the states that have the regional nominating commissions for their appellate judges. I would hope that they would at least make public, as 1320 does, make public the names of those who have applied so if constituents in that district want to comment on the applicants or provide information to the commission, that they would be able to do that.

I would also hope that when the commission writes its procedural rules, it would put in an ethics requirement that if a commissioner receives such a communication from a member in the district, that he or she would share that information with the full commission. You know, so that there aren't any side conversations going on.

REP. SCHULER: So you don't advocate the communication between the residents of a district with the commission?

MS. SAMPSON: I think the commission should be seeking all the information that it can get on the applicants.

REP. SCHULER: Okay.

MS. SAMPSON: I think it would address

the concern, if people are going to lose their right to vote for judges, to feel that they are part of this process and could have a voice in it. I would be real concerned about organized lobbying, you know, for or against, like I don't like this person.

REP. SCHULER: That is a very, it could be a very good possibility, that that could happen, is that correct?

MS. SAMPSON: Yes.

REP. SCHULER: In those states that have the regional, I think you mentioned Florida?

MS. SAMPSON: Florida and Nebraska.

REP. SCHULER: How do they handle that,

do you know offhand?

MS. SAMPSON: In their procedural rules, they have a requirement that the commissioners have to disclose communications from people outside the nominating commission and they have to share the substance of those communications with the other commissioners. I don't know of any particular rules about lobbying activities.

People are going to do what they want to do. But the commission is the one that eventually

develops the most coherent and complete body of information about the applicant. And here, I do training for these commissioners and they do Department of Law Enforcement checks and so on.

REP. SCHULER: Then the issue I think was raised by the other folks who gave testimony, do we want uniform rules or regional rules for these groups? I think that is an issue here.

MS. SAMPSON: Um-hum, yeah.

REP. SCHULER: If you are going to allow one nominating committee to run by this set of rules and another that would allow lobbies and another group that didn't allow, you could have some problems.

MS. SAMPSON: I don't think you are going to control lobbying. I think people are going to want to influence the process.

REP. SCHULER: Sure.

MS. SAMPSON: So I think that would be an argument for uniform rules.

REP. SCHULER: That's what I am looking at here.

MS. SAMPSON: Yeah, that it includes

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1	REP. SCHULER: All right.
2	MS. SAMPSON: that includes
3	saying that if but sometimes lobbying isn't a
4	big organized effort, it could be one person
5	REP. SCHULER: That's true.
6	MS. SAMPSON: calling a commissioner
7	whom he or she knows. And I think the
8	commissioners, through the integrity of the
9	process, the commissioner has to disclose the
10	substance of that conversation.
11	REP. SCHULER: That's true. All right.
12	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
13	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you.
14	Representative Manderino.
15	REP. MANDERINO: Thank you, Mr.
16	Chairman.
17	Finishing off where Representative
18	Schuler just asked about the rules, if I heard
19	your testimony correctly, at least I was coming
20	away with the message of, if you have regional
21	selection panels, I would recommend uniform
22	rules. If you have one statewide selection
23	panel, then it makes more sense because the
24	rules will still be uniform.

MS. SAMPSON: Right, exactly.

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REP. MANDERINO: I mean, to leave kind of rule making up to the discretion of the pact.

MS. SAMPSON: Yes.

REP. MANDERINO: But in either case, it should be public.

MS. SAMPSON: Yes.

REP. MANDERINO: Okay. The other thing that I found interesting that you said is that most of the states, and maybe you even said all of the states, I don't know, but no one on a first retention election has as long a period as we were proposing which was 10 years?

MS. SAMPSON: No, not normally.

REP. MANDERINO: Okay.

MS. SAMPSON: I forget where this is in my testimony. Page eight, initial term of office for appointed judges, our model provisions are silent on this. We don't say it should be a certain number of years. I am describing for you that in most states the initial term is two or three years and then I list five states or six states where they get full terms on their initial term of office. It is part of that snowflake analysis.

REP. MANDERINO: But those that have maybe

a shorter term for the initial, for when you are first appointed, then once retention, if a judge is young enough and interested enough that they make it to a second retention. After the first retention they are usually, whatever the typical span is, if it is 10 years; or, if the state, is typically eight years?

MS. SAMPSON: Exactly. It is whatever the state requires.

REP. MANDERINO: Maybe the information that you provided to Miss Dalton will be helpful to them and we will look at it. But the one thing that I am kind of trying to get more information about, I don't necessarily have a problem with, even though my preference on the statewide merit selection component is kind of in activity optimistically, but I am having a problem with the notion of regionalism as proposed somewhat in 1320. My concern is with a feeling of allegiance only to a particular region once on a statewide court.

MS. SAMPSON: Um-hum, um-hum.

REP. MANDERINO: Okay? So I guess that you have two, a couple of different states, examples for us to look at, one where they came on regionally but they are not necessarily, they

1	don't view themselves as just representing that
2	region and they get retained statewide, but you
3	did mention a few where their retention and
4	everything seems to be much smaller.
5	MS. SAMPSON: From a smaller
6	jurisdiction.
7	REP. MANDERINO: confined to their
8	district. Has your Society done any review
9	of how that has worked or has anybody done any
10	review of how that has worked in terms of either
11	the integrity of the bench or the feelings of the
12	constituency of that state in terms of how that
13	works?
14	MS. SAMPSON: No, we have no data on
15	that. No. Are you thinking, too, of, you know,
16	the independence of the judges and so on?
17	REP. MANDERINO: (Nods head
18	affirmatively.)
19	MS. SAMPSON: Yeah. As I said to
20	Representative Piccola, I would think that
21	statewide retention would be a greater safeguard
22	of judicial independence.
23	But can I go back to what you had said
24	about being concerned that if judges are selected

regionally, they might have more of an

allegiance to the region?

REP. MANDERINO: Yes.

MS. SAMPSON: If I said that correctly?

I don't want to mistate what you have said.

REP. MANDERINO: Well, one of the provisions in 1320 -- And let me clarify my understanding of 1320 just so that you know what was being proposed with regard to it. My understanding of what's being proposed in 1320 with regard to our court of last resort or our Supreme Court was: we will have a statewide court and we won't necessarily appoint judges based on region, but we will guarantee that there is at least one judge from each of the three regions.

MS. SAMPSON: On the Supreme Court.

REP. MANDERINO: Yeah. So that if the vacancy occurs and the vacancy occurred in the middle region and the only judge that had been from the middle region is the one who vacated, left the bench ...

MS. SAMPSON: Right.

REP. MANDERINO: ... then kind of that spot would be guaranteed to the middle region.

MS. SAMPSON: Right. That's what -REP. MANDERINO: But the vacancy occurred

1	and there is already at least one member on the bench
2	from each region
3	Ms. SAMPSON: Um-hum.
4	REP. MANDERINO: then it didn't
5	matter which region the appointment came from.
6	MS. SAMPSON: Right.
7	REP. MANDERINO: It was kind of a
8	notion, so there was a guarantee of at least the
9	the diversity of one judge on that.
ro	MS. SAMPSON: Right, from each of the
11	three regions.
12	REP. MANDERINO: From each of the three
13	regions, but not a guaranteed provision.
1.4	However, 1320, this is the part, 1320, when it
15	gets to our appellate intermediate level court
16	was kind of more of a quid pro quo: three from here,
17	three from here, three from here.
18	MS. SAMPSON: Right. Or five, five,
19	and five, whatever.
20	REP. MANDERINO: Right. And I guess that's
21	where I have the concern that these five judges
22	are going to stay
23	MS. SAMPSON: On the intermediate
24	level.
25	REP. MANDERINO: on this way, and these

five judges are going to say this is my 1 2 constituency and these five judges are going to say that this is my constituency and that was 3 what I was trying to see what are other states doing and how does that effect? MS. SAMPSON: I have a question before I get into that. Do those intermediate 7 appellate -- and this is what I don't know about Pennsylvania -- do those intermediate appellate 9 court judges decide cases that come from the 10 trial courts only in those regions or it's a 11 statewide court? 12 REP. MANDERINO: It is a statewide 13 court. 14 15 MS. SAMPSON: And so they would be 16 hearing -- I was listening to Judge Spaeth earlier, saying judges hear these appeals in 17 panels or en banc? 18 19 JUDGE SPAETH: Panels, usually. 20 MS. SAMPSON: Panels usually. If those 21 panels were diverse ... 22 REP. MANDERINO: Were diverse. 23 MS. SAMPSON: ... I would see that it would bring multiple perspectives to that group 24 25 decision making process.

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1	REP. MANDERINO: But the thing you
2	would want to guard against
3	MS. SAMPSON: I don't know if the law
4	requires that the panels be diverse? I don't
5	know that or if it is just not.
6	REP. MANDERINO: Now they are not, but
7	now we don't do it that way either. But I guess
8	what you are saying is, if you did it that way,
9	then you would want to consider building in a
10	safeguard that you had diversity on the panel
11	as compared to a uniform panel?
12	MS. SAMPSON: I think I don't know
13	enough to tell you that.
14	REP. MANDERINO: Okay. Maybe I think you
15	told me this
16	MS. SAMPSON: I think that needs to be
17	something locally determined, because I don't
18	know enough and I don't want to get outside of
19	my area of what I do know.
20	REP. MANDERINO: Is that the kind of
21	information that you have given to Mrs. Dalton that in
22	looking at other states that might have these regional
23	aspects if it is detailed enough to show that?
24	MS. SAMPSON: No, it doesn't show that.
25	I have some reference books back at the office,

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1	though, and I can go and check some of those and
2	of it is not there, maybe I can find some people
3	who do know and let Karen Dalton know that. But I
4	better write it down so I don't forget.
5	REP. MANDERINO: She is rolling her
6	eyes about that Yes, you can send them directly to
7	me, too. Karen said, she had referred to having sent you
8	the information. That's all. Thank you.
9	MS. SAMPSON: So the question is, do
10	states require regional diversity appellate
11	panels?
12	REP. MANDERINO: So those that have
13	regional selection to their selection process.
14	MS. SAMPSON: Okay. I will see what I
15	can find out for you.
16	REP. MANDERINO: Thank you.
17	CHAIRMAN CLARK: And we thank
18	you.
19	MS. SAMPSON: Okay. Thank you. And I
20	am available as a resource to all of you as this
21	issue develops and if specific questions or
22	concerns come up, I hope you will call on us.
23	Thank you.
24	CHAIRMAN CLARK: The next

individual to testify before the Committee is

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Miss Peirce with the League of Women Voters.

MS. PEIRCE: Good morning. I am here today on behalf of the League of Women Voters and our 51 Chapters throughout the state. We are happy to present, once again, our position on how best to select justices and judges for our Appellate Courts.

The League of Women Voters
is 75 years old this year. In fact, it came
into being in August of 1920. The actual date
was the 26th, last Saturday, when the 19th
Amendment became law and the Suffragist
League changed its name to reflect its new
mission. One of the first items on the
agenda of the Pennsylvania League was to call
for a constitutional convention. It was a long
time coming (48 years), but when it was finally
held -- and when it resulted in an amendment
calling for merit selection of judges being
placed on the ballot -- League members were out in
force around the state urging a yes vote.

As you know, that amendment failed by a narrow margin. But the League is very persistent. It is our hope that a merit selection amendment will be on the ballot again

in 1997, almost 30 years after that first time.

Since those early days, we've presented testimony many, many times and our message has not varied much. We endorsed the findings of the Beck Commission and the Pomeroy Commission before it, and we continue to believe that gubernatorial appointment from a list of nominees submitted by a representative commission and followed by Senate confirmation is the best way to elect appellate court justices and judges.

Rather than repeat all our earlier statements, I have enclosed with this testimony a League position paper entitled, Where We Stand On Judicial Selection. This summarizes our reasons for believing that merit appointment would be much better for Pennsylvania than the present system of partisan election, with all its inherent problems.

The recent examples of the corrupting effects of massive fund raising for state and national election campaigns only serve to highlight the need for judges -- whose only obligation must be to the law and the Constitution -- to be freed from the necessity of raising large amounts of money, often from parties who may have a stake in the outcome of court decisions.

It is very important to know that merit selection is under serious consideration, and we are happy to contribute our comments on House Bill 1320, which seeks to ensure diversity on the appellate courts by dividing the state into three regions, with a Judicial Nominating Commission for each region.

certainly diversity is desirable and important in the makeup of our statewide courts, and geographical diversity -- or the lack of it -- is one aspect that is most recognizable to voters.

Judicial candidates are the only statewide candidates whose county of origin is listed on the ballot, and almost everyone knows that all the sitting Supreme Court justices come from Philadelphia or Allegheny County.

They are all men, also, and only one is African American. Obviously, diversity means much more than what part of the state a justice or judge comes from. House Bill 1320 addresses diversity in all its particulars, both in the makeup of the nominating commissions and in the standards for judicial selection. But in calling for three districts and three commissions, it seems to stress geographical diversity above all else.

that all three districts are approximately equal in population, but what about the distribution of the lawyer population? Surely there are highly qualified people all over the state that a diligent nominating commission would seek out, but it may be that stressing geographical diversity could make it more difficult, at the time a vacancy occurs, to ensure that nominees are the best available among both men and women and those who come from racially and ethnically diverse backgrounds.

A hypothetical case might be that of a lawyer with outstanding credentials, experience and reputation who comes from a rural county and could bring a new perspective to the court, but whose name cannot even come up at the time of the vacancy because she or he lives just outside the district line. Trying to match exactly the racial and gender makeup of the courts to that of the general population would be described -- and decried -- as a quota system. Are geographical quotas that different?

The League also questions the need for separate commissions, as called for in the bill.

It takes time for any commission or board to meld into an effective working group, and we would suggest that setting up three -- and having one or more remain idle for long periods -- is somewhat inefficient. It seems possible that staggered terms might result in having someone go off a commission before ever participating in a search for proposed nominees. A single commission, meeting periodically, could be aware of upcoming vacancies on the courts and cover the whole state in its search for the best candidates. The bill's requirements for diversity of the members could apply to one commission as well as to three.

The details of merit appointment systems vary among the many states that choose their judges, and few of them do select by districts.

I called Kathy Sampson the other day, as do I quite often when I have a question about the courts. I'm a member of the Judicature Society, anybody can join, it's a great organization, and I was delighted that you had invited her to testify and give information on those other states.

We are very encouraged by your interest in improving the way judges are chosen. We congratulate the Committee for seeking input from so many sources. It is our hope that all our comments and suggestions will aid you in your search for a judicial selection system that will make Pennsylvania's appellate courts the best in the country.

I would say along with Judge Spaeth and Lynn Marks that the League does not oppose House Bill 1320. We prefer the regular system that we have described so often with one nominating commission and statewide search for candidates, but it is more the particulars that we would disagree with.

I'd like to add just a few words
about the fall elections. Because Pennsylvania
still does have partisan election for all its
judges, because we believe that one of the
principal flaws in that system is that it's
extremely difficult for voters to learn anything
about the candidates, because the League's mission
is to promote the informed participation of citizens
in government, we're pleased to announce that the
League is sponsoring three forums for Supreme Court
candidates to be held on October 8th, in Philadelphia,

October 21st in Pittsburgh, and October 27th in the
Lancaster/Harrisburg area. All three will be televised
statewide. See your local listings for the exact broadcast times. Thank you very much.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you.

MS. PEIRCE: As I said, I have attached a position paper relating to this.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Yes, that is attached. Thank you very much.

Any questions of Ms. Peirce?
Representative Boscola.

REP. BOSCOLA: I am a member of the Bethlehem League of Women Voters, have been for several, many years, even served on the Board of League of Women Voters, and my part there had a lot to do with the voters guide, which I know that you are well aware of, that helps inform the electorate of candidates in a way that is not partisan.

MS. PEIRCE: Right.

REP. BOSCOLA: Which is really appreciated by the people in my district. You know it. See, as a member of this, I am not too thrilled about merit selection. Even though I'm a proud member of the League disciplinary, that I might differ with them a little bit. And let me ask you a couple of questions

based on some of your testimony.

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I note here you said that these judges need to be freed from the necessity of raising large amounts of money, often from parties who have a high stake in the outcome of court decisions. And, yes, people will contribute to campaign organizations. But now you take, you turn around, thinking now, how do you gain access to the commission or to the Governor or to the Senate who confirms? Because somewhere along the line, politics is still going to play a part and instead of going to the people directly for money or individual contributions or organizations, the judicial candidates will now be seeking access through going to the commission or the Governor, who makes the appointment, or the Senate. And I'm sure you are going to see monetary contributions from attorneys who are seeking that in that form so we are still going to deal with the monetary issue.

MS. PEIRCE: I don't understand. What are they raising money for?

REP. BOSCOLA: Because they are buying access, they are buying access into the system because the want to be part of that nominating candidate slate.

You know what I'm saying? It happens, I mean,

I'm only being realistic here.

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MS. PEIRCE: Okay.

REP. BOSCOLA: And what I'm concerned about is now we have candidates that don't necessarily -- and there are some that are running this fall -- that might not have a lot of money, but they have the ability to raise money because people believe in them. Because they went into organizations and talked about who they are, their qualifications, and other organizations in which the individuals particularly believed in them, and they contribute to them.

I met some of our candidates that are running for he appellate court through business organizations, labor organizations and some political organizations.

Do you know I had to play volleyball with a couple of members of the appellate, that are running. And when would a normal person be able to play volleyball with their judges based on merit? This is what happens when you are forced to go out and meet the people.

And that's not just me. There were other members that were just, you know, working nine to five jobs and they were able to talk to these judicial candidates and find out who they are as a person.

Because I believe when people vote for somebody, they

want to know that they're honest, they want to know that they care about you and what their background is and can they relate to that, that background that, hey, I am working for a living like you did and see how --

And what I am afraid of, you might say, well, you shouldn't be voting for a judge because you played volleyball with him. I'm not saying that.

I'm saying that I guess we get to meet these udges and you get to talk to them, you get to understand ho they are.

I would rather see a judge in different parts in the state going to a dinner to play volleyball with people rather than going on the golf course with the Governor or several members of the Senate.

And you can address this, but I want to talk about another point. You said that diversity on the court is what is really important, and I agree with you, but if the people in this state really want diversity, then it's up to them to vote for it. And in my opinion we have had -- Even in the legislature, you know, we don't have much diversity in the legislature but the people elect us and they're the ones that they really believe that we should have diversity in the legislature to vote for

that. And the same with the court, we have had female candidates running for election and have been defeated.

I don't want any commission saying, well, now we should have an African American on the court and I believe we should have a woman on the court, because then we get away from the best qualified candidate again.

Lastly, I would like to say that I really appreciate all your efforts to make up the voters guide, because there is a newspaper -- well, it's a piece of literature that is sent out to the public to let them know what the qualifications are of judicial candidates. And I applaud you for that.

I still think and I would like to address this issue, as to whether it is merit selection or public election. The fact of the matter is you have inappropriate behavior by judges and we have not figured out how to handle that. And until we investigate and discipline our judges, to me, that is the key to judicial reform.

MS. PEIRCE: Well, we did change the judicial system, discipline system a couple years ago. I would assume it's working better now. It hasn't be in effect for very long. I think that was

a significant reform.

I don't know exactly how better people can find out about judges, proposed judges. It seems to me that I believe that with most plans for merit selection, when the commission has decided on its nominees, those names become public and people can find out about them and they can have input to their Senators or to the Governor or whatever they want to do.

It is very difficult, as you said, for any ordinary people to get to know people who are proposed judges, whether they're nominated or you know in the electoral process or by a commission. And I don't think, I certainly don't think that the people have a real choice in candidates in the partisan system now. Judge Spaeth addressed that. And we have seen the process that the parties go through when they decide who their candidates for the primaries are going to be, and there is not a lot of input from the voting public in that process.

REP. BOSCOLA: Well, I asked two of the individuals running for appellate court now, what did they think about merit selection and did they think they would have the opportunity under merit selection that they have now

going through public elections? And they said, no, they feel that money would be the influential factor in merit selection, they probably wouldn't have the opportunity because they personally don't have a lot of money and that through a merit selection, it's easier to buy access.

MS. PEIRCE: I am not sure I know how they would do that. Assuming that the people that are on the nominating commissions are honest people, they are to be chosen in a model system by both minority and majority leaders of the General Assembly and the Governor appoints.

REP. BOSCOLA: All the people the Governor appoints, the Senate confirms.

MS. PEIRCE: Now I'm talking about the commission, the people that search for them.

REP. BOSCOLA: But in the political appointment, if the Governor wants a certain candidate, you know that he's going to be in that pool of names that are submitted to him and that's political reality.

MS. PEIRCE: It's probably true, you cannot take the politics out of the system. Even if all you took out was the large amounts of money, though, I think that would be a significant improvement.

1 REP. BOSCOLA: Thank you.

MS. PEIRCE: Okay.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Any additional questions?

Thank you very much for your testimony.

MS. PEIRCE: Okay.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: The next individual to testify and the last individual of the morning is Clifford E. Haines, Vice Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association, and he's along with Lawrence J. Beaser, Esq., also with the Philadelphia Bar Association.

Good morning, Mr. Haines.

MR. HAINES: Good morning. You've already introduced me by name so I won't repeat that. I am a partner with the Philadelphia law firm of Litvin, Blumberg, Matusow & Young. With me today is the past-Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association, Lawrence J. Beaser, who is with Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley.

As has been suggested, I am the Vice Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association, which means I have got three more years to come up here and talk to you. And I hope that when I am Chancellor in 1997, I will be here and welcomed by all of you who will be returning, I am sure, at that time.

I am pleased to be here today and I am bringing greetings not only from the 13,500 members of the Philadelphia Bar Association but my family on Long Beach Island, who tell me that the weather continues to be as beautiful as it has been, and hopefully it will be about four o'clock this afternoon if I am lucky enough to get back that fast.

This hearing is specifically intended to focus on House Bill 1320, which provides for the merit selection of appellate judges on a regional basis. Because the Bar Association's Board of Governors has not yet considered the regional component of Representative Clark's proposal, I must necessarily confine my remarks to the merit selection component of House Bill 1320.

The Philadelphia Bar Association has supported the concept of choosing judges based on merit for many years. We firmly believe that merit selection of appellate judges will give the people of Pennsylvania a more distinguished, more independent, more representative appellate bench. Pennsylvanians deserve the very best the legal profession has to offer, and we are confident that can be accomplished only if we abolish the political election of judges in favor of some form of merit selection.

Our Association's support for merit selection

predates the events of recent years surrounding our Supreme Court and is one issue in which the majority of our members have agreed for many years. When we surveyed our membership in 1984, 94% of our members wanted the Association to speak out in favor of merit selection of judges. When we surveyed our members again in 1990, merit selection topped the list, again with more than 90% of our members identifying merit selection as an issue of primary importance to them. Early returns from our 1995 membership survey again indicate that merit selection leads the list of issues of concerns to our members.

Most of our reasons for supporting a change from the popular election of judges to a merit-based selection system stem from limitations which are inherent in the elective process itself.

To win election to the bench, a successful judicial candidate need not necessarily convince voters that he or she will be a good judge; instead, aspiring candidates for statewide judicial office must persuade political party leaders that he or she should be a candidate. With all due respect to the individuals involved, newspaper accounts of meetings in which party endorsements of Supreme and Superior Court candidates were made during the current election cycle illustrate how highly politicized our present system is

and, more significantly, how little consideration is given to the qualifications of candidates for the positions they seek.

That is not surprising -- after all, political parties are in the business of being political. It is therefore both inevitable and extremely unfortunate that political concerns will continue to be prioritized over merit unless you, and your colleagues, begin the slow process of reform by passing a merit selection constitutional amendment.

Having received the necessary party endorsements, a judicial candidate then faces an even more formidable task under our present system. In 1988, the Report of the Governor's Judicial Reform Commission, what we now refer to as the Beck Report, reported that in 1983, the successful candidate for Supreme Court raised campaign funds totaling almost a hundred and ninety-three thousand dollars. Six years later, in 1989, the amount raised by the successful candidate had risen to more than \$1.4 million, more than half of which was contributed by members of the legal profession. Final figures are obviously not available for the spending in this year's Supreme Court races, but we can safely guess that the numbers will be high and that members of the Bar will again represent a significant percentage of contributors.

Fund raising by judicial candidates raises troubling issues which are qualitatively different from those raised by candidates for other elective office. Candidates for nonjudicial offices are able to garner financial support from those who believe in their stated positions and idealogy.

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But when they engage in fund raising, judicial candidates by necessity seek out their natural constituency: the members of the bar. Paradoxically, the Judicial Canons which establish the judicial rule of governing judges appear to be at odds with the notion of campaigning for judicial office and fund raising, particularly among lawyers. And as the pressures to run a well-funded campaign continue to escalate over the years, so will the temptation to cut ethical corners.

Each of you as an elected member of the General Assembly owes some measure of success to the elective process. You or your colleagues might easily find a certain superficial appeal to the notion that if partisan elections for the legislature and executive branches serve the best interest of the public and the Commonwealth, then there is nothing wrong with similarly electing members of the judicial branch. But this argument ignores the fundamental, qualitative differences between the legislative and judicial function. As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1835,

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quote, "The power vested in the American courts of justice
. . . forms one of the most powerful barriers which has ever
been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies.
Thus, it is uniquely the role of the courts to exercise a
counter-majoritarian force when necessary, so as to protect
the rights of the minority from the will of the majority.

John Marshall once said that the judiciary comes home in its effects to every man's fireside: it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all. Is it not, to the last degree important, that he (the judge) should be rendered perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or control him but God and his conscience?

continue to rule Today, iudaes on issues which come home with us, rules which affect how we live, where our children go to school, the people with whom we associate in our personal and professional dealings, and a myriad of other issues that are central to the quality of our lives and our society. importance of The protecting judges and judicial candidates from outside influence cannot be over stated. Again, we applaud Representative Clark's effort to remove partisan election and their vast potential for improper influence and misdirection from our judicial selection process.

These are only some of the reasons why the

Philadelphia Bar Association initially took a stand in favor of merit selection of judges, while we strongly endorsed the recommendations of the Beck Commission in 1988 and why we have continued over the years to advocate for a merit selection constitutional amendment. This year, that goal -- at least with regard to appellate judgeships -- may finally be within our grasp.

As any good Philadelphia lawyer knows, it is dangerous to overstate one's case, so I will not tell you that merit selection is a perfect system, nor will I tell you that a change to a merit-based selection system of choosing appellate judges will remove politics from the process. After all, as Dan Rottenberg wrote in The Philadelphia Inquirer in 1993, merit selection will not remove fallible humans from judicial selection and delegate the task instead to computers assessing objective scientific standards.

However, if our objective is to provide the people of Pennsylvania with the best and most representative appellate bench possible, merit selection is a vast improvement over the elective system. As evidence of the superiority of merit selection over elective systems, since 1950 every state that has changed the way it selects judges for statewide positions has moved away from the highly politicized election systems -- all but one changed to a

merit selection. Georgia, the exception, changed from a system of partisan elections to nonpartisan elections.

Opponents of merit selection frequently point to the federal system of judicial selection has an example of a merit selection system, and argue that we here in Pennsylvania do not need that kind of system. Certainly the federal system can be justly criticized as highly political and the federal judicial selection process often may have little to do with true merit. But the proposals we support provide for true merit selection, rather than the political appointment of judges which often occurs under the federal system.

Many people have expressed concern that an ideological litmus test has been applied under the federal selection system from time to time. Unlike the federal system, the merit selection proposal before you does not readily allow for a litmus test on any particular issue as a prerequisite for recommendation by the nominating body.

There are those who fear that merit selection is a scheme propounded by the old boys network to keep women and minority lawyers off the bench. The experiences of other jurisdictions demonstrates that the contrary is true.

According to statistics compiled by the American

Judicature Society in July 1991, 17 of the 50 African

American jurists serving on state appellate courts were

initially chosen by merit selection, as compared to 9% who first reached the bench through partisan election. The remaining African American judges were initially chosen by either gubernatorial or legislative appointments without a nominating commission, or through nonpartisan elections.

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For women jurists, forty-five of the one-hundred and thirty-one serving on state courts of last resort and intermediate appellate courts were initially chosen by merit selection as compared to thirty-three who first reached the bench through partisan elections. The remaining women judges were initially chosen through their gubernatorial or legislative appointment without a nominating commission or through nonpartisan elections.

In short, merit-based selection systems have resulted in more minority and women judges serving on appellate courts than have elections.

There are those who are concerned that, under a merit selection system, the people will lose their voice in the selection process. It is true that citizens will no longer vote directly for candidates for our appellate courts under these proposals. But until the public has had a chance to decide for itself by referendum whether to adopt a merit-based selection system, any argument against merit selection on this basis is no more than populist rhetoric.

In conclusion the Philadelphia Bar Association wholeheartedly endorses merit selection of appellate judges. We hope you will let the people of Pennsylvania decide whether to continue as we have with the current system, or whether we, too, like so many other states, are willing to take the positive steps needed to effect real change and real reform.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here today and to be heard in support of merit selection in Pennsylvania. If you have any questions for us now, we would be happy to address them. We are grateful for your attention and look forward to working together with you in the future on this very important issue.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you very much for your testimony. I understand that you have not considered the regional component of this bill yet, and perhaps you weren't here for the opening hour of the hearing, but maybe as you leave, why, Mr. Beaser will fill you in on the realities of geographic selection and the necessity that that be part of a merit selection process as far as the many members of the legislature are concerned.

MR. HAINES: Well, the remarks that I made were obviously on behalf of my association. And as I suggested, the association has not yet considered that component of it. But it is a subject that is likely to come up this

 fall. And if invited, I may well be back with a position on that aspect of your proposal, Representative.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you.

Representative Chadwick.

REP. CHADWICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Haines, thank you for coming.

MR. HAINES: My pleasure.

REP. CHADWICK: I agree with your belief that we should get away from the highly politicized system of selecting appellate judges that we have here in Pennsylvania. Most of the proposals that I have seen provide that those who would pick the pickers, many of those who come from the leadership of General Assembly: Speaker of the House, the House Minority Leader, President Pro-Temp, The Senate Senate Minority leader. My concern is that if those individuals have tremendous amount of influence in picking the pickers, that we will not have, in fact, gotten away from a highly politicized system of selecting appellate judges. And I wonder if you have a position on whether or not those who pick the pickers should come from organizations like the Bar Association as opposed to leadership of the General Assembly.

MR. HAINES: Well, I know there have been a variety of proposals that have been on the floor over the years and a variety of different components of people who

are involved in the selection process, that is, picking the pickers. I think it is inevitably impossible to eliminate a political component to the selection process.

I got here in a car, but I got to my position by political process of sorts within the Bar Association. Hardly the kind of political process that you all went through. But I think that people who are going to speak out on issues and take positions on issues, are going to get there by some form of political process.

We have to start somewhere, though, to ensure that at least people are taking into consideration the judicial qualities and the merits of the individual who wants to be in the position of being a judge, to be a judge, which happens to be very unique and, in my view, very different. It is one thing to have a law degree, it is one thing to go in a courtroom and argue on behalf your constituent or on behalf your client. It is a very different thing to be a judge. And I think that those of us who spend our time in courtrooms trying cases come to understand the very important aspect of the quality of judicial temperament.

And with all due respect to the voters,

I am concerned that they don't even know who they are
voting for, let alone whether they have the necessary
qualities to be a judge.

MR. BEASER: If I can amplify for a moment first on what Mr. Haines just said that the nature of who a judge is and what a judge does? When you go into a courtroom, when what the client wants is not necessarily, with great respect somebody who they played volleyball with but somebody who is going to decide the message on the case and the law and what the facts are and be bright and have a good judicial temperament and bring to bear knowledge, and particularly at the appellate level where you don't have the trial, bring to bear what the law should be and what the law is and to look at the cases and to make a decision based on neutral principles, the concern that I have had about the present system is that's exactly not what we have and not what the system leads to.

In terms of your specific question about who picks the pickers, getting back to what Representative Clark said, that there is some reality here in the system: I am not in favor and I don't think the Philadelphia Bar has ever been in favor over the last 12, 15 years that I have been involved in having the Bar Association involved in being the picker. I don't think that's -- private associations don't do government work.

The issue in terms of who chooses, there are a wide variety around the country. I think the proposals that have come up today about having the choice would be by

the leaders and the Governor reflects the reality of the way commissions have been set up in this state for the last 25, 30 years, in terms of a sharing of power. I am not, as you are, convinced that is necessarily the best way, but in terms of reality, that may be the only way that it has a chance of getting through.

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There is always a major concern with who picks the pickers. What I urge to you focus on, as well, is the present system that in our view needs to be eliminated, the system where money talks, where chance rules the who gets elected, where voters don't know who they are voting for and where decisions at the ballot box are made on the basis of people's last names and where they don't live, and where the perception of undue influence runs rife through the system. We believe that needs to be changed. And that the system that will come out of this body and the General Assembly will, by necessity, be a compromise, but one that I think is needed in order to change the current system that is a corrupting one and one that -- at the appellate level. We are not talking common pleas. But at the appellate level has left a problem in terms of the perception that there isn't justice, necessarily, being done around the state. We have a lot of good judges and this Philadelphia Bar Association has for years supported our judges. But the best ones are there, despite the

system, and we're here today to urge you to change that system.

REP. CHADWICK: Thank you. I'll just leave it with the comment that based on my eleven years in Harrisburg, I probably have a little less confidence than you do that we do a good job of picking members of the commission. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Representative Maitland.

REP. MAITLAND: I just have a comment that, I'm very impressed that as members of the Philadelphia Bar Association, you are here offering testimony in support of merit selection which is likely more to be enacted to reduce the number of your members that make it to the state's appellate courts. And while my mind is not made up on this legislation, I think your testimony for what you feel is the good of the state adds a lot of credibility to the legislation and again I thank you.

MR. HAINES: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Representative Boscola.

REP. BOSCOLA: Mr. Haines.

MR. HAINES: Yes, ma'am.

REP. BOSCOLA: I'm concerned about people giving up their right to elect their judges, is not what you call, populist rhetoric. And I think that was very unfair. I am genuinely concerned about the people's rights to select

their judges. It is not based on any contract and I just want to clarify that.

And I want to throw something out at you. You know, I worked in the courthouse as deputy court administrator and I know a lot of attorneys. So when this was coming up, I did get the opportunity to ask them some questions about what they felt about merit selection, being attorneys. And you know, you know what the biggest thing they said to me was? Lisa, I don't favor -- I'm not sure about merit selection, I don't think that it be a politicized system. What I like about it is, I no longer have to contribute to judges.

So, see, I can understand why members of the Bar and individual lawyers would like this, because now they won't have to contribute to these campaigns. That's what is driving this issue with some of the Bar Association.

Finally, Mr. Beaser, I think you missed
my point about the volleyball. The volleyball was just
showing you how, in a statewide election, that the
candidates now come to the people. And this is the genuine
concern I have about merit selection, that you will remove
this from the people. They will never have the chance to
play volleyball or have dinner or even meet their appellate
candidate.

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MR. HAINES: Representative, let me respond to one aspect of what you have suggested. I don't quarrel with your point of view that in Lehigh County, you ought to go elect your judges. And they may be people that you play volleyball with in the school, through schools or churches or synagogues or wherever, and I think that any proposal that would take away from the public in many, many counties, rural counties, where everybody knows everybody, the right to the choose their judges is not the right way to go. But we are not talking about that. We are talking about a statewide election. I think --

REP. BOSCOLA: I played volleyball with a

MR. HAINES: Probably not all of them. But I will tell you that --

REP. BOSCOLA: I am not talking about myself, I am talking about other people, the average

MR. HAINES: I understand that.

REP. BOSCOLA: . . . who would never have the opportunity to meet them except for because the election

MR. HAINES: Let me just use -- I know you all don't like to hear about Philadelphia, but let me use Philadelphia as an example. I think I am a pretty active practitioner. I am not only involved in the Bar
Association, but I am a trial lawyer. I am in the
courtroom. And when I see the judicial ballot and I don't
know who the people are, that is, that are running for
office, that frightens me. I don't know how, what more I
can do to know who these people are. But I cannot
intelligently go into the voting booth and make a
selection. If I can't do it, if I can't do it and these
are my contemporaries, how is it that every other voter is
going to do it? And when you are talking about a statewide
election, where people don't have the opportunity to do
much more than play volleyball, how is it that you
determine whether that individual has the capacity to be a
judge?

I am not talking about the capacity to be a nice person. I am not talking about the capacity to be honest. I am talking about the capacity to be a judge, which I suggest to you requires an extraordinary level of ability and a level of ability that we could use a little more of in this Commonwealth, guite frankly.

REP. BOSCOLA: There are a lot of voters that do take the time to find out who their judicial candidates are. You're taking away their right to express that opinion in the ballot box.

MR. HAINES: I don't know that I agree with that.

When I look at the turnout in the polls, I not so sure that there are a lot of voters that are even bothering to go vote for you all, let alone for the judicial

candidate.

And my best guess is that when they get in there and pull the switch, if they are not voting straight party, they are stopping when they get beyond you all because they don't know who they're voting for, and they don't even bother. So I am not sure we're taking away from people anything in that respect.

REP. BOSCOLA: You're right, and that's part of the problem that I have with it. People feel so removed from government so as it is and this measurement is just another way to isolate the people from the process.

MR. HAINES: But we're not suggesting that you eliminate people from government. We are suggesting that the way in which you put judges on the appellate court where they are supposed to be above the partisan politics altogether, be different than the way we elected.

You know, government doesn't elect everybody that works in this building: a lot of people who work here, get here because they are appointed, because we have made a decision that that is an intelligent way to get, hopefully, competent people.

MR. BEASER: The other thing, the important thing,

and I was trying to say Mr. Haines said it a lot better than I did and I did not mean to insult you on the volleyball issue, because it was really the issue of what he said about the function of the judge. But the critical thing that we're asking today is to let the people make the decision at the polls whether they're comfortable, they know who they're voting for or whether they want a new system, one that is adopted in most states.

All we ask is that you let the people decide.

REP. BOSCOLA: I agree with you and I know it is going to be part of the my responsibility in my community to educate the people as far as exactly what this means to them. And that's a concern that I have with any referendum is how it's worded on a ballot, and if it seems to be something that somebody is willing to vote for because it sounds good, but do they understand the rights that they're giving up and that will be my role in the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Representative Schuler.

REP. SCHULER: Thank you. Just a few questions here, and a couple of comments. You represent the Philadelphia Bar Association. Do you have any idea what the other Bar Associations feel about this, the Pennsylvania Bar Association, or are you aware of their position? I don't want to put you on the spot. If you

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don't know, say so.

MR. HAINES: I am going to defer to Larry; he may know the answer to that question, but I don't. And I don't feel comfortable representing their position, particularly on this bill.

MR. BEASER: I don't believe the Pennsylvania
CHAIRMAN CLARK: Yeah, the Pennsylvania Bar

Association, I don't believe it has taken a position on it.

REP. SCHULER: I think we have to keep in mind here, we're not taking away the rights of the people to vote. We are giving them an opportunity to make that decision. And in our discussion here, it appeared, and I even noticed that one of these questionnaires that comes up here, is sort of misleading, but I think we have to keep that in mind. We are giving the people an opportunity to make a decision on how they want or wish to elect their judges. We're not taking anything away. This thing with volleyball, that's fine and so forth. I mean, I haven't played volleyball with Bob Walker or some of these other fellows who does break gavels once in a while, but that is something that . . . Well, I will quit. Thank you.

MR. BEASER: The one other thing that I think is very important is not only are you giving the people the right to decide on this issue, but they will have the right

in a retention election to the turn out of office any of the judges they don't like. So you are not, this bill would, in no way, touch the retention election. People could still say no to a judge that the people didn't like. So you've got that check, in terms of the election of the people and retention election to turn out of office any judge that they do not approve of.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you very much.

MR. HAINES: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Before we conclude this morning, Ms. Sampson, I would like to follow up on Representative Chadwick's question about picking the pickers. Could you give us some insight on how pickers are picked, and, we are picking our pickers properly?

MS. SAMPSON: Again I brought tables that I could bore you to death with 33 states and how they do it. The primary mechanism used to pick nominating commissioners is that the Governor picks the nonlawyers and the Bar Associations, either statewide or local — it depends, states vary on that — elect or appoint the attorney members. There are changes, there are varieties in other states where sometimes the Attorney General or the Chief Justice picks some commissioners, there are some states where the legislators get involved, but the common pattern is that the lawyers choose the lawyer members and

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the Governor picks the public members.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And are they generally 50/50?

MS. SAMPSON: In most states. Or close to it. It might be a majority of one on either side.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Does that satisfy your curiosity?

MR. HAINES: I rest my case.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you very much. We will break for lunch now and we will be back at one o'clock.

MS. SAMPSON: Thank you.

(Lunch recess taken.)

CHAIRMAN CLARK: We are now in session of the Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Courts Public Hearing regarding Regional Merit Selection of our appellate court judges. And we have two individuals to testify for us this afternoon and the first person is G. Robert Thompson and he is a Republican State Committeeman and I believe he's from someplace out toward western Pennsylvania.

MR. THOMPSON: Oil City, sir.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Oil City, out in western

Pennsylvania. Mr. Thompson, welcome to the Committee.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you for the invitation to appear. I think I am a voice crying in the wilderness after listening to this morning's testimony. However, I'm here to speak in opposition to House Bill 1320 which

deprives the citizens of the Commonwealth their voice and, more importantly, their vote on the selection of appellate court judges in Pennsylvania.

Special interests have been trying for years through the guise of merit selection to control the system of justice in our state. And you, their representatives, cannot, in good conscience, deliver the prerogatives of good citizens into the hands of those interests: the present system.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Excuse me one minute. Do we have copies of Mr. Thompson's testimony, please?

MR. THOMPSON: If you don't, I have got additional ones here.

MR. THOMPSON: The present system is flawed primarily because the media and the major political parties do not sufficiently educate the voters on the strengths and weaknesses of the candidates; this problem is addressed more effectively in House Bill 265.

The founder of our state, William Penn, warned the Colonists in 1687 "not to give away anything of liberty or property that at present they do enjoy." He was a wise man. The right to vote is an issue we must fight to protect. Surrendering our vote on a selection of those who judge us is a major retreat.

The preponderance of judges from Allegheny

and Philadelphia Counties in our appellate courts deprives
the courts of a diversity of views. House Bill 1320
addresses this problem with a bureaucratic monstrosity that
would impress even Merton Quirk. Obviously designed by
attorneys and paid staff to ensure future employment, it
would replace our primary and general elections. The most
recent election clearly indicates our citizens want less
government, not more.

Unfunded mandates, restrictive laws, intrusions on our liberties and attacks on our constitution need to be reviewed by a system of court that reflects the diverse areas of our state. This can best be accomplished by candidates presenting themselves for elections to the citizens on a regional basis for election as provided in House Bill 265.

Quality assurance is a legitimate concern of the members of the bar. This also can be best accomplished by candidates presenting themselves to the voters on a regional basis where the citizens have a better opportunity to assess their record and reputation.

Election is better than the rough and tumble partisan politics of the confirmation process in the Pennsylvania Senate.

History teaches us that liberties lost are rarely regained except by force of arms. Surely we all believe

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that ballots are better than bullets. As our representatives, I respectfully ask that you would not betray our trust by taking our ballots away. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson, you do understand that before the merit

selection on a regional basis would become a standard in

Pennsylvania, our constitution would have to be amended.

MR. THOMPSON: The same as House Bill 265. They both qualify.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Right. And through that process, the voters would decide on whether they want the current system to stay in place versus the regional merit selection. So voters ultimately would decide on which process they are more comfortable with.

MR. THOMPSON: My concern is that they won't be offered the opportunity for regional elections versus regional merit selection. I don't think anybody in their right mind would give up their right to vote.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. You also indicated in your testimony that special interests have been trying for years, under the guise of merit selection, to control the system. Do you have an idea of what type of special interests they may be?

MR. THOMPSON: Twenty years ago, I was on the
Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce

before it changed its name. And I was on there for
eighteen years. And every year, there were members of the
bar trying to convince the Pennsylvania Chamber to amend
their stance to support merit selection. And at that
point, I'd get up and argue rather futilely because I
didn't have a good alternative. But the regional election
makes sense to me at this point and that's why I'm pushing
it.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: So basically you think
the legal community has a vested interest in getting this
merit selection.

MR. THOMPSON: That's right. They would like to control the whole system of justice.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. Also, you indicate that the bill would set up a bureaucratic monstrosity. However, according to testimony earlier from Ms. Sampson, there are a number of states that do have merit selection by commissions and some have them on a geographic basis. So obviously in some states, this process, you know, has been instituted and seems to be working.

MR. THOMPSON: I can't comment on other states, but I don't think we need three more commissions that'll just replace what we're already paying for in primary and general elections.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. Representative Schuler, do

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1	you have any questions?
2	REP. SCHULER: Yeah, just a couple.
3	Mr. Thompson, let me clarify your position. You
4	are speaking as an individual, I assume?
5	MR. THOMPSON: Well, the Republican State
6	Committee passed a resolution that I authored calling for
7	regional elections of appellate court judges. The American
8	Legion this year at their state convention endorsed a
9	similar resolution. So, as I understand
10	REP. SCHULER: Was there an alternative to that
11	resolution?
12	MR. THOMPSON: No. It was submitted by a Post 32
13	and then by District 28 and it was rewritten here in
14	Harrisburg and the legislative committee rejected it as it
15	was rewritten and used my language and it was passed by the
16	convention.
17	REP. SCHULER: But that was the only resolution
18	that was presented, there wasn't any ?
19	MR. THOMPSON: No, there was no
20	REP. SCHULER: choice made?
21	MR. THOMPSON: No.
22	REP. SCHULER: You mentioned lawyers and somebody
23	mentioned this morning that the reason lawyers would be for
24	merit is so they wouldn't have to contribute. Personally I
25	think that's the best argument for having merit selection,

just on that one basis. But you have made the argument 1 about this sufficiently educating. And, of course, you are actively involved in political parties. My question then is, do you have any suggestion - and I don't mean to put you on the spot, that's not my purpose -- how can you

educate the people of Pennsylvania about judges?

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MR. THOMPSON: Well the one thing is to draw the candidates from the regions. I know the judges in Warren County and Erie County and Mercer County and Venango County and Crawford County and I know their reputations and I think most of the citizens are aware just reading the paper who are the weak ones and who are the tough judges and who'll always vote for people that think as we do.

Then your argument is not the REP. SCHULER: education, but because they are closer to the people; I think that's what your saying?

MR. THOMPSON: Yeah, but it brings the candidates closer to the constituency because, very honestly, I doubt if there are more than a dozen of us in Venango County that ever met the candidates from Philadelphia.

REP. SCHULER: I believe that. I don't think that's particular to Venango County.

MR. THOMPSON: Sandy Newman has been to town twice, but the total number of people she has been exposed to has been very limited.

REP. SCHULER: Okay. One last question. You mentioned lawyers and I want to pursue that. Are there any other interest groups that you feel play a significant role in establishing . . . ?

MR. THOMPSON: Well the majority leader in the Senate is sponsoring merit selection, so I'd submit that those in power and the legislators are very interested in expanding their areas of influence; and there's the pickers that you were referring to earlier.

REP. SCHULER: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Thompson, necessarily to dividing the state into regions and having an election, you're still going to have a fairly large region . . .

MR. THOMPSON: Yes.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: . . . to cover. And you have the western regions where that could very well mix in with the northwest with the western part and you may end up with judges running from surrounding counties in your district you may never know, no matter how hard you try to get to know them.

MR. THOMPSON: Well, those that read the Pittsburgh Press or the Pittsburgh Post Gazette would probably be familiar with them, but the majority of the people read local papers.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And then those individuals would

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need to raise money and campaign in that region.

MR. THOMPSON: Well, there is nothing wrong with campaigning, Dan. If the judges don't get to meet the people and the people meet the candidates, we got no good solid basis for voting for or against. And maybe I am well over-stressing this voting, but I will be 71 next month and I haven't missed an election since I got out of the Army Air Corps. Except, once, I was on the operating table having heart surgery and they just wouldn't let me out.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: But they are still going to need to, you know, raise money to be on T.V. and to get some name recognition but . . .

MR. THOMPSON: That is a political --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: . . . but not necessarily deliver a full and fair assessment of their qualifications.

MR THOMPSON: Well, that's what political parties are for, that's our function, is to promote candidates to get them elected whether for township supervisor or for Governor. And I think we do a reasonable effective job, except on these judicial races that are statewide.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Are you satisfied with the -- we had some testimony here earlier about how the political parties endorse their candidates and put them on the ballot; are you satisfied with that process, did you get to know all the candidates, in depth, and that you have a fair

and democratic process of nominating those candidates which you endorse to your committee meeting?

MR. THOMPSON: My choice -- and it's effective in Venango County -- is open primaries. The party does not endorse. Statewide, we do. And, in fact, I voted to endorse Governor Ridge. I think the first endorsement I ever voted for 20 years on state committee.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Another question. When candidates that run for judge and look for other endorsements, too, from other special interest groups, you know, does that part of the election process bother you at all? That they may go to the AFL-CIO or that they may come in and make a pitch to the chamber or they may come in and make a pitch to EFCA in order to get their endorsements so that their rank and file will follow them to the polls.

MR. THOMPSON: Representative Clark, I think that that is a very healthy process because the judge, while he's doing this, is getting educated to what the voters want and demand. Judges have a tendency to get a Jehova complex once they are in office and they seem to be above the rank and file voter and this is a healthy situation before they get in there that they have an opportunity to meet and to hear.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Thompson, let me leave you with one last thought that you can think about in your

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drive back to Venango County. Is Judge Breene still out there?

MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Venango County.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Do you think who, what all candidates the AFL-CIO have endorsed over the last 30 years to the Supreme Court and what candidates the Chamber of Commerce have endorsed over the past thirty years can you match those up with the political affiliation, and then you tell me if those special interests had an open and full endorsement process where candidates got to come in, express their ideas, got to know the membership and then were fairly dealt within the endorsement process?

MR. THOMPSON: I don't believe they ever meet the rank and file members of the unions with the school teachers, but they obviously do quote the support of the special interest groups. But I don't, I haven't heard any of them make any promises or offer any inducements: if I am judge, I will do this. This just doesn't happen.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, then why do those special interest groups consistently seem to grasp taking endorsing one party or the other?

MR. THOMPSON: Well, I have a problem with that, too.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

1	MR. THOMPSON: Because I am partisan and you know
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3	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Any other questions for Mr.
4	Thompson?
5	Thank you very much. I enjoyed hearing from
6	you. And I will tell your chairman that I had an
7	opportunity to speak with you today.
8	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you.
9	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Happens to be a constituent of
10	mine.
11	MR. THOMPSON: Oh, good. Ann is a fine lady.
12	CHAIRMAN CLARK: She is. Thank you.
13	The next person to testify in front of the
14	Committee is Joanna Flum.
15	MS. FLUM: Joanna Hamill Flum, sir.
16	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Joanna Hamill Flum
17	MS. FLUM: We have to get all the names in.
18	CHAIRMAN CLARK: President from the
19	Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association. Welcome.
20	MS. FLUM: Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman
21	Clark, Representative Manderino, Representative Schuler. I
22	have stated my name as Joanna Hamill Flum, and I am
23	President of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association.
24	On behalf of the Association, I would like to thank you
25	for the opportunity to testify on the subject of the

proposed constitutional amendment in Pennsylvania that would eliminate the right to vote for appellate judges and mandate changes in the appointment of appellate judges on a regional basis.

My occupation as an active trial attorney for fourteen years in this Commonwealth has provided me a great deal of insight into the quality of our judiciary, both in the Courts of Common Pleas and the appellate courts in Pennsylvania. I have found our judiciary, both in the trial court and on the appellate level, to have the greatest integrity, knowledge of the law and judicial temperament. Generally speaking, my experience with the judiciary has been positive. I have conferred with many colleagues and members of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association on this issue, and, generally, each of them has had a similar positive experience and attitude toward the judiciary.

By way of history, I would like to tell you that on January 23, 1993, the Board of Governors of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association met and overwhelmingly voted to reaffirm its 1983 resolution to support the right of the citizens of Pennsylvania to elect all judges in Pennsylvania. Our board included in this reaffirmation the support of election reform as it relates to judicial candidates. Later in my testimony, I will

indicate the type of election reform that we believe

answers the various criticisms of the current election
system.

During the 1993 - 1994 session, much of the public and press impetus for judicial reform in the selection of our appellate judges came, quite naturally, as a reaction to the events surrounding former Supreme Court Justice Larsen. However, one must remember that in the Larsen situation, there was, for the first time in 145 years, public controversy as to the propriety of the conduct of one of the members of our elected Supreme Court.

Fortunately for the system, and for the citizens of Pennsylvania, the situation was appropriately handled.

And many of you, on this Committee, are to be personally congratulated and thanked by the citizens of Pennsylvania for assisting in the solution of the Larsen problem.

The problem which confronted the public emanating from this particular case are not unique to elected judges, for these problems arise in states where judges are appointed as well. Indeed, the solution to the problem was the ability to effectively investigate and discipline inappropriate conduct. As you undoubtedly know, within the last several years, a serious ethical concern also was raised about the conduct of a former judge of the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas. Yet,

at that time there was no serious suggestion that we should appoint, rather than elect, judges to the Courts of Common Pleas. The procedure in Pennsylvania that allows effective discipline and impeachment solved the Larsen situation, and will continue to solve similar problems, far more effectively than changing the method of selecting judges.

The Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association opposes
House Bill 1320. We continue to believe that the phrase
"merit selection" is merely a "sound bite" cleverly
concocted by those who wish to deprive Pennsylvania
citizens of basic rights. The term "merit selection" is
designed to connote negativity about the election process.
I suggest to you that the term does not equally connote,
nor result in, meritorious appointments.

Unfortunately, the process of the appointment of judges in House Bill 1320, while not less political, is certainly less public than the current system. The nominating committees will submit to the Governor a proposed list of candidates from which the Governor will appoint with the advice and consent of the Senate. There will be no public hearings, no public scrutiny, no public participation. There will simply be the selection of the Governor's hand-picked person from the list approved by this committee. History bears out that the Governor's

appointments are usually always from a person of his or her own political party. On a national basis, more than 90% of all gubernatorial judicial appointees come from the same party as the Governor. This is not meant in any way to cast aspersions on the ability of our current Governor, as our position was identical during the tenure of the previous governor, who, of course, as you know, came from the other major political party in Pennsylvania.

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We have only to look at the federal system, which is often referred to as the model for appointment of judicial candidates. Over 95% of all federal trial judges appointed by the President of the United States since the Civil War have been members of the President's political party. Under the appointive process politics is a major -if not the major -- consideration in the selection of the judge. Unfortunately, it is the politics of a few chosen elite individuals rather than the politics of the entire electorate. Indeed, "litmus tests" are certainly used in the selection of the federal judiciary. This attitude that it is somehow fair or proper for judges to be questioned at great length about their views on particular controversial issues by an elite screening panel, while denying potential judicial candidates the right to discuss their views and values in the light of the electoral process which currently exists in Pennsylvania, is particularly

troubling.

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We need only look to the past testimony and advocacy of the electoral process by former Commonwealth Court Judge Madaline Palladino, who was appointed to a vacancy on the Commonwealth Court, defeated in the general election, and then ran successfully for a full term during the 1980's. Judge Palladino -- uniquely in Pennsylvania -can speak of the advantages or disadvantages of the current system versus a system similar to that envisioned in House Bill 1320. Judge Palladino, in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1993, stated that, because of her experience, she believed totally and completely in the advantage of the electoral system. Like us, Judge Palladino believes there is great benefit to previous political experience in shaping a judicial temperament that is responsive to the needs of a complex, diverse and ever evolving society. A successful political campaign which is broadly based, exposing the candidate to the wants and needs of every element of our culture, is an invaluable educational reservoir from which a judge may later draw experiences to arrive at fair and equitable decisions.

Indeed campaigning helps candidates to see and understand the electorate.

The Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, while opposing House Bill 1320, does support a package of

election reforms known as the "Greenleaf Package."

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We find particularly offensive the so-called "gag rule" which applies primarily to the public's right to know rather than the candidate's ability to speak. The gag rule does not prevent candidates who have strong biases from seeking judicial office, it simply prevents the voting public from finding out what those biases are before casting their votes. As we indicated earlier, so-called "merit panels" often use probing questions to delve deeply into a candidate's psyche in order to determine that candidate's judicial philosophy. It is extremely troublesome that it is permissible for a few individuals to probe a candidate's innermost feelings, in secret, behind closed doors. It is fundamentally wrong that the public does not have equal access to such information in the light of day. We, therefore, support the language of Senate Bill 1004, which proposes a constitutional amendment allowing justices and judges to speak out on political and disputed legal issues in the year of their candidacies. Such a process, however, would require several years, and we, therefore, also urge the adoption of electoral reform proposals which lack constitutional dimension, and could be enacted immediately to provide immeasurable improvement in the election process. We believe this package of bills answers all of the criticism of those seeking an appointive

process, while still allowing the public to enjoy broad participation in the selection of one-third of our form of government.

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that judicial elections resemble a lottery, we say rotate ballot position. Senate Bill 1005 calls for the rotation of the ballot position of judicial candidates. To those who say our judicial elections have succumbed to regionalism, Senate Bill 1006 eliminates county designation from the ballot. To those who denigrate the public by believing that it is too apathetic to care and too unsophisticated to make knowledgeable selections, we continue to believe that informed exercise of the right to vote can never occur in a system where the candidate is not allowed to speak to anyone other than the editor of a newspaper or a member of a selection panel.

The Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association always supported public financing of judicial elections such as that contained in Senate Bill 1001. In that Bill, any candidate who applies for, and receives, public financing is forbidden to accept contributions for the election which exceed \$2500 per individual; \$25,000 from the candidate and his spouse; \$2500 from a political action committee; and \$500 from a partnership. We additionally support the passage of Senate Bill 1002, which limits the contribution

by an attorney who is a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to an amount not in excess of \$50.00 per candidate, and limits any law firm doing business with the Commonwealth to a maximum contribution of \$500 per candidate. Actually, we wonder why opponents of the electoral process, who so regularly complain about attorney contributions, do not join Senator Greenleaf in his efforts to promote and pass Senate Bill 1002.

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To those critics of our current electoral system who suggest there is a corruptive effect of politics among the court because of the electoral system we ask a simple question: What are you going to do about our state legislators, members of Congress, Senators, Governor, and even our President? If elections are truly as corruptive and corrosive as is claimed, can we afford to choose those who serve in the other two branches of government by the same system? Certainly, you would agree with me that the electorate was astute enough and understood the pertinent issues enough to elect each one of the distinguished members of this Committee to office. To imply that the citizens of Pennsylvania are competent to elect members of the General Assembly but not judges, serves only to denigrate the public.

It is the firm belief of the Pennsylvania Trial

Lawyers Association that election reform proposals which

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include rotation of the ballot position, elimination of county designation, relaxation of the gag rule, adoption of public financing, and caps on individual attorney contributions, provide a genuine opportunity for improvement in the process by which we elect our judges.

We are appalled by those elite who advocate paternalism toward the electorate and not so subtly suggest that the citizens of this Commonwealth are too ignorant to effectively exercise their rights at the ballot box. We continue to believe that the citizens of Pennsylvania should not be stripped of a basic right -- the right to elect those men and women who exercise great power over their lives -- the judiciary.

I am open to any questions you may have.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you very much. Previously, we have sort of outlined that the functions of the judiciary is not akin to the function of the legislative and executive branch of government. The legislature and the Governor are representatives of the people and, therefore, campaign and tell people where they stand on issues, how they're going to vote on issues if elected, and they go through a process like that; and we have decided that that was not akin to a judiciary position, or a judgeship, where, you know, they are to be fair, impartial, that they should look at each fact, situation, and apply

the law compressing to that situation. And we previously rejected the notion that if the electorate can elect its executive and legislative branch that they could likewise elect their judiciary because of the fundamental differences between those branches of government. And that . . . you know. So, if you could make comments further on that, why, I would appreciate your insight.

MS. FLUM: Sure. I understand what you call the fundamental differences. However, there is something more basic than even the fundamental differences you alluded to and that is, the right of a citizen to elect people who hold power over their lives. Now, having a merit selection system would only mean that the people will never get to know what these candidates stand for. The only people who are going to make the determination as to whether or not I, as a citizen, may, can have a judge are elite screening panels; that is not open.

I think that whether or not you are electing a representative or you are electing a judge or you are electing anyone, it should be done in the ballot box by the citizenry, and I don't accept the premise that there is that much of a difference. I think that if judges were permitted, if the gag rule were lifted to some degree and judges were permitted to discuss somewhat their judicial philosophy without getting into specific cases, that would

give the electorate more information.

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Also, the way we, the system we have now permits the average citizen to determine whether or not that candidate is qualified in respect other than judicial or lawyer type of background. The people who sit in judgment of other people should be people who understand the average ordinary citizen, not someone who is in the ivory tower and not in contact with the average person. So I do not believe, nor does the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association believe, that a citizen is smart when it comes to elected members of the General Assembly but suddenly becomes stupid when electing members of the judiciary.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And I don't believe the members of the Committee feel that way either.

MS. FLUM: I am sure you don't.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I would like to pay a little insight that I have always wavered and probably leaned towards the election process until I received some very good insight last summer, during the impeachment process of Judge Larsen, and that experience had a profound impact on me and I guess led me to believe that the merit selection process is certainly worth our time and efforts here in the legislature.

MS. FLUM: Sir, do you believe that that situation which as I mentioned for the first time in 145 years in

Pennsylvania occurred, do you believe that there is any less potential for that type of situation to arise if you have merit selection, rather than elective? I don't think so.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Absolutely unequivocally. Not everything that we saw last year and last summer came before the Assembly, it came before the public, and, you know, I am troubled by the process and how that seemed to have influenced the Supreme Court on a very broad and reaffirming basis.

Representative Schuler.

REP. SCHULER: Just one question. On page eight, you mentioned the fact that the elite, or they may be, I guess that's the committee that would pick these people, are too ignorant to effectively legislate the right ballot box. Wouldn't it follow it also, we are not making that decision. This legislature or that committee is not making the decision. The people of Pennsylvania, through a referendum or a constitutional amendment, are going to make that decision. Are the trial lawyers afraid that they may not make an intelligent decision?

MS. FLUM: Absolutely not, sir. Let me --

REP. SCHULER: Well, then, what's wrong?

MS. FLUM: Well, let me --

REP. SCHULER: Go ahead.

MS. FLUM: Thank you. As you probably know, in 1969, the electors of Pennsylvania, in the primary election, rejected the option of having an appointed judiciary which was presented to them by Section 13(d) of Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution; rather, the citizens of the Commonwealth chose to select their judiciary by election. In 1980, the citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania elected, for the first time, their attorney general. Again they were given the option, the opportunity to elect statewide officials, rather than having that official appointed. So two times when this issue came before the citizens of Pennsylvania, the citizens decided that they want to have the right to elect their officials.

Now, a third reason would be, why this issue, this issue is not unique, why not put every issue on to a referendum? Which, by the way, as you know, would cost a lot of money to run. But, more importantly, those people who favor merit selection are well-funded by large, rich corporate interests in this state, and one has to ask oneself, why is it that corporations such as Harsco and Alcoa, have an interest in this issue? Why is it that the Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association came out in favor of merit selection? Why is it that those people, some people who testified here today, when they come up to the

Hill to lobby you for your votes on this issue, meet in the offices of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association?

Because very large corporate, private interests want to deprive the citizens of their right to vote. And if there's a referendum, you know very well that they'll use their enormous power, their enormous money to run a very slick advertising campaign in favor of merit selection so that those people have the right to decide who should be a judge and not the electorate.

REP. SCHULER: You gave me two reasons that the people voted against it, and that's fine. Why not a third time?

MS FLUM: Well, as I said --

REP. SCHULER: Are you afraid that they are not going to see the light?

MS. FLUM: Absolutely not. In fact, I have appended to my testimony a public opinion poll that was taken, I believe in 1993, showing unequivocally that the population of the people who were polled, who were representive sample, want their right to elect judges. Perhaps people on this Committee may have made a sample of their own districts and found the same thing. Why do we have to go to the expense of having a referendum when we have experience on the issue and public opinion polls show that everyone, that the electorate wants to be able to vote

for judges?

REP. SCHULER: Then the third reason is the expense involved?

MS. FLUM: Yes. I think it is to -- Well, I mean the last time I looked, or the last time I got information on this, it would cost many millions of dollars, as you know . . .

REP. SCHULER: It probably would.

MS. FLUM: . . . to run a referendum, yes, sir.

REP. SCHULER: I agree. My last point here. I

wasn't going to ask this, but you brought up the point.

REP. SCHULER: You pounded on the Manufacturers

MS. FLUM: Oh my goodness. Should I be on guard?

Association and everybody else. You didn't include the trial lawyers in that. I can remember a few years ago when we did the insurance reform. Boy, they were quite an active lobbying group. And you know it's like calling the kettle black. You know? But I just have a little problem with the way you address that issue, and you have a right to say it and so forth, and I am sure there was a lot of that. But lets get the record straight, the trial lawyers are not beyond lobbying either.

MS. FLUM: Absolutely not. I think there's nothing wrong with lobbying. But, you know, sir, that the trial lawyers is the only statewide group in this

Commonwealth who represents totally the interests of the injured citizens of this Commonwealth. So when we lobby, we are lobbying on behalf of those people who are injured, innocent victims.

REP. SCHULER: Well, aren't you the benefactor in that?

MS. FLUM: Well, of course. I mean to some degree we are. But we do a job. And we have a job to do.

REP. SCHULER: Well, first of all, I have a little concern about trying to make it that you are do gooders.

MS. FLUM: Well, as a matter of fact, sir, I believe I do good because I believe strongly what I do. It would be very difficult for an injured citizen to go into, perhaps, Mr. Beaser's office and say, Mr. Beaser, would you represent me? He would say, I would like \$500 an hour. Now what I do is, I do service for people and every one of my members does when they represent these people who are injured. I am proud of what I do and I am sure every one of our associate members would say they are proud of what they do, too.

REP. SCHULER: I am sure they are and I have no objection to that and I just want to make sure that we all understand where the trial lawyers are coming from. The better you do the job, the better your compensation.

MS. FLUM: Well, that's merit, isn't it?

REP. SCHULER: All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Representative Manderino.

REP. MANDERINO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess what I have to say is more by way of comments than questions, but I do have to say that I have been called lots of things in my life but elite has never been one them until today. And I think that there are a lot of people who support merit selection, who support it for as meritorious reasons as you do what you do, who do not believe that either they are elite or that the system is one of elitism, or will produce that.

I guess the other point that I just want to make is picking up on what Chairman Clark said. Because I, too, very much believe that there is an important distinction in how we have fashioned our three branches of government, and there is an important distinction with regard to the judiciary and their role being one of independence. I am the representative, and the members of this Committee as representatives of the people, we're voted to come here to make law and to make that law pursuant to the wishes and desires of our constituents.

That is not the case with judges. Judges are set up as an independent branch of government to apply the facts that come before them and interpret the law as made

by we, the representative body. And I am very troubled by proposals to remove a gag rule and allow judges to campaign on issues that show a judicial bias. Because while everyone's personal baggage that they carry with them as an individual because of their life experiences is, just by the very nature of us being human, part of what forms who we are and how we look at issues, so too is the responsibility of the member of our judiciary to apply the facts before him to the law as we have made it. And I really think that that's an important message that we can't lose sight of, regardless of which side of the issue we're on.

Lastly, I guess, I just want to make the point, and Ms. Hamill Flum, you pointed out that, 30 years ago, we made a choice, we asked this question before and I think that's true. I also think that reform comes in cycles and we used to have an appointive system in Pennsylvania and we reformed, so to speak, and switched to an elective process. And it's not, I don't think, too often to ask every 30 years about whether or not it's time to reform again. And the answer may be yes and the answer may be no, but the reason it goes to a referendum is not because we want to test the airs of public sentiment but because we are proposing a change to our Pennsylvania Constitution. That is what brings it before the people because it's

highlighted enough to be spelled out in our constitution;

and so, I don't want people to think that the referendum

issue that we're talking about here is a public sentiment

referendum issue. It's really saying, how do you want your

constitution fashioned, citizens of Pennsylvania? And I

would like to see us ask that question again 30 years

later.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you.

Would you like to comment.

MS. FLUM: I was just going to comment about the word elite. I certainly did not mean to offend anyone on this Committee. I really was referring to the panels or the committees that would, are contemplating House Bill 1320 as being set up as elite screening panels and when I hear words from people who testified today, such as, an elective system is inconsistent with a qualified judiciary, that's a slap in the face to every judge, whom I know, is highly qualified in this state. And when I hear words that election of judges is simply nonsense, to me that sounds like an elitist attitude. And when I hear comments that people don't know who the candidates are, and that sounds like an elite comment. So I want to make it clear that I am referring to the screening panels as set forth in House Bill 1320. Thank you.

1	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you.
2	Do we have any further questions?
3	Thank you very much.
4	MS. FLUM: Thank you very much.
5	CHAIRMAN CLARK: And with that, that concludes our
6	public hearing on the Regional Merit Selection Process and
7	House Bill 1320. Thank you very much.
8	(Written testimony of William M. George submitted
9	for the record.)
LO	(Whereupon, the public hearing was concluded at
11	1:50 p.m.)

I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me on the within proceedings, to the best of my ability, and that this copy is a correct transcript of the same.

Roxy Cressler, Reporter

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Notary Public