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1	COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2	JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
	SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS
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-	IN RE: HOUSE BILL 43
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7	Verbatim record of hearing held at the
•	University of Pittsburgh, William
_	Pitt Union, Room 637, 3959 Fifth
8	Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
	on Wednesday,
9	July 12, 2000
	9:00 a.m.
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	MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
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	HON. THOMAS P. GANNON, CHAIRMAN
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	* * *
14	ALSO PRESENT:
	ADOU'I REGERT!
15	The Board W. Mary J.
	Hon. David J. Mayernik
16	Brian Preski, Esquire, Chief Counsel
10	Richard Scott, Esquire, Minority Chief Counsel
17	Jane Mendlow, Research Analyst
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Reported by: Nancy J. Grega, RPR



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MR. PRESKI: I am Brian Preski, Chief
Counsel for the House Judiciary Committee. With me
right now are Richard Scott of the Democratic Caucas
and Jane Mendlow, M-E-N-D-L-O-W, of Representative
Blaum's Office. Right now we are awaiting the arrival
of Chairman Gannon and other members of the Committee.
However, we did want to open up this meeting. One of
our testifiers, Robert Raphael, R-A-P-H-A-E-L, Esquire,
of Raphael, Ramsden, R-A-M-S-D-E-N, and Behers,
B-E-H-E-R-S, is present and would like to make a few
comments just for the record. We are prepared to take
those comments right now.

MR. RAPHAEL: My name is Robert Raphael.

I'm a lawyer here in Allegheny County. I'm Past

President of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, Family
Law Section, the Allegheny County Bar, Family Law

Section. I'm a committee member of the Joint State

Government Commission on Domestic Relations Law.

I am Past President of the Allegheny County Bar

Association and Past President of the Pennsylvania Bar

Institute, the educational arm of the Pennsylvania Bar

Association. I have been doing this kind of work for a long time.

MR. PRESKI: Mr. Raphael, I know that you have to leave and go to Boston. What I would ask you,

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just if you could in a few brief minutes, give us your position on the issue that is before the Committee this morning, that would be common law marriages, Representative Mayernik's proposal to abolish those common law marriages.

MR. RAPHAEL: I advocate the abolishment of the common law marriage. I think most of the people who think they are common law married are not common law married. They don't know what a common law marriage is. They think it is you file a joint tax return, you are married, or if they have lived together for a certain period of time, they are married, or if they have children, they are married. It brings about a great deal of confusion. of Social Security, they have to prove that they are married; in terms of Workmen's Compensation, I think even in the recent U.S. Airline accident here, a number of people came in and claimed survivor benefits claiming they were the spouses and they are stuck with trying to prove. I think that people should know whether they are married or not married. There are people that may want to live together without the marriage and even if they are living together for a period of time, one party claims they are married and the other one says, we never did get married. I think

that's wrong. I think a consideration should be given to, that there should be a place where people can go in in every Register of Wills Office throughout the State, there would be a book where they could identify themselves and have to prove who they are and they would put down the date that they are there and sign their names and that alone would be an acknowledgement of marriage and at least they would know what the obligations and commitments are. They shouldn't have to wait until they have lived together for ten years and separate and then fight over whether it was a marriage relationship or just a live-together situation.

MR. PRESKI: Mr. Raphael, one question if
I could. You talked about the US Air crash from here
in Pittsburgh. Is it fair for me to say that in
those cases where people claim common law marriages at
times, they do that when there is some specific benefit
they are trying to get either from the courts or from
the government or some other type of program and then
conversely, do people often not claim the common law
marriage when it would be some type of detriment to
them?

MR. RAPHAEL: No question about it. You know, a classic example would be when I was in law school, my tort professor gave a situation where a

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car drives into an intersection and the professor said, you tell the client, did you look to the left; did you look to the right and did you look back to the left and if you didn't do that, you are contributory negligent. Now, did you look to the left and did you look to the right and the answer is yes and this is true when people come to a lawyer about common law marriages. You say to them, in order to be married, you know, you had to make a declaration in presenti and the client will say to you, what's that and you explain what that is and the next thing you know is, of course, I did that. It's just wrong evidence question of who commits the better perjury.

MR. SCOTT: Quick question. You mentioned, and you did it quite succinctly, of all of the disadvantages and the fact of the holding forth and making a declaration. Are there any miniscule benefits for common? I'm just trying to say, does it benefit anyone, i.e., the Commonwealth, the married couple?

I mean, I agree with you but I know there are some people going to say, you know --

MR. RAPHAEL: Well, you know, people move in with each other. I don't know what they expect when they do that and one party will say one thing and another party another. I don't know of any real

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benefit. I think if people wanted to have a relationship, there cught to be a declaration in writing somewhere so everybody knows it: The government knows it, the individuals know it and everybody is protected.

> MR. SCOTT: Thank you, sir.

MR. PRESKI: Mr. Raphael, my understanding is that you have to catch a plane and get to Boston. Thank you very much. One request though. If you do adopt any resolutions at the Bar Association's meeting, that they be sent to us.

MR. RAPHAEL: I will be sure that is taken care of.

MR. PRESKI: To go back on the record, the next -- very briefly, we hear from Professor Mary Kearney and Professor Lockard from the Widener University School of Law.

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: Thank you for the opportunity to appear. We are both professors at the Harrisburg campus of the Widener University School of Law. Both of us teach family law and, in addition, Professor Lockard directs a civil law clinic which serves indigent populations.

Our research and experience leaves us to conclude that Pennsylvania would be better served by

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retaining the common law marriage and so we are in opposition to House Bill 43. We have many reasons for this conclusion which we have presented in our written testimony which, I believe, we have available to you. So, today our oral focus will be on our primary reason for our opposition to House Bill 43 and that's the adverse impact of abolishing the doctrine would have on some of our most vulnerable Pennsylvanians, namely poor women and children and particularly also the elderly. From our research, about 90 percent of the common law marriages brought in Pennsylvania are brought by women. Often, they are brought in the situation which you have alluded to, survivor claims, Worker's Compensation claims, a man is killed on the job and his partner of many years is seeking benefits as a survivor, government benefits, veterans benefits, pensions, Social Security Those the typical situations where a benefits. common law marriage claim arises and our experience from looking at 20 years of Pennsylvania court cases --(An off-the-record discussion was held.) CHAIRMAN GANNON: You may start again.

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: We are both professors at Widener University School of Law and we are actually speaking in opposition to House Bill 43

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and so we are in favor of retaining common law marriages in Pennsylvania for the main reason, and as I was saying, it has an adverse impact, particularly on the indigent population in Pennsylvania.

I think one case that Professor Lockard and students at the clinic handled recently provides a good example of the benefits of retaining the common law marriage doctrine. Ms. Smith was a client of the Harrisburg Civil Law Clinic. She was 76 years old and she had lived with Mr. Jones for about 20 years. Mr. Jones had been adjudicated incompetent and placed in a nursing home. His court-appointed guardian began eviction proceedings against Ms. Smith because her name was not on the deed to the home which they had shared for 20 years. The students from the Civil Law Clinic obtained affidavits from neighbors, from friends, from relatives indicating that the couple indeed had held themself out as a married couple, had stated a present intent to be married and that, in fact, a common law marriage did exist. result of those affidavits that were gathered, the quardian withdrew his petition to evict Ms. Smith from the home, allowing her to remain in the house and, in addition, the clinic students filed with the Social Security Administration for spousal benefits for

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Ms. Smith. Her monthly income went up from approximately \$450 a month to \$900 a month and so she was able to maintain her home and she was able to receive an adequate level of income from her old age. the common law marriage doctrine not been available to Ms. Smith, she would have remained at the same level of income and probably most likely been evicted from her home. Ms. Smith was somebody who came from a generation of Pennsylvanians who knew about the common law marriage doctrine because she had grown up in Pennsylvania and had been around as long as she had and she was someone who believed that she truly was married under the common law marriage doctrine, and so she would be the kind of person who would, I think, be done a grave disservice by the abolition of the doctrine.

We think that this case is typical in a number of respects of the kinds of cases where it arises in Pennsylvania. It's typical, first of all, because the parties were involved in a long term relationship. This relationship went on for about 20 years and usually when someone is claiming common law marriage when it gets to the court level in Pennsylvania, we're not talking about a six-month, one-year, two-year situation. We're talking about a

longstanding relationship. So, we think it's typical in that respect.

We think it's typical because Ms. Smith met the low income requirements to qualify as a civil law clinic client and I think we think that's typical because many of the people claiming common law marriage in Pennsylvania are of a lower socioeconomic status.

It's a typical case because the property, the home, was titled in Mr. Jones' name. Oftentimes in these cases, the property is still titled in the man's name and so the way the woman has access to the property is through her status as a common law wife.

I think it's also typical because, as I said earlier, about 90 percent of the common law marriage claims brought in Pennsylvania are brought by women oftentimes because the woman outlives the man or is in better health than the man. So, she is the person seeking the benefits. As Mr. Preski pointed out earlier, yes, in many of these cases it is where someone is filing for sort of benefits, oftentimes survivor benefits.

In addition to these reasons -- we think this is the kind of a case that mitigates in favor of the retention of the common law marriage doctrine.

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In addition, if I could just address what is probably the strongest argument against the common law marriage doctrine in favor, in other words, of House Bill 43, which are concerns about judicial and administrative efficiency. Our research suggests that this issue of common law marriages reaches the appellate level only about once, Pennsylvania Appellate Court level, only about once or twice a year. So, we do not believe that the appellate courts are overburdened by this issue. At the trial court level, although it's more difficult, and we don't have data on how many cases reach the trial court level each year. At the trial court level though our understanding and experience suggests that the fact finders, the trial court judges, are well equipped to sift through the meritorious from the nonmeritorious claims in the way that they have to sift through claims with any oral contract. This is an oral contract and oftentimes they are in a position of having to decide whether or not there was an oral contract made. That's what they are doing in these And so for those reasons we don't believe that cases. the courts are overburdened by this doctrine.

In addition, Pennsylvania courts have set up a bifurcated approach dealing with common law

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marriages that we think works very well. situations are -- the first situation which I have been describing where one of the spouses or one of the partners has died and the other surviving partner is seeking some sort of benefits. In that situation Pennsylvania courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption in favor of a common law marriage because of the difficulty, frankly, when there is only one surviving partner of proving that there wasn't a common law marriage. However, the surviving partner still has to show that there was co.habitation and that the couple had a reputation of being married in the community. So, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of common law marriage. However, that rebuttable presumption does not exist in the kind of cases which could and probably would generate fraud and that's a situation where both partners are alive. They have been together and they have separated. One of them is arguing that there is a common law marriage because she usually is seeking assets. The other partner is saying that there never was a common law marriage; we were just living together. In that situation there is no rebuttable presumption in favor of common law The person who is seeking common law marriage status has to prove by clear and convincing

evidence. So, has a higher evidentiary burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that there was cohabitation and that there was the present intent to be married. In many of those cases of our research the Court finds that there wasn't a common law marriage. So, because of this bifurcated approach that Pennsylvania has taken to common law marriages, because of the relative paucity of common law marriage claims that have reached the court, we believe that the judiciary has adequate resources and adequate information to make determinations of whether common law marriages exist. Do you want to add anything about your experience?

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: I just want to add a couple of words. I have been the Director of the Civil Law Clinic at Widener University of Law for nine years. During that nine-year period, I would estimate that we see one, perhaps two claims of common law marriage per year. I don't believe there is an epidemic of common law marriage claims in Pennsylvania. Almost invariably the claim does arise in the context of a party, usually a woman, seeking public benefits and needing to prove the existence of a marriage to obtain an entitlement to those benefits. Most of the claims come to us believing that they are

married. This is not an idea that we put into their heads. For instance, Ms. Smith, who Professor Kearney talked about, came to us and said, we were married. It was not a situation where she sat down and told us she was being evicted and we said, well, perhaps we could establish a common law marriage, we can keep you in the home. She believed that she was married.

Now, I know Mr. Raphael testified that oftentimes individuals are not aware of the requirements for common law marriage in Pennsylvania and I think that is entirely accurate, but they do believe that they are married and they have established a relationship that, I believe, is as deserving of protection as a formal ceremonial marriage. They are often long term. They are stable relationships. The individuals believe that they have entered into a marriage and I think that they deserve the protection of law.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: Let me ask you a question. If we eliminated common law marriage in Pennsylvania as this bill proposes, how would that void be filled? What do you project from a legal standpoint would happen? In other words, what I am looking at is those relationships where perhaps you have two people living together -- let me give you

two scenarios. One where they present themselves as being married but they are not; on the other hand, it's common knowledge that they are not married but they continue to live together and support each other and cohabitate. How do you see that void being filled if this is eliminated?

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: A number of jurisdictions have established a putative spouse doctrine.

Pennsylvania has not to the best of my -- I can find no reported cases accepting the putative spouse doctrine.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: Could that be because we recognize common law marriage?

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: I think in large part, yes.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: Go ahead, I'm sorry.

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: And I think that the reason so many jurisdictions have accepted the putative spouse doctrine is because of the perceived inequity in situations where people believe they are married and, in fact, are not and that ameliorates the effects of the lack of a marriage. The problem with a putative spouse doctrine is that it entails at least as much judicial effort as does a common law marriage because, again, there is going to be testimony from a party, yes, I believe I was married.

We thought we were married. In most of the jurisdictions that accepted the putative spouse doctrine, there has to be a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage. So, not only are we going to go into the circumstances of the relationship, but we are also going to have to go into the good faith of the party who is asserting the putative spouse doctrine. That would be one way to fill the void if we eliminated common law marriages. I don't know that it's a superior way. I don't know that it has any benefits over common law marriage.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: I can't think of any cases that I'm aware of where you have a situation different than what you are talking about, the wife seeking benefits or the spouse, female spouse, seeking benefits after the death of the husband in the common law where a couple have lived together for a long period of time and the dependent spouse says so and so now has assets, pensions, savings, investments and I think I should get a share of that because, not necessarily because we were allegedly married, although that might be an argument, but because I was at a disadvantage for all of these years staying home and doing the cooking and cleaning and washing and raising the kids. Would you see a change in attitude

if we eliminate the common law -- I mean, I can see where the courts come in and say, well, if you can establish common law marriage, we'll listen to you, but if you can't establish common law marriage, you were at risk the whole time you were in that relationship.

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: And I think that in part responds to both this question and your previous question, which is I don't see a substitute or a replacement for common law marriage. I think what Pennsylvania will say to people like Ms. Smith is tough. You should have known better. You should have gotten married. You should have gone to the courthouse 20, 25 years ago.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: I sense that there would be a little more sympathy on this situation where you have Ms. Smith who believed she was married as opposed to, you know, maybe the high profile case where, you know, hey, we weren't married, just living together. Everybody knew it but I deserve a whack at these assets because I suffered at home for ten years and that was ten years out of my life. We don't see that in Pennsylvania. I'm just wondering if we did away with common law if all of a sudden the courts would have to look at something like that

without the argument to say, well, if you had a common law marriage, we could help you out because we recognize that, but you don't, so we can't do anything for you whereas that is no longer available. PROFESSOR LOCKARD: I think that is a valid concern because I think certain jurisdictions, there certainly has been high profile cases of that nature in California. CHAIRMAN GANNON: Which doesn't recognize

CHAIRMAN GANNON: Which doesn't recognize common law marriage.

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: Right. I think it's a valid concern.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: I was thinking of palimony.

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: And that's all of a sudden the Marvin versus Marvin.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: I'm just wondering if we eliminated common law marriage, if we would see Marvin versus Marvin type cases a lot because --

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: There would be alternative access.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: Well, I think the courts would be without a door to say, well, if you can go through that door, we can help you but if you can't, too bad; whereas now that door is shut and now they

say well, okay. Maybe we have to look at that because we can't offer you any other option.

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: And I think there is a possibility of that door opening and opening a Pandora's box.

MR. PRESKI: My question is this. The first one is, do you think if there was an abolition of common law marriage, that the courts sometime would come in like the Chairman had said on a hard facts case and come up and say, okay, now we have putative spouse but it's judicially creative rather than legislatively created? I mean, you have dealt with these kind of people. I mean, are the cases of such, you know, hard facts, you know, little old lady, all these years that some court somewhere is going to say, I'm finding a way to let her collect?

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: I think there is a real possibility that that would happen.

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: But they are going to have to work harder to find a theory.

MR. PRESKI: What about Mr. Raphael's suggestion that there be some type of, I don't know how else to say it except some type of common law registry maintained? I mean, from an evidentiary standpoint, that would certainly help the clinic out

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but do you have any comments on that?

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: I think that something of that nature would be very beneficial. I haven't had the time to consider what the format should be.

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: I think the problem is that somebody who is going to go so far as going to register in the County Courthouse or a clerk's office or something like that is probably also the type of person who is also just going to get the Judge or somebody to marry them and have the formal ceremonial marriage. I think that what happens in the common law marriage situation is you have people who don't deal with the administrative system or the legal system as much and so frankly there isn't going to be that level of sophistication or knowledge. Not that they wouldn't necessarily do it but they might not know about it. I mean one of the things that we really came up with in our research, one of the things that runs through, one of the threads that runs through a lot of these cases is the kind of people who are seeking common law marriage claims are typically not educated. So, in addition, it's not just a poverty issue. It's not necessarily a gender issue or a race issue. I think it's an educational issue and so to know about it, I think it's a good idea,

but it's such a step closer to a civil marriage ceremony that the kind of person who is going to be seeking these benefits is probably not going to be in the position.

MR. PRESKI: So, my thought is that where you talked about the rebuttable presumption where the one spouse is deceased, maybe the law treats that registry the same way except you don't need to have both. Both don't need to sign in. One signs in and you give them the rebuttable presumption that it does exist, thinking outloud. Based upon the research that you did, and I don't know whether it's this deep or not but is common law marriage something that is a vestige of old times? Is it growing more or has it just been kind of steady throughout?

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: It is definitely a vestige of olden times. I mean, it was imported from England. It was really created in a time when people did not have access to ceremonial marriages the way they do today. However, what's interesting about it is it's abolition, ten states have it, including Pennsylvania, ten jurisdictions have it including Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia. So, it would be 11 including the District of Columbia. Most of the states that abolished it, abolished it

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between the Civil War and the early 1920's and only a handful of states have gotten rid of it since 1940, a couple of them in 1940, two or three in 1940's and then two or three in the 1990's, but the majority, about 30 states that got rid of it, got rid of it in the late 1800's, early 1900's. What was particularly interesting to me were some of the reasons those states got rid of it at the turn of the century. A lot of times, for example, it was a way -- they abolished common law marriage because they were concerned about interracial marriages, particularly in a lot of the southern states. They didn't want a situation where an African-American woman and a Caucasian male were to claim common law marriage after, for example, the man had died even though it had probably been a common law marriage relationship. The states were very concerned about recognizing interracial marriages. So, the kind of history abolishing it to me was very striking. something I didn't realize until I had done all of my research and the reasons, the motives for it were very different. Some states got rid of it just because they did see it as a vestige of a time long gone; that people now can go to the courthouse if they want to get married but other states,

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particularly the southern states, seemingly, from what came up within the research, got rid of it for racial And the states that have got rid of it recently, so, those are the majority of the states, about 30 states around the turn of the century. ten states that have gotten rid of it since 1940 have done it because I think they have considered it antiquated and outmoded from what interesting is three states, Michigan, Idaho and one other that I can't recall, that got rid of it in the 1990's, all of them seemed to have expressed some regret at having done so after the fact; that maybe it did protect a particular class of citizens. For example, there is an interesting article in the Michigan Bar Journal after common law marriage was abolished by a lawyers group who had supported its abolition and then came back afterwards and said, maybe it's not such a bad thing; maybe now because, for some of the reasons you both have suggested, the judiciary is having to look harder to protect a certain group of people who were protected under common law marriage status and because it wasn't something that came up too often. Maybe it's something we should have kept.

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: Michigan is a jurisdiction that does recognize putative spouse doctrine.

MR. PRESKI: And that came after?

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: I believe, yes.

MR. PRESKI: That's it.

MS. MENDLOW: I'd be interested in knowing if you see any pattern where certain either insurance companies or certain parties are not interested in continuing the recognition of common law marriages because it's more of a hassle and, therefore, as opposed to the issue of protection of the "rights" of the women who may have been in a long term relationship. This may be a situation where there are companies or, you know, that would prefer not to have to give out certain benefits and if you are in a common law marriage and they haven't been married, it makes things clear and simple. Can you give me some insight on that?

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: I think that is a valid point. I cannot think of a specific example.

I could not cite to you a particular example. It makes sense because the main opposition to common law marriage has been both judicial, that it creates judicial inefficiencies because the courts have to figure out someone is married, and also administrative inefficiency which is what I think you are referring to. It is easier, there is no question, it is easier

them spousal benefits, at the insurance level or any level, any sort of governmental benefits. It's just easier because you either have the piece of paper or you don't. However, our position is that it's fair and it's more just and it may take a little more time to dig a little bit deeper and figure out if, in fact, a marriage existed.

MS. MENDLOW: One other question real quickly and that would be prior to the hearing, Mr. Raphael was mentioning that there was a recent Supreme Court case where the individuals again were not married but there were actually children in this relationship and yet the Supreme Court ruled that they would not recognize it as a common law marriage. I was wondering if you were familiar with that case?

professor Kearney: I think the issue in general about the adverse effect -- I'm not directly familiar with that particular case. However, I think oftentimes these cases do affect not just the women who are seeking common law marriage status but the children. There may still be in our society, maybe not, some stigma associated with the legitimacy, but if there is, clearly that would fall upon the children where it really, I think, affects the children is in

the rights to intestate succession. So, I think that if there isn't a common law marriage, then they can lose some of their rights in terms of intestacy.

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: I would agree.

MS. MENDLOW: I guess what I was concerned about is the amount of judicial discretion that is given in determining whether or not there was this "common law marriage" and I think Mr. Raphael was expressing, and I hope I am not mischaracterizing what he was trying to explain to me, but he seemed quite taken back by that decision because in that case it appeared there was this understanding; there was a long term relationship producing several children and yet somehow there was a ruling that it not benefit the children or the woman. I was interested and perhaps we can get back to Mr. Raphael on that to learn more about that case.

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: I think one of the problems with common law marriage is that the requirements for the establishment of a common law marriage are not well understood either by the public or by the Bar for that matter and that's unfortunate and that's how you can have an instance such as the one you described where there are children and there has been a long term relationship but yet the court can

still determine there is not a common law marriage.

But I think that is a matter that is best addressed through education rather than abolishment of common law marriage.

MR. SCOTT: I would assume that England still has it?

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: I would assume they do.

Traditions last a long time there.

MR. SCOTT: I was getting ready to say that you'd really hit up against a wall if England doesn't have it.

What Chairman Gannon brought up as far as what aspect of retention was to give the courts the ability to choose a Door No. 1 rather than a Door No. 2, but it would appear that the brethren of the Bar listen to Attorney Raphael who has been past president. He gave his background and I see that one of our next speakers, who happens to be a lawyer, is not in favor of it. As a matter of fact, I think we are all lawyers except Jane sitting up here now. So, I'm trying to weigh out academia, what you are saying, you two from Widener versus people that, I don't want to say people in the real world. When a piece of legislation goes through, we have what we call a fiscal note, whether or not the Commonwealth will spend

money or save money. So, what do you think, with the abolition, what would happen with the Commonwealth?

Would it save money or spend more money? You have to look at it from that viewpoint because the numbers will through the fiscal note.

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: What a response before Professor Lockard who has been practicing for 20, 25 years now in the area of poverty law. probably has seen about as many common law marriages as any practicing attorney but in response to your question, I would say they both save and lose. think maybe in the long run, I mean the short run, they save money because if there isn't a recognition of a common law marriage, the state may not have to pay particular benefits or the federal government may not have to pay particular benefits to an individual. So, they would save money in that regard. that they might lose money in a case like Ms. Smith in the long run because I think somebody like that will be on the public welfare rolls. So, the state will be paying in a different form for not having recognized the common law marriage. So, it depends at what point you want to spend.

PROFESSOR LOCKARD: Yes, I concur. I think that rather than -- at least in the short term,

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the savings won't be a loss. It will be a shift.

Rather than collecting this Social Security disability benefit, she will be collecting other forms of public assistance.

MR. SCOTT: Right. I'm not talking about the insurance company who has to pay up the benefit except for the Commonwealth and I think that will be a controlling factor when the legislation comes up. I'm trying to look at it realistically. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

because, you know, we have been talking and Scotty made his comment about, does England still have it and you go back and you have that body of common law that the court has to look at for precedence when they have a case before it involving the issue of whether or not common law marriage existed and they are going to be bound by some of that precedence and we haven't abrogated this section of common law, to my knowledge. They could argue and go back to English common law for precedence, which they would have to overturn if they wanted to come to a different result whereas by abolishing the common law, that would be at the starting point. So, the court could begin to set up a new common law from that point forward without

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concern about abolishing precedence. You just deal with that particular deck of cards as presented to you and make sure the hand comes out exactly the way you want and you go from there, whereas you are bound by the -- the reason I bring that up is because you made that comment that it's not very well understood, which means that somebody has to go back and find out what elements have to exist before you can make a case that a common law marriage did, in fact, exist because -and then look at precedence and see whether or not those factors are there. Whereas, without that confinement, you can start from scratch and say okay and use the term putative marriage, for instance, instead of common law. I was thinking like two people buying a piece of property as tenants in common but they were living together and everybody thought they were married. When the common law issue comes up, did that become tenants by the entirety? At any rate, I thought that was -- that struck me on some of the other comments that were made, that maybe the courts were to go in another direction, either maybe more stringent or perhaps less stringent and you might see a lot more cases, not so much on entitlements but on the Marvin versus Marvin side of the equation because people would see much better opportunity.

PROFESSOR KEARNEY: The legislature can

decide if that is a desirable thing or not.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: Perhaps instead of being

recognized as a marriage in the community -- well, a

recognized as a marriage in the community -- well, a lot of people thought they were married. Some people knew they weren't and some people thought that they were. Well, that meets the criteria. You might have a much more looser standard. Anything?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN GANNON: Thank you very much. I'm glad to see that Widener University School of Law is represented here.

(The following was submitted for inclusion in the record:)

HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE COMMON-law MARRIAGE TESTIMONY HOUSE BILL 43

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INTRODUCTION

We wish to express our opposition to

House Bill 43 which proposes the abolition of

common-law marriage in Pennsylvania. For the

reasons presented below, we believe that
common-law marriage serves many important
purposes. Chief among these is the protection
of traditionally disadvantaged groups. Our
presentation sets forth the origin and
rationale for common-law marriage, the Pennsylvania
courts' treatment of the subject, and a
discussion of the policies for and against
common-law marriage. Although we are mindful
of objections to the doctrine, we conclude that
the citizens of Pennsylvania are well-served
by the continued recognition of common-law
marriage.

ORIGINS OF AND RATIONALEFOR COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE

The concept of common-law marriage was transported to the American colonies from England. Today, ten states and the District of Columbia recognize common-law marriage. Most of the states that abolished the doctrine did so by 1970 although a few eliminated it in the 1990's. Nevertheless, many of those states which have abandoned the doctrine will honor common-law marriages that have taken place in jurisdictions that still recognize it.

The reasons for common-law marriage are varied. Sometimes they occur when one party has greater bargaining power and does not want a formal marriage to occur. More

1Cynthia Grant Bowman, "A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage," 75 Or. L. Rev. 709, 719 (1996).

²Those states are Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas and the District of Columbia.

³Bowman, <u>supra</u> note 1, at 716 N.24.

often, they arise over time when both parties assume that they are legally married. As one commentator explained the phenomenon:

In most instances...people drifted into common law marriage either because one of the parties persuaded the other that they really be married in this fashion, or because the customs of their social class sanctioned this kind of union. In such cases they had no contact with the law until one of them died or a divorce action was brought.

The issue often arises after the death of one of the parties when the other is seeking spousal benefits or a share of the estate.

In other instances, both parties are alive and disagree about the distribution of assets after the relationship has dissolved.

PENNSYLVANIA COURTS INTERPRETATION OF COMMON-1AW MARRIAGE

Common-law marriage in Pennsylvania has

two requirements: capacity and a present

agreement to be married. First, the parties

must have the mental capacity to enter into

an agreement. In addition, they must have

an agreement in the present, as opposed to the

future, to be married, although that agreement

"does not require any specific form of words." 6

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court most recently addressed the subject of common-law marriage in Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer. The court adopted a bifurcated approach to common-law marriages. One standard is used when one party has died, and the other party argues

Homer Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, 59-60(1988).

⁵In re Garges, 378 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1977). <u>See also Joseph B. Kelly, Pennsylvania Marriage, Divorce, Custody, Property and Support & 2-7 (3d ed. 2000)</u>

⁶ Id. at 309.

⁷¹⁴ A.2d 1016 (Pa 1998).

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that a common-law marriage existed. A second standard exists when both parties are still alive and dispute the existence of a common-law marriage.

In Staudenmayer, both parties were alive and disagreed about whether they had a commonlaw marriage. The common-law marriage issue arose during the equitable distribution phase of divorce proceedings between the Staudenmayers. The couple, who decided to divorce in 1992, had been married in a 1984 civil ceremony and had lived together between 1976 and 1984.8 In 1982 or 1983, Theodore Staudenmayer was injured in a work-related accident and began receiving structured settlement payments for his injuries. When the couple divorced, Linda Staudenmayer argued that those payments constituted marital property and should have been included in the equitable distribution calculations because the settlement occurred during their common-law marriage. Theodore responded that Linda was not entitled to a share of the settlement proceeds because the award occurred before the civil ceremony while they were merely living together.9

The court enunciated the requirements

for common-law marriages in Pennsylvania. The

court focused on the requirement of an exchange

of words in the present tense made for the

purpose of establishing the husband/wife

relationship. 10 Although no specific words

are required for the exchange, the parties

must establish proof of an agreement to enter

into a present relationship.

The court further explained the difference between the two types of common-law marriage claims. When one party is seeking spousal benefits or a share of the estate after the other party has died, the surviving party may have a hard time proving the exchange of words in the present tense. The courts therefore have adopted a rebuttable presumption in favor of a common-law marriage absent testimony about a present exchange of vows. The surviving

⁸<u>Id.</u> at 1018.

⁹ Id.

¹⁰ Id. at 1020 (citing Commonwealth vs. Gorby,
588 A.2nd 902, 907 (1991); Estate of Manfredi,
159 A.2d 697, 700 (1960)).

party meets her burden of proof if she establishes continuous cohabitation and a general reputation of marriage.

In the second instance, which was presented in the Staudenmayer case, both parties were alive and could testify about their intent to enter into a common-law marriage. In that case, the rationale does not exist for relying on the rebuttable presumption in favor of common-law marriage based on cohabitation and reputation of marriage. Therefore, the Supreme Court required the party arguing in favor of a common-law marriage to show by clear and convincing evidence that words were exchanged in the present tense for the purpose of establishing the existence of a common-law marriage. 12

In Staudenmayer, the court determined that
Linda Staudenmayer failed to meet her burden
of establishing by clear and convincing evidence
the existence of a common-law marriage.

Linda failed to produce proof of an agreement
to enter into the legal relationship of
marriage because she did not produce evidence
of "an exchange of words in the present tense
spoken with the purpose of establishing the

relationship of husband and wife." 14 The

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11 Id. at 1020-21.

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¹²Id. at 1021.

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13 Id. at 1022.

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14 Id. at 1021.

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Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's conclusions that Linda Staudenmayer's lack of recollection about times when she referred to Theodore Staudenmayer as her husband during the supposed common-law marriage, her inability to explain the necessity of a civil ceremony if they were already married, and the timing between raising the issue and learning that the structured settlement might not be considered marital property further undermined her common-law marriage claim. 15 For these reasons, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Linda Staudenmayer did not meet her "heavy burden" of proving a common-law marriage and that she did not enjoy a presumption that such a marriage existed based on cohabitation and reputation of marriage in the community. 16

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In dicta, the majority opinion traced

the Pennsylvania courts' objections to common-law marriages, noting that they represented a "fruitful source of perjury and fraud." The Court further stated such claims were "tolerated, but not encouraged" and "disfavored." In keeping with that same line of thinking, Justice Nigro, in a concurring opinion, proposed that Pennsylvania join other states in abolishing common-law marriages.

In subsequent cases, lower Pennsylvania courts have followed the <u>Staudenmayer</u> court's rationale in analyzing the issue of common-law marriage. When a man died in a work-related

accident, his companion of five years sought workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that they were a common-law husband and wife. 20 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed the

¹⁵Id. at 1022

¹⁶ Id. at 1021.

¹⁷ Id. at 1019 (quoting in re Estate of Wagner, 159 A.2d 495, 497 (1960)).

¹⁸<u>Id.</u> at 1020

¹⁹ Id. at 1022 (Nigro J., concurring).

Workers' Compensation Board's determination that a common-law marriage existed because the couple had had a private marriage ceremony and had lived together uninterruptedly for five years.

In contrast, a federal district court rejected a prisoner's argument that he should be granted visits with a woman who he claimed was his common-law wife. 22 The court determined that the prisoner did not meet the "heavy burden" of proving that the couple had an agreement to enter into the legal relationship of marriage at the present time or that the couple had the general reputation of being married. 23

In both cases, the courts seemed comfortable reviewing or sifting through the
facts to determine whether the elements of
common-law marriage had been met. In the
workers' compensation case, the court determined that the surviving partner was indeed
a widow and should be granted survivor benefits.

In the prison situation, the court concluded
that the claim of common-law marriage was
without merit. Taken together, the cases

suggest that common-law marriages serve an important function: they allow one court to remedy an injustice that would be created by the denial of worker compensation

20 Brandywine Paperboard Mills v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, --A.2d--(2000).

benefits, and they avoid an injustice that would be created by the recognition of a sham marriage.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMMON-LAW MARRIAGES AND RESPONSES

Several arguments against common-law marriages exist. The first is that the original purpose of common-law marriages as providing an alternative to ceremonial marriages no longer exists. People now have the access to churches or courthouses that they may not have had a couple of hundred years ago so they do not need common-law marriages.

²¹ Id. at -.

²²Africa v. Vaughan, 99831. Supp. 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998).

²³Id. at 556.

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Although that original basis may no longer exist, common-law marriages still serve a valuable purpose for the reasons discussed below.

A second objection to common-law marriages is rooted in fear of fraudulent marriage claims. The concern is that one party will claim that a marriage existed, when it did not, simply to get control of the other person's property or estate. One commentator explains that this concern about fraud manifested itself in the stereotypes of "gold-digging women" who sought a share of the decedent's estate by claiming that they were widows rather than mistresses. Although this may occasionally happen, the incidence of this in the reported cases appears to be far less than meritorious claims by women seeking benefits or property after the death of the other party. 24 In addition, the evidentiary process is well-suited to distinguish between valid and fraudulent claims. 25

²⁴ Bowman, supra note 1, at 733.

²⁵Clark, <u>supra</u> note 4, at 58. <u>See also</u>, Note, Kathryn S. Vaughn, "The Recent Changes in the Texas informal Marriage Statute: Limitation or abolition of Common-law Marriage?", 28 Hous. L. Rev. 1131, 1137 (1991).

Pennsylvania courts require evidence that the couple in question had the reputation of being husband and wife, they can identify legitimate claims. 26

A third argument against common-law marriage is that it debases the institution of marriage. 27 To the contrary, common-law marriage arguably elevates the institution of marriage because it values substance over form. common-law marriage, the foundation of the marriage depends on the actual relationship between the couple rather than on a piece of paper.

An additional argument is that common-law marriage undermines the state's desire to keep marriage records and to enforce healthrelated marital requirements, such as tests for sexually transmitted diseases. 28 response to this argument is that the state's goal of preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases is not met by premarital screening since much sexual activity takes place outside of marriage.

A related argument is that common-law imposes burdens on agencies administering benefits related to marriage and on the

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court system. The argument is that the absence of a marriage license or piece of paper for common-law marriages makes agencies' and courts' jobs more difficult.

Several responses can be made to that argument. First, the issue of whether a common-law marriage exists is not a determination that the judiciary has to make very

Finally, fairness to the party who believes that she is in a common-law marriage may override concerns about judicial efficiency.

The elimination of common-law marriages will

²⁶ Clark, supra note 4, at 58.

^{27&}lt;sub>Id.</sub>

²⁸ Bowman, supra note 1, at 752.

often. 29 For example, Pennsylvania has only five reported appellate decisions on the subject in the past six years. Moreover, courts do comparable analysis when determining the existence of other kinds of oral contracts so they are well-equipped to make these determinations in the context of common-law marriages.

most adversely affect traditionally disadvantaged groups: the poor, women, children and minorities. A case that was recently handled by Widener's Civil Law Clinic illustrates how common-law marriages can benefit these disadvantaged groups.

Ms. Smith (not her real name) was referred to the Civil Law Clinic by the Dauphin County Area Agency on Aging. The Agency referred Ms. Smith to the Clinic because she was being evicted from the home that she had shared with Mr. Jones (not his real name) for over 15 years. Mr. Jones had recently been placed in a nursing home and adjudicated incompetent. His court-appointed guardian had then begun eviction proceedings against Ms. Smith, whose name was not on the deed to the shared home.

Students from the Civil Law Clinic were able to obtain affidavits from neighbors and relatives that established the existence of a common-law marriage between Ms. Smith and Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones' guardian withdrew the eviction proceedings, thereby enabling Ms. Smith to remain in her home. In addition,

the students presented proof of the common-law

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The reported appellate decisions suggest that Pennsylvania courts have examined the issue once or twice a year over the past twenty years. The issue usually arises in one of three situations: workers' compensation survivors' claims; divorce and property distribution; and elections against wills. In approximately three-quarters of those cases, courts did not find that a common-law marriage existed.

marriage to the Social Security Administration.

The Administration found that there had been a common-law marriage and awarded Ms. Smith spousal benefits. Her monthly income thereafter increased from \$469.00 to \$944.00. Because of the common-law marriage doctrine, Ms. Smith was able to maintain her housing and receive an acceptable level of income for her old age.

Ms. Smith's story is not atypical,
particularly among elderly Pennsylvanians. Ms.
Smith, who was seventy-six years old, was aware
of the common-law marriage doctrine, and
believed that she and Mr. Jones had been married
when they began cohabiting. Her belief in the
validity of common-law marriages is typical
of individuals who grew up at a time when

common-law marriages were widely recognized throughout the United States. The danger of a sudden change in Pennsylvania's recognition of common-law marriage is that it will have a disparate effect on our least educated citizens.

Some commentators have stated that the majority of couples in common-law marriages have had less education and have attained a lower socio-economic level than the majority of the population. When that is the case, they may not be aware that a common-law marriage does not have the same validity as a ceremonial one. Therefore, they may expect to get the kind of benefits that a spouse would get from a ceremonial marriage and may rely on having them.

A second group adversely affected by the elimination of common-law marriage are women.

In most of the appellate cases involving common-law marriage claims, the claimant is a woman. Often, she is seeking widow's benefits, such as insurance benefits; sometimes, she is seeking the right to support or alimony. The frequency with which women bring these claims may speak to a larger issue about women's economic

30 Vaughn, supra note 25, at 1141 (citing Stein, "Common Law Marriage: Its History and Certain Contemporary Problems," 9 J. Fam. L.271, 293(1969); J. Sirmamake, The American Family in the Twentieth Century 69 (1953)).

dependency on men. In any event, the abolition of common-law marriage in Pennsylvania will impose economic hardship on women who often have been involved in long-term marriage arrangements but are left with nothing.

Another related group adversely affected by the elimination of common-law marriage are children. 31 Often, the women seeking to establish a common-law marriage have had children with their common-law husband. When the parents' relationship is not legally recognized, the children are considered illegitimate. In addition to whatever stigma still may be associated with illegitimacy, that status may affect those children's rights to intestate succession.

Finally, some commentators have noted that the abolition of common-law marriage may

adversely affect some minority groups. 32 Members of some ethnic groups may use the informal mechanism of a common-law marriage more often than white middle-class society. Therefore, the elimination of common-law marriage could disproportionately affect members of that group. For these reasons, the non-recognition of common-law marriage may leave certain segments of society more vulnerable than others.

We would respectfully request the legislature not to abolish common-law marriage in Pennsylvania.

MR. VERTZ: Good morning. My name is Brian I have prepared from written testimony which I have given to you. The level of the discussion seems to be somewhat more sophisticated than the level of my testimony. So, if I may, I'm going to depart somewhat from the written testimony to comment on the discussion I have just heard.

First of all, I should let you know that I

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³¹ Vaughn, supra note 25, at 1145.

³² Vaughn, supra note 25, at 1147.

am an attorney who is engaged in the practice of law in Pennsylvania and have done so since 1992. My practice is focused entirely in the area of domestic relations and although I cannot represent them in an official capacity, I have discussed my testimony with Harry Gruener, who is the President of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, David Pollock, who was my former boss and is currently the President of the Family Law Section of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and Carol McCarthy who is my current boss and is the President of the Family Law Section of the Allegheny County Bar Association.

Most of the family lawyers that I know favor the passage of this bill which would abolish common-law marriage. The reason is not primarily as the professors before me have said because of the administrative burdens on the courts, but because there is a great potential for fraud and perjury involved in this doctrine. Many persons, many couples throughout Pennsylvania choose not to be married. They choose not to have the entanglements, the legal entanglements of a marriage. They choose to maintain separate property and separate finances. They choose to keep their estates separate and they may have very

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good reasons for doing so. For those persons it's important to facilitate their ability to do that.

There is also a mythology, a street if you will, out there. Many people had misconceptions about how it is a common-law marriage is formed. is a common misconception that a common-law marriage is formed by living together for seven years and we have all heard that. That is not true. It may be true if there is also an oral contract between the parties, if they have exchanged informal vows, words of present intention to form a common-law marriage, but as I said, in many cases they simply have chosen to live together and not to form a common-law marriage or to have a ceremonial marriage. In those cases, when one of those spouses dies, there is the surviving spouse. I shouldn't say spouse actually because, as I said, they are not intending to be married under the common-law but the surviving partner may seek Social Security benefits, may seek pension or life insurance benefits, may seek to receive a spouse's share of the deceased partner's estate or to elect against the will and in those cases they should not be permitted to do so.

Because this mythology exists, the mythology will exist whether or not the statutory law

says that common-law marriage is abolished. Even after common-law marriage is abolished, there will be some people out there that still believe that they can be married by living together for seven years and this will not change that.

There are -- Mr. Chairman, you asked whether there were substitutes for a common-law marriage and substitutes exist today. Unmarried partners can get bank accounts that are titled as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. They can designate each other as beneficiaries of life insurance and pension benefits and such. They can draft wills and name each other as the beneficiaries. There are certain benefits that they cannot confer on each other such as Social Security benefits or other spousal benefits that are governmental entitlements but those rules could always be changed.

One situation that the professors described was a situation where a surviving spouse came to the Clinic and sought benefits that would be attributable to her common-law husband's earnings and that is a common occurrence. The legislation that has been proposed contains a savings clause and if this legislation were passed, my understanding is that it would not have affected Mrs. Smith's entitlement to

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those benefits because her marriage, her common-law marriage, was contracted before the enactment of this legislation. Similarly, this legislation contains a provision which would delay the effective date for one year, which would give an opportunity for the newspapers and for various public agencies to get out the word and start to change the street law so that people who don't have common contact with attorneys, indigent persons who are not getting good legal advice, could begin to hear that common-law marriages have been abolished and they should go through the steps to get a ceremonial marriage. A ceremonial marriage is not exceedingly difficult or expensive to get in Pennsylvania. There is a courthouse in every county of this Commonwealth and the fees are not exorbitantly high.

Mr. Preski, you ask the professors about the idea of a registry and you suggested that perhaps it would be a good idea if only one of the putative spouses had to sign the registry in order to perform a marriage. The problem is that again there is a great potential for fraud because we frequently see cases where one spouse is, after the death of one of the partners, the other partner is seeking a share of the estate or seeking life insurance or pension benefits

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and is in an adversarial position to the deceased partner's family. Having one spouse sign a registry would probably not ameliorate the potential for fraud.

You asked also about the case that Mr. Raphael described, the Supreme Court case. of the Supreme Court case is Staudenmayer and I have a copy if you would like. In this Staudenmayer case, the parties did have a ceremonial marriage. simply lived together for eight years before they got their ceremonial marriage and when they were divorced, the wife in this instance sought to get a share of personal injury settlement proceeds that were awarded to the husband before they were ceremonially married and in that case the Supreme Court decided to affirm the trial court, which had denied her that right. found that there was no evidence of an exchange of vows prior to their ceremonial marriage and the state of the law in Pennsylvania was somewhat murky before the Staudenmayer case. It was not clear that a common-law marriage could not be established by reputation of marriage and cohabitation when both spouses were living. So, the bifurcated approach the professors described is new. It was only enunciated by the Supreme Court in July of 1998 when the Staudenmayer decision came out.

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In my view the abolition of common-law marriage would not significantly worsen the plight of the indigent. Common-law marriage, as I have suggested, is almost universally misunderstood by lay-persons of every economic level. Just commonly believed, as I said, that a common-law marriage is established by living together for seven years. This myth and other myths will probably survive that the street law can be changed over time if there is a concerted effort to get out the word after this legislation is passed.

I would conclude my testimony by saying that most of the lawyers I have spoken to favor the passage of this legislation.

Strikes me, I was looking at this brief summary of the Staudenmayer case. You know, it's apparent that here they lived together eight years prior to 1984. He was involved in an accident in 1982, which would have been six years, they had been living together for six years and they get married. They are both alive at the time she decides she should get a whack at this personal injury settlement and the court comes back and says, you might have been engaged but you weren't in common-law marriage and then the court,

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somebody on the court says, you know, we ought to repeal common-law marriage. It just seems to me that the court may have come to the correct conclusion in this Staudenmayer case based on the fact that I'm not all that certain that that case considering that factual situation would justify a repeal of common-law marriage because they didn't find a common-law marriage. I can see where they are sitting there and agonizing over it. We have to find a common-law marriage here but we really don't want to but all of the law and the precedent and everything says we have to do it. The only remedy so that this doesn't happen again is the legislature has to repeal commonlaw marriage because this is just totally outrageous, the result that occurred, but we had to do it. That's not the case here. They said, there is no common-law marriage and the legislature should abolish common-law marriage. So, we don't have to look at cases like What are you hired for? That's your job. don't want to look at cases that they feel are taking up their time. I guess, as pointed out in this little summary, this litigation went on and on and on. I would imagine that there was a substantial sum involved here and perhaps that's what really got the ire of the justices, you know, that these people just

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wouldn't let go and they had to deal with it. I'm not that sympathetic in a situation like that. But I'm just wondering in my own mind whether those facts would warrant, you know, justification for a public policy change -- we are going to do away with commonlaw marriages because our Supreme Court justices just don't feel like hearing these kind of cases.

MR. VERTZ: Well, Your Honor, I think there is more to this case than just the administrative burden. I think that what one of the problems is, this case highlights the paltriness of evidence that often comes before a court when it comes to deciding common-law marriage. There were interesting facts She had changed her license. She had obtained a Social Security card in his name. She had adopted his last name before they were ceremonially married and they had had joint bank accounts, filed joint tax returns. There were a lot of the incidence of marriage but because there was this later ceremonial marriage and because there was no solid evidence of an exchange of vows, the Supreme Court and trial court were compelled to find there was no common-law I think the exasperation that Justice Nigro marriage. expressed there is that if common-law marriage were abolished, street law would eventually change. People

would eventually learn that they must get ceremonially married and that would eliminate the uncertainty that these families have and it would also ease the administrative burden and it would also reduce the potential for fraud and perjury. So, there is no way the courts alone can change the law. They don't feel that they should do that. Certainly, they could do that but they don't feel they should do it. They feel it should come from the legislature and that is probably correct.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: That's a good point. I mean, common-law is under the control of the courts.

I mean, the courts could issue an order saying we are not recognizing common-law marriage as a matter of common law. If the legislature wants common-law marriages, they are going to have to enact a statute that says we are going to recognize common-law marriages.

MR. VERTZ: Well, there is a statute on the books currently that says that common-law marriages, that the law pertaining to common-law marriages will not be affected by the enactment of the divorce code.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: You are right. I'm sorry.

I misspoke. I forgot that.

MR. VERTZ: It does require legislative

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CHAIRMAN GANNON: So, they couldn't change that by court decision. It would have to be a statutory remedy.

There was one other element in that case that kind of struck me too and I can see, and I guess this is really maybe where the dilemma comes into play and that is you have a relationship that is developed over a period of time where a couple lives together. They accumulate assets together. They accumulate wealth together. It's not an event-driven type of thing. It happens over a period of time. They get jobs and they start to develop savings and acquire assets and whatever. Now, that situation is terminated for whatever reason and one or the other says, I should get a share of that because we developed that together and some of that should be rightfully mine and I don't think myself or anybody up here or the courts would say, yes, we are going to see what we can do to try to -- whereas now you have this as eventdriven This is one single event. Somebody had an accident, they got -- it's like -- I don't want to draw the comparison that that is anything like the lottery but all of a sudden there was this sum of money placed in one party's hands. It wasn't some-

thing accumulated over time and now the other party says, I want some of that too and I think that might have been a little bit different. That wasn't something that both had accumulated over time. There was probably no loss of consortium.

MR. VERTZ: Although if there was a common-law marriage, there might be.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: There might be. What I'm thinking is the court said, you know, it's awfully difficult for us to shoehorn something like that into a common-law marriage whereas it's easy for us to justify finding a common-law marriage when you are talking about pension benefits and stock that you both bought over time or investments that you made or you bought a house or whatever, your assets became intermingled and now we are going to try to sort that out as opposed to, well, we lived together and he hit the lottery and now I want some of that money because we got married six years later.

MR. VERTZ: Well, you have to keep in mind that if at the time when one of the partners seeks a share of those assets that are acquired together, if both of the partners are alive, the common-law marriage doctrine is not helping that spouse or that partner, that dependent partner, because

what the Staudenmayer case says is that they haven't had an event, if they haven't exchanged vows, there is no common-law marriage. So, there is no equitable distribution remedy.

think in this case the court was less driven to find a common-law marriage. In other words, they said, well, you know, the guy got a lump sum of money. It was six years before. You know, we're not going to try to shoehorn this thing and so unless she comes up with some really solid evidence which she apparently did not, they said no. Where I could see, if that was not a factor in play, but they might have found another decision. I'm just speculating, where they would try to provide some benefit for that.

MR. VERTZ: An interesting related topic is that under the current state of the law, if there were children involved here, the children probably would have been entitled to child support based upon that personal injury settlement. We have cases in Pennsylvania that say that lump sum awards, personal injury settlements, inheritance, other kinds of lump sums can be considered as income for child support purposes. And so in a situation where they are living out of wedlock and have children, those children will

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get the benefit of the dollars that flow into either partner's possession.

MR. PRESKI: In your years of family law practice, have you ever had any occasion to argue in favor of a creation of the common-law marriage?

MR. VERTZ: I have and it's exceedingly difficult to do so particularly when there is no real good evidence of an exchange of vows.

MR. PRESKI: Now, let me -- from your testimony, if I could paraphrase, basically the practitioner who has a client in front of them who in order to, Chairman's words, get a whack at whatever is out there, you basically then are put in this position where you say to your client, Mr. and Mrs. Jones, the common-law marriage doctrine in Pennsylvania says that sometimes -- you just state a present sense intention that you were married. Understand, if you answer that question yes, we can move forward and you can get your whack at the money. If you say no, then we are pretty much out of court. Well, then you would ask the question, have you ever stated a present sense intention to be married. assumption is that the answer is always yes and that's your greatest concern, that inherent in the question that has to be asked will always be the potentially

fraudulent or perjurious answer.

MR. VERTZ: Of course, I would never put
those words in my client's mouth in that manner but
at the time when I had a case of this nature, it
preceded Staudenmayer and so I had plenty of cards
saying to my husband on his birthday and joint accounts
and they didn't file tax returns together, but other
kinds of things but the answer is yes, there is a great
potential. There is a temptation for a partner to
perjure himself or herself and say, yes, or to even
construe words that are not specifically, will you
marry me, yes, or do you want to be my wife, yes; to
construe other sort of affectionate words as an
exchange of vows.

MR. PRESKI: Okay. I guess my next question would be, is that the professors pretty much intoned that if we adopt House Bill 43 and do away with common-law marriages, that the courts are going to run in and bring something else that is judicially creative in order to fill this need for, what they described it as, was an indigent population. Do you have any concerns or thoughts about that?

MR. VERTZ: I think Staudenmayer demonstrates the court's unwillingness to do that. If the court were inclined to fashion judicial remedy for

these situations, they have had the opportunity to do that in the past. There are plenty of cases that have come before the court where there was not an exchange of words, where there was simply this reputation and cohabitation where they have declined and the courts have consistently narrowed the scope of the common-law marriage doctrine over the past 10 to 15 years. So, I would expect that to continue. I really wouldn't expect, and our courts have also considered the issue of palimony, if you will, and declines to make that remedy.

MR. PRESKI: All right. Thank you.

MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Attorney Vertz, I can understand when you say a layman, no matter what their economic strata, I'm still somewhat perplexed. First, let me say the registry point you brought up that Attorney Preski mentioned, I can understand. It sounded good, what Brian said initially but the fact that it would be replete with fraud if one person is deceased, I can understand why two people would have to sign. That was a good point.

In the Staudenmayer case you mentioned there were no exchange of vows but it was my understanding, and this is why I am saying this as a layman. I have never dealt with this in my practice but if you

have cohabitation and you need a written declaration or do you need a verbal exchange of vows with a witness? A written declaration is fine?

MR. VERTZ: What the Staudenmayer case says is if both spouses are living, there must be a verbal or written exchange of vows. If one of the spouses is deceased, then the court can look to cohabitation, constant cohabitation, and a general and broad reputation in the community as married persons. The reason being that if one of the spouses is dead, the dead man's rule bars the surviving spouse from putting words in the mouth of the dead person and so they can't testify as to an exchange of vows.

MR. SCOTT: I know it just appears to me that if you change your Social Security number to get the other spouse's name, if you have a joint bank account, and I know a lot of husbands and wives, ceremonial, that have separate accounts, and what was the third one, oh, your driver's license, that's really a whole thing. I don't know why -- I can understand what she said but why the court found it so difficult. I mean, they had been living for eight years together prior to. This woman went through all of these changes and then for the court to say no, you're not married.

MR. VERTZ: The problem is that one spouse or one partner can probably do that unilaterally without the other partner's consent and there was no evidence in this particular case. They asked whether she had, whether the male partner had given consent to any of these things and he testified that he hadn't consented to any of these things. She did it on her own. She was living in a fantasy world. I'm overstating the point here but that is what they found in that case.

MR. SCOTT: That would cover the rebuttable presumption then. I mean, if, in fact, she went out and put a thousand dollars in for her and her husband and he never knew about it, I guess you could change your license to someone else's name if you got the mail in a timely fashion. It seems like one of them would have blinders on. I agree with what you said because there are people, I won't say women because I guess males also that try to be surreptitious and can do those types of things. Okay, at first blush it just seems like you can do anything but you have answered that, counselor pretty good. Thank you.

MS. MENDLOW: Given the fact that

Pennsylvania is in the minority in terms of the states

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that have retained the common-law marriage doctrine, could you give us some insight as to experiences that occur in other states because I'm sure the practice really hasn't been discontinued of people living together and making some assumptions about what is rightfully theirs as a result of their union and cohabitation. Can you give us any cite as to what is the trend or, as you would say, changes in thinking or something like that?

MR. VERTZ: I'm afraid I haven't studied the national trends on this and I really haven't read any studies about the impact of this. I have heard anecdotes about it. There is one prominent attorney in town who mentioned during the discussion of this subject at the Allegheny County Bar Association meeting that in one state that recently abolished, that some family lawyers there were seeing results that they thought were somewhat inequitable in cases where there had been a long term common-law marriage and the statute abolishing common-law marriage didn't provide a saving clause and so after a 20-year relationship where there were children and comingling of assets, the spouse, at the end of that relationship, wasn't able to get her fair share. But as I said, that was in a state that didn't have a saving clause in their legislation. And so, I don't know that that would be as much of a problem with this legislation.

MR. SCOTT: What's a saving clause?

MR. VERTZ: As this legislation is drafted, any common-law marriage prior to the enactment of the legislation would be judicially recognized in perpetuity.

REPRESENTATIVE MAYERNIK: So, you are speaking of a grandfather clause?

MR. VERTZ: A grandfather clause.

REPRESENTATIVE MAYERNIK: States that have abolished common-law, what benefits have they seen?

MR. VERTZ: I'm not sure that I can answer that. My practice is limited to the Commonwealth and I haven't reviewed the state of the law nationally. So, I'm not sure that I can answer that. I can only speculate that it was resolved in fewer cases coming to court on that issue.

REPRESENTATIVE MAYERNIK: Do you have any idea or would you find out for us in answer to the prior question as well as in Allegheny County, can you find out what you would estimate the savings to be or how many cases are heard regarding the common-law?

I'm trying to get some savings aspect on judicial economy on passing the legislation?

MR. VERTZ: I'd be happy to do that.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: This Staudenmayer case just intrigues me because it's pretty obvious that there wasn't any fraud involved here because she said, I can't remember any occasion when we exchanged words. If there was any kind of perjury or fraud, she would have said, oh, yes, plenty of times. So, she was pretty honest.

The other thing that struck me is I was thinking about this settlement that occurred in '82. They were living together for six years. Why wouldn't she have raised this common-law marriage at that time and tried to get some loss of consortium? You know, we are married. So, I'm entitled to that unless all of this occurred, this accident that gave rise to the settlement occurred prior to their cohabitation but I am speculating. It intriques me that there are some facts here. We always talked about years ago we had a saying and I guess we still do, good cases make bad law and it seems to me that this is a good case. not a bad case because it came to a -- and from what I'm reading here, it was just over this one issue. Apparently, all of the other economic issues have been settled.

MR. VERTZ: It appears so.

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CHAIRMAN GANNON: It looks like it was just this personal injury settlement that was in dispute.

MR. VERTZ: And it just demonstrates the difficulty of proving an oral contract, period. She may have believed all of the time that they had a common-law marriage; that they had contracted with each other and that he may have had some different thought in his mind.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: You know, you talk about street law. My vision of a common-law marriage, you know, wasn't like, you know, you spent a weekend at the Poconos and said, oh, we are married between ourselves. My vision is that it was something that developed over time; that you began to develop that relationship and that bond and that you, just as a matter of course, considered yourself husband and wife where you had that relationship and you presented that to the world, you know, when you went to a party or you went to some kind of event. Who's this, oh, that's my wife, Sally; that's my husband, Joe, and you presented yourself that way. It evolved over I guess that's why, like you said earlier, oh, if you lived together for seven years, that's commonlaw marriage. I don't think anybody, even at that

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1 level, they didn't think it was event driven. 2 had to go someplace or do something to exchange 3 promises or vows even though it wasn't done in a --4 it might have been done in a formal ceremony but it 5 wasn't done before a civil or religious person who was 6 by law authorized to do that. So, I always looked at 7 it that way. I think most people do. That struck me 8 that they even asked that question. Well, Ms. 9 Staudenmayer, did you ever get together and light 10 candles and say you are married. No, no, we didn't 11 do that. Well then, you're not married. 12 MR. VERTZ: That would be an interesting 13 case. 14 15 16

I haven't seen that one. The other interesting case would be where there was a defective ceremonial marriage such as a formal ceremony but it turns out that the legal authority for some reason is not there. But I haven't seen those cases yet.

MR. PRESKI: Have you ever had a situation where they have lived together but they very clearly said they are not married?

MR. VERTZ: Oh, absolutely. As family lawyers, sometimes we draft cohabitation agreements which spell out their rights. My property remains my property and her property remains her property and she is not entitled to support, those kinds of things,

and sometimes in most cases there are even provisions for what will happen with custody or support of children if they plan to live together without being married but have children.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: They are the prenuptials without the nuptials.

MR. VERTZ: Without the nuptials.

MR. PRESKI: To try and break it down, this is really about education. I mean, you talked about street law where this whole other body of law exists outside of everything. It's really just about education?

MR. VERTZ: It is, sir.

MR. PRESKI: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GANNON: Thank you very much, Mr. Vertz, for sharing that testimony. It's very interesting and enlightening. Is that it?

MR. PRESKI: We have a variety of other testimony that is going to be presented in written form to the Committee. We'll keep the record open.

I'll submit that to you and what we will do is after that is all brought in, we will prepare a booklet for the members who were here and those not.

REPRESENTATIVE MAYERNIK: I'd like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Gannon for

attending and bringing the Committee to Pittsburgh
to hear testimony regarding this issue, the bill I
sponsored, at the urging of Mr. Gruener, who is one
of my constituents and thanks for bringing the
testimony today, to listen and hear what people have
to say. I know time is very difficult and I appreciate you being here. I apologize for my tardiness but
I had another function earlier this morning with
several other Allegheny County representatives that
we were breaking ground for the Family House.

(The following was submitted for inclusion in the record:)

TESTIMONY OF BRIAN C. VERTZ, ESQ.

My name is Brian Vertz. I am an attorney who has been licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania since 1992. My law practice is dedicated exclusively to the area of domestic relations -- divorce, child support, custody and related areas. I am a member of the Section Council for the Family Law Section of the Allegheny County Bar Association and chair of the Program Committee for the Family Law Section of the Pennsylvania Bar Association. I am not representing those organizations in an official capacity, but I have discussed my testimony with Harry Gruener,

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president of the Pennsylvania chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, David Pollock, chair of the Family Law Section of the Pennsylvania Bar Association; and Carol McCarthy, chair of the Family Law Section of the Allegheny County Bar Association.

Most of the divorce lawyers that I have spoken with favor the passage of legislation that would abolish common-law marriage. doctrine of common-law marriage is obsolete and rife with fraud and perjury. Generally, a common law marriage is formed when a man and a woman exchange vows, or words expressing their present intent to be married, without obtaining a marriage license. Proving a common-law marriage can be exceedingly difficult. There is usually no written record of the event, and in perhaps the majority of cases, there are no witnesses when these words are exchanged. there is no other evidence, a common law marriage may be established by proving that the spouses lived together and were known in the community as a married couple.

Our courts must determine the existence of a common-law marriage when one spouse dies

and the surviving spouse seeks a statutory
share of the decedent's estate, or in a divorce
context, when one spouse seeks support, alimony,
or equitable distribution of marital property.

Pension administrators and life insurance
companies confront common-law marriage when a
spouse's consent is required to change a beneficiary designation or a spouse might be entitled
to a survivor benefit. Governmental agencies,
such as the workers' compensation board, must
determine whether a common-law marriage existed
when a spouse seeks benefits. In most cases,
there is very little hard evidence, and one spouse
is usually adversarial to the other spouse or
his/her surviving family.

In modern times, some couples choose to live together without being married. They may have good reasons for maintaining separate finances and avoiding the commitment of a legal marriage. When an informal relationship breaks up, an angry or opportunistic partner may attempt to extract money or property from the other partner by claiming that a common-law marriage existed. Common-law marriage was a useful doctrine in the frontier days, when people

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lived far from courthouses or authorities who were empowered to sanction their union. Today, marriage authorities are readily available in every county of this Commonwealth, and marriage licenses are not exceedingly expensive or difficult to obtain. The potential for fraud and perjury substantially outweighs the usefulness of the doctrine. Common-law marriage is a remnant of ancient law that has simply outlived its functional utility.

House Bill 43 was drafted in response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer. Mr. and Mrs. Staudenmayer lived together for eight years before they were formally married in 1984. When they divorced in 1992, Mrs. Staudenmayer asked the divorce court to divide a personal injury settlement that her husband had received in 1982, before they were formally married. wife was not entitled to a share of the husband's personal injury settlement unless the parties had established a common-law marriage prior to their ceremonial marriage in 1984. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there was insufficient evidence of a common-law marriage because Mrs.

Staudenmayer could not recall a specific occasion when she and Mr. Staudenmayer had exchanged words of present intent to be married. However, the litigation was protracted and costly because there was substantial testimony and evidence about their cohabitation and reputation in the community as married persons.

Staudenmayer is the latest in a series of decisions that have attempted to narrow the scope of the common-law marriage doctrine. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Nigro called upon our legislature to abolish common-law marriage stating, "I would advocate the abolishment of common-law marriage in Pennsylvania so that official records, and not the courts, may determine if and when the parties were married."

House Bill 43 was drafted also in response to the report of the Joint State Government Commission's Advisory Committee on Domestic Relations Law, which was formed by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1995 to recommend changes to the Pennsylvania Divorce Code. The committee included twenty-eight well-known divorce lawyers, judges, and law professors, who worked for four years to reach consensus. The Advisory

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Committee also endorsed the abolition of common-law marriage.

I have testified that most divorce lawyers favor the abolition of common-law marriage, but there is a dissenting view. Legal services lawyers, in particular, are concerned about the impact that House Bill 43 would have on the population that they serve. Indigent persons often cannot afford good legal advice. Instead, they rely upon the "street law," which consists of rumors and popular misinformation that may contain a kernel of truth. Lawyers who serve the indigent worry that they will continue to cohabit together, bear children, combine their property and finances, and structure their lives as married persons without having entitlement to spousal support, equitable distribution of marital property, statutory share of a spouse's estate, right to elect against the will of a spouse, right to receive spousal life insurance and pension benefits, and other legal protections. They worry that children will be raised in families that are illusory.

In my view, the abolition of common-law marriage will not worsen the plight of the indigent.

Common-law marriage is almost universally misunderstood by laypersons at every economic level. It is commonly believed that a common-law marriage is established by living together for seven years. Actually, there is nothing magical about seven years; it is a myth. Some myths will probably survive, but "street law" will eventually catch up with the changes in statutory law.

To give the media sufficient time to inform the public, House Bill 43 would not become effective for twelve months after its passage. The bill contains a saving clause, which would preserve the legitimacy of common-law marriages that were contracted before passage of the bill. I favor the passage of House Bill 43 to abolish common-law marriage.

(The hearing terminated at 10:52 a.m.)

* * *

I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence taken by me in the above-entitled matter are fully and accurately indicated in my notes and that this is a true and correct transcript of same.

Nancy J. Grega, RPR/mma

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