COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

TASK FORCE ON ADOPTIONS, GUARDIANS AD LITEM

AND COURT-APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES

In Re: House Bills 1533 and 1838

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Verbatim record of hearing held in the Gold Room, Allegheny County, Courthouse Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on Thursday March 23, 2000
1:00 p.m.

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

HON. CRAIG A. DALLY, CHAIRMAN HON. JANE C. ORIE HON. DON WALKO

ALSO PRESENT:

Hon. Paul Costa Jane Mendlow, Research Analyst David Bloomer, Research Analyst

> Reported by: Nancy J. Grega, RPR

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INDEX OF WITNESSES

INDEX OF WITNESSES	
<u>WITNESSES</u> :	PAGE
Jackie Wilson, Three Rivers Adoption Council	3
	22
Juvenile Court Project	
Kiersten Frankowski, Esq., Juvenile Court Project	33
Craig Kollar	54
Melanie Kollar	54
Hon. Paul Zavarella	69
Mary Jo Meenan, Esq., Chief, Court-Appointed Special Advocates	92
Stephen R. Kaufman, Esq., Board Member, Court-Appointed Special Advocates	93
Christin Morris Thompson, Director of Adoptions, Children's Home of Pgh.	101
Linda Erin Rich, Director, Allegheny County Bar Foundation, Juvenile Court Project	106
Celia Foy,	110
Pennsylvania Council for Children's Services	
	WITNESSES: Jackie Wilson, Three Rivers Adoption Council Mark Edwards, Esq., Juvenile Court Project Kiersten Frankowski, Esq., Juvenile Court Project Craig Kollar Melanie Kollar Hon. Paul Zavarella Mary Jo Meenan, Esq., Chief, Court-Appointed Special Advocates Stephen R. Kaufman, Esq., Board Member, Court-Appointed Special Advocates Christin Morris Thompson, Director of Adoptions, Children's Home of Pgh. Linda Erin Rich, Director, Allegheny County Bar Foundation, Juvenile Court Project Celia Foy,

CHAIRMAN DALLY: I'd like to call the hearing of the Judiciary Committee, Task Force on Adoptions, Guardians Ad Litem, and Court-Appointed Special Advocates to order.

I am Representative Craig Dally. I represented North Hampton and Monroe counties in the eastern part of the state, and also serving on the task force is Representative Jane Orie from Allegheny County and Representative Don Walko from Allegheny County. Also joining us from Allegheny County is Representative Paul Costa. I thank the representatives for being here today.

I'd also like to introduce Dave

Bloomer who is on the Republican Judiciary

Committee staff and Jane Mendlow who is also

on the Democratic Judiciary staff.

We are here today to seek additional testimony on two House bills that have been introduced by Representative Kevin Blaum.

Particularly, those are House Bill 1533 and House Bill 1838. These bills pertain to the issue of consent to adoption as well as relinquishment of parental rights, adoption counseling and adoption medical history

1 information.

We held a previous hearing on this on October 13 in Harrisburg and this is our second hearing, and we thought it would be best to come to western Pennsylvania to secure witnesses from this area of the state to get their feedback on the legislation.

The first person to testify today or listed on our agenda was the Honorable Paul Zavarella, but Judge Zavarella would like to sit and listen to some other testimony and then provide some insight as to his experiences in the courtroom and relate that to what's been said today.

So, with that being said, Jackie Wilson. I know, Jackie, you don't want to go first but you will be fine. Welcome, Jackie.

MS. WILSON: Good afternoon. I have been invited today to offer testimony regarding House Bills 1533 and 1838. I'm Jacqueline Wilson, and I am the Executive Director of Three Rivers Adoption Council here in Pittsburgh.

I would like first to commend the House on their understanding the need to visit

the issues related to these House bills since

they are timely and they need to be visited.

Regarding House Bill 1533, we agree that it's certainly necessary to shorten some of the timeframes that we have for revoking consents to relinquishments. The current ability to revoke often lingers until finalization and then that leads to an uncertainty for the child, uncertainty on who they are, where they belong, and the stability they need is not there when it lingers on for such a long period of time. So, it gives them some, again, stability in an expeditious manner that they are deserving as children. Oftentimes, of course, children don't have a right to say what's best for them. So, as adults, we need to be the ones that are able to make those decisions and they need to be in the best interests of the children.

The termination subcommittee, I know, was recommending that the time to revoke consent be reduced to ten days versus the 30 days that is being proposed and certainly the shorter timeframe, the better the ability to bring some closure and some finalization on

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the subject. So, I would ask the Committee to also look further into the subcommittee's report. I'm not sure if an actual report has been out yet or made available and if you have seen it or not. Take a look at that and some of their recommendations regarding this so that we can make sure that whatever best is done in order for the kids to be best served.

We want to make sure that we are able to deal with these self-issues that the children will have and the self-esteem and their sense of self, and certainly that comes by bonding and becoming a part of a family. If we wait too long, the child never knows who they do belong to. Their sense of self and the beginning of their roots then ends up being hindered, and that process is hammered for children, and when it takes too long and someone then disrupts that by changing their mind three months, six months, nine months down the road, then we have taken a nice piece of that child and started some confusion for them and their lives that they don't need to have to have in their young lives.

With regard to House Bill 1838 and

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the mandate of enacting counseling for both parents, that is certainly a step in the right direction. Both parents who are contemplating relinquishing their rights to their children deserve to have counseling. They deserve to be able to make sure that the decision they have made is the right decision. They need to be able to know all of the options that they have, including adoption, but certainly there are other options they can choose. We need to make sure that they are clear with that. Oftentimes, in deciding to relinquish parental rights, sometimes it is well thought out and sometimes it is a spur of the moment, dealing with the conditions that they are in at that moment, and we need to make sure that it is a clear-cut decision that they have made, one that they have made that has been well thought out with all of the things that they need to go through and deal with. So, having the counseling is certainly one thing that we think is vital to ensuring that all of the options are discussed with them.

However, one of the things that concerned me was the wording in Section 2502

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where it states that if the parent "requested" adoption-related counseling, and I think it would better serve the Bill and the birth parents if the Bill read that they all were, they were all "referred" to counseling. don't think the birth parents should have to request it. I think this is an important enough step for them. Their needing to make that decision is not another decision that they need to make. I think it needs to be offered to all of them and then they can, of course, choose to accept that counseling but at least to be offered to them. So, I think that would better serve the Bill if we changed that language.

Section 2533(3.2), it seems to indicate that adoptive parents will be asked to pay for adoption-related counseling received by birth parents. That's my understanding that I received when I read the Bill and it states, without regard to the adoptive parents' income; that's reasonable reimbursement. It seems that they may be reimbursed for the expenses that they have paid for both birth parents' counseling, and I

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think if we put that in the Bill, I think that hinders people from adopting children. Adoptive parents should not have to pay for counseling sessions that a birth parent receives. I know the Bill talks about each county setting up a segregated fund and that those kind of payments should come out of that fund and not out of adoptive parents' pockets. If a birth parent does not have access to third-party payment including medical assistance, then we need to look toward the segregated fund and you can make sure that all of the counties have established that fund and if they have surpluses that they are adding to that fund from the \$75 filing fee and, in addition, some of the surpluses they might be running through the county budget, but by no means should adoptive parents need to pay that.

With all of the children we have that need to be adopted, with all of the push that we have in trying to encourage adoption from people because it is a good step for them to make to become adoptive resources for children, we don't need to hinder that by

asking them to pay for that kind of a service for birth parents. I think that would be very crucial and devastating to this Bill. That would be all that I have. Are there any questions?

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Thank you very much.

Any questions? Representative Orie?

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: In regards to your last statement with creating a fund, did you say that from the filing fees themselves create almost like the fund for the counseling that needs to exist or what was your alternative?

MS. WILSON: From my understanding from the Bill, that there is a \$75 filing fee that adoptive parents pay and that this would go into the fund. Now, counties and adoptive agencies do have the right to waive that fee from adoptive parents because they may not even have that money, but from my understanding of the Bill, that that fee would be a part of that segregated fund. That should be set up by every county and then that county can also supplement that fund as well with additional monies.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: You are taking it from that fee?

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MS. WILSON: Right. That's where that needs to come from. It needs to come from out of that fee.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: If I could go back to Section 1533 where you were indicating the ten days versus the 30 days, you didn't think that using the 30 days would cause impairment to the child or confusion; that it should be reduced to ten days?

MS. WILSON: I don't know if the ten days versus the 30 days, you know, two weeks versus a month, and so there needs to be some kind of a compromise with that. I think whatever the timeframe that we choose, I think we need to make sure that it is enforced; that it be no more than or no less than. Perhaps it could be no less than ten days but no more than 30 days. I have not seen the termination subcommittee's full report to know what all they have placed in that. I think it's just real important that we have some concrete quidelines set aside so that when someone is relinquishing their rights to the children,

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the birth parents can move on to what they need to do in their lives so that there is some closure for all of them.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Would you also say that the adoptive parents should also get counseling? Who should get the counseling?

MS. WILSON: I think the counseling primarily needs to be with birth parents because adoptive parents have gone through a lot of training and they know a lot of the resources that are provided to them and a lot of the agencies they go through, they do provide some of those services for the adoptive parents. I know at the Three Rivers Adoption Council, we also have an adoption preparation group for children. So, there are a lot of things for children but we don't see those same things for the birth parents. So, the counseling needs to be for the birth parents and needs to happen before they sign the consent. Once they have signed the consent, they have done it already, they need to know what their options are and we need to make sure that they make decisions thoughtfully and it has not just been on the

spur of the moment.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: When you indicate that Three Rivers had something for the parents that are going to adopt, are there resources developed for the birth parents or would they utilize the same type of resources for their counseling or is there something that exists along that line?

MS. WILSON: I think that there are a lot of private providers and a lot of counselors and therapists. Again, the Bill mentions the Department of Public Welfare developing a list of people who are qualified to provide these services. Certainly, I think some things need to be done and established and funds need to be set aside on the county level for the development and implementation of specific adoption-related counseling services for birth parents. I think we need to provide it for them and the state and counties need to make sure that these services are offered in the manner which they need to be offered. A lot of therapists can do a good job at counseling but they are not aware of adoption issues and the specific issues

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1 related to them. While they may do an 2 excellent job, they may not know all the 3 issues that they need to get to with those 4 people. 5 REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: I have no 6 further questions. Thank you. 7 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: Thank you, 8 Miss Wilson, for being here and for your 9 testimony. Three Rivers Adoption Council is 10 an umbrella agency; is that correct? 11 MS. WILSON: That's correct. 12 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: And do you 13 work with the county, CYF organization? 14 MS. WILSON: That's correct. We have 15 approximately 62 agencies that are members and 16 affiliates with the county, with the agency, 17 throughout the state. So, we do have 18 contracts and affiliations with Allegheny 19 County Children and Youth Services, Washington 20 County, Beaver County. So, we do service a 21 lot of the counties, Fayette, Cambria. 22 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: You had 23 referred to a \$75 filing fee provided in the 24 legislation. I was trying to find that.

that in 1838? What I'm getting at is, there

is no similar fee now for an adoptive parent?

MS. WILSON: From my understanding, there is a fee now. This was something that was already in the legislation, that there is a \$75 fee now but it is waived a lot of times by the agencies that provide adoption services to adoptive parents because they can't always afford it.

REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: Just following up on what Representative Orie was saying about birth parent counseling, typically is it a birth parent that comes to you and says, I have a child that I would like to put up for adoption?

MS. WILSON: We do get some phone calls from birth families, from birth parents, but for the most part, we are a resource of getting adoptive resources for the children that are available. So, someone from Cambria County may call and say we have an infant, or the Children's Home may call and say we have a baby; do you have a resource for them. So, we are part of a national exchange and a state exchange to provide adoptive resources.

REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: Thank you.

1 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Representative 2 Costa? REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Good morning, 3 4 Miss Wilson. I like your name. I agree with 5 you as far as this counseling goes. 6 probably know, parents that are going through 7 custody are required to take mandatory 8 counseling. That's a very important decision. 9 To make an important decision as to give up 10 your children, that is not required, which 11 amazes me. I'm glad that this is part of the 12 Bill and I think this should stay in it. 13 Thank you for bringing it up. 14 MS. MENDLOW: There were a couple of 15 points, Jackie, that I wanted to touch on, if 16 possible. One thing was you did mention the 17 subcommittee on terminations. I just thought, 18 for the record, it probably would be important 19 to clarify that that was a subcommittee of the 20 Joint State Government Task Force on 21 Adoptions. 22 MS. WILSON: That's correct. 23 MS. MENDLOW: So that, just for the 24 record, it was not a legislative standing 25 committee or anything.

MS. WILSON: That's correct.

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The other point I MS. MENDLOW: wanted to touch on was the question about, and this is a point of clarification, as to whether or not the counseling, the expenses related to adoption counseling should be paid by the adoptive parents, and what Representative Blaum, and speaking in his behalf, was trying to do here, on page 9 of the Bill, House Bill 1838, was basically permit those expenses to be paid by the adoptive parents. The reason being that various court decisions had determined that adoptive parents were prohibited from paying for the adoption counseling and certainly there was no desire to force the parent to take any type of particular counseling but the idea was that any resources that might be available to ensure that the birth parents get this particular type of counseling should be

not we need to revisit that as opposed to making it a requirement. That really goes

back as well to what we had been finding, was

there, that was his objective, and whether or

an enormous problem with access to the

counseling fund, and it seems like most counties have not been using any of those resources based on that \$75 filing fee that's been in place since, I believe, 1992. So, the idea was to try to get, you know, everyone better linked up at the point they were contemplating the possibility of relinquishing their rights or consenting to adoptive placement.

And I also had a question for you in terms of your feelings about whether adoption-related counseling should be provided through or by an agency approved by the Department of Public Welfare for doing that particular type of counseling as opposed to, as in current law, where it basically is left very ambiguous and could be counseling provided by someone who might not have any expertise in adoption issues. I would be interested in your feelings on that.

MS. WILSON: Well, certainly, as an adoption agency, I would say, of course, that an agency or providers who have been approved by the Department certainly who meet certain criteria would, of course, would be more

beneficial. That doesn't mean that it couldn't be someone's pastor. If a group of pastors thought they wanted to be approved to be on that list, then they should submit their resumes and the information that they have that makes them able to do that. Certainly, some people are going to be more comfortable with their minister or their rabbi and that should be okay. That should be permitted as well, as long as it's been approved by the Department as satisfactory counseling. They may say they don't want any counseling at all and I think that should still be okay, but I think it needs to be offered to every single That every hospital in the county and every clinic needs to have that list to be able to give to anyone who they think is contemplating, anyone who is not quite sure. Certainly, that is at the time of birth. somehow -- I don't know how we back up even beyond that for clinics -- where a young lady or woman is coming in and doing prenatal visits contemplating, it needs to be given So, we need to get it before the then. maternity ward as well.

1 MS. MENDLOW: Thank you very much. 2 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Any questions? 3 (No response.) CHAIRMAN DALLY: Thank you very much. 5 (The following was submitted for 6 inclusion in the record:) 7 I am sure that many of us can cite at 8 least one case where a birth parent made the 9 decision to revoke their consent after their 10 child has been placed for several months with 11 their adoptive family. While this action is 12 undoubtedly difficult for all adults involved, 13 we must look at the impact such a decision has 14 on the child. For a child who has begun to 15 bond with their family and has had their role 16 in the family defined, this disruption can 17 have a long-lasting effect. The turmoil and 18 confusion created because of not knowing where 19 and/or to whom they belong ultimately 20 decreases the child's sense of self. 21 I would note that the Termination 22 Subcommittee is recommending the time to 23 revoke be reduced even further to ten days 24 versus the 30 days being proposed.

Consideration of this will bring a more timely

resolution to the adoption process. Prompt closure will allow for an earlier sense of permanency for the child and the adoptive family.

With regard to HB 1838, enacting legislation to mandate the offering of counseling services to birth parents is a positive step. The decision to relinquish parental rights is undoubtedly a painstaking one. Offering counseling prior to the consent being signed is vital to ensure the birth parents understanding of all options, including relinquishment of right and adoption.

However, the wording of Section

2502(a)(2) wherein it states "if the parent
requested adoption-related counseling
services..." would much better serve birth
parents if the Bill stated: If parent
accepted adoption-related counseling. This
terminology would assist in ensuring the
counseling services being offered to all birth
parents contemplating the decision to
relinquish parental rights.

Of concern is the terminology in

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S2533(3.2), wherein it seems to indicate that adoptive parents will be asked to pay for adoption-related counseling received by birth Adoptive parents should neither be parents. asked or required to pay for such services received by birth parents. Doing so (particularly without with regard to their income) can/will pose a significant hardship to foster families (counseling services can cost over \$100 per session.) It would be suggested that if birth parents do not have access to third-party insurance (including Medical Assistance), to offset the cost of counseling services, procedures must be implemented with the service provider and the county for reimbursement for services from the segregated fund.

Taking this step could/would hinder the adoption process as well as prohibit many individuals from adopting. With the many children needing permanent homes, we cannot afford to alienate families by placing this requirement in this Bill.

Thank you for your time in this matter.

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1 2 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Next person on the 3 agenda today is Mary Jo Meenan. Is she here 4 in the audience? 5 (No response.) CHAIRMAN DALLY: How about Stephen 6 7 Kaufman. 8 (No response.) 9 CHAIRMAN DALLY: How about Joan 10 Shoemaker? 11 (No response.) 12 CHAIRMAN DALLY: You may be on the 13 spot here. The other witnesses are not here 14 yet. Would you care to testify now? Yes, 15 sir. 16 MR. EDWARDS: My name is Mark 17 Edwards. I am an attorney with the Juvenile 18 Court Project, part of the Allegheny County 19 Bar Foundation. We represent indigent parents 20 who are part of CYF proceedings. We were not 21 on the agenda to testify but would be willing 22 to address some of the issues today. 23 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Why don't you come

forward now and present your testimony and

then we'll have the judge follow you.

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JUDGE ZAVARELLA: That's fine,
because I intended to comment on the practices
in Allegheny County between our Family
Division and the Orphans Court.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: After the hearing, if you could, give your mailing address and other relevant information to Mr. Bloomer so we can stay in contact with you.

MR. EDWARDS: For the record, my name is Mark Edwards. I'm an attorney with the Juvenile Court Project, part of the Allegheny County Bar Foundation. We represent indigent parents in Allegheny County that are involved in CYF proceedings and oftentimes we see the issue before the panel coming up in termination of parental rights proceedings in cases in which the CYF reviews the cases at 90-day intervals.

On behalf of our clients, we feel compelled to oppose the 30-day limitation of the revocation of consent. This is an extremely difficult decision for many of our clients and we feel that additional time is needed, and to basically shorten this timeframe has an adverse effect on their due

process rights. I certainly would voice strong concern to my colleague's comment that she believes that it should be reduced even further to ten days. Again, it's a very serious issue for our clients. They are emotional. I believe my colleague did note that it's a very emotional time. Oftentimes, it's a spur-of-the-moment decision, and we feel additional time needs to be given to them so they can confer with counsel about the seriousness of this issue.

We oftentimes see this coming up as part of the Adoption and Safe Families Act.

What happens is that basically if I go to a termination of parental rights hearing and I lose on behalf of my client, CYF can file a petition for aggravated circumstances and if that is found, the agency need not make reasonable efforts to reunify on other children and, therefore, from a legal standpoint, these clients oftentimes give consideration, if they feel it would be in their biological children's best interest if they would consent, and that oftentimes is the nature that we see these type of issues.

Now, my understanding is that in Allegheny County, Great Lakes Adoption, who is also not here today, handled termination of parental rights hearings on behalf of the county. If a consent is signed by a client, what happens is they wait 40 days and they then proceed to get this on for a hearing before the judge. So, basically, what we are looking at is a 40-day waiting period and then probably a month, no more than a month, to get it on the docket before a judge. So, it's not lingering for that long a time.

Again, I would thank the panel for the opportunity to address you.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Okay. Thank you. Questions?

REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Thank you,
Mr. Edwards. I'm ignorant to the facts as to
how the adoption process works. Can you
basically walk me through it very quickly from
the time that the birthing parents decide they
want to give a child up for adoption and what
steps are involved and the process of getting
them, through the adoptive parents?

MR. EDWARDS: Well, oftentimes my

involvement is only when they are contesting. However, there are times when a child is placed with a relative or someone that the biological parent may feel that it would be in their best interest that the biological child stay with that foster parent. A consent form is signed by the biological parent and what has to be in that consent form is defined by statute. Forty days later, if the hearing is not scheduled, what happens is the agency who handles the adoption hearings on behalf of the county will request that a hearing be scheduled and then that consent will be finalized by the court.

REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: So, the worst thing or the way this bill is saying, once that consent is signed, they have up to 30 days to change their mind?

MR. EDWARDS: The way -- my
understanding of the way you are wording this
is that there is a 30-day window and once that
30 days expires, the consent is irrevocable.
Our concern is that this is too short of a
window to place on our clients. The way the
Bill is worded at the present time, my

1	understanding is, that the client would have
2	the ability to revoke or change their mind up
3	to the time that the decree is signed to
4	terminate the parental rights.
5	REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: That's a
6	minimum of at least 40 days right now plus the
7	additional 30 if this goes in?
8	MR. EDWARDS: It's all a matter of
9	semantics, but when you are looking at a
10	serious decision like that affecting our
11	clients, we don't think that is too long a
12	period to wait.
13	CHAIRMAN DALLY: Representative Orie?
14	REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Just as a
15	follow-up. One of your colleagues had
16	mentioned the best interests of the child.
17	What about that aspect?
18	MR. EDWARDS: I certainly probably
19	have other panel members that would address
20	that. I'm looking after my client's interests
21	and that's what I'm concerned about.
22	REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Thank you.
23	CHAIRMAN DALLY: Jane Mendlow?
24	MS. MENDLOW: Mr. Edwards, one of the
25	considerations in trying to address the

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problems here is in terms of whether there should be a time set in statute for revocation of consent as opposed to current law which is rather open-ended.

MR. EDWARDS: Again, with all due respect, I would think that there is a window on it. Again, there is the 40-day period and then by the very nature of the court docket, it's scheduled probably within 30 days. So, there is some window there.

MS. MENDLOW: You know, again, just from, I would say, this is over a course of probably ten years where there has been a lot of feedback to the legislators about this process and concerns about how the Pennsylvania law works and there was a legislative Budget and Finance Committee report that was done on the adoption process back in 1991, and at that point that legislative report recommended a 30-day, you know, revocation period but the other thing that Representative Blaum had tried to take into consideration as well was what seemed to be the state of the art and practice in other states, not that Pennsylvania has to imitate

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but to just try to understand more or less how we fit in, and it appears that Pennsylvania law is rather dissimilar and unique in having this statute whereby the revocation really could occur any time prior to the termination of the parental rights or the adoption decree. In terms of some information for the record, Maryland has a 30-day revocation period; New York, a 30-day period if the child is placed with an agency or 45 days if a child was placed in a private placement; Virginia, a 15-day period; the District of Columbia, a 10-day revocation period; Delaware, 60 days; Connecticut, consents are irrevocable unless the court finds fraud, duress, or coercion; West Virginia is 20 days; Massachusetts, consents are irrevocable; New Jersey, it's irrevocable if a child is placed with an adoption agency. I just throw those points out for the purpose of discussion, and sometime we can talk and maybe if you could advise us as to whether or not you would offer any other compromise points on this issue.

MR. EDWARDS: I would just note that, again, we're in the trenches, so to speak. I

see this on a daily basis and it is never,
never an easy decision for these clients to
make and a lot of times they will go back and
forth and it rips them up because they are
actually consenting. They are saying it's in
their best interest, we are going to consent;
but it takes some time and I think the clients
should be given the time to do that.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Paul?

REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Again,

Mr. Edwards, thank you for answering those questions. Do you agree with the counseling portion of it prior to making the decisions and the consent or do you think that even makes a difference?

MR. EDWARDS: I think that the counseling is a very important aspect to this. I think that it's important that there be some form of legal counseling given to the client to advise them. Currently, the state of the law in Pennsylvania is there is no open law adoption. So, when they are giving up their rights, the fact of the matter is it's totally within the discretion of the adoptive parents whether or not they have any continuing

relationship with that child and that's not -there is absolutely no guarantee. They need
to be fully advised of that. There is
mediation in Allegheny County, a mediation
project, and we'll oftentimes suggest that our
clients participate in that. Again, what I
have to do is advise my clients that there is
no guarantee and that needs to be fully
explained to the clients.

REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Any more questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Just, I guess, a comment on my part. We held a hearing back in October. We heard from a lot of parents, prospective adoptive parents, that, I guess, presented the other view and I think Representative Orie touched on it about the best interest of the child. In a lot of these cases, the adoptive parents are in a position, you know, their home has been prepared. The child may even be with them and, you know, the day before the decree is issued, revocation comes and it just seems we need some kind of finality. What you are saying then is under

1 the current system, they have -- there is finality in the sense that it is in 70 days as 2 3 opposed to 30? MR. EDWARDS: I'm saying that there is a way to get that calendared on the court's 5 docket and it doesn't continue for an 6 indefinite period of time. Now, granted, what 7 you need to know is, assuming that our clients 8 did revoke their consent, the court obviously 9 will proceed and a petition for involuntary 10 11 termination would be filed and it would be --12 it would eventually end up as a contested 13 termination of parental rights hearing. 14 CHAIRMAN DALLY: In cases like that, 15 where does the child usually remain? 16 MR. EDWARDS: The child remains with 17 the foster parent where the child has been 18 residing. So, the child is not removed. 19 CHAIRMAN DALLY: And does your office 20 or do you represent the natural parent then in 21 the termination proceeding also? 22 MR. EDWARDS: Absolutely. That's 23 solely what I do with our office and they 24 have -- they will have an interactional

examination. They will have the parent

1 examined with a psychologist and a caseworker 2 will testify. The psychologist will testify. 3 Any of the caseworkers or service providers 4 will testify and based on that information that is presented to the judge, the judge will 5 6 make the decision as to whether or not 7 termination is appropriate. 8 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Thank you. Any further questions? 9 10 (No response.) 11 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Thank you very much. 12 MR. EDWARDS: Thank you for the 13 opportunity to speak. 14 MS. FRANKOWSKI: My name is Kiersten 15 Frankowski. I actually work for the same 16 project as Mr. Edwards. He is my supervisor. 17 I just wanted to follow up on his testimony a 18 little bit. 19 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Come forward. 20 MS. FRANKOWSKI: For the record, my 21 name is Kiersten, K-I-E-R-S-T-E-N, Frankowski, 22 F-R-A-N-K-O-W-S-K-I. I'm also an attorney 23 with the Allegheny County Bar Foundation, 24 Juvenile Court Project, and actually, 25 Mr. Edwards, who just testified, is my

supervisor.

I have a little bit of a different perspective because I'm at the stage where I'm handling the cases prior to getting to the termination stage and I think before I even get into that, I think it's very important that everybody in this room understand the distinction between a private adoption process and the adoption process coming through Children, Youth and Family Services. It's very different.

The first witness who testified from Three Rivers adoption, I understood the point she was making about an expeditious process and that these children need to have finality and permanence, and what I want everyone to understand is that in a CYF case, you are not usually dealing with a parent who is perhaps considering this adoption process since the child was in the womb and actually sought out an adoptive resource and has a family already lined up. The people that we deal with are kind of in the system because the court says so and they are at this point with having to face a potential involuntary termination of

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their parental rights or consenting to an adoption because of the Adoption and Safe Families Act. I think that is a critical distinction that needs to be made. There is a lot less thought and choice involved with the people that we represent, with our clients.

With the Adoption and Safe Families Act, when a child is out of a natural parent's care for 15 out of the past 22 months, it's mandatory that that child be referred to the adoption department. We see this every day because we do represent natural parents in Children, Youth and Family Services proceedings and, unfortunately, are times the children are out of their care and are in foster placements. Once the clock ticks to that 15 out of the previous 22 months, CYF immediately searches for adoptive resources if the child is not already residing with a preadoptive home and they take steps to file an involuntary termination of parental rights against the natural parent. What happens is these are just filed. As the clock ticks, the paperwork gets done. Their attorneys do their Our clients get the paperwork. work.

also need to understand we don't represent ever single natural parent in the system. So, there are people that slip by us. Not everyone has someone to explain these papers to them.

Mr. Edwards indicated that there is now a problem with what is called aggravated circumstances and that is part of the Adoption and Safe Families Act. In the event that a natural parent has their rights involuntarily terminated to a child, any children that they are still legally the parent of after that, the more natural children, if they also are involved in the system, if that child becomes a dependent child, CYF can request that the court find aggravated circumstances and they can request that if this child is ever removed, that no reasonable efforts to reunify need to be made.

So, essentially, if aggravated circumstances are filed, a child can be removed for whatever reason and CYF, by judicial mandate, can refuse to try to reunify this family and that could be a first removal. It could be a simple "home alone" case, just

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something that hasn't been completely flushed out, but if that child has been removed, placed in shelter, and placed in a foster home, they will not have to work to reunify this family. That is why this is a very sensitive issue for our project and our clients because with these involuntary terminations, unfortunately, we have a lot of clients that have one or two of these on their previous records and they have children that they are working to reunify with. The county is filing these aggravated circumstances against them. What we need to do is try to prove, in the event that the client did consent, although the judge signed a decree that said this was an involuntary termination, we do have a record that says that the client did show up and say, Your Honor, this is in the best interests of my child and I'm not going to fight this. We can beat aggravated circumstances that way and, therefore, protect our clients and their future children and their families. This is how we have become involved with the consents to adoption and it's fairly recent for people that do our kind of job because of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act.

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I follow the cases prior to this, before Mr. Edwards actually gets them at the termination stage. What I try do is determine at a soon enough point when that clock starts ticking to the 15 out of 22 and I know that Children, Youth and Families is going to pursue an involuntary termination. I need to be advising my client that you do have other options. You can choose to consent to an adoption, in which case that is how we will avoid aggravated circumstances in the future. On the other hand, you can receive your petition for involuntary termination of parental rights and we can proceed to trial with that and you either win or lose. problem is when we do lose and when the facts are against our clients, regardless of what happened, it is aggravated circumstances and it puts the future children and unity of the family in jeopardy.

With these consents to adoption, we have something to explain to the people, how they can protect themselves and their

families, and I actually just sat down and did one with a client and the county last week and it's very helpful for that person to know that until the judge says okay, I'm signing this, they can change their mind. It's something very different than where parents will go and secure their own counsel, and this has been worked out and thought about and mom knows the adoptive parents, adoptive parents know mom. It has worked out. I understand the reasoning for the wording in the proposed Bill in that arena, but it is a very different arena with the child welfare cases and I think that really needs to be considered.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Thank you.

Questions?

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: I'm completely confused about this aggravated circumstances. It's just not coming clear to me. Before I get to that point, when these kids are put into the system that you deal with, is this because of neglect? What are the circumstances behind that?

MS. FRANKOWSKI: There are various reasons. What they are are child dependency

1 proceedings. Either the county or perhaps the 2 local police will petition for dependency. Usually, it's CYF that does that and there are 3 4 several different grounds, but you are getting 5 the idea. It's neglect, and these are alleged 6 things. They have to go to a formal 7 adjudication. They have to prove their case. 8 Common cases, home alone, truancy, things of that nature, not anything towards delinquency. 9 10 This is the dependency side. Once that child 11 is adjudicated dependent, that child is a 12 child of the system, a ward of the state, 13 whatever you want to call that, and once that 14 child is dependent, if that child is not 15 continued in the placement with his or her 16 natural parent during that whole time, unfortunately a lot of times they are put in 17 18 foster care for whatever reason, temporarily 19 or whatever the plan is --20 REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: That's what I 21 wanted to say about the 15 of the 22 months. 22 Is that what you are saying? 23 MS. FRANKOWSKI: Right. 24 REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: I guess my 25 point is does that not depend on the

circumstances as to like, for example, child abuse?

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MS. FRANKOWSKI: No.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Does that have any bearing on the 15 --

MS. FRANKOWSKI: No.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: The seriousness of what --

MS. FRANKOWSKI: It may or may not. It's the judge's discretion with regard to placement of the child. Granted, the more serious the allegations when the county petitions for dependency, that will usually determine if the child can remain in parental care or foster care. You need to understand that these aren't always horrific cases. These are indigent people. These are people without resources. Perhaps they lost their housing. It's through no actual neglect or abuse that the child has to be removed other than the child needs to be somewhere safe until the parents can locate suitable housing, get a job, and provide, be able to provide for this child. I mean, they are not always -people always think, oh, if CYF is involved,

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it's got to be horrible. That's not always the case. A lot of these people need the county's help and they are in the system not through any fault of their own other than their circumstances and the minute that child is placed out of parental care, that clock starts to tick and out of 15 months -- well, out of 22 months, they'll look at a whole 22-month period. If 15 months of that time has been spent outside of parental care in a foster home or shelter, another placement, they will have the court change -- they will ask the court to change the goal to adoption and they will file for an involuntary termination of parental rights, and they are following the Adoption and Safe Families Act in that regard.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: When they file that involuntary, the parents are then entitled, the natural parents, to dispute that or to challenge that?

MS. FRANKOWSKI: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: So that those circumstances, for example, where God forbid they don't have the money or resources, that

is something that a judge would make a determination?

MS. FRANKOWSKI: Yes.

my point with that. If, for example, it's resources or whatever, 15 months is a pretty significant period of time for these things, too, whether you need to get a job, at least a reasonable amount of time to make those type of changes to determine whether or not you can continue with your child.

MS. FRANKOWSKI: Right. I understand what you are saying there, and if everything worked perfectly, --

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Right, I know.

MS. FRANKOWSKI: -- that would be great and the judge would have to determine that, but all cases aren't like that.

Unfortunately, the Adoption and Safe Families Act is new. There are many cases in the system that have been lingering and lingering and once the Adoption and Safe Families Act was passed, CYF had to start filing the terminations. We are seeing a lot of it and, unfortunately, they are cases that we probably

can't beat in front of a judge just because -
REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Because of the

circumstances of those kind of cases?

MS. FRANKOWSKI: A child that has been with his or her grandparent all of his life and perhaps has a relationship with the parents, maybe not. Maybe the parent wasn't the most involved but, I mean, that would be a mild case. I mean, just a long time out of care. I mean, to go to an involuntary termination with that, it's highly unlikely, regardless of the issues, to be successful.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: And I guess that's where I come from. I understand that's where you represent but sooner or later the best interests of the child, in my opinion, should prevail over all of this.

MS. FRANKOWSKI: That is why the judge is sitting there hearing all of this, and in all of these hearings there is an attorney present for the child, there is an attorney present for the county. Those are issues that are best settled at an involuntary termination stage, but what I'm saying is for the interest of my clients and their new

families of children that happen to be in their care, this is an older child that has been out of their care, if it goes to that involuntary termination and we are unsuccessful and those are terminated, that can come back and affects the rest of the family in the future always. To be able to advise them about these consents in the cases where it's highly unlikely that we would be successful at an involuntary termination, the parent can sit and think and try to understand and realize what's in the best interest of his or her child and just to know that until the judge has the final say is somewhat of a comfort because these aren't people that are choosing to be there and not that all private adoptions are that way either. This is someone that is in a position because of the system they are in. They are kind of forced into this position and they get these involuntary termination papers and it's kind of hurry up, you have to decide. They are either going to go to trial or we can get you to sign these papers, and for them to have that time to let that sink in and for us to be 1 able, because all of these families are involved with CYF.

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We could have their caseworker help with setting up counseling which was something that was spoken about before, and I know that Three Rivers Adoption does do counseling for birth parents and adoptive parents, and in this system, CYF would be paying for that. So, I don't even need to comment on having adoptive parents pay for --

I quess my last REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: question, and I understand what you are saying, is from the point of view of CYF. With the number of cases that are in the system, is there enough manpower to have that type of one on one with these parents to go over these things, or are you guys inundated and very few staff? What about those circumstances?

MS. FRANKOWSKI: It's a problem but, I mean, there are the collateral agencies out there such as Three Rivers Adoption. are many other agencies that are involved that work with CYF cases, and we do have our judges and hearing officers order those things to be

1 explored in cases like this so that our 2 clients are able to make the most informed 3 decision that they can. 4 I guess the bottom line over all of this is that this is something that gets 5 6 thrown at these parents and it's very 7 delicate. It's something completely different 8 than in the private arena. I think that that 9 needs to be taken into consideration. 10 REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: I understand. 11 Is there counseling along those lines with 12 these parents? Is there right now? 13 MS. FRANKOWSKI: It is available, 14 yes, and we have had judges and hearing 15 officers order the parties to mediation, 16 adoption mediation. Unfortunately, the agencies that provide adoption mediation will 17 18 refuse to mediate if the parent is thinking 19 about contesting. So, it defeats the purpose 20 before we get there. 21 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Representative 22 Walko? 23 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: I'm a little 24 confused, Miss Frankowski, so forgive me.

You're only concerned about the situation

1 where there is an involuntary adoption 2 proceeding initiated and then a consent 3 entered? 4 MS. FRANKOWSKI: Not necessarily. 5 What we're moving towards is trying to, if we 6 have the case that is right for a consent and 7 our clients are informed and it's something --8 it's a tool that we can have to prevent the 9 involuntary termination from even being filed. 10 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: The entry of 11 the consent is? 12 MS. FRANKOWSKI: Yes. 13 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: And you're 14 concerned that the incentive there might be 15 the wrong incentive for a parent to consent to 16 the adoption because of the impending 17 involuntary termination? 18 MS. FRANKOWSKI: Yes. 19 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: What I was 20 wondering, typically how long do those 21 proceedings take from the initiation of the 22 involuntary until the entry of a decree? 23 MS. FRANKOWSKI: It varies. 24 varies. It depends on the facts of the case. 25 It depends on the testimony presented at the

1	actual hearing and docketing, court
2	scheduling. I would say on average, a few
3	months to at least from the filing of the
4	petition to actually getting it before a
5	judge, several months, and then from the
6	hearing until the judge entering a decree, it
7	varies. They could sign it right there or the
8	judge could say, I'm taking this under
9	advisement and then you are at the Court's
LO	mercy.
11	REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: Thank you.
12	CHAIRMAN DALLY: Representative
L 3	Costa?
L 4	REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: No.
L 5	CHAIRMAN DALLY: Miss Mendlow?
16	MS. MENDLOW: Kiersten, could you
17	possibly clarify for me, in the situation
18	where a child has been in the custody of the
19	agency for 15 out of 22 months, is there not
2 0	allowance if the agency feels that there
21	should be an exception why this termination,
22	why the girl shouldn't be adopted, isn't there
23	an exception made in the Juvenile Act?
24	MS. FRANKOWSKI: Yes, there are
25	eventions There are several eventions

The child is placed with a family member. If the child is over 12 and will not consent to an adoption. There is also a catch-all -- they just feel it will not serve the needs and welfare of this child. Unfortunately, that is usually our argument being presented to the judge. It's pretty common for them to just seek the termination, except in the case of older children that are with family members and just aren't going to consent.

MS. MENDLOW: So, they are just automatically filed. That's the practice nowadays?

MS. FRANKOWSKI: If the judge and hearing officer finds that the goal be changed to adoption and generally if it's past 15 out of 22 and the child is not with a relative, like what I just explained, they will.

MS. MENDLOW: Thank you. The other question I have is, are you familiar in terms of the involuntary termination proceedings in Allegheny County, do you find that there is a reluctance to terminate unless an adoptive parent has been identified?

MS. FRANKOWSKI: Absolutely.

1 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Miss Frankowski, I 2 have one question. You mentioned once a child 3 is in custody for the 15 out of 22 months, it moves to adoption. So then, the natural 5 parent is then presented with a choice of 6 either signing a consent for adoption or going 7 through the involuntary termination 8 proceedings? 9 MS. FRANKOWSKI: They are not 10 presented with a choice. That is another 11 problem. And that is not ever their option. 12 They are presented with a petition to 13 involuntarily terminate their parental rights. 14 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Then, what do you 15 advise? 16 MS. FRANKOWSKI: We are pushing. We 17 are trying to make it so there is a choice so 18 that rather than the attorneys justifying the 19 papers -- sitting down and saying, do we even 20 need to file these papers, that this could be 21 a case appropriate for consent. 22 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Oh, I see. 23 MS. FRANKOWSKI: Unfortunately, 24 people who aren't represented by us or don't

have their own counsel might not even know

1 this exists. 2 CHAIRMAN DALLY: So, in other words, 3 if a child is in custody, the natural parent isn't approached to sign, they just file an 5 involuntary termination? 6 MS. FRANKOWSKI: Unfortunately, yes. 7 CHAIRMAN DALLY: At that point in 8 time is when you consult with the natural 9 parents and say to avoid aggravated 10 circumstances, you can consent to this 11 adoption? 12 MS. FRANKOWSKI: In an ideal case, we 13 would have caught it early. Generally, if I'm 14 at a hearing with a client and that goal is 15 changed to adoption and CYF indicates that 16 they are going to file the petition, I'm 17 talking to that client immediately explaining 18 the options. 19 CHAIRMAN DALLY: So, it's at that 20 point in time when you would get the consent 21 signed, assuming once the involuntary petition 22

circumstances?

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MS. FRANKOWSKI: Only if the rights are involuntarily terminated.

is filed, that is representing aggravated

1 CHAIRMAN DALLY: After the petition 2 is filed, that negates the aggravated 3 circumstances situation? MS. FRANKOWSKI: They can show up at 5 an involuntary termination proceeding and decide in the middle that they are no longer 6 7 contesting. 8 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Okay. Is that what 9 you were going to say, Mark? 10 MR. EDWARDS: That is the policy that is being taken in Allegheny County. It's not 11 written anywhere. If I show up at a contested 12 13 hearing and my client then agrees to consent, 14 at that time the county solicitor will not 15 follow up and pursue aggravated circumstances. 16 That's the policy in Allegheny County. 17 CHAIRMAN DALLY: That's not 18 necessarily the law. They could pursue? 19 MR. EDWARDS: They could. 20 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Thank you very much 21 for your testimony. I'd like to hold off the 22 judge for one more witness, if we can, because 23 I think it's important for the task force to 24 hear these other people even though they are

not on our list. Melanie and Craig Kollar,

would you be willing to speak to the panel as far as your situation is concerned? I know you are not prepared to do that today but the other members of the task force were not at the hearing in October and I think it is important that they hear your story. I'm sorry to put you on the spot like that.

CRAIG KOLLAR: My name is Craig Kollar, K-O-L-L-A-R.

MELANIE KOLLAR: I'm Melanie Kollar, K-O-L-L-A-R.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: If you want to.

CRAIG KOLLAR: Our situation was that we are or currently still have temporary custody of a child. Our situation is an agreed open adoption originally gone awry. The birth mother changed her mind some three months after placing the child in our care. She was offered counseling prior to that and refused the counseling. Since that three months, we had worked with her to try and reach a mutual agreement. We were unsuccessful at first. She had visitation rights. Those visitation rights were subsequently terminated because of her lack of

interest.

2 Currently, now, we are in pursuit of 3 involuntary termination waiting approximately, according to our attorney, if we wait 5 approximately six months with no contact from 6 the birth mother or birth parents, that we 7 would have a reasonable chance at 8 involuntarily terminating her rights. 9 still -- it's still precarious circumstances. 10 We understand that the birth father could 11 suddenly emerge because he's never really been 12 involved. We never met him. We don't know 13 who he is, in fact. There were paternity 14 tests taken but nothing proven conclusively. 15 So, even if the birth mother agrees to the 16 adoption or her rights are involuntarily 17 terminated and, in fact, the birth father's 18 rights are involuntarily terminated, he could 19 suddenly emerge and claim ignorance in the 20 whole matter and presumably have a reasonable 21 chance of contesting the whole ordeal. 22 Anything I left out? 23 MELANIE KOLLAR: Our daughter is 24 almost 15 months.

25 CRAIG KOLLAR: She's 15 months now

and she's -- you know, the three months that happened and it tore our lives apart. literally had to flee our home because the birth mother told us she was coming to pick the baby up and she had every right to come to our house, knock on the door and take the baby and never let us see her again. Fortunately, she told us she was doing that. We left and we had to go to a hotel and hide out which legally we could do. We didn't really have to make ourselves available. It wasn't kidnapping, and until we could get a temporary court order, a temporary custody court order which we did -- she didn't show up for the temporary custody hearing. So, we questioned really what her motives are; why she really wants this child.

MELANIE KOLLAR: She hasn't seen

Allison since October 27th. There has been no
contact and then she did try to negotiate an
adoption agreement with us at the end of the
year. She just stopped contact and we haven't
heard anything from her since.

CRAIG KOLLAR: We think, too, in terms of the consent and the termination of

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rights, certainly in our case and what was mentioned by Mr. Edwards earlier, I think those are different cases altogether. the agreement upfront. The birth mother had some six months to mull over this decision. It wasn't like the baby pops out and now all of a sudden she has to decide. I don't always buy the argument that you have the baby and you are cut off. You've had nine months and now the baby is here and all of a sudden, I've changed my mind. I don't think we have -we're not necessarily concerned with our best interests. I think once again we want a mutual agreement that is in the best interest of everyone. There is certainly a lot of emotion at stake here for the adoptive parents and I know that firsthand and Melanie knows that firsthand.

MELANIE KOLLAR: Financially as well. We have cared for this child for 15 months and we have a lot of financial investment.

CRAIG KOLLAR: It's like the burden is really on us. Nobody seems to really consider the adoptive parents so much. It's like, well, you'll get another one. Once you

have that baby, I think it's really not an issue.

As far as the money is concerned, it is a very huge financial burden but the emotional burden is certainly far greater than the financial burden. I mean, we have spent a lot of money in legal fees to this point and all because the birth mother decided to change her mind. Did she really? Tomorrow she could come out of the woodwork again and seriously fight this and we are right back to where we started.

I want to make another point. That what we are asking for in these Bills, we want it to be as swift and decisive period as far as the termination goes. We are not saying that any birth parent is under the obligation to sign 72 hours or five days or ten days. They have all that time in the world before they sign, but once they do sign, that it's final. They are under no obligation to sign at any particular point.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Craig, in your situation then, the child that you are in the process of adopting or have adopted, that

1	agreement was signed prior to her birth; is
2	that correct?
3	MELANIE KOLLAR: We had an adoption
4	agreement prior with the birth mother.
5	CHAIRMAN DALLY: So, Children, Youth
6	and Families were not involved in your case?
7	MELANIE KOLLAR: No.
8	CHAIRMAN DALLY: You had the child
9	since the child was born?
10	MELANIE KOLLAR: Yes. She signed a
11	consent following the birth of the child which
12	she later revoked.
13	REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: I just have a
14	comment. I mean, that's my point on these
15	types of circumstances versus yours. It's the
16	interest of the child clearly, it's evident to
17	me, over this 15-month period. That would be
18	my only comment.
19	CRAIG KOLLAR: I think we are a
20	different situation.
21	REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Absolutely.
22	CHAIRMAN DALLY: Representative
23	Costa?
24	REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Under your
25	situation, when does this come to finality?

1 CRAIG KOLLAR: As I said earlier, 2 even if the birth mother, her rights are 3 terminated involuntarily or she consents to the adoption, there are things that we can do 5 to terminate the birth father's rights but, 6 once again, he could claim ignorance in the 7 whole thing, come out at any point afterwards and contest it. 8 9 REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Would it have 10 to be ignorance to the fact that he didn't 11 know the mother was pregnant? 12 CRAIG KOLLAR: Yes, yes. 13 REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: And there was 14 no contact? 15 CRAIG KOLLAR: That's one of the 16 points we want to make, too. Any man who 17 sleeps with a woman surely understands the 18 consequences. We don't want the burden to 19 be -- I mean, certainly, a man can't throw his 20 arms in the air later and say, gee, I didn't 21 I think he has an obligation to 22 maintain a relationship, a meaningful 23 relationship, with that woman. MELANIE KOLLAR: Actually, there are 24

states that are taking -- have precedence for

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that. They are putting some responsibilities on the male to make sure that they are responsible for determining if there was a pregnancy that resulted. It's not -- states are taking steps to place that responsibility. I think New Jersey is one of them.

CRAIG KOLLAR: Jane mentioned that earlier, that there are a lot of states that are practicing different laws. This is not a novelty. We definitely have examples that we can follow.

MELANIE KOLLAR: In our case, because our birth mother has named two men as potential fathers, one we understand has been proven not to be the father via DNA testing. The other one -- both of them know about the situation but our concern is that there may be another man that is actually the father that she is not naming but could come out later on and claim ignorance. We don't know that. We have to rely on the birth mother to give us that information, and if she doesn't, then we are kind of at jeopardy because two years, three years, there is no statute of limitations to prevent that from happening.

1 CRAIG KOLLAR: I think the current 2 laws are very archaic in that they were 3 created in the time of anti-adoption bias, 4 times when people did every single thing they 5 could to keep the family unified, and I believe those times have passed. We need to 7 consider the child more. 8 REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Are you saying 9 there is no obligation for the mother to point 10 out who the father is? Can't there be -- I 11 don't know what the term is, maybe the judge 12 could answer that, but there has to be 13 something that you have to produce and within 14 so much time to end this. 15 MELANIE KOLLAR: I mean, she is 16 supposed to tell you but she could lie or she 17 could withhold. 18 REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: I assume every 19 male that she introduces, there would have to 20 be a blood test? 21 MELANIE KOLLAR: In our case, we 22 could ask for an involuntary termination of 23 every man she named. 24 REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Then again, if

they are not the real father and the real

1 father comes forward later on, that does 2 nothing? 3 MELANIE KOLLAR: Exactly. REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: But I would 4 5 assume you would have to have a blood test to 6 prove who the father actually is. Who is 7 paying for the blood test? MELANIE KOLLAR: She would have to. 8 9 REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: I hope not 10 you. 11 MELANIE KOLLAR: She would have to, 12 her and the potential father. 13 CRAIG KOLLAR: Once again, she 14 doesn't have to name all of the men that she 15 slept with. 16 MELANIE KOLLAR: You ask her to. 17 Initially, she named one man and then whenever 18 she revoked her consent, she said it's not 19 him, it's another man. So, how do we know 20 that it's not somebody else? 21 CRAIG KOLLAR: There could be three. 22 There could be four. We don't know that. 23 REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: I just can't 24 believe that the courts can't step in and say 25 you have a timeframe to come up with who the

father is or --

CRAIG KOLLAR: There are other issues. In some other states, the birth mother can simply say, well, he's told me that if I ever name him as the father, he'll kill me.

REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Okay.

CRAIG KOLLAR: Things like that. So they can terminate on that basis.

REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: I'm sure CYS sees circumstances like that.

CRAIG KOLLAR: Sure, sure. If she can't really name a father, they were literally -- you'll have to advertise in papers over a period of time, newspapers, that kind of thing.

melanie Kollar: There are requirements you have to meet like if she says she doesn't know. You have to advertise in papers and things like that, newspapers, to try and locate the father. In our situation, we have that issue as well which I don't believe is necessarily addressed in this Bill.

CRAIG KOLLAR: Just one final thing. We think there are a lot of things about the

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current adoption law in Pennsylvania that could be changed but the three primary issues are the termination, the counseling, and the birth father issues and I think if we just nibble at it starting with those three issues, we would do a lot to improving the laws in Pennsylvania.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Very good. Thank you very much. Jane Mendlow has some questions.

I was wondering, MS. MENDLOW: Yes. Melanie and Craig, if you might want to also mention something that you discovered, I guess it was a bit later on, about the mother's involvement with the Children and Youth Agency to some degree, I think to a large degree. goes to a very serious issue as to the best interests of the child, not in a situation where we are trying to pit one family against another because of any material benefits but in terms of some issues that might relate to abuse and neglect. I thought maybe you might want to touch on that since others have spoke about it.

MELANIE KOLLAR: Our birth mother,

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this was her fifth child. Her first two children were removed by Children and Youth and her rights were eventually terminated due to abuse and neglect.

remember, Melanie had mentioned that we were in the process before the end of last year of maybe coming to an agreement again with the birth mother and then she suddenly dropped out of the picture. One of her children that is still with her had actually burned down her apartment complex with a cigarette lighter. These are the types of issues we are dealing with in our case.

MELANIE KOLLAR: In addition to that, we remain in contact with her family and they are supportive of the adoption being finalized because of the welfare of the child. She has proven that she has not been able to manage. I'm not sure what I want to say.

CRAIG KOLLAR: The birth mother's mother is actually willing to testify in our behalf of the adoptive child. That is how strongly she feels about the welfare of this child. So, in fact, we are in contact with

1 her and she visits the child regularly. 2 REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: This waiting 3 period and all of this information that is known, that doesn't expediate (sic) things so 5 that you can adopt this child under these circumstances? 6 That doesn't play a factor in 7 this at all? 8 CRAIG KOLLAR: No, no. 9 MELANIE KOLLAR: In fact, our 10 attorney advised us because her attorney made 11 contact in December to negotiate the adoption 12 that we have to wait six months from that 13 point even though she has not inquired about 14 the child or seen the child since October. 15 still have to start back from December 16 whenever her attorney made contact with us and 17 wait the six months from that point. 18 CRAIG KOLLAR: All she has to do is 19 call us and say how is our daughter and that 20 is considered contact and we're back to square 21 one. 22 REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: So, if she

keeps extending it?

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CRAIG KOLLAR: Exactly. Sends us a

does this every five and a half months, it

card, stops by for a visit.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Even though there is no one on one with the child?

CRAIG KOLLAR: We had some visitation, as I said earlier, with her through the Salvation Army. It was supervised visits. We would drop her off 15 minutes prior, pick her up 15 minutes afterwards.

MELANIE KOLLAR: She basically just stopped showing up for the visits and eventually they just terminated her.

again, was on us. They were every Wednesday, and every Wednesday, you could imagine, us leaving this child with strangers and then picking her up and sometimes she would show up and sometimes she would show up and sometimes she wouldn't show up. We would have to go out of our way every week. We had to drop her off like clock work but yet she could show up. She missed four or five in a row before they actually even terminated her rights.

MELANIE KOLLAR: She probably missed about two months, not necessarily all in a row, and our attorney advised us that they

definitely went out of their way to give her every opportunity to visit that child because normally they terminate after three or four missed visits.

CRAIG KOLLAR: What's even more frightening is if something were to happen to us, that child would immediately go back into her care.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Any further questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Thank you very much.

He's been waiting patiently, the
Honorable Paul Zavarella from the Allegheny
County Orphans Court. Thank you for joining
us, Judge.

JUDGE ZAVARELLA: You are welcome.

I'm glad I'm here and I'm glad I waited until other persons gave you their testimony. I certainly do not want to dispute or say anything that would take away from their statements, but I think for a Legislative Committee, perhaps if I could, I'd just like about ten minutes to tell you something about the adoption process in Allegheny County.

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Committee knows but perhaps some of the persons here don't know, Philadelphia

County has their adoptions in the family division. Our adoptions were always in the Orphans Court division and there are some counties that do not have court divisions, so that it is very difficult to try to legislate for every type of county jurisdiction we have.

the other as a lawyer and a judge for more

than 40 years, I would think, and I'm sure the

I have been involved in it one way or

the Orphans Court division here handled all of the terminations and handled all of the

Up until the late 70's perhaps into the 80's,

juvenile court in those days and the Family

adoptions including those that involved

Division. The cases became burdensome so that

in Allegheny County, we separated the juvenile

court, if you will, the Juvenile Division of

the Family Division and they began to

terminate their own cases, the judges in that

division. We continue to hear the adoption

cases. A few years ago we determined that if

the Family Division juvenile judges terminated

the case, they should indeed hear the adoption

1 proceedings.

A lot of the matters in the Family
Division, juvenile section came about because
of federal legislation and as it exists now in
Allegheny County, they were correct that the
private adoptions, the agency adoptions,
individual adoptions take place in the Orphans
Court division. The Family Division adoptions
still, I believe, involved children who are
dependent or neglected and I feel certain that
they follow the statute on their adoption
hearings and on their termination hearings,
but it is indeed, as I said, it's a different
arena.

As far as the adoptions that we hear, the last testimony was difficult for me to not understand but there has to be some remedy for cases like that. I agree with the plight of the parents.

I reviewed the proposed amendments together with Jan McNamara who has been in the adoption field and I know she is younger than I am but she has been with us for a long time and we don't have too many comments in opposition to the amendments. I noted there

is a 30-day period to withdraw the consent and you still maintain the 40-day period in what we call the confirmed consents. That may be brought about by counties where they still do relinquishments of parental rights and take the consents of the natural parent. We did that in prior years in Allegheny County.

Judge, the administrative judge determined that we would no longer take consents from persons who wish to voluntary appear and consent to the adoption. That was the practice in Allegheny years ago. We now rely on the confirmed consent provisions of the Adoption Act, so that I take it that you don't contemplate shortening that 40-day period in the confirmed consent.

I have to point out to you that we have had just one case, and it's recent, in which a person wanted to withdraw their confirmed consent years after the consent was given and authorized by the court. The placement did not work in that case. The mother's rights were terminated by the confirmed consent here more than two years

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The child was placed by an agency to a aqo. couple in California. We are starting to see Internet placements, placements made into other states other than Pennsylvania and so forth. As it turned out, the father's rights were terminated in California. The placement failed. The adopting couple did not want the Our agency brought it back to child. Allegheny County and the child was, I suppose, temporarily placed by the juvenile section of the Family Division and they found another adoptive family. The natural mother appeared several months ago and wished to withdraw her consent to the confirmed consent proceedings. The lawyer was going back to the very, very old law, even before we had confirmed consents, and the more modern approach to terminating parental rights by saying she did not voluntarily and with knowledge grant her confirmed consent.

It's a very important case in this respect. We struggled as to whether she would have a right to a hearing to even revoke her consent and we could find no guidance because most of the statutes relating or cases

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relating to this type of objection were here before the confirmed consent. So that it might be perhaps a legislative purpose or to deal with a case like that to say that even though the confirmed consent was entered into and the time period for changing your mind, withdrawing expired, that somehow they might be precluded from reaching back to upset the whole process.

We submitted it to the four judges of our division and we could not agree whether unanimously we could say you are not entitled to a hearing; your consent was given according to the law and it stands. So, we are going to give her a hearing, although the advocates from the Family Division are raising that issue again.

So, sometimes even in legislation, if you do have a date to withdraw the consent, I thought I'd point that out to you, that sometimes lawyers try to go back anyway. So, maybe you should at least consider a more firm approach, 40 days and under no circumstances. I'm not certain about that approach but I just point that out to you.

I think in our Family Division they have twice the number of adoptions that we have. We may have 250 private adoptions, if you will. The confirmed consent practice is working in Allegheny County. We have very few problems with it. Of course, most of our cases come from agencies and they have been able to, I suppose, with little problems, to bring about the consent by confirmed consent.

I point out to you that our agencies receive many children from other counties.

So, under the law now, they have their choice to proceed where the agency is or where the adopting parents are. I sometimes find that a little bit difficult when people from other counties, of course, appear in Allegheny

County but on balance, I suppose, it's better to have the agency bring the people here than us to go out.

I think your section on the putative father was necessary although we have been doing that in Allegheny County without the section that you have in your statute here where you refer to the lack of support and lack of contact. Our lawyers have been doing

that and we have been approving it.

2 The counseling we agree with. 3 don't really have too much contact with that, but our adoption department does. with the first speaker. It seemed a little bit awkward to us to have the reimbursement 6 7 made to the birth parent for their counseling, particularly since we have the funds that may 8 cover expenses such as that. We don't know 10 too much about the fund because the check is 11 deposited with the Register of Wills office. 12 It goes to our county controller and I don't 13 believe we have too much experience with that 14 fund, the counseling fund. Somehow maybe 15 lawyers don't really appreciate it or know it 16 here in Allegheny County. So that I know the 17 fund is being collected. It's now with our 18 county controller and we intend to take a look

at that.

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I can point out another matter in the Adoption Code that perhaps is not totally appropriate here. We are having difficulties with foreign adoption decrees. There seems to be a good percentage of foreign adoptions coming into our division. Certain foreign

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countries will change the name in their adoption decree. Other countries issue the adoption decree in the name of the natural So, when that adoption decree is parents. presented for filing under Section 2908, the parents are concerned about the name change. If the name is changed by the decree, we have adopted practices to let that be a part of the filing of the foreign adoption and somehow the birth certificate comes from the Commonwealth If that doesn't occur, the in that name. natural parents are concerned about filing a change of name petition in the Civil Division of the court because you have to advertise. It's an expensive proposition. You have to do a judgment search and that doesn't seem to be warranted against a child who was adopted as an infant in Russia or China or wherever. So, I think maybe a look at this Section 2908 might have some benefit.

The Register of Wills or the clerk of the Orphans Court has sort of adopted a procedure because people in that, shall I say, quandary, we're getting more pro se litigation. So, our Register proposes to

bring the help then the busin

bring them up to the motion's judge and try to help them, but our Civil Division does have the business of changing names. So, I call that to your attention.

Other than that, we were able to live with the present Adoption Code. I think the amendments will help. I feel somewhat, I don't know, maybe we'll take another look at the Family Division situation. I now know that if there is a Family Division problem not involving Juvenile Division, if the parents are separated and the mother has custody and the father does not maintain his custody rights, if that case develops into an adoption case, the administrative judges agree which division should handle it. If the Family Division litigation has been there from the beginning, the Family Division judges will hear that termination case. If it is something that totally did not involve any parental rights during the breakup of the marriage, we'll hear that in the Orphans Court division.

So that I probably, I may talk to the Family Division about the problems that I

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heard today, but in my view now, those are children that are dependent or neglected and so forth and I think it's a federal mandate and I'm not arguing with the county Bar Foundation because they do a very splendid job. We have pro bono lawyers who help. We always appoint counsel for the child and we have a list of lawyers that will do that. So, all in all, we agree with the proposed amendments.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Thank you very much, Your Honor. Any questions?

(No response.)

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Judge Zavarella,
based upon the testimony from the previous
individuals who testified, it seems like there
is a different standard or different set of
circumstances with children that are
dependent, have been declared dependent, and
those children such as in the Kollar situation
where there is a private adoption shortly
after birth. Do you think it would be a
workable situation where you could have two
different standards in terms of consent for
children that are dependent and children that

have not been declared dependent?

some time since I did the Family Division cases, but in my experience, the grounds for termination were different. There existed a condition in the home that couldn't or was not repaired that led to the grounds of termination and sometimes that was the issue in the cases, that the family, the mother or the father, could not, did not support the child; did not visit; was placed with other people. I don't know whether that is still the grounds in the Family Division and perhaps you could comment on that. It does seem to be a different type of termination, yes.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: I guess I could ask
Mr. Edwards that question.

MR. EDWARDS: Grounds for termination are set forth by statute.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: But my question was, do you think it is workable to have two different standards as far as consent is concerned? Obviously, with your set of circumstances as opposed to a voluntary --

MR. EDWARDS: Private adoption, yes,

1 I think that would be workable. CHAIRMAN DALLY: And language to the 2 3 extent "except in cases where children are declared dependent" or something like that? 5 MR. EDWARDS: That would be a fair 6 compromise. 7 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Okay. 8 Representative Costa? 9 REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Thank you. 10 I'm actually asking you this. Are we 11 permitted to set double standards? I mean, I 12 guess you are saying that for a private 13 adoption or agencies, this is the procedure 14 that they have to go through and if it is 15 county related, this is the procedure. 16 that what you are proposing? I don't have a 17 problem with that but I'm just curious, are we 18 allowed to do that? 19 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: I would think 20 the grounds of your concern was that it's not 21 real consent. Is that true? There might be 22 undue pressure. There might be certain -- so, 23 a consent could be fine tuned? 24 MR. EDWARDS: Correct. 25 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: The definition

of consent.

Whether their constitutional rights would be violated because of the double standard, but I think, because of the different set of circumstances, certainly you can claim that the parent that has the child is dependent, is under duress because of the involuntary termination and what have you. This agreement to consent is much different than one who gives it voluntarily.

REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: The more I think about it, I worked in the Prothonotary's Family Division and we handled thousands of divorce cases, consensual and contested. So, the rules were different for both. So, I guess it would work.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: It's something we will definitely look at.

JUDGE ZAVARELLA: I couldn't understand, the consent was given to avoid aggravated circumstances. Is that not a consent to the adoption regardless of what it does to the family? How do you take the consent or how do our judges take it? How do

1 you acquire that consent? Do they sign 2 something that is filed? 3 MR. EDWARDS: That's correct. 4 JUDGE ZAVARELLA: And is it not under 5 the consent practice that's in the statute? 6 MS. FRANKOWSKI: Yes. 7 JUDGE ZAVARELLA: It's a confirmed 8 consent? 9 MS. FRANKOWSKI: Yes, that's exactly 10 what it is, Your Honor. 11 MR. EDWARDS: If the panel is 12 interested, we have a consent to adopt form 13 that is being used that would help the panel. 14 We could submit it. CHAIRMAN DALLY: That would be 15 16 helpful. 17 REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Judge 18 Zavarella, I do not want to put you in a 19 tenuous situation here but I have one question 20 for you. Under circumstances that exist like 21 the couple that had indicated to us the 22 problems they were having adopting, is there 23 any way the courts can take judicial notice of 24 this with the family, with the history of this

woman and with CYS and take more of, you know,

under circumstances like that to stop that
from occurring, to do something or intervene
or be proactive?

JUDGE ZAVARELLA: Well, I thought

JUDGE ZAVARELLA: Well, I thought about that when I was listening to the testimony and I was going to ask whether it was an Allegheny County adoption. It's not. You see.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Breathe a sigh of relief.

JUDGE ZAVARELLA: No, no, no. I would like to take a look at that case, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: I guess it disturbs me, I mean, clearly the blatant circumstances in my opinion and when you see a history that is there, and I understand it's in the system, where her own family thinks she's not capable, there should be a point for the interest of the child, the interest of the family, to move that to finality, to move on without that pending fear of four and a half, five months, whatever it is.

JUDGE ZAVARELLA: I don't believe -most of the contested cases that we have are
not that way, shall I say.

1 REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Blatant.

JUDGE ZAVARELLA: Blatant, yes. I

don't know what county this is coming from,

but it would be very hard to remedy the

situation by legislation.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: No, I agree.

That's why I'm asking about judicial intervention. Clearly, none of us can do anything about that.

JUDGE ZAVARELLA: It would be hard for me to talk to the couple because I don't know the lawyers that are involved. I don't know anything about it, but there are perhaps matters that could help them, yes, I would think in the system somewhere, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Thank you.

MS. MENDLOW: I guess I would just like to, with respect to Kiersten and Mr. Edwards, the issue of the Juvenile Act, do you feel that there needs to be clarification that a parent should be given a choice regarding a consent to an adoption versus the involuntary termination of parental rights? I guess I thought that under the Adoption and Safe Family Act, the idea was to file a

1 petition for the termination of parental rights but that could be achieved through a 2 consent and I can see where it's like a 3 downward spiral. If they go into involuntary 4 5 termination, it could jeopardize another child 6 they have. 7 MR. EDWARDS: The problem is the involuntary petitions have to be filed quickly 8 and the county is reluctant to withdraw once 9 10 they are filed because of the time factors. 11 So, it would be an important factor. 12 MS. MENDLOW: You are recommending --13 I'm trying to translate -- amendment to the 14 Juvenile Act that calls for presenting an 15 option or, you know, that could be something 16 that could be presented to the parent as 17 opposed to only at an involuntary termination, 18 an offer of a consent to an adoption or an 19 involuntary termination? 20 MR. EDWARDS: Yes. I think that 21 would be of benefit. 22 MS. MENDLOW: Okay. 23 Thank you. CHAIRMAN DALLY: Okay. 24 Our next two witnesses are Mary Jo Meenan,

Esq. and Steve Kaufman.

They are both with

the court-appointed special advocates.

MR. KAUFMAN: We appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today. I will somewhat abbreviate our remarks in the written testimony and refer -- my full testimony is contained in writing and has been presented.

CASA is an organization dedicated to achieving timely permanence for children. believe that each child is entitled to a safe, loving, and permanent home in a timely The children served by CASA are dependent or without proper parental care or control. Their lives and decisions regarding their permanent placement rests not only in the hands of their natural parents and extended families, but also in the hands of several systems including medical, legal, judicial, and educational. The court's ability to make timely decisions for children has life-long ramifications for our clients. The recent changes to the Juvenile Act, in accordance with the Adoption and Safe Families Act, recognize the importance of timely decisions.

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Based on our experience and our belief in permanence, we support the principles that are embodied in the two pending bills.

Specifically, with respect to House
Bill 1533, this bill now defines the time
period during which a consent to adoption may
be revoked. This clarification in the law may
have the effect of expanding the pool of
potential adoptive parents.

The current law is extremely liberal, allowing consent to be revoked up to the moment of either termination or an adoption. This time period can easily be in excess of 12 months from the time a consent is given. The legal system's ability to hear and decide these cases in a timely fashion varies widely from county to county, and the child's welfare does not appear to be the factor guiding the timing of the process.

In Pennsylvania and in many other states across the country, many adoptive parents are reluctant to accept a child into their home if they fear that the adoption is a legal risk. Many potential adoptive parents

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do not feel comfortable bringing a child into their home and making a lifetime commitment to them, knowing that the child may, in fact, never be legally freed for adoption and/or that the time period to revoke consent could last for months, maybe longer. Delays in legal proceedings can sometimes have the impact of lessening the chances of permanence with a potential adoptive family.

In any scenario where an adoption is delayed unduly, children may suffer due to a variety of factors. Sometimes they are faced with confusion of having two families, each with parent figures. We have witnessed other children who are so confused and distressed by not knowing where they will live, that they present with serious mental health disorders including night terrors and fecal smearing. For a very young child faced with a move in a critical time of development, psychologists tell us that each new attachment has the potential for being more fragile than the one preceding it. Local practitioners have trained CASA staff and volunteers on the basics of attachment. In training, we have

heard that although a child who has formed a healthy attachment can generally transfer it, there are critical periods in their development where a change in primary caregiver can be detrimental to their well being.

This Bill reflects an important recognition by our legislature that while such consent has enormous impact on the parent, it likewise impacts the child and adoptive parents as well. It makes sense to protect the interests of all involved by the insertion of such a reasonable time period.

With respect to House Bill 1838,

again, this Bill acknowledges that

relinquishment of parental rights is a

life-changing event. It should be made with

the benefit of counseling and we believe it's

a good companion piece to House Bill 1533.

When read together, the Bills

constitute a balanced approach. It takes into account fundamental rights of both parent and child. The counseling set forth in House Bill 1838 will ensure that the parent understands the importance of a decision to relinquish and

that the decision will no doubt play a part in their emotional well being for many years to come. Provisions for specific counseling also ensure that such a decision is informed and not in any way coerced. It will also preclude a parent from later making the case that the decision was not arrived at in an ethical manner.

The Bill appears to have been carefully thought out and crafted to allow parents many opportunities and forums to request such counseling. We also believe that each court having a complete list of approved counseling agencies is a necessary safeguard, as courts are often reliant on the litigants before them when determining which agency is most appropriate to provide a given social service to a family. We would be happy to answer any questions. Mary Jo Meenan is executive director of our agency. I'm a member of our board of directors.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Questions?
Representative Walko?

REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: What would your direct response to Miss Frankowski and

1 Mr. Edwards be concerning the concern about 2 the concerns they have raised with regard to 3 the consent and revocation of the consents? MS. MEENAN: Unfortunately, we were 5 not here. If somebody could quickly summarize their objections, we would try our best to 6 7 react to that. 8 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: Would you, 9 Mr. Edwards, or Miss Frankowski, summarize 10 your positions? 11 MR. EDWARDS: Briefly, I think 12 everybody here has acknowledged that 13 termination of parental rights or adoption is 14 a life-changing event for a biological parent. 15 Specifically, the concern is the 30-day insert 16 on the proposed Bill. It is irrevocable at 30 17 days. We feel that is a very short period of 18 time for our clients and given the fact that 19 it's a very emotional decision for them, we 20 feel the 30 days is too quick and in essence 21 they are being railroaded. 22 MS. MEENAN: Would there be a time 23 period that would be reasonable? Are you 24 suggesting 60 days, 90 days?

MR. EDWARDS:

The way the current

Bill stands, until the decree is signed. So there is a finite period placed on the time.

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MS. MEENAN: I guess our only reaction to that is that maybe every 30 days is too quick. I haven't looked at other states' statutes. I assume all of you have. I think many do have 30 days. I would imagine others choose 60 or 90. I would suggest some time constraint rather than leaving it totally open up to the moment where you are on the witness stand realizing, as what happened in juvenile court about three months ago, that the mom was really making the decision only to impact her newborn who was in foster care and actually it is a bit ironic because parent advocates are, in fact, put in the positions under the parameters of the new law to actually be encouraging new consents. So, I think there is that whole new dynamic at play in the dependency court.

MR. KAUFMAN: And if I might add to that, I found the language in 2711(d)(1), the actual contents of the consent reads, I understand I may not revoke this consent if 30 days have elapsed since I signed this consent.

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I think that could be put in a little more plain English in the sense of, I understand I may not revoke this consent, you know, after, and put the date in there, April 5th, 2000, which is 30 days from today's date or the date I'm signing it so parents are absolutely clear on what they are signing.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Thank you.

MS. MEENAN: And actually, just one more comment on the time period. I spoke with one of the county attorneys who handles a lot of the involuntary terminations. I'm sorry that she was not able to make it today. informs me that that consent provision is used very, very rarely currently, about 1 to 5 percent. Generally, if they feel they have a case for an involuntary termination, they go ahead and file, and apparently that is different. Not contesting the involuntary is different from doing the whole consent and filing for consent. So, in her view, there wouldn't be a major impact on dependency cases in any event even with this change.

CHAIRMAN DALLY: I don't know whether you heard the testimony of the Kollars or not.

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1 They gave an example of a child that wasn't 2 dependent and the adoptive process there and 3 the struggle that they are facing now because the natural mother revoked the consent prior 5 to the final decree. It appears there are two 6 different sets of circumstances. 7 MS. MEENAN: How much time had 8 elapsed? 9 CRAIG KOLLAR: Three months. 10 MR. EDWARDS: It's a private 11 adoption. 12 MS. MEENAN: That can certainly be 13 devastating. I just would like to point out 14 to the Committee that we did contact the 15 Children's Home of Pittsburgh and there is a 16 representative here today, Christin Morris 17 Thompson, who would be certainly prepared to 18 comment somewhat informally to the Committee. 19 They handle a lot of infant adoptions that are 20 voluntary. They provide services to both 21 natural and adoptive parents. I think they 22 would see a lot more of the circumstances that 23 you were envisioning with these Bills. 24 CHAIRMAN DALLY: Representative Orie? 25 I have one REPRESENTATIVE ORIE:

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question in regards to counseling. I understand this what is disturbing to me. is a traumatic and very difficult decision to make and what I see is where they have an option to take this counseling. I think it should be mandatory. I think any couple should have to take counseling so that they can't say later I didn't realize how bad this Anybody making a decision like that should have that available to them. I wanted your input on that because I don't like the option or they may or I think it should be something that they should do because it's such a big decision. It's something you can always fall back on and at least we know we have covered everything we should do.

valid concern, but from speaking with therapists, what they generally tell us is if it's forced therapy, it is not therapy at all. If someone really doesn't want to be there, just providing it and going through the motions may or may not have an impact on the ultimate decision. I would defer, I guess, to the mental health experts on that. I'm really

1 not certain.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: I get that, but the point is, most of the ones that come back and say they want to revoke, they didn't realize the big decision they made and even though they may go in there and there is no input whatsoever, they are aware of exactly what is going to happen at that point in time. They can't fall back and say, oh, my God, this is worse than I thought. To me, those are the ones that are going to come forward, the ones that didn't have the full disclosure, didn't have the full understanding, didn't have the personal or professionals, whatever. So, that's my point on this.

MS. MEENAN: I don't know how it works in other states, but that might be also a good thing to research, whether that is, in fact, a ground. Do a lot of people come back for that reason?

CHAIRMAN DALLY: Representative Costa?

REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: I have to back up what Representative Orie said. I had asked Jane about an hour and a half ago under this

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Bill, is it mandatory. Can birthing parents sign a waiver. I don't think they should be able to sign a waiver and I understand where you are coming from, but I'm afraid, and again, my background is I worked in the Family Division and we used to have to deal with waivers and consents and pretty much it's like, sign this, sign this and if it gets to the point where there is even, in a divorce, when you go through a divorce, when you go through to file a Complaint in Divorce, you have to say you acknowledge that there is counseling available. How many people are actually going through the counseling? Maybe one out of a thousand. The rest of them are just signing off on it. I hate to see a decision made like this in that the parents don't have the opportunity to realize what they are doing and the rights they are giving I agree, if we can make it mandatory, there should not been a waiver that they can sign off on. I understand your point though, if they are not accepting it or wanting to hear it, that's one thing, but at least if you give them the information and they have it, if somebody reads it to them, and definitely make
them understand you are giving up your rights.

them understand you are giving up your rights,

maybe it will sink in at that time.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Then, you don't have the problem with the days, 30 days, whatever it is. I guess that's my point.

Anybody else have any questions?

REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: Jane brought up the point we have mandatory counseling for custody that you have to go to mediation but Jane brought up a good point. What if the birthing parent chooses not to go to the counseling after you set everything up? That could delay the process, too.

MS. MENDLOW: On that issue, the question I think we had and we were trying to develop was one thing is you suggested looking at other states. New Jersey was one state that was particularly held up as a good example where counseling is an extremely important part of their whole system, all tied in with the agencies and a very expedited process. The question that we had was do you want to totally have consents break down if someone just doesn't show up and they are

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cantankerous; they don't go to the counseling; counseling is offered; they have set the appointment and then what do we do when you are trying to help people who want to be adoptive parents and you're trying to do a good job; what happens then in the process is do we inadvertently bring it to a standstill?

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Why can't there be a stipulation with that that if you don't undergo it, you do not take this; that goes in regards to your waiver so that these people know that is something that is going to be weighed in the decision to do that? I think the counseling, if you don't have that, I think everybody should have that opportunity to hear whether they want to hear it or not or to participate or not.

MS. MEENAN: That sounds like a reasonable compromise. I know, I used to work in criminal mediation in the Boston courts, and we actually find the forced mediation in Allegheny County kind of unusual. Mediation by definition is purely voluntary, yet we are making people participate in the process. It's kind of a twist on the pure form of

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mediation.

difference between the adoption process and the custody process is that in custody, the parents want to see the children. Basically, they would hold themselves up from being able to see the child. On this side, what's the incentive? And I agree with Representative Orie; that if you refuse to go to counseling, you have waived your right to revoke and that's the end of it. That would expedite it.

REPRESENTATIVE COSTA: But the

MR. KAUFMAN: That's different than saying there can be no consent without a counseling period. I think we all agree counseling is much better than no counseling. Everybody should be encouraged. I think important steps could be taken to make sure counseling is readily available as opposed to something that is very difficult for somebody without a car or whatever to get to. It should be made as easy as possible and strongly encouraged.

MS. THOMPSON: My name is Christin Morris Thompson. I'm the director of adoptions at the Children's Home of

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Pittsburgh. Mary Jo actually was very gracious in asking us to come along today. I thought if I had an opportunity to say anything, it would be about the counseling component. That's why I'm back here shaking my head vigorously.

That's such a big part of our program, and we feel it is so necessary. in terms of where the Children's Home would stand on that as a private nonprofit social service agency would be to make the counseling mandatory. I hear what Mary Jo is saying, that you can't force somebody to go to counseling, and you cannot, but we have licensed master's level social workers on staff at the Children's Home that are very good at being able to talk to the birth mothers and birth fathers and say, a lot of people don't feel they need mental health services. If you say to them, do you think you need counseling, many cases not. We talk to many attorneys that say, we offer the counseling. They didn't want to go to counseling. When they work with the Children's Home, we go to the hospitals to

visit them. When we go to the home, we go to them. It doesn't hold up the process. If they can't get to us, we go to them.

What we are offering to them is to sit down and talk about this adoption plan. Have you thought this through? You know, what do your family members think of this? Is there anyone in your family that could possibly parent this child? Would that be your first option? Let us help you explore that. An adoption plan is a very serious decision and we are very supportive of that if that is something they have thought through and they have talked that through and they have had comprehensive counseling options presented to them.

I get a little concerned about we're all for the shorter timeframe if they have had good counseling services. So, I'm not as concerned about a 30-day time limit if I know that they have been in counseling with an agency that is providing good services to them and comprehensive services. It's not good enough -- I've had attorneys call up and say, can you meet with her for an hour to review

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her options. I don't have a relationship with that woman or that man and for me to go in for an hour, if they don't want to be there, they are probably not going to say a whole lot. really is a counseling relationship of going in and talking and it is as simple as saying, we need to talk to you about this adoption It is very important that in order for plan. you to make this decision, you need to talk about this adoption plan and let me just hear what you are thinking about and we'll let you know what options are out here for you. Offering them foster care until a decision -until they feel like they can make a good decision for themselves and their child is such a benefit and that is something we are able to do.

So, there is a lot -- I think the other piece of the counseling is the funding stream. Judge Zavarella talked about a fund being available. What we have been told about that is that there is not a whole lot of money there. It's so hard to access, don't bother. So, I know it's confusing and I guess I want to hear more about that, but we have never

been able to get access to that fund. The Children's Home has to foot the cost of counseling and it is very, very difficult.

Many places will not foot that bill and they will flat out say to both parents, we don't get paid for this. We're not going to provide that service. So, that is a concern. That's another concern of ours. We believe that counseling is so important that it should be mandatory but there has to be some kind of funding.

Put that option in for the state, then there is an appropriation and then the state can also contribute to that which then has some number that at least we can look to. We are not leaving the counties without that as well. I agree with you. If we are going to do anything, everybody should have counseling.

MS. THOMPSON: Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: I agree with the fairness and with the decision and I understand what both sides are saying on that.

MS. THOMPSON: It's the responsibility of the agency then that if the

birth mother is coming and planning an adoption but the birth father hasn't been in contact yet, don't go and place the child and find out two months down the road that the birth father did want to parent the child or a family member wanted to parent. That's part of the counseling process, to get the social workers out there on the phones. It's hard work. It's not an easy thing but make sure that that happens and that is all a part of the counseling process. It's not just sitting down with the birth parents but it is us doing our diligent searches and finding the players that are involved in all of this.

REPRESENTATIVE ORIE: Thank you very, very much.

MS. RICH: My name is Linda Erin Rich and I'm the Director of the Allegheny County Bar Foundation, Juvenile Court Project. I'll just take a moment of your time because we have taken a lot of it, but I just wanted to make it clear that I certainly believe that we support strongly the counseling aspect of this but we feel there has to be something that must be a part of that, and that is some

1 explanation to the parents of the legal 2 ramifications of this, because in 3 Pennsylvania, we don't have open adoption. 4 There are parents who are willing to consent 5 because they have established a bit of a 6 relationship with the foster parent. 7 have talked to the foster parent. The foster 8 parent says, oh, yes, you can have some contact with your child in the future and then 10 as soon as they sign the consent and 11 everything is final, the adoption is final, 12 the adoptive parents have changed their phone 13 number or moved or whatever and the parent's 14 expectations are completely impossible to 15 fulfill. They need to know that this can be 16 done and the adoptive parents are within their 17 rights to do this as the law stands in 18 Pennsylvania. I think you can't do counseling 19 without including the legal aspects as well. 20 MS. MENDLOW: Is it Christin? 21 MS. THOMPSON: Christin Morris 22 Thompson. 23 MS. MENDLOW: If you could tell me, 24 the first page of House Bill 1838 we define 25 adoption. I would just like your opinion on

this. Do you have any problem with, in the Adoption Act, the kind of counseling services that we're looking, are adoption and related counseling services that should be provided by the agency approved by the Department of Public Welfare?

MS. THOMPSON: I would agree. I
think the only thing I would consider adding
to that language might be that it is actually
a licensed social worker or a licensed
counselor so that -- I do know -- I have known
of licensed facilities that sometimes have
volunteers providing counseling; that may have
someone, an intern, providing counseling, and
I am uncomfortable with that. I think it
needs to be a professional that is providing
the service.

MS. MENDLOW: On that point, here is my problem, I guess, or concern. First off, couldn't we address that concern that you have regarding, you know, that someone like a volunteer who has no training is doing this adoption counseling by our Department of Public Welfare regulations regarding this type of service through an agency?

MS. THOMPSON: Yes.

MS. MENDLOW: Here is what I'm trying to get at: I'm concerned about our listing all licensed MSW's, anyone who has an MSW through our Department of State, Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, would suddenly become an approved entity. Department of Public Welfare doesn't regulate individuals, it only regulates agencies. I guess what I'm wondering is do you feel that there is some measure of, you know, safety, you might say, in the regulation by limiting this type of service to a service provided within a regulated agency that our Department of Public Welfare has the legal authority to then better clarify what that agency should be doing, who should be doing it, what should be contained in this counseling?

MS. THOMPSON: Absolutely. I guess what I was thinking about was actually having licensed social workers as employees of agencies.

MS. MENDLOW: Not out there on their own?

MS. THOMPSON: No, no.

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1 MS. MENDLOW: Okay. Okay. 2 MS. THOMPSON: So, you know, they 3 have the adoption experience. MS. MENDLOW: Thank you very much. 5 MS. FOY: My name is Celia Foy, 6 C-E-L-I-A F-O-Y. I'm from the Pennsylvania 7 Council for Children's Services. I just 8 wanted to say a lot of good points have been 9 raised today. I'm not prepared to offer 10 input, but I am wondering if we are able to 11 submit something in writing and if there is a 12 deadline and where it is sent to? 13 REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: There is 14 probably no deadline. 15 MR. BLOOMER: Representative Walko, 16 if anybody wants to send any kind of testimony 17 at a later date, that's perfectly fine. 18 can have copies for our Committee. A person 19 on your agenda, James Mahood, was called to 20 another court case in an emergency. He will 21 not be able to present his testimony but we 22 are reading his into the record as well. 23 to let you know, there is no kind of deadline. 24 Whenever you can get any kind of testimony or

any kind of information, it's more than

welcome. Send it to me. I can give you a
copy of one of our cards or you can make it to
Representative Thomas Gannon who is the
chairman of the Judiciary Committee. I just
wanted to stress that you have plenty of time.

REPRESENTATIVE WALKO: And this task force will be meeting again probably in Philadelphia in the near future and I know Miss McMeekin may have comments or statements to submit. We would appreciate it and I think at this time, we'll have to adjourn this hearing and we thank you for being here and for all your insight and testimony.

(The following were additional comments by Mr. Kaufman presented for the record:)

The national CASA movement began 23 years ago when a Judge in Seattle developed the concept of assigning trained community members to especially complex abuse and neglect cases.

In 1994, the local CASA

Program opened its doors, largely in response
to a tragic death in foster care that occurred
two years prior, in 1992. A panel comprised

of community members and child welfare professionals recommended that the Court Appointed Special Advocate Program may be one important addition to the child welfare and court system. The Task Force and the local Judge believed that the case monitoring and frequent contact with children carried out by CASA volunteers would increase the likelihood of child safety. The local professionals applied to the National CASA Association for startup funding.

Today, almost seven years later, CASA has 100 community volunteers and the capacity to serve over 300 children. CASA volunteers push for quality services to both children and parents. They clarify important issues for the court. They provide the court and parties with an important historical context and, with thorough fact-gathering, present the current status of the child in detail. Knowing a child's special needs is critically important when making permanence decisions for the child.

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(The following was submitted for

inclusion in the record:)

House Judiciary Committee

Task Force on Adoptions, Guardians ad litem

and Court Appointed Special Advocates

March 23, 2000 Public Hearing

Adoption Reform Legislation

Testimony of James E. Mahood

By way of background, I have been engaged in the private practice of law in Pittsburgh for the past 20 years. During that time, I have limited my practice to the area of family law. Before that, I practiced law for six years with Neighborhood Legal Services in Pittsburgh. A good portion of my practice as a neighborhood attorney with NLS was also devoted to family law.

I am the immediate Past Chair of the Family Law Section of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, which is an organization of more than 1800 lawyers from across the state of Pennsylvania who practice in the area of family law. I am Chair of the Family Law Section's Task Force on Adoption. I am a Fellow of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. The Academy is a national

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organization of lawyers whose practice is almost exclusively limited to the area of family law. There are approximately 50 members of the Academy in Pennsylvania and less than 2,000 nationally. I also serve as a Member of the Joint State Government Commission Advisory Committee on Adoption Law. Finally, I am an adoptive parent of a six year old.

On September 13, 1995, I appeared before the Senate Committee on Aging and Youth and offered testimony at a public hearing in Pittsburgh concerning six Senate bills then pending regarding Adoption. At that time, as an officer of the PBA Family Law Section, I offered the resources of the Section in review, critique and drafting of proposed legislation concerning adoption, in part because, as here, the Section had not had the opportunity to obtain Bar Association approval for comment on the specific legislation then proposed. I also made the plea that the Legislature adopt the comprehensive review of the Pennsylvania Adoption statute because of the importance of the subject matter, rather

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than approach problems as might arise in a very interrelated statute on an ad hoc basis which might, in the end, lead to counterproductive or unintended results. I will renew that plea today for the same reasons and also because of the pending efforts of the Joint State Government Commission Advisory Committee on Adoption.

Through joint resolution1, the Legislature has directed the Joint State Government Commission² to establish a task force and an Advisory Committee to study the Commonwealth's adoption law and make recommendations regarding the law to the General Assembly. While the Commission has employed the Advisory Committee concept in other areas of law in the past, including Commonwealth procurement and eminent domain, this is the third currently active Advisory Committee in the area of family law. other two are the Advisory Committee on Decedents' Estate Laws, which has been advising the General Assembly on probate matters for more than 53 years, and the Advisory Committee on Domestic Relations Law,

which had its first meeting in 1995. All three committees are ongoing, which means that their work is not finished with the presentation of one report on a specific issue to the General Assembly. Each Committee is tasked with continuously studying its area of the law, and each will make recommendations to the General Assembly throughout the coming years as appropriate.

Chaired by Nancy Newman of Montgomery
County, the Advisory Committee on Adoption Law
has 35 members, including birth parents,
adoptive parents, adult adoptees, child
advocates, persons working in the adoption
field, lawyers, judges, a court administrator,
a professor, and a representative of the
Department of Public Welfare.

The Advisory Committee had its organizational meeting in January of 1998 and met again in March and October of 1998; April, June, October, and December of 1999; and February of 2000. A meeting is anticipated for May of 2000. Four subcommittees were formed to study specific areas of adoption law and have held numerous meetings to date. The

subcommittees are Placement and Costs, Search and Information, Special Needs, and Terminations.

Materials being reviewed by the subcommittees include the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, the Model State Adoption Act which was developed under the authority of the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, the Uniform Adoption Act, case law, adoption literature, and laws of other states.

Procedurally, the Advisory Committee will prepare proposed amendments to the Adoption Act and present them to the commission's Task Force on Adoption Law³, which is chaired by Senator Stewart J. Greenleaf. If approved by the Task Force, legislation containing the Committee's recommendations will be introduced in the General Assembly by Task Force members. The proposed legislation will be accompanied by a report containing official comments. It is anticipated that the Committee's report will be published in June of 2000.

Committee concerning the subject matter of
House Bill 1533 or 1838 because the
Committee's work is not yet complete and I
have not been given that authorization, I can
say that the subject matter of both HB 1533
and 1838 is included in the draft of proposed
legislation which is being debated by the
Advisory Committee. As you might expect given
the varied background of the Committee
membership, many statutory provisions receive
extensive debate. Nonetheless, the Advisory
Committee expects to have a final
comprehensive draft to submit to the Task

While I cannot offer comments on HB

1533 or 138, either as a representative of the

Advisory Committee or the PBA Family Law

Section, as an individual, I can offer the

following:

HB 1533

Force in the next several months.

HB 1533 would change the law which currently permits a birth parent to revoke a consent to adoption up until the time of entry of a decree of termination of parental rights

or adoption, to limit the time for revocation to 30 days of execution of the consent to adoption. This section impacts birth mothers and birth fathers differently, since a birth mother's consent cannot be obtained under current law until after 72 hours following a child's birth, whereas a birth father's consent can be obtained at any time after notice of a child's expected or actual birth. Accordingly, the earliest a mother's consent could be final would be 33 days after birth, while a father's consent could be final months prior to a child's birth.

I see no reason to treat men and women differently under this section of the Adoption Law. While current law permits a father to give a consent to adoption prior to birth, either parent can revoke the consent up until a decree of termination or adoption is entered. This at least gives the father the opportunity to experience a child's birth and see if that life-changing event alters his willingness to consent to adoption.

I believe that the giving of a consent to adoption of one's child is too

profoundly important to unduly shortcut one's able to reconsider that decision. I think this is particularly true in those many cases where the fathers themselves, though legally adults, are little more than children. Since a child is not available for adoption without the consent or termination of rights of both birth parents and neither current law, HB 1533, nor any other pending provision would alter this, I believe it is more advisable to keep the time limit on revocation of consent to adoption the same for both birth mothers and birth fathers.

Beyond this and the scope of HB 1533,

I would go one step further and change current
law to preclude a consent from a birth father
until after a child's birth. As a new parent,

I personally discovered a depth of feeling
that was unimaginable before the birth of my
son. Current law recognizes this and also the
physical and other emotional factors which
might impair a mother's ability to give a
knowledgeable consent by precluding execution
of a consent to adopt until 72 hours after the
birth of a child. Particularly since a child

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is not free for adoption until the rights of both parents have been terminated, there seems no fair reason not to permit fathers the same opportunity to experience the effect of a birth of one's child before they can, with knowledge, be called upon to make so important a decision as consent to adopt.

As to the 30-day limit for revocation of consent, this would somewhat shorten the time for a termination decree under the alternate procedure of Section 2504, which permits a petition to terminate rights to be filed 40 days after a consent has been given, with the hearing to be scheduled no sooner than 10 days after the petition has been Making no allowance for the time when a hearing might be scheduled, a termination decree cutting off revocation of consent could issue 50 days after a consent under current law, contrasted with the 30 days proposed by HB 1533. By itself, this shortening of time seems likely to affect only a small percentage of birth parents who would change their minds in the after 30-day timeframe, whereas in the far greater percentage of cases where no

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change of heart is present, the adoption could be finalized more quickly to the great relief of the adoptive family. Since the line must be drawn somewhere, and since there seems no good reason why 30 days is worse than 50, subject to the above caveat, the 30-day provision of HB 1533 seems reasonable.

HB 1838

HB 1838 adds definitions of "adoption-related counseling services" and "putative father." As to the former, HB 1838 also specifies that only an agency can provide adoption-related counseling services and makes provision for an acknowledgement that counseling services were offered to or requested by the birth parent and, if provided, by whom. Other provisions of HB 1838 provide implementation of adoption-related counseling services and clarify that the expenses of such are a permissible reimbursement. The provision for counseling services is salutary because it recognizes the fundamental importance of a knowledgeable consent to adoption of one's child.

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Like HB 1533, HB 1838 would also limit revocation of consent to adoption to the 30 days following the consent. My comments to this provision in HB 1533 also apply to HB 1838.

HB 1838 would also add a provision conditioning validity of consent to adoption in the case of birth parents under the age of 18 upon a provision of the consent advising the birth parents of the availability of adoption-related counseling services. This also is a salutary provision increasing the likelihood of a knowledgeable consent to adoption of one's child. I would go further and recommend that legislation require acknowledgement of the availability of adoption-related counseling services in the consent to adoption for all birth parents, regardless of age, particularly since other provisions of HB 1838 require notice of such services and an acknowledgement executed by the birth parent would be the best evidence that the notice had been given.

Other provisions of HB 1838 are very troublesome. HB 138 would amend Section 2503

provided to a putative father as to what specific actions he must take to preserve his parental rights. Currently, both sections specify that a notice be given alerting the putative father that his rights are subject to termination if he fails to file an acknowledgement or claim of paternity under Section 5103, and fails to either appear at the termination hearing to object to the termination of his rights or file a written objection prior to the hearing. HB 1838 then goes on, having eliminated the notice of what specific acts are required to preserve parental rights, to specify that a putative father's rights are terminable if he fails to do any of the following: File a written objection prior to hearing and appear at the hearing and provide substantial financial support and make substantial and ongoing

provision for the child's care.

(b)(3) and 2504(C) to eliminate the notice now

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These changes, without notice of the statutory requirements, raise a specter of terminating the parental rights of a putative father who has provided financial support and

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care for his child, and who has appeared at hearing to object to the termination of his rights, simply because he did not also file a written notice of objection prior to the hearing. Imagine the young 18-year-old putative father who falls into this trap. Parental rights should be subject to termination for substantial reasons, not because one was unwary of the legal technicality, particularly where notice of statutory requirements are eliminated. I urqe that these provisions of HB 1838 proposing amendment to Sections 2503(b)(3) and (d) and 2504(c) be reconsidered and withdrawn.

Again, since the Legislature's directive to the Joint State Government Commission is shortly to bear fruit with the report of the Advisory Committee on Adoption Law setting forth a comprehensive review of the entire Pennsylvania Adoption Law, I hope that the House Judiciary Committee, and members of the House and Senate generally, will take into consideration the thousands of hours of work of the Advisory Committee and its subcommittees in the very important

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Legislative debate will set the face of adoption in Pennsylvania in the future.

1 1995 Senate Resolution 72, Pr.'s

No. 1488, a concurrent resolution, was adopted
by both the House and the Senate in 1996.

² The Joint State Government Commission was established in 1937 as the bipartisan, bicameral research agency of the Pennsylvania General Assembly. One-time and ongoing projects on a variety of subjects are performed by the Commission as requested. Topics of past studies include the Clean and Green Act, public residential education, east European business development, and defense-related industries. In addition to providing objective research services of the General Assembly, the commission staff responds on a daily basis to requests for information from government agencies and institutions within the Commonwealth and from other states, the federal government and foreign governments.

TASK FORCE ON ADOPTION LAW.

SENATE MEMBERS: Sen. Stewart J.

Greenleaf, Chair (R-Montgomery); Sen. Robert

1	J. Mellow (D-Lackawanna); Sen. Jeffrey B.
2	Piccola (R-Dauphin); and Sen. Jack E. Wagner
3	(D-Allegheny).
4	HOUSE MEMBERS: Rep. Lita Indzel
5	Cohen (R-Montgomery); Rep. Mark B. Cohen
6	(D-Philadelphia); Rep. Edward H. Krebs
7	(R-Lebanon); and Rep. Constance H. Williams
8	(D-Montgomery).
9	Thank you
10	Respectfully submitted:
11	James E. Mahood
12	Pittsburgh, March 23, 2000.
13	* * * * *
14	(The hearing terminated at 3:25 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE.

I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence taken by me in the above-entitled matter are fully and accurately indicated in my notes and that this is a true and correct transcript of same.

Nancy J. Grega, RPR/nmm