HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

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Supreme Court's Suspension of the Acts of the General Assembly

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House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts

York County Commissioners' Room York, Pennsylvania

Thursday, October 16, 1997 - 1:15 p.m.

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BEFORE:

Honorable Daniel Clark, Majority Chairperson Honorable Al Masland Honorable Jere Schuler

IN ATTENDANCE:

Honorable Thomas Caltagirone Honorable David J. Mayernik Honorable Michael Waugh

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CHAIRPERSON CLARK: I want to thank everyone for coming out this afternoon. My name is Representative Dan Clark. I'm the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Courts. This afternoon in York County, we're going to have a public hearing which focuses on the Suspension of the Acts of the General Assembly by our Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. That is the official title of the hearing, and hopefully, the hearing will take shape along the lines of how the Supreme Court has been able to frustrate some of the matters that the legislature has tried to address as doing the people's business.

Recently, we have passed laws in the area of medical malpractice, tort reform, landlord tenant law and review of our death penalty appeal process in efforts to answer concerns of our constituents and also concerns of the Commonwealth and have found a lot of those efforts were not after the Supreme Court had ruled on them.

Also as a member of the Judiciary

Committee, we have sought to address various

issues. One would be the Commonwealth's right

to a jury trial. It appears as we get into hearings on those issues and research those issues, we run into problems that they may violate the Supreme Court's rule-making authority and, therefore, be deemed unconstitutional. It appears that the Supreme Court has taken this rule-making authority, which is provided by the Constitution, but has expanded that far beyond any intent of when that was placed in the Constitution back in 1968.

I think that is some of the testimony we want to glean today, and hopefully, after a number of these hearings, ending with a hearing in Harrisburg on October 30th, when we will have a little better handle on the issues before us; hopefully, have some remedies to those, and be able to move in the legislature to rectify some of our concerns and to hopefully balance out the participation of the three branches of government in governing this Commonwealth.

I'd like to introduce to you other members of the Judiciary Committee who are with us today. I think what I'll do is have them

1 introduce themselves. I'll start here with my 2 far right. We'll just go across the panel. 3 REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: 4 Representative Jere Schuler, Lancaster County. REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: 5 Representative Tom Caltagirone, Berks County, 7 Democratic Chair of the Judiciary Committee. REPRESENTATIVE MASLAND: I'm Al 8 Masland. I represent most of western 9 Cumberland and a small part of northern York 10 11 County. CHAIRPERSON CLARK: And with that, 12 we'd like to welcome our first people who will 13 provide us with testimony, H. Stanley Rebert, 14 who is the District Attorney of York County, 15 along with Michael A. George, who is the 16 District Attorney of Adams County. 17 18 MR. REBERT: Good afternoon, gentlemen, and good afternoon, ladies and 19 gentlemen in the gallery. I appreciate the 20 21 opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association 22 concerning our Supreme Court's rule-making 23

Article 5, Section 10 of the

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powers.

Pennsylvania Constitution provides: The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts. All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions.

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This particular power of the court has come to greatly impact the ability of law enforcement to protect victims, witnesses, and all of our citizens from the ravages of crime. This committee is well aware that the Supreme Court has increasingly asserted authority over matters historically left to the legislature in of its state constitutional the name rule-making power and has become increasingly incapable of exercising any self-restraint in this area; thereby, overruling or modifying a broad spectrum of legislation including, but not limited to, laws of evidence, capital punishment proceedings, child videotaped/closed circuit TV testimony, and the Commonwealth's right to a jury trial. Even the academic community has commented on our Supreme Court's propensity to wield its rule-making authority

in Pennsylvania as a powerful check on legislative action it does not like.

Indeed, one author who is himself a criminal defense attorney and law professor has strongly set forth that he believes the rule-making power of our Supreme Court is completely out of control, offends the separation of powers doctrine, robs the Pennsylvania legislature of its powers, and ultimately thwarts the will of the people.

The Supreme Court consistently uses its fortified rule-making authority to reduce law enforcement's ability to protect our citizens from crime. As an example: Child videotaped and closed circuit testimony. After the court struck down legislation allowing traumatized child abuse victims to testify, the General Assembly pursued the only avenue available—constitutional amendment.

The amendment was improved by you in two consecutive sessions and presented to the public, which overwhelmingly approved this amendment. But our courts do not like it, and by means of truly Byzantine logic, the Commonwealth Court held that even that wasn't

good enough. It struck down the amendment holding that because of the constitutional rule-making clause, the question before the voters was twofold: Should child videotaped and closed circuit testimony legislation be permitted? Should the legislature be empowered to enact laws in this area? You and I may easily see that these are simply two sides to the same question, but our opinions don't count. Once again, the rule-making clause is used as a weapon against those who would protect victims and fight crime.

Although the Commonwealth has throughout most of its history been placed on an equal footing with the defendant with respect to having a jury hear the case, the Supreme Court in the '70's took that right away. The General Assembly, offended by this inequity, statutorily reinstated the Commonwealth's right to a jury trial by an overwhelming vote. Our Supreme Court, however, in a split decision stripped the power to legislate in this area away.

So, even though the General Assembly

wants victims and criminal defendants to be on a level playing field, the court has, through its rule-making clause, said that what the public wants and what you, as the public's representatives want, simply doesn't matter.

Evidence Code. There historically has never been any question about the General Assembly's power to promulgate evidentiary rules. When the General Assembly moved, however, to consolidate all of the evidentiary rules into a comprehensive and organized Evidence Code, the Supreme Court once again decided to use the rule-making clause as a means to take over this area of law making as well. Why this was not impermissible rule-making before, but is today, no one has ventured to explain and no one has ventured to speculate where it will stop.

Death Penalty Collateral Appeals.

State Habeas Corpus Law has always been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as falling within the purview of the General Assembly.

Amazingly, when the legislature moved to shorten the time period for death penalty appeals by consolidating the direct and

P.C.R.A. appeals, the State Supreme Court did a complete about-face, implicitly taking over the role of legislating State Habeas Corpus Law as it applies to death penalty cases.

The court has suspended and, in effect, thrown out the Capital Unitary Review Act contained in Act 32 of 1995, reinstating the much lengthier double appeal process. The court, at least for now, has graciously permitted the General Assembly to retain its power to enact P.C.R.A. legislation for non-capital defendants. The public is, understandably, outraged by the lengthy delay between the death penalty verdict and the carrying out of the penalty.

As their representatives, you properly enacted sound legislation to do something about it, but our court has said no. There is nothing you can do about it. There is nothing the public can do about it, and that no matter what you or your constituents want, these seven individuals will decide what is best.

From a personal perspective, I consider this the most important in terms of

the public's confidence in the efficacy of the criminal justice system--that of capital litigation.

There are eight defendants on death row as a result of York County prosecutions. We are second only to Philadelphia in that statistic. Yet, not one of those defendants has received the penalty that was imposed by a jury of his peers, despite the fact that some convictions date back to the early 1980's, and that at least two of the condemned prisoners have acknowledged their guilt and requested that no action to prevent their execution be taken.

These cases are all at various levels of appeal in the state and federal court systems. That is not justice. A ninth defendant, who was convicted early on in my administration, is the only one to have reaped his just rewards, and that was a natural death due to AIDS.

To say that death penalty cases are over-litigated is, perhaps, the grossest of understatements. In an effort to expedite the process, while in the meantime respecting the

rights of criminal defendants charged with such awesome crimes, you enacted the previously mentioned Capital Unitary Review Act. The purpose of the act was to expedite the cases going through the system while giving the defendants not only the opportunity to directly appeal their convictions, but also the opportunity to wage collateral attack on those convictions. Now, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interceded and suspended the Capital Unitary Review Act.

The court has not ruled that the act is unconstitutional or that it is illegal. It has simply made a judgment that the act is, in effect, a rule of practice and procedure and that rules are created and imposed by the court; not the legislature. In effect, the court has advised the legislature that it's not your job to legislate rules; that is our bailiwick and our bailiwick alone. So the net effect is that, we take one step forward and two steps back. In terms of litigation, everything is now being returned to the Court of Common Pleas to commence again the collateral process.

Just a few days ago I spoke with Jeff Gunnet, whose wife was carjacked and murdered by Mark Spotz, the closest thing to a serial killer that will ever have been my duty to prosecute in York County. Mr. Gunnet was asking about the progress of the defendant's appeal. My last contact with this husband of a victim was to advise him about CURA and how I felt it would expedite the litigation that we both knew the defendant would relish. I could hear the disappointment in his voice at our setback.

The court's annexation of traditionally legislative functions cuts to the heart of our nation's democratic principles.

Ones the court assumes an area of law within its rule-making power, the process of developing rules moves behind the cloak of judicial secrecy, beyond the reach of the other branches of government, and beyond the power of our citizenry to correct or even to monitor.

Indeed, by founding their actions on the state Constitution, the court renders any statutory provisions on that point of law null and void.

This is in marked contrast to the promulgation of court rules in the federal system and in the vast majority of states.

These jurisdictions recognize that rules of court can be expanded to regulate more than technical housekeeping matters, but to instead affect important social policy questions such as the revelation of prior sexual conduct to attack rape victims, the release of dangerous criminals on bail, the availability of sanctions for frivolous lawsuits, and the right of the victims of crime to have their cases heard by a jury of their peers.

Accordingly, in most of our nation, the promulgation of court rules is subject to the democratic process. The legislature delegates to the courts the initial function of developing proposed rules, usually through a system of advisory committees. The legislature then must approve these rules or, in particular cases, itself formulate them. In this way, the public benefits both from the expertise of its judiciary and from the perspective of its elected officials.

This public hearing today is a

significant step in the right direction. The prosecutors of this state have unanimously endorsed the concept of bringing Pennsylvania in line with most other jurisdictions by assigning to the court system the initial responsibility for proposing rules, while reserving to the legislature its proper power to approve or disapprove rules before they can become law.

The rule-making power, although perhaps, esoteric in its particulars, has significant impact on many citizens who must at one time or another have recourse to the court system. Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association urges you to move forward with a constitutional amendment providing democratic oversight of the rule-making powers of the court.

Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak on this important matter. I apologize. I am not used to reading my closings, but I received instructions from the association that I better have the script in writing so that I don't miss anything.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: You did a

wonderful job. I think now I'll have another member of the legislature just appeared introduce himself to you. Then we'll open it up for any questions that you might have of District Attorney Rebert or District Attorney George. Representative Waugh.

REPRESENTATIVE WAUGH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know several folks here. I'm Mike Waugh, a member of the House representing the south side of the City here in York County.

I'm not a member of the Judiciary Committee,
but since you're here in York with us today, I thought I would take a little time to join you.

Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Thank you, Mike. Do you have any questions?

REPRESENTATIVE WAUGH: No.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Representative Schuler.

REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Clarify some points in your testimony for me. Am I correct that when the courts get into this rule-making process, that that rule would come to whom; the legislature, or would we go through like we do

1 with other rules in the legislature, like the 2 Independent Regulatory Review Commission? Are 3 you familiar with that? 4 MR. REBERT: I'm not totally familiar 5 with that, but I don't believe the rule would come to the legislature. No. I think the rule 6 is concocted, for lack of a better word, by the 7 8 court. 9 REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: Let us assume they come up with a rule and it's in 10 11 conflict with people's wishes, the legislature. 12 How would we handle that? 13 MR. REBERT: I think you handled it in the same manner in the child abuse scenario. 14 An amendment was proposed that you passed and 15 then the people passed and --16 17 REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: They 18 overruled us. 19 MR. REBERT: Right. 20 REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: How do we correct that? 21 MR. GEORGE: Sir, I think, if I may 22 address that, that's exactly why this issue is 23 24 important to the Pennsylvania District

Attorneys Association. What we have is a

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situation where rules are being pronounced, handed down which are more than procedural rules. For instance, the number of briefs that somebody files on appeal, that's something logistically that, perhaps, the Supreme Court ought to be able to dictate.

But, when we get into situations where the Supreme Court is taking legislative initiatives and saying that they're improper because they interfere with their rule-making ability, it's causing a problem. It's causing a problem because all of us, you at that table, us sitting out here and litigating on behalf of the public in the courtroom are responsible to the public. We have accountability.

Well, the district attorneys police the police.

The legislature polices the police. The

Attorney General polices the police. There's a

check and balance there. In this particular

instance that doesn't apply. The appropriate

question is, who is policing the Supreme Court

when they are legislating things against the

will of the majority of the population?

REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: The district

attorney mentioned, we passed an amendment; the people passed a constitutional amendment to take care of this situation that you used in your testimony, but yet, the court still overruled. How do we address that issue? Do we have elections every two years for judges?

MR. GEORGE: Well, there potentially could be addressed through a constitutional amendment. We hate to keep waving we need to amend the Constitution because that's a serious matter and it's something that shouldn't be taken lightly.

REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: What amendment would you propose to address this issue?

MR. GEORGE: That the rule-making situation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, there is accountability; perhaps, a veto power by the legislature on it or that it's limited to the procedural --

REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: That was my original question. If we disagree with the rule making, how do we handle it? Does it come back to the legislature and we override their rule?

MR. REBERT: I think, if I may,

because of the rule-making power arises from

the Constitution, it --

REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: Therefore, we would have to amend the Constitution.

MR. REBERT: Again, I have to repeat what Mr. George has said. We don't like to mess with the Constitution if we don't have to, and I'm sure you don't either because it's a complex process and it's not good to go changing what our founding fathers came up with. But, since the rule-making power is vested in the court in the Constitution, the ultimate solution has to be an amendment to the Constitution to put that rule-making authority elsewhere.

think what we see here is two things. Number 1 is the frustration that we went through with the child witness amending the Constitution and only to have the Supreme Court come back and say, well, the question wasn't proper on the ballot. Let's take a hypothetical that we took, this Article 5, Section 10, and have a Constitutional amendment to strip it. It was

voted in the past by the people of the

Commonwealth, went through two sessions of the

legislature; voted by the people of the

Commonwealth to take that section out, only to

have Supreme Court to come back and say, well,

there's something wrong with the question.

So, even when we do get through that process, it seems that we can't get through that process. I think that's one of the frustrations of, how do we do it when we have done it once before and have that struck down? I don't know if anyone can answer that for us.

The second thing I think Jere was

trying to get to was, how would the solution to

this work if the legislature took an active

role like the other states do as far as rule

making? Maybe you can expound how the other

states handle the rule-making power and who

gets the last say or how those resolutions

conflicts there?

MR. REBERT: I'm not familiar with how the other states handle this kind of a situation. As a matter of fact, I spoke with the association this morning, their legislative group. I said, well, I see what you're saying.

How is this amendment going to be worded? I simply don't have an answer to that question for you at this point. I really don't.

REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: That's all I have.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Representative Caltagirone.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. The thing that I want to
get across to the District Attorneys
Association, members of the General Assembly is
that, we perceive a problem and there may very
well be a problem.

But, being a student of history and looking back over what we do, especially we are a country of law, we are a state of law, we do have three distinct bodies that we operate under the federal and state Constitution, and that's the legislative in my mind first, the executive and the judiciary. It's a constant swinging of that pendulum that takes place in our society where many of us in the legislature feel that the courts try to don our jobs instead of their robes. Many times they accuse us of wearing their robes in making

legislation. All I urge is that we proceed cautiously.

with the Constitution. I think we have to take that very, very seriously because, anytime we make changes in the Constitution, it's not something that we can alter or change quickly to suit our needs. It depends, I think, and Jere and I were talking before the hearing started, about the individuals that serve many of the courts. We are, I think, maybe criticizing the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania today, but we were talking earlier about the problems that we have with the Appellate, the federal judges who serve for life.

At least in this state we have retention, albeit there's very few judges either Common Pleas judges or the Commonwealth or the Appellate judges in the state system that ever get defeated for retention. We did change that, as a matter of fact, through a Constitutional amendment several years back.

But, there are many local judges that we hear complaints about from time to time;

common Pleas judges let alone the Appellate judges. But when you look at the federal system and they're appointed for life, and, of course, much of what you do in your courtrooms throughout the state and counties, bubbles, percolates into the federal courtrooms. We're never going to be assured of the type of justice that people are going to receive at the hands of the federal judges or even the state judges.

The point that I'm making is this, that I think extreme caution has to be taken when we look at changing the system of justice as we know it. I'm not saying that what they've done in these issues -- I have been very involved in several of these issues that you highlighted in your testimony. I know that it upsets many of us in the legislature that we worked long and hard, and it's not the flick of a finger that you can get legislation through and the process -- both of you have worked with us in the process of getting legislation through the legislature and the time it takes. Then, of course, with the litigation that takes place and the review of our acts by the Supreme

Court, there are many of us that are not always happy with the decisions that they render.

trying to make is that, I think we have to be very, very cautious, because I know at the end of your testimony it's hanging in the air there about the rule-making process, the powers of the court and how far we should go and what specifics it should address with the Constitutional amendment that you've suggested from the District Attorneys Association.

Of course, here again, we are only moral; we're only human, and words can mean different things to different people. Of course, you have to boil that down to a Constitutional amendment, the people in this Commonwealth have to approve it. Again, we always have it left open to the interpretation of the courts.

MR. REBERT: Neither one of us nor the association would disagree with you about amending the Constitution. That's a very dramatic step. One of the reasons that I was not prepared to give you a quote on the proposed amendment is, I think it's going to

take a lot of work. We all are going to have to sit down and go over the proposals and weigh all the pros and cons and submit it to you for review. We're a long way from doing that.

We share your concern with amending the Constitution. I think I can speak for the association on that issue. So, that's going to be a very complex process that we're going to certainly think through quite completely.

MR. GEORGE: I tend to agree that the association is very reluctant to mess with the Constitution. It's something, though, that we feel is important enough it should be considered in this particular instance.

You had mentioned the federal system. I think we can look at the federal system as a model. My understanding of the federal system is that, the rule-making policy or procedures is a legislative authority and it is delegated to the Supreme Court, subject to legislative veto. That is not Pennsylvania's model currently, but perhaps, that might be something that we want to look at when we're considering a Constitutional amendment.

REPRESENTATIVE CALTAGIRONE: Thank

you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Thank you.

Representative Masland.

REPRESENTATIVE MASLAND: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. Just picking up on Chairman
Caltagirone's comments, I think that
frustration is a very appropriate word to
describe how we in the legislature feel; not
just how you feel out in the trenches.

But, as Chairman Caltagirone will recall, we spent during my first term in the legislature a substantial amount of time dealing with a code of evidence. We had all kinds of working groups over there dealing with a bill that made its way through the Senate and we worked long and hard on it in the House, only basically to be told, don't waste your time because whatever you do we're really not going to pay attention to and we're going to do our own thing. That's the message from the Supreme Court.

That was frustrating; the videotaping was frustrating. I guess it's something that we're not really going to get away from even if we do have a Constitutional amendment. It's

been my ultimate belief that we might be able to address that and probably could tighten it up. But, if you look at the language in Article 5, Section 10, it says, general rules governing practice, procedure and conduct. I think that's fairly tight. I think --

MR. REBERT: It's all encompassing terms.

REPRESENTATIVE MASLAND: Maybe we should take conduct out or maybe define practice more closely. But, I think we all agree that the court should have power to do something with it; the basic conduct of the courts, the basic, as you said, how many briefs do you file if you're going to be arguing a case before the court? That makes sense.

The problem, though, is that they're getting into more legislative matters; that they're not just proposing rules, but they're basically setting policy via rules and that's the frustrating thing. We constantly have to be aware of that whenever we do anything.

For instance, we are now discussing the lobbyist disclosure bill to try to set some guidelines as to those individuals who lobby us

in the legislature. Well, some of those lobbyists, a fair number, are lawyers and there's a great concern that no matter what we do, if we say a lobbyist has to file this document, a lobbyist has to tell us this, that the Supreme Court will come in and say, you can't dictate how those lawyers conduct their practice. Well, they're lobbying us. They are coming in trying to influence legislation and we should have some control over what they're doing.

But, there is a fear in that instance that they might come out and say again, well, that's the practice of law. Well, they're not going to court. They're coming to the General Assembly. I for one will say we ought to have some control over that.

I don't know if this debate probably started with Madison and Hamilton. I doubt that they assumed that the Supreme Court of the United States or any Supreme Court of any of our states would go quite as far as ours has done in striking down things which our legislative in saying that that's really their rules power. I think we probably should look

into how other states do it and see if that will solve the problem. Again, I fear that they're going to interpret things the way they want to interpret it.

Any thoughts on that? I'll put a question mark at the end of there in case you want to respond to that.

MR. GEORGE: Perhaps, Madison and Hamilton resolved that issue and that's why the federal system is set up differently than our state system is currently.

REPRESENTATIVE MASLAND: Good point.

MR. REBERT: I think you have a good point in the all encompassing nature of that section of the Constitution. That ultimately answers the question that I think we need to take a real close look at amending the Constitution.

Since the Supreme Court bases
everything on our state Constitution, we're
locked into their decisions. I sympathize with
the fact that you've been down this road once
and you got knocked down anyway, and I think
you just need to press forward.

REPRESENTATIVE MASLAND: Again, to

echo some of the other concerns, nobody up
here, I guess that may be a surprise to some
people out in the audience that we're going to
have a few Constitutional amendments to vote on
in November. But, we in the legislature don't
relish the idea of amending the Constitution at
the drop of your hat. We want to proceed
prudently.

But, to try to do something in this area I think would be prudent, but the problem is trying to do it and define what you're doing in such a way that you really have the result you're looking for and you don't just end up with the same situation.

MR. GEORGE: Just so there's no misinterpretation, the association shares your prudence. We want to be very careful about how this is worded and how it is done. It's not something to be done lightly.

REPRESENTATIVE MASLAND: Thank you for your testimony.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Seeing no further questions, I want to thank both of you gentlemen for providing us with your insightful testimony today. You are certainly welcome to

1 stay with us as we hear from the rest of the 2 individuals that are going to testify today. 3 Thank you very much. MR. REBERT: Mr. Chairman, I might want to just comment that I see that Jeff 5 Gunnet is listed as a witness, if you will. 6 7 CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Yes. 8 MR. REBERT: He indicated to me that 9 he did not have any prepared remarks to make, but I certainly assume that he is still welcome 10 11 should he want to say something. 12 CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Absolutely. The 13 next individual who is scheduled to present 14 testimony for the subcommittee is Gary Kling. 15 Good afternoon. Terrible 16 MR. KLING: Good afternoon. thing we have to have a microphone to talk 20 17 feet, but such is life. Gentlemen, my name is 18 19 Gary Kling. I'm a landlord here in the City of I've been active in our local Landlords 20 York. 21 Association since its founding in 1972. In the time that I've been a landlord 22

In the time that I've been a landlord

I find that the state laws regarding landlords

have gradually changed working against the

landlord until just recently. Then we had our

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legislature try to put some balance back into it so we don't have strictly a one-sided thing because a lot of landlords are just people like everybody else. They depend on their rents to pay their bills, their taxes, their insurance. And, if their operations are not profitable, they take a loss. Well, you only take so many losses until you lose your capital, and that's one of the things that we're confronted with.

So, when tenants do not pay their rent, we like to have at least a reasonable type of recourse. Our recourse has gotten better in the last couple of terms here with the changes of some of the laws regarding the timeliness of court actions when it becomes necessary to take action against the tenant to either collect rent or to get possession of the property back.

I was thrilled to see the way the legislature took care of that. We had a good change in law. It was balanced. It wasn't a flop back the other way. It was a good step. Unfortunately, the law was passed. It was supposed to go into effect and now we have a delay; not imposed by legislature; not imposed

by any reasonable time lags that's necessary for implementation; rather, by the Commonwealth's court system.

Until we got the law implemented with the rules that were passed down by the court, we wound up with a lot less than what the legislature gave us. The legislature was fair when they gave us the change in the laws to bring balance back to the landlord/tenant relationship. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania managed in almost every case to take what the arrangement was and compromise between where it was and where it is. That's not, I think, what the intention of the legislature did. They have done a good job. I know some of the work that went into this legislation getting it through both Houses and passed. It's ridiculous to have it modified by the courts.

I was always under the impression that the courts was there to get keep you guys straight; not to do your job for you; rather, they just keep you in line with the Constitution. I don't know what to do. But, there's a term that comes to my mind that has not been applied against judges for a long

time. Maybe we should look it up again and see what impeach means. Because, when people don't do their job and they're doing somebody else's job; they're messing with things that they don't have the authority to work in. I stand here as a citizen, as a landowner, a property owner, standing behind the Assembly and the job that they did in that particular area of legislation.

I don't have an awful lot to say that's good about what the court system has laid down on that. They have defeated part of what was worked very hard on to come up with a fair and straightforward law. That's all I have to say. I'll answer any questions.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Could you expound a little bit on some of the problems that would reoccur as a landlord? Then possibly how they were sought to be fixed.

MR. KLING: The biggest problem is that the old law assumed that the landlords were rich; that they had an infinite amount of money, and that the poor tenant had absolutely no recourse. And so, they gave tenants time to get their families out of a property and it was

at the landlord's expense.

Well, at one time that was a reasonable thing, but margins aren't what they used to be. Margins in apartments are as close. We now have federally funded, if you would, housing units that are providing very inexpensive housing. The private landlord must compete with that.

What we find is, we lose good tenants to public housing all the time. So, we try to keep our rents as low and reasonable as we can. We are constantly being confronted with increase in cost. Apartment buildings are worth more than most single-family dwellings. The result is that the tax bills are higher.

insurance is concerned, landlords, if they can get insurance, it's at exorbitant rates. I can remember when I could insure a building within my working for a hundred to \$200. That same building to carry less insurance on it now costs me twelve to \$1500. That's not a small increase. That's a lot of tenants that got to pay rent.

When things happen that causes a

landlord to take further losses, it has two effects. Number 1, either the landlord takes a loss and absorbs it, which you have mortgages to pay and there just isn't any room for that kind of thing; or you pass it through to the tenants who stay and pay who are honorable decent people who want a roof over their heads, a decent place to live in, but they find that their rent is going up because somebody moved out or didn't move out but decided they're just not going to pay the landlord.

As the result is, the change in the law was such, instead of taking 42 days plus to evict a tenant who was not paying the rent, had no right to stay in the building because they did not want to pay the rent, it wasn't that many times is not even based on the ability of the tenant to pay the rent. Many times it's their choice. They'd rather use dope or drink booze, or whatever, live beyond their standard of living.

When they don't pay for housing, I
don't think they are entitled to housing, at
least not in my housing. Forty-two days
without any income from a unit is a dent in the

your annual income. That's six weeks; that's a good size chunk of the year. Couple of those people in the units, particularly if you only a few units, your bottom line goes negative real fast.

The change in the law would allow us to get that tenant out in under 30 days. The way it was changed, we could have -- If the tenant didn't pay the rent the first of this month, by the first of the next month that unit could be empty and a new tenant could come in if we could find such an animal. But with the changes in the law now, it's back over the 30 days and we're back approaching the 42 days that we had before. I thought getting under 30 was a reasonably good approach at being fair. Taking it back above the 30 days is just not --

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Yes. A follow-up. You indicated that the Supreme Court suspended that statute and those rules or --

MR. KLING: No, no, they didn't suspend them. They took their good old time getting around, they put a hold on everything.

Took their good old time to put it into motion. But then, when they did come out with rules, instead of following the law they said, well, we don't like the way the law is. We're going to put it our way. The legislature gave us 10 days and the old law was 30 days, we now wind up with 20 days instead of the 10 days that was given to us by the law.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: So you do have a new set of rules? They're just less than what --

MR. KLING: What the law says we should have. I really object for them rewriting the law the legislature amended. If you guys in the legislature mess up the laws, then it's us to come back to you and get them to be amended. That's a good and normal procedure. It takes a little time, but everybody has input who is affected by it, both those who profit and those who pay the bill.

But, to have it arbitrarily changed by somebody who has no interest in what it is, without any grounds, without going through the process of a hearing -- hearings, et cetera, I think is just highly unfair.

1 CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Thank you very 2 much. I understand your point. Hang on, I'm 3 going to see if there are any more questions. (No response) 5 CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Okay. We thank 6 you very much. 7 MR. KLING: Thank you, gentlemen. CHAIRPERSON CLARK: The next 8 individual to testify before the committee is 9 Gary Gilden, Esquire. He's from the Dickinson 10 School of Law. 11 12 MR. GILDEN: Good afternoon, members of the Subcommittee: My name is Gary Gilden. 13 I'm a Professor of Law at the Dickinson School 14 of Law of the Pennsylvania State University. 15 First, let me make sure the committee 16 understands, I am not here to address the 17 18 exercise of the Supreme Court's rule-making power. That was the understanding when Mr. 19 20 Preski called me up. But rather, I want to 21 address some other matters that, perhaps, properly confine the inquiry to that scope to 22 identify maybe what is not the issue and to 23

There really are two other dimensions

narrow that issue.

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to what some people are categorizing as this new crisis with respect to the Pennsylvania courts. As this Subcommittee is well aware, very recently a trial judge in Pennsylvania declared that a portion of Megan's Law that required the defendants to prove that they are not sexually violent predators, that that provision of the legislation violated the Constitution.

Also, there has been recent controversy over the interpretations of the Pennsylvania Constitution, not as to the rule-making power, but as to the substantive rights set forth in the Constitution. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that under the State Constitution, law enforcement requires a warrant to search containers and automobiles. The United States Supreme Court has held no warrant is required under the United States Constitution.

Actions like this of judges have certainly upset the will of the legislature, to use one of your colleague's word, frustrated the will of the legislature. The action of the courts in cases like that certainly have placed

burdens on law enforcement as it sought to gather evidence and protect the public.

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Decisions of the sort may well be contrary to the will of the majority of the citizens of this Commonwealth. All of this combined has generated what some members have perceived to be a new crisis as a result of the courts. What I'm here to suggest today is what has been perceived as a crisis is, in fact, proof that the system is operating precisely in the fashion in which it was designed.

Again, let's make that perfectly clear, I'm not speaking about the exercise of the rule-making power because I have no competence or information on that. I'm talking about the extent to these other two aspects of judicial decision making had been brought into the same basket by some person, and I want to address those two and those two only.

To put this in perspective, let's first identify, if you indulge me, areas in which the courts have not been acting, indeed, cannot act to frustrate the will of the legislature. First of all, where the legislature passes a bill that does not pose a

constitutional problem, the role of the court is quite limited both in theory and in practice. The court's job is not and has not been to decide if a statute is wise as a matter of the balancing of competing policy interest. Where no constitutional issue is presented, the court defers entirely to the judgment of the legislature. If there's some ambiguity in that statute, the court's job is not to decide what it would have promulgated as the provision, but simply to identify what it believes this legislature's intent has been.

And if, for some reason, the court has misinterpreted the legislative will, no constitutional amendment is required to cure that. The legislature can simply pass amending legislation to correct the misinterpretation of its will. In other words, in areas where the legislation does not touch upon any constitutional provision, it is and always has been the legislature, not the courts, that have the final word. So, that's an area which poses theoretically and practically no particular problem.

There's a second category of cases,

where again, the legislature always has the final word. That is an area as where the court acts in the first instance under common law to resolve situations where the legislature simply hasn't chosen to act at all. If we look to the origins of our tort system where the early cases came up with respect to persons injured by other persons driving, persons injured by defective products, because there was no legislation on the books, it fell to the courts in the first instance to allocate the rights and the responsibilities among the various participants.

Under the common law, judge-made law, but again where there is no constitutional issue raised, this legislature has the power, acting within constitutional bounds, to enact any bill it wishes to reformulate those rules to exert its own policy judgment. Again, no one needs to be reminded of what seems to be a constant stream of tort reform legislation where the legislature is called upon to reformulate the common law rules created by judges.

As with other areas of decision

making, the court ultimately does and must defer to the legislature, again so long as what is happening does not touch any constitutional issues. The court is not in the position to either in practice or in theory to second-guess the policy judgment.

In those two situations where this committee and its colleagues passes legislation that raises no constitutional issue, or where this committee passes — and its colleagues passes legislation to change common law rules created by the courts that don't touch the constitutional dimension, this legislature has always had the final word. The only area in which the courts have the power and the ability and the history of acting in a way that countermands the will of the legislature is when legislation touches upon the Constitution.

Again, I see from the agenda that one area which this has arisen is the area of the exertion of rule-making power, but as I said, I have nothing to say on that matter because I have not studied the issue and no expertise or even modest competence. But, I do want to talk about how the court does no disservice to the

legislature, to the citizenry, to the

Commonwealth to its role when it acts to strike

down legislation that invades the Constitution.

The Constitution, apart from allocating powers among the branches of government, prescribe certain rights of the individuals that limit government, including limitations on the prosecution, including limitations on the police, including limitations on the legislature. By definition these rights which are designed to limit government are prescribing rights that limit what the majority has decided to do.

The rights were enshrined in the Constitution because of fear that there would be times when looking in terms of short-term expediency government would claim the need for power to invade certain rights. And rights were enshrined in the Constitution because of fear that majorities acting in their self-interest would fail to protect the rights of minorities.

And when the court finds that a piece of legislation which was, by definition, designed to carry out the will of the majority,

when it finds it violates the Constitution, obviously, its decision is going to upset the legislature. Obviously, its decision is going to upset the majority of the populous that the legislation was designed to carry out that popular will, but that's precisely what the court system was intended to do with respect to constitutional rights.

And, in fact, the exercise of the power of judicial review to strike down legislation that is unconstitutional, far from being something that's a cause of concern in this Commonwealth, across the nation; in fact, the exercise of this power by the courts has, in fact, historically made the United States the envy of the world for its protection of liberty, for its protection of freedom.

Newly-emergent democracies in eastern Europe are seeking to emulate the American legal system, including the power of judicial review over constitutional issues as the best way to balance the need to preserve order without unduly trampling civil liberty.

Obviously, when the legislators take the oath to uphold the Constitution, the

premises that they have made to consider judgment that a piece of legislation is constitutional. However, ever since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Marbury versus Madison, it has been accepted that despite the legislators taking the oath, we do need the courts as the ultimate arbiters of constitutionality.

I suppose there are a variety of reasons, but the two most prominent ones, as I see it, are, first of all, judges are duty bound to decide their cases based upon precedence rather than individual value judgment, individual policy judgments, or what the court believes the majority of the people in a particular point in time want. That gives us some consistency; it gives us some distance; it gives us some distance;

The other reason that this is reposed in the courts is that, perhaps the judges need to feel less fearful of a wrath and retaliation of voters. As was just pointed out recently, retention is much less ominous as a threat than automatically standing for reelection every two or every six years.

And, indeed, history has proven the wisdom of giving courts this particular power. It's the courts that have guaranteed and furthered attempts to provide equal rights to racial minorities against the short-term desires of majorities to perpetuate discrimination. It's courts that have protected freedom of speech against hysteria of McCarthyism at a time where there were overblown fears of somehow Communist infiltration of the United States.

So, I think we have to accept it as the premise of the system that the dissatisfaction that the courts have overridden legislative judgments when the court is interpreting the constitutional rights that were invaded is evidence not that the system is dysfunctional, but instead, evidence that the system is functioning.

what I want to address more

particularly is the issue of what happens when

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the lower

Appellate Courts and even the trial courts

decide a case under the Pennsylvania

Constitution that reaches a different result

than the United States Supreme Court has reached under the United States Constitution.

I know I heard the District

Attorneys Association say that they don't take constitutional amendments lightly, but I am well aware that it was a year or two ago that they proposed an amendment designed to respond to this supposed crisis that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was finding rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution and handcuffing law enforcement in areas where the Supreme Court had found no right to exist.

Let me give you a couple of examples.

I want to address the concerns in why I think
they are misplaced.

The United States Supreme Court, as I said in my opening remarks, has held no warrant is required to search an automobile or containers in that automobile. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has insisted under the Pennsylvania Constitution Article 1, Section 8, that the officer who believes he has probable cause to search a car or its container must seek a warrant from the magistrate unless there is some exigency that would excuse that

requirement.

Supreme Court in this case and other cases of its ilk have been cast as a maverick court defined the precedence of the United States Supreme Court. It resulted, as I just mentioned, in proposal being floated to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to mandate that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania interpret Article 1, Section 8, in precisely the same fashion that the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

I submit that these concerns with these decisions are both misplaced and, indeed, unprincipled and perhaps hypocritical.

Let me first address why the concern that somehow the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is engaged in reckless activism, thumbing its nose as the United States Supreme Court is entirely misplaced.

It must be understood that the

Pennsylvania Constitution is a source of rights
that is entirely independent from the United

States Constitution. In fact, it's no

different than when this legislature passes
laws in areas where the federal government has
acted as well. We know there's federal
legislation protecting investors and
securities. There's an array of federal
securities act. This legislature has also
passed acts protecting under Pennsylvania law
investors regulating in some fashion the
issuance of security. There are countless
areas where both the federal government and the
state government have legislated to afford
protection of assigning rights and
responsibilities.

Just as the state legislation has its own history and its own intent as an independent source of rights, so too does the Pennsylvania Constitution have its own unique history, its own unique intent, and its own unique definition as a protector of rights. In fact, the Pennsylvania Constitution is not a clone of the United States Constitution.

Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution was not cloned from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Quite to the contrary, from a

chronological standpoint, the Pennsylvania

Constitution was adopted in 1776, a full 10

years before ratification of the United States

Constitution, a full 15 years before

ratification of the Bill of Rights that

contains Article 4.

Indeed, the Declaration of Rights
under the Pennsylvania Constitution was not an
amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution. It
was part of that organic document and not,
coincidentally, Article 1 happens to be the
very first provision of the Pennsylvania
Constitution; whereas, the Fourth Amendment was
an add-on in an amendment to the United States
Constitution some 15 years after Pennsylvania
had adopted its Constitution.

So, we have out there two wholly independent documents deserving of wholly different and independent interpretation.

There's absolutely nothing in theory that dictates that the Pennsylvania Constitution must be interpreted in an identical fashion to the United States Constitution; just as there's no dictate in an area where this legislature is not preempted. There's no mandate that

whenever this legislature acts, it is simply walking in lock step with the federal government.

Now, apart from the fact that we have a unique genealogy between the Pennsylvania and United States Constitution and that they are wholly independent rather than interdependent sources of rights, there are institutional reasons which virtually guarantee that the United States Supreme Court will interpret the United States Constitution to afford less generous rights than a State Supreme Court will in interpreting the State Constitution.

You don't have to read any sort of legal theory. You just have to read the opinions of the United States Supreme Court itself where it admits, when we are called upon to decide whether a right exists under the United States Constitution, we are in every case constrained by two factors, two factors that dictate we ought to be very, very careful before we recognize a right.

Factor Number 1 is the circumstance that when we declare a right, it applies across the 50 states. No state has discretion to

refuse to confer rights if we interpret the United States Constitution to demand it. And because our decisions cut across a wide geographic swath of 50 diverse states, we may not be very certain of the practical effect of our decisions. Therefore, we better be very, very careful if we are going to advance rights because we're not certain whether each of the 50 states can implement that.

Institutional Constraint Number 2 is federalism. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that when it chooses to find a right exists, it disempowers the state from reaching a contrary decision. There are concerns not only with the fact that we don't know what will happen as a practical matter, but we have to be very, very careful about this gentle balance in terms of the allocation of power between the federal government and the state government. When we find a right to exist under the Fourth Amendment, no state government, no local government has any discretion but to follow that rule.

Neither of these two institutional limits is present when a state Supreme Court

interprets its own Constitution. Or more to the point, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decides whether a warrant is required under Article 1, Section 8, apart from interpreting an entirely different document, it is not shackled by the same two institutional constraints.

The decisions of the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court go no further than the boundaries of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has a much greater understanding of the diversity in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the ability of government to recognize a right as a practical matter than the United States Supreme Court does when its decisions apply equally in California, Rhode Island, Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Georgia, whatever.

Secondly, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court does not have to worry about federalism.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court when it

recognizes a right, does not have to worry

about whether it has stepped on the toes of a

different branch of government. While, the

Supreme Court worries about the federal

government invading the province of the state, the State Supreme Court is not worried about stepping upon the federal government's toe when it recognizes a right. In effect, the United States Supreme Court has said, we conceive and the system conceives that it is the states that are to be the laboratories for individual rights. This is where experimentation as to whether a right may be properly tolerated without unduly burdening government or public order. It's the states that we look to to advance individual rights because they lack the two institutional problems that we do.

So, the Pennsylvania state Supreme

Court does no disservice to the United States

Supreme Court when it reaches a different

decision under its own Constitution than the

Supreme Court has done under Article 4. The

state Supreme Court does no disservice to any

other organ of government when it chooses to

recognize a right under the State Constitution.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did no disservice to anybody when it found in Commonwealth versus DeJohn that in Pennsylvania police may not routinely inspect our bank

records without cause, even though the United States Supreme Court said as a federal matter that's not a problem. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did no disservice to anybody in the Commonwealth when in Commonwealth versus

Mellili it found that without cause the police may not routinely use pen registers to find out phone numbers that were dialed even though the United States Supreme Court refused to mandate that rule across the nation.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court would do no disservice to anybody if they were to find that the right-to-bear arms under the Pennsylvania Constitution is broader than whatever interpretation the U.S. Supreme Court decides under the Federal Constitution.

Not only is the concern that somehow the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is trampling upon the United States Supreme Court when it affords a differential interpretation to the Pennsylvania Constitution; not only is that concern misplaced, but efforts to reign in the courts by mandating that they follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court is rather hypocritical.

The Legislative and Executive
branches of this Commonwealth have fought to
preserve their sovereignty against the federal
government. The legislature has objected to
the undue mandates of federal law, especially
the unfunded mandates of federal law.

why then would the legislature somehow seek to insist that the Pennsylvania courts are somehow to be enslaved to follow federal court decisions; to forego their sovereignty; to lose any power to give any meaning to the charter of this Commonwealth? The only answer I can give concerning efforts to require the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to interpret its Constitution in exactly the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution is an effort to put short-term expediency ahead of principle and sovereignty because of short-term dissatisfaction with particular decisions.

If any government is going to prosper and earn the respect of its citizens, as, by the way, ours has quite successfully for over 200 years, the legislature has to remain faithful to the overall structure of separation

of powers. It has to be faithful to the overall concept of checks and balances that have quaranteed its integrity.

That's true even if an individual court decision reaches a result under the Constitution that the legislature disagrees with as a matter of policy. I respectfully submit that apart from the rule-making power, upon which I have no opinion, that what we're witnessing in 1997 is absolutely no different than how the system has thrived for the past 200 years.

I would be happy to answer any questions apart from the rule-making question that the committee may have.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Thank you very much. I'd like to welcome Representative Dave Mayernik. Representative Schuler.

REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: I don't disagree with you, sir, dealing with interpretation of the law. That's the function of the courts. Let's use -- That's not really a hypothetical situation, but right now we have an education issue in Pennsylvania. It's before the courts. If the courts come down and

say, we believe that the funding system now in operation in Pennsylvania is unconstitutional, all right, I can live with that. But if the courts come down and say it's unconstitutional, this is what you have to do to make it constitutional, then I have a problem. Would you respond to that?

MR. GILDEN: Yes. I'm used to asking those questions rather than answering, so it's fun to be on this side. Let me give you the typical two-answer.

If they found that the alternative system was the only system that is tolerable under that particular constitutional provision, then I have no problem because the court would be saying that the framers of the Constitution mandated this as the only avenue.

But if they say this is a way to make it constitutional, but, of course, the legislature always retains the power to come up with a better idea which, of course, then we retain the power to apply it to the Constitution, I have no particular problem with this legislature saying, well, here's what they say could make it constitutional. We've got a

different idea. We think our idea complies
with the new constitutional standard, and the
court would be called upon not to say, listen,
we told you what you must do, but then to
assess whether what you came up with was
constitutional or not.

Ultimately, the courts said we strike it down again because this is the only way, I think the ultimate remedy is, if that's what they believe the Constitution is interpreted to mean, and the legislature is dissatisfied with that and it violates what it believes the Constitution ought to mean, the constitutional amendment always stands as the ultimate power in the citizen to correct what someone perceives to be abuses of the court's power.

I don't think the court ultimately can shackle or hamstring the citizens or this legislature, because ultimately the power resides in the people and the people have every opportunity; obviously, more cumbersome than legislation, but intentionally so, to amend the Constitution to comport with what they think is tolerable as we approach that 21st Century.

REPRESENTATIVE SCHULER: Thank you.

That's all.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Let me ask -- I don't want to put any words in your mouth, but you've indicated that the tort arena would be an appropriate area for the legislature to delve into because it derives from common law and there was a void in legislation developed through the court system. The legislature tried to address the tort system with the medical malpractice. Maybe if you could comment on where we want to file in that process, I'd appreciate that.

MR. GILDEN: Yes and no. I'll only speak at the level of theory. To the extent that the legislature changed the rules that did not touch upon the Constitution, its power was essentially the final word. At some juncture, and this is what has happened in tort reform legislation that has placed caps on recovery, that the courts have said certain tort reform provisions have violated the Constitution.

It's funny, I had brought before me
the Civil Justice Digest from the Roscoe Pound
Foundation from spring of 1997, one of the
articles under Civil Justice System is tort

reform proponents unveil a new goal, limited judicial powers and circumvents state constitutions. It suggests that one of the problems that legislatures ran into is that their attempts to change common law in some of the provisions created constitutional problems. In other words, some tort caps, some caps had found to violate the provisions of the Constitution.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Maybe you can help me with the next step. The legislature cannot infringe on individual's constitutional rights. Yet, the courts decide what is a constitutional right or not. And the question is, how broadly or how narrowly they define a constitutional right.

Perhaps in the legislature's mind the Supreme Court is broadening that to a point that they have hamstrung what the legislature is trying to do. The legislature is looking, possibly, for a way to reign that back in. Any comments on how it's been done in the past that this is a circular process, why, I'd appreciate your insight.

MR. GILDEN: There is one way and

it's not the simplest way, but it's the way the system is designed. The people always reserved the power to amend the Constitution, at least if we're dealing with the State Constitution. So, if the Supreme Court were to say that your tort reform legislation invades the provision of the State Constitution and your constituents believe that they have misinterpreted the Constitution or reached a result that they don't wish to have; again, not as simple as legislation but deliberately not as simple as legislation, now there is the power to amend the state Constitution. Obviously, there's a whole different issue presented if it's found to violate the federal Constitution. that's a bigger problem; same avenue; far more cumbersome, however.

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another step further. If the Supreme Court indicates that there's a constitutional right that the citizens by amendment feel -- the citizens feel too broad and by amendment want to constrict that constitutional right, and the Supreme Court again frustrates that by indicating that the phrase in the legislation

wasn't proper or it wasn't advertised properly
pursuant to statute or it wasn't properly
formed in the proper question, is there a way
to address that?

MR. GILDEN: Yes. There's two ways to address it. One is to anticipate that.

Obviously, before a constitutional amendment is proposed, the legislature should take great pains to do the same legal research they'd ultimately have to do to defend what they did in court, rather than, let it happen and then ask after the fact, gee, did we follow the proper procedures? It would be prudent to anticipate that and make sure that any proposed amendment unambiguously satisfied the procedural requisites.

Also anticipate any subsequent attacks as to ambiguity in the language just as any good lawyer would, any good counsel to the legislature, any good legislator is well equipped. It's no different than what you do on a daily basis with legislation. I think the answer is, be careful in advance so that there's no ambiguity as into the language as to your intent; no defect as to the procedures

that you followed. I would hope that would happen even without that risk occurring.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Okay. Let me ask you one more question. Do you have an opinion or any thoughts on the Supreme Court's order with regard to unified court system?

MR. GILDEN: No.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: That was simple enough. Representative Masland.

REPRESENTATIVE MASLAND: Thank you.

It's a pleasure to have my former professor on the other side as I get to ask him questions.

My first question is, is all that going to be on the test?

MR. GILDEN: Well, I think you're giving the test here, so I guess not.

REPRESENTATIVE MASLAND: Seriously, I do appreciate the way you framed the issue because I think it is important for us to know what we are talking about in terms of Supreme Court, maybe expanding its rule-making power on the one hand versus the Supreme Court performing its constitutional function of looking at the laws that we create to determine if they have offended the Constitution. So, I

think that has been very helpful.

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One comment, though, that comes up as you talk about federalism is that, probably one of the problems we have with respect to things being different under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of their Constitution and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of our Constitution is that, we are frequently told by Congress what to do and how to legislate, and if we don't do that, then we're going to lose funding. So, we do things like pass legislation to tell school boards to expel everybody that brings anything close to a weapon onto school property; when, if you look back at the federalist papers, and I'm sure you are familiar with, you look at the issue of criminal justice and criminal laws, they would have said quite plainly and simply that that's all the matter for the states. The federal government, the U.S. government is not going to tell the states what is and is not a crime. have that tension at our level. I think that's part of the problem when we look at things from a judicial perspective.

MR. GILDEN: I think you have

identified the source of the problem, the source of the confusion; that is, the legislation is so accustomed to finding — the state legislature is so accustomed finding itself eventually stuck with the federal rule. It then looks across the hallway to the court that somehow is liberated from it and saying, well, wait a minute. If we're stuck, why aren't they? I think it's important, again, to narrow the issue.

First of all, I think it's quite clear that states are litigating their power vis-a-vis the federal government, the criminal justice area. Recent Supreme Court decisions finding that the federal government's commerce power does not extend in certain areas because they are the areas of criminal justice where it belongs to the states.

In the past two or three years there have been a handful of cases on that point, where the U.S. Supreme Court has said, Congress, you have been acting under the commerce power, but actually you are passing legislation that properly goes to the states. So that's happening. Some of your power is

being restored under the same principle.

On the other hand, Congress has certain powers, far beyond the powers of -- The Federal Congress has certain powers, express powers, that go well beyond the powers assigned to the federal courts. In other words, there are enumerated powers of Congress where they do have the power to preempt the legislature.

The United States Supreme Court has
the limited power to decide cases in
controversies, about federal law and no power
to talk about state law. So, if we just simply
laid out the system, quite frankly, if we
compare the federal government and the state
government, you have less power as the
legislature compared to your federal
counterparts than the courts do compared to
their federal counterparts. That's just the
way the system is doled out.

There are expressed powers of the legislative branch in the federal government that go far beyond any powers that are assigned to the United States Supreme Court. I think you have to understand that it's not parity. You don't somehow get the same power that the

state courts do as compared to the federal government. That's just the lay of the land.

Back to the preliminary point, I believe state legislatures have been successful recently in asserting or reasserting their sovereignty in the area of criminal justice. I think the Brady Bill was one example. I think it was the drug-free school zone was another example where federal legislation under the commerce power was struck down because under federals and principles that said that's matter for the state legislature.

But, I think you have to not confuse the two issues. The powers of the judiciary compared to the federal judiciary are different than the power of your legislature compared to the federal legislature.

REPRESENTATIVE MASLAND: Thank you.

Although the issue we're dealing with today is not directly involved with some of your comments, I think it was Senate Bill 981,

Senator Hart's bill, that dealt with the extent that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could exceed the rights given, granted by the U.S.

Supreme Court. I think that there was a lot of

conflict and concern. I think you are probably are correct in saying that short-term expediency did drive that issue as much as anything else. It's something I'm sure we'll have to take another look at again eventually.

I do thank you for your time here.

Thank you for your comments. Although I did

not have you for constitutional law, I had you

for remedies. You did a fine job and I'll tell

Professor Kelly that.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: We thank you very much. There's no further questions for you.

The next individuals testifying is

Suzanne Eng and Jeff Gunnet. We would like you

to come up here and give your testimony one at

a time. What we'll do, Mr. Gunnet is, have

Susan give her testimony followed by your

testimony and then questions from the panel.

MS. ENG: Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee on Courts: I thank you for taking time to listen to the voice of a victim of capital crime, in your efforts to again limit the number of appeals granted to murderers of mothers' children.

The death of a child by murder is not

life does change as time goes by, as the years pass. You learn to bear the absence of your child because that's what you have to do; either that, or lose sight of the needs of your remaining children at home. She's not coming back and you know it. But sometimes you think, it wasn't really she who died. What proof did they have but her perfect teeth? Many children nowadays have perfect teeth. Yes, you admit to yourself, yes, but how many were missing and wearing their work uniform as your child would have been?

You go to bed at night and say a prayer, please come to me tonight in a dream, my dear, so you can seem real to me again. You are so afraid that the memory that you hold dear of your child is going to fade and that there's nothing you can do about it. Just as the pain eases, you're afraid that that memory might ease also.

I don't have enough memories of
Trista Elizabeth Eng. She was only 16 years
old when she was murdered. I don't have the
memories of her high school graduation or the

memories of special college moments; of seeing her strive to succeed in what ever career she would have eventually chosen for herself. At 16 she had her sights set on architecture. But had she decided to be an assembly line worker, a computer operator, or waitress, I would have been equally as proud of her, and I wish she would be here for me to be proud of her.

What I do have are 16 years of memories captured in not enough pictures and some videotapes. I have some of her precious belongings such as diaries, favorite clothes, school art projects, knickknacks and I have her flute, but these aren't enough. These few special belongings fit in a single chest. A box I jealously guard because Trista will never be here again to draw more sketches, to write or to model clothes.

My youngest daughter Kate asked me the other day for the key to this box. I panicked for a second. Would the scrap books be returned? Does Kate know the importance of these objects? I bought the cedar chest a few months after Trista was murdered. It's supposed to be a symbol of hope for young

ladies. Instead of holding a future, it holds well-loved things of an all too brief past, and it has plenty of spare room that will never be filled.

If you don't mind, I'd like to tell
you a little bit about my Trista. Growing up
she was either best friends or mortal enemies
of her younger brother Morgan. She always held
her little sister as precious. She was a
joiner, a doer, a scout, a library volunteer, a
church Sunday School helper; my helper at home.
She loved performing for an audience in band
concerts, dance recitals, school plays. I can
picture her clearly as a fourth grader standing
in the kitchen with her flute in perfect
position, her posture and shoulders straight,
reading sheet music that I still can't read.

Later, she learned to play saxophone and piccolo, and she played in the high school marching band, and she played lots of softball with a youth group in Dillsburg.

Trista's favorite color was red. As soon as she could wear lipstick, bright red lipstick highlighted her beautiful ever-ready smile. It really looked right on her. The

last coat she would ever own was red wool.

Sometimes I get this coat out and I grab it and I hold on to it tight just to feel Trista there. Morning after morning I would reach over to her in the car and squeeze her arm encased in this red coat and kiss her good-bye as she went off to start her school day. Red roses were her favorite flowers.

Trista was a loving caring person who often put aside her own problems to help her friends deal with theirs. She was insightful, realistic and strong with character. I was always able to talk to her as a mother imparting words of wisdom as a friend sharing dreams. I learned after her death that she thought my wisdom was a little bit off. Good grades and study would never be as important as her friends. But, she would have never wanted me to know just what she thought of my advice; my feelings mattered to her.

She liked to try to beautify me, carefully applying eye makeup and blush. If you could have met Trista, you would agree with me, she was a very beautiful girl. She was tall with fixed straight dark brown hair, a

wide beautiful smile showing those perfect

white teeth that I mentioned earlier, exotic

eyes and golden soft skin that flaunted her

Eurasian ancestry. I was very proud of her and

I still miss her so very much.

My daughter was murdered Monday, July 12, 1993. It's over four years ago; yet, it often seems like yesterday. I was at work; her sister at a friend's and her brother out camping. Trista was at home getting ready for work. A man came to the door in response to an ad I had placed to sell a recliner that we didn't use anymore. That man offered her a ride to work. He was nice looking, clean cut. Trista needed a ride. She couldn't get in touch with her friends for a ride. Trista accepted his offer of a ride.

At some point he drew out a gun, drove Trista miles away to isolated state game lands in York County, in the northern part; raped her and shot her to death. The reason given: He was angry with women. He was up on rape charges in another county and he was very, very angry with women.

After six weeks of hoping and praying

for a word from Trista, of contacting the authorities, of hanging missing child posters around town and in the paper, after her 17th birthday came and went, and I was sure she would be home for her birthday. I was positive if anything happened she would be there for that 17th birthday. After a thrilling morning when I found her flute in the front seat of my car and I knew she was safe, I later found out that her girlfriend had had her flute and she was returning it and no one was home so she put it in my car.

After six weeks of being sick at heart, my Trista was found. It was I, her mother after hearing a radio news cast on my way to work that Thursday morning, August 26th, 1993, who called the police from work to ask if the body found on the game lands might be that of my Trista. Where I got the courage to do that, I will never know. I, to this day, don't know how I could do that.

It was I who coolly gave the state

police the phone number of Trista's dentist. I

could do it coolly because, you see, it wasn't

really Trista that they found; but it really

was. The authorities came shortly after I got home from work. The beaded necklace they found, well, at the time the kids all over the place were making these little beaded necklaces. It wasn't necessarily Trista's. Then they showed me an earring that took my breath away. It wasn't especially extravagant or costly looking, but it was especially Trista's; one of a pair that she wore almost all the time.

After killing Trista on July 12,
1993, and leaving her dear body open to the
elements in a cornfield in the July and August
heat, Hubert Michael fled the state. He jumped
bail on his rape case but was returned from
Utah on July 27 after being arrested in a
stolen car. Brought back to county prison, he
told his brother what he had done to Trista,
shooting her three times; not once or twice,
but three times. Then he told a different
story. It was not he who committed this crime
and he knew nothing about it.

Nevertheless, he was arrested for my daughter's murder on August 27, 1993. He escaped from Lancaster County prison on

November 14, 1993, by switching ID with his cell mate. It wasn't until March 26th of the next year that Michael was apprehended in New Orleans.

Hubert Michael was tried for the

Lancaster rape and found guilty; brought to

York County, he agreed to plead guilty in

return for a life sentence. But when it came

time to plead in court, Michael changed his

mind. He pled not guilty. He wanted a jury

trial. Then he wanted a change of venue.

Up in Berks County, after a couple of potential jurors were interviewed, court recessed. During the recess Michael decided to again plead guilty, whether or not the death penalty would be requested. Back in court he recited the litany. Yes, he knew what he was doing. Yes, he was happy with the competency of his attorney. Yes, yes, yes, everything. Yes, he killed my Trista.

Back in York County he wanted a jury to decide his fate, but a jury from a different county. This was denied. When the jurors lined up in the hallway for interviews in York County, Michael again changed his mind. He

wanted the judge now to decide his fate. The jurors were sent away. Again, he was satisfied with his attorney. The judge sentenced him to death. He was not going to fight. He wanted to get his automatic appeal over with. Then he wanted a new attorney. Things were not done right. A hearing took place depicting a crazy or sane, a poor young man from a bad home life or from a good home life. Appeals are still being scheduled.

Hubert Michael has played games with my family, with the people of York and Berks Counties, with the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. He has had my family and me on an emotional roller-coaster ride ever since he killed my Trista. He, the murderer, the criminal has been in control every step of the way with little respect for his victim, my family, and the Pennsylvania judicial system. Every time he changed his mind and made an abrupt about-face, he was playing games, enjoying control over those he devastated with his ungodly actions. And believe it, he exercised control over the judicial system.

Hubert Michael, if not exercised

control, he took full advantage of every little turn. Hubert Michael is typical of the individuals on whom the State Supreme Court wants to endow unlimited appeals. With each appeal there will be the hurting, the heartache, the despair for the victims, for us, Trista's family and friends, and the family and friends of the victims of all capital case inmates.

These criminals have been found to be cold-blooded killers who have little or no remorse for their crimes, for taking our loved ones from us. I do not want them to have the right to this many appeals. They are entitled to their day in court, to trial by jury of their peers, and yes, to an appeal, but no more. I was glad for the legislative action limiting the number of appeals and appreciate the time and effort that it took to enact such a law as the Capital Unitary Review Act.

I am fearful and resentful of a judiciary branch of our state government that seems to be trying to assume power to take carefully thought-out laws, legislation that has been enacted by and for the people of this

Commonwealth in the body of our elected 1 2 legislature, and throw them out without just 3 cause. Thank you. 4 CHAIRPERSON CLARK: I thank you. Do 5 you have any questions? (No response) 6 7 CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Go ahead, Mr. Gunnet. 8 I originally came -- I 9 MR. GUNNET: 10 heard of this hearing yesterday afternoon. 11 originally came here to support the testimony 12 of the District Attorneys Association, but after the last couple minutes my support is 13 14 with Mrs. Eng. I lived in that world. I live in that world. Victims in a homicide case have 15 no rights because they're not there to exercise 16 rights, but certainly family members do. 17 Through the proceedings leading up to the 18 19 trial, as Mrs. Eng pointed out, the emotional roller-coaster ride with so many stalls in 20 21 between, you ask why, and you're always told that is the accused right. 22 23

Well, the accused right is to have a trial by jury. Then if found guilty, which in my case and Mrs. Eng's case was the case, we

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feel, I feel and I'm sure all victims of family members of people that have people on death row feel that the rights now cease. We have rights That was my question the whole way through, when does our rights kick in? Up to this point we have none.

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The legislation to speed up the appeal process was a good one. At least it brings some closure to the ordeal; never total closure, but through the judicial system of our situations. So I support wholeheartedly everything that Mrs. Eng has spoken to you about. I live in that world, especially the last couple pages. We go through it every day of the week, every morning. I still wake up thinking that it's just a dream, but folks, it's not. That's all I have.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: I thank you. Representative Waugh.

Thank you, Mr. REPRESENTATIVE WAUGH: Chairman. I think I should maybe explain on behalf of Mr. Gunnet, and just make a comment also for the other members of the committee who are not from York County. Like Mrs. Eng, Mr. Gunnet was a victim of crime. Just two and a

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half years ago his wife was murdered just outside the City of York. I can tell you as a member of the General Assembly from York County that both of your cases are cases, of course I'm not intimately involved in, but certainly I have been watching and listening as the media and other information is passed here in the county. They both weigh heavily on my mind as deliberations over these matters continue.

My heart goes out to both of you and I wish you the best. I just thought it was important for members of the committee to understand before us now sit two members of families of some of the most heinous crimes committed in our county just in the last several years. I know it was hard for both of you to be here today. I thank both of you for testifying. It was very important to our work in the House of Representatives. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON CLARK: Thank you. Representative Masland.

REPRESENTATIVE MASLAND: Just one brief comment. The legislature has tried on occasion to clarify and expand the rights of

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1 victims' families, certainly not to the extent that we probably should, but to give you a 2 3 voice at the time of sentencing to make sure 4 that the court does hear from you and that you 5 have as much of a right to say your piece as 6 the defendants do. There's certainly more that 7 we can do, and I do thank you for taking the time to come here and share some very difficult 8 9 experiences. Thank you. 10 CHAIRPERSON CLARK: I thank you. believe that will conclude our Subcommittee on 11 Courts hearing for today. We'd like to thank 12 everyone who brought testimony forward, and 13 also thank the individuals who came and were 14 15 interested in listening to this testimony. Thank you very much. 16 (At or about 3:00 p.m., hearing was 17 18 concluded) 19 20 21 22 23

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CERTIFICATE

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I, Karen J. Meister, Reporter, Notary 3 4 Public, duly commissioned and qualified in and 5 for the County of York, Commonwealth of 6 Pennsylvania, hereby certify that the foregoing 7 is a true and accurate transcript of my stenotype notes taken by me and subsequently 8 reduced to computer printout under my supervision, and that this copy is a correct 10 record of the same.

> This certification does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means unless under my direct control and/or supervision.

> > Dated this 2nd day of November, 1997.

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Karen J. Meister - Reporter

Notary Public

My commission expires 10/19/00