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2	COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
3	CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
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5	CITY HALL CONFERENCE ROOM
6	BETHLEHEM, PENNSYLVANIA
7	HOUSE BILL 2619
8	PUBLIC HEARING MUNICIPAL AGGREGATION
9	
10	THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2010
11	9:39 A.M.
12	
13	BEFORE:
14 15	HONORABLE JOSEPH PRESTON, JR., MAJORITY CHAIR HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BRENNAN HONORABLE ROBERT W. GODSHALL, MINORITY CHAIR HONORABLE KAREN D. BEYER
16	HONORABLE BRIAN L. ELLIS HONORABLE DOUGLAS G. REICHLEY
17 18	ALSO PRESENT:
19	HONORABLE JOHN R. EVANS HONORABLE RICHARD R. STEVENSON
20	
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22 23	
23 24	BRENDA J. PARDUN, RPR P. O. BOX 278
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1	ALSO PRESENT: (cont'd)
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3	ELIZABETH A. ROSENTEL, RESEARCH ANALYST (D) MARCI SANTORO, COMMITTEE LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT (D)
4	COLIN FITZSIMMONS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (R) AMANDA RUMSEY, COUNSEL (R)
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6	MANAGER	
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20	DIVESH GUPTA 127 SENIOR COUNSEL	
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23	WRITTEN TESTIMONY SUBMITTED.	
24	AMY STURGES, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS	
25	PA LEAGUE OF CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES	

## PROCEEDINGS

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CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Good morning. The hour of 9:30 having come and gone by, I'd like to be able to call the meeting together for the Consumer Affairs Committee. We're here in the thriving metropolis Bethleham -- Bethlehem, and for the purpose of the hearing as we deal with the municipal aggregation issue.

I'd like to start to my right, to the audience's left, and have the members introduce themselves and the counties they represent.

REP. BEYER: Good morning. Rep. Karen Beyer, Lehigh, Northampton Counties.

REP. GODSHALL: Bob Godshall,

Montgomery County. And I do owe a vote of thanks

to Ralph Carp, your parks and public property

director for Bethlehem, who led me in here when he

found me out on the highway.

REP. BRENNAN: Good morning. Rep. Joe Brennan, 133 District, Lehigh, Northampton County.

I'd like to thank Chairman Preston for holding this hearing today in almost my district.

We are in Rep. Samuelson's district. And I'd like to thank Bob Donchez, president of city council,

and the mayor of Bethlehem, John Callahan, for allowing us this beautiful venue.

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REP. ELLIS: Good morning. I'm Brian Ellis. I represent the 11th District in Butler County.

REP. STEVENSON: Good morning. Rep. Dick Stevenson, the 8th District, Mercer and Butler Counties.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: This, in a sense, is the second hearing that we've had concerning the bill, municipal aggregation. Last week we were in the Cambria County area. And this is a concept of -- I've tried to broach. We've sat down, we've had meetings with local elected officials, one on one, without industry present, having -- going over the definitions and nomenclature and dealing with the municipal aggregation with business.

We've also sat down over the last couple of years, last year and a half, almost two years, of going down almost every source of energy manners that we have. I think that this is a way to be able to help the big guy and the little person on equal ground.

One of the concepts that was brought to me, and I'd like to be able to say this, as I said

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at the hearing we had yesterday, this is not an
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     idea of Joe Preston. This is an idea by a group of
     other people, and as I also said yesterday, if you
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     hear a politician say this was their idea, run from
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     them because they're lying. We are too busy, and
     the ideas should come from individuals, people, and
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     as entities, people put forth their ideas so that
     we can have an honest, robust discussion. I'd like
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     to be able to keep it that way.
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                  Mr. Chairman, do you have any
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     comments?
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                  REPRESENTATIVE GODSHALL:
                                            No comments.
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     Thank you.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: The first person to
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     present is Richard Hudson, director of regulatory
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     and legislative affairs, ConEdison Solutions.
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                  MR. HUDSON: Good morning.
                                              Is this
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     on?
19
                  Thanks. Good morning. My name is
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     Richie Hudson. I'm the director of regulatory and
     legislative affairs for ConEdison Solutions.
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                  First, a little bit about my company.
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     ConEd Solutions is a competitive retail electricity
     provider serving all types of customers --
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     residential customers, small business customers,
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and large business, and institutional customers -in states like PA that have enacted retail choice.

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We operate in twelve other states and the District of Columbia. We've had a very successful market entry here in PA in the PPL service territory, and we're serving several thousand residential customers in PPL.

We're also a well diversified energy company. We have a vibrant energy efficiency performance contracting unit, and we're also heavily involved in green and renewable energy, particularly with the focus on solar energy investment.

I also have a role with our trade association, known as RESA, which is the Retail Energy Supply Association, which is a broad and diverse group of competitive providers similar to ConEdison Solutions.

Just to be clear, my testimony today is on behalf of ConEd Solutions, but I have been authorized by RESA to state that the trade association shares many of the sentiments and concerns that I'll be discussing today about House Bill 2619.

In my previous testimony on this issue

earlier this year and last week, I've made clear that my company supports opt-out municipal aggregation in concept as a way to promote the development of the retail market here in PA and overcome the status quo bias that currently exists in favor of utility-provided default service.

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However, today I want to focus my remarks on one major concern that we have with House Bill 2619 as it is currently drafted. Under opt-out aggregation, as you know, city officials would negotiate a contract with an electricity provider and the city's residents, and under this bill, small businesses would be automatically enrolled with that supplier, under the terms and conditions negotiated by city officials.

Customers would be provided with the terms and conditions and they would be given a written notice, such as thirty days with a period of time to call or send in a postcard to opt-out of being enrolled in the opt-out aggregation program.

However, under this bill, if a customer fails to respond in that time line, thirty days, the supplier is allowed to lock the customer into a contract that he or she never affirmatively agreed to, and I think that's important point. The

customer could be locked into this contract for an indefinite period of time, and the supplier would be permitted to impose early termination fees and other owner-switching restriction on the customer if they should decide at a later point in time to take service from another competitive provider.

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We believe it's fundamentally inappropriate to lock customers into a contract with onerous switching fees and other types of penalties when they never affirmatively agreed to that contract in the first place. And we would urge this committee to adopt the amendatory language that we're putting forward that would specify that any opt-out aggravation program would not permit a supplier to impose the types of switching fees and other types of restrictions.

Consider this following scenario: A customer decides they want to enroll with a cell phone service provider. They decide they want to enroll with Verizon, and they don't want to be subject to a contract, so they pay for their phone out of pocket. And then six months later they see a great advertisement from T-Mobile for the brand-new iPhone and for a contract that would allow them to

save about 20 percent off of their cell phone service. So they call the T-Mobile and say, Sign me up. But the T-Mobile representative tells them, I'm sorry but we can't enroll you because you're locked into a contract with Verizon, and you could be subject to a significant fees if you were to switch with us at this time.

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So, confused, you call Verizon and try to find out what's going on, and the Verizon representative tells you that you were sent a notice in your bill about two months ago that told you about the terms and conditions of an opt-out cell phone aggregation program and you were locked in to a contract with Verizon for three years because you failed to respond within the specified time period.

Of course, you're free to switch and go to T-Mobile if you're willing to pay Verizon a hundred fifty dollar fee. Of course you're going to be outraged, and that's exactly what can happen under this bill without the amendatory language that we are recommending.

The 1996 Electric Choice and Competition Act was designed, as its name implies, to empower customers of choice. And you'll hear

from others today that this bill will not harm customers and that it will, in fact, enhance competition. But make no mistake, as currently drafted, this bill robs customers of choices that they have today and it will stifle competition by allowing one or two dominant suppliers to lock customers in to a contract under this type of municipal aggregation program.

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If this does indeed happen, these suppliers will not enter the market because all of the customers are going to be captive under the aggregation program.

PA currently has the beginnings of a vibrant competitive market. There are twelve suppliers competing for service in the PPL service territory today, and the question to ask yourself is whether you want this type of vibrant competition all across PA or whether you want effectively an unregulated monopoly providing service.

Finally, I'd like to say that it is not necessary to lock customers into this type of contract with these types of fees and switching restrictions in order to have a successful aggregation program. The value of opt-out

aggregation comes from the initial economies of scale and scope that are present when you enroll a large group of customers all at once and can avoid the marketing and other customer acquisition costs involved with picking up customers one by one.

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You can achieve these benefits under an opt-out aggregation program that preserves the types of choices and options customers have today, and, in fact, ConEdison Solutions, the company that I represent, is a supplier to just such a program in Massachusetts called the Cape Light Compact, and under this program, a group of about a hundred sixty thousand customers have seen millions of dollars in savings since we began serving the program in 2005, and we've been able to provide very competitive pricing and significant benefits to customers without having to resort to the types of onerous switching fees and other restrictions that I've discussed.

So, in sum, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I'm very happy to answer any of your questions.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Questions?
Representative Ellis.

REP. ELLIS: Thank you very much

Mr. Chairman.

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Thank you, Richie, for coming today.

Just real quick, you brought up the -your concern with the aggregation prior being able
to lock customers in and impose exit and
termination fees. What would you suggest as an
alternative to that?

MR. HUDSON: What I am suggesting is that the opt-out municipal aggregation program be structured just as utility default service is today. So, today, if you're a PPL customer, PPL will go out and procure energy on your behalf under what's known as default service, under a procurement plan that's regulated by the Public Utility Commission, and you're free to leave that default service without restriction or penalty.

So I'm proposing language which is attached to my testimony that would clarify that under an opt-out aggregation program, the provider would not be able to impose switching fees or other types of restrictions.

REP. ELLIS: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: You mentioned the town in Massachusetts. I take it they do not charge a opt-out fee; correct?

MR. HUDSON: That is correct. 1 We are 2 the supplier to that program in Cape Light, and we 3 do not impose any type of restrictions on customers. 4 5 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Is that by law or is it by choice? 6 7 MR. HUDSON: As we were able to research in a little bit of an expeditious manner 8 9 this morning, the law in Massachusetts, as I 10 understand it, and I'm not an attorney, has a 11 six-month period in which customers, after the 12 aggregation program is put in place, customers, 1.3 within one hundred and eight days after the program 14 starts, are able to switch without penalty. 15 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: So if you wanted to, 16 you could charge in an opt-out fee. MR. HUDSON: Only after six months. 17 18 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: If you wanted to. 19 MR. HUDSON: Yes, but only after six 20 months. 21 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Now, you know, I 22 went through a lot of things when we -- as we had 2.3 conversation briefly yesterday, but in the last 24 five or six years, people in this area thought 25 competition would not happen. And I watched

companies, you know, come in, and I even talked about members, there's going to be competition.

It's not going to happen.

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And in the central part of Harrisburg yesterday, I know there are eleven people competing, and I think, roughly, weak estimate, 50 percent of them do not charge a fee for cancellation.

One of the things that is different in your manner that you gave for the example was a telecommunications company. The issue in this bill is that the people themselves chose an elect the spokespersons who are going to negotiate and have a ordinance, and most times an ordinance has to be publicly noticed, where the people have a choice even to say to their borough council people or township commissioners or supervisors, no, we don't want you to do this.

That's what they elect people to be able to somewhat make that decision for them, which is different than the private sectors. I can't tell your CEO, I can't tell Verizon's CEO, I can't tell the company in AT&T, whatever, I can't tell them, but I had a choice of any elected, as a citizen for the people that I chose to be able to

have a voice that be able to represent us. And that's part of what the deal is in this.

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And then the PUC checks and monitors the agreement between the provider and the township or borough or city that negotiates this contract, and that's a little bit different. I'm not saying that -- what you're asking me -- asking in a sense is that we want to tell a company that you can't do this, and so, therefore, the company that may want to choose a fee as compared to -- like in Harrisburg there are some that choose a fee versus the company that doesn't choose a fee to opt out. Now I understand you say you just want people to just opt out any time. I'm looking at that.

But I just wanted to raise that issue to you and to the members, some of the things that we're looking at, that it's different between the private sector and here we are talking about three towns on one side of the river and five towns on the other side of the river can form and negotiate a contract if all of the entities, the legal entities, pass an ordinance to come together and then agree on a contract and then it's still approved by the PUC.

So we are talking about something

different, where they can have a larger pool, and to be able to maintain that pool and the benefit also goes to the municipalities to be able to have a lower rate as well. I just wanted to be able to say that.

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Do you have any comments?

MR. HUDSON: Yeah. You raised some very interesting points, and I recognize the fact that under this bill it would be duly elected city officials that would be negotiating the terms and conditions of the contract. However, despite wellintended customer notice provisions that are provided for this bill, most customers first are going to ignore the opt-out notices that they receive. We all know what you do with those mandatory notices when they show up in your mailbox. They pretty much go straight in the trash and you never look at them. And secondly, most people just aren't going to know what's going on at the city council level in order to, you know, be educated and informed about this.

So what, in effect, you have happening is well-intended city officials are going to negotiate in good faith a contract that they think is the best thing for their residents, but it may

turn out that another supplier three months down the road, six months down the road, a year down the road is able to enter the market and provide a lower price offer or a more innovative product than exists for the aggregation program, and I think most people would agree that, you know, you don't want to find out after the fact that you're barred from taking advantage of this new product and service or this lower price because of something your elected official did really without your knowledge.

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CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Okay. I just want to raise that issue, because in this, no one is saying currently right now in the bill, and we just found out yesterday wasn't in this print about the three years. Doesn't mean that the township or borough has to negotiate a contract for three years and that was part of the conversation we were talking about before. They can negotiate one year or two years or three years. And I'm even thinking about even raising that, and I'll address that a little bit later.

Rep. Beyer.

REP. BEYER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Richard. How are you?

MR. HUDSON: Good morning.

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REP. BEYER: I actually agree with just about everything you said. I don't like the thirty-day notice. I don't think it's long enough. I mean, consumers are not even going to see a difference in their bill, really, or not even acknowledge or experience a reduction when it's just a thirty-day issue. So I like that.

You know, Rep. Ellis brought up a really good point at the last hearing. How do you feel about school districts being included in -- since we have small businesses included in residents, how do you feel about perhaps school districts being included in the whole process?

MR. HUDSON: As you know, the current bill doesn't contemplate that. We personally at ConEd Solutions would be in favor of that. We think school districts are well positioned to benefit from various types of aggregation programs, including a program like this.

REP. BEYER: And in your aggregation agreements elsewhere, are school districts included?

MR. HUDSON: Actually in the Cape Light aggregation program that I referenced, there are no

restrictions on who is eligible to participate.

All customers are in that program.

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businesses, medium-sized businesses, are they?

MR. HUDSON: They are. They are
included. However, the large customer segment
tends to be more actively involved in shopping for
service from a -- you know, one-on-one relationship
with competitive providers, so from a theoretical
perspective, I can certainly understand and agree
with the sentiment in this bill to exclude those
customers from the aggregation program.

REP. BEYER: All. How about large

REP. BEYER: Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Thank you.

And as we go along with these meetings, I have some different thoughts and suggestions that I'm going to potentially make for changes in the issue in dealing with the school districts, it was my concern just as well. One of the things I've heard from the school districts is they all kind of joint purchase themselves and negotiate currently now, the ones that can in the areas that the caps have come off in some sense and I guess even in some of the other areas, they kind of do, but we

are going to look at it a little bit. 1 Okay. 2 Thank you very much. 3 MR. HUDSON: Thank you. CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Next is Teresa 4 5 Ringenbach, who manages midwest government and regulatory affairs for Direct Energy, LLC. 6 7 How are you today? MS. RINGEBACH: I'm good. How are you? 8 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Good. I quess you 9 10 can start how you want with your name and --11 MS. RINGENBACH: I'm Teresa Ringenbach. 12 I'm with Direct Energy. I'm their manager of midwest government regulatory affairs. And I thank 1.3 14 you for having us this morning to come discuss 15 municipal aggregation. 16 A little background on Direct Energy. 17 Direct Energy actually has its headquarters for 18 North America in Pittsburgh. We have three hundred employees in that location, and then we also own a 19 20 home services side, which is your HVAC, electric services, and that is spread out throughout the 21 22 state. We have about eight hundred employees within PA. 2.3 24 Direct Energy is currently serving and 25 making offers to residential, small commercial,

large commercial, and industrial customers throughout PA in the PPL territory. We're serving a number of residential customers when rate caps came off, we were here making offers. We're about to make offers behind Duquesne. So we are very committed to choice and competition on the electric side in PA.

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I'm here to talk about municipal aggregation. And Direct Energy does serve municipal aggregation programs in different states. We serve municipal and natural gas aggregations that are opt-out in Ohio. We serve municipal electric aggregation in Connecticut.

And just a bit of background. Before I came to Direct, I actually started in the energy industry selling and as a customer in opt-out municipal aggregations in Ohio. So that's my history. And how I started in the energy industry was serving these types of programs.

I just want to address real quickly the point that customers aren't aware or throw out their opt-out notices. My history with these programs is actually that you see a number of opt-outs in the beginning. You're actually going to see more people opting out when the programs

starts, and then that gradually decreases as the programs continue.

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Direct actually does an opt-out every year for our programs, and it's the same time every year, and we actually have customers calling before the opt-out: When is my notice coming? What's the new rate? So I would argue that these programs actually do get customers really engaged in their bill and making decisions.

After reading through the legislation, it's really well written. It definitely addresses a lot of the issues that you could see with these types of programs, but Direct has two points that we'd like to see addressed in the bill.

The first deals with the fact that customers who are already under contract with a supplier are excluded from the municipal aggregation program, and that is as it should be. However, by excluding them, it also means that if that customer should choose to break their existing contracts by their own choice, pay whatever fees, and want to join their community's program and get their community's price, they can't do it as written. Instead they would have to break their contract, return to the utility default price, and

the way this switching rules work, that's at least for one month they would be subject to that utility price, and then become enrolled in their community's program.

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In Ohio, on the gas side, that's actually how it works. And I can tell you from the local leaders point of view, they don't like getting that call when their resident or whoever calls up and says: Why are you telling me I have to go back to the utility, pay a higher price for a while, and then get my community's rate? This is my community's program and I want in.

So what Direct is asking is that some sort of language be put into the legislation that addresses that situation. And what we've suggested is something that says -- and I'm not an attorney so I will put that out there as I write that.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: That's to your benefit.

MS. RINGENBACH: However, nothing in this section shall prohibit and exclude a customer under contract with another electric generation supplier from contacting an electric generation supplier to request enrollment in an opt-out municipal aggregation program. The electric

generation supplier to the municipal aggregation program may not market to the customer for opt-out enrollment but must follow any rules -- or, sorry -- any laws or consumer protections for verification of an electric generation supplier enrollment.

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So basically that customer can leave their contract, enroll in your community's program, but it also -- the point is to make sure that their enrollment is verified just as any other enrollment is, to avoid slamming that customer or interfering with their contract.

address is -- actually, Richie touched on it but in a very different way than what Direct would like. Currently the legislation says that that customer gets to opt out or leave the program without incurring any fees at the end of the contract term. However, there's no restrictions on the contract term. So what you could have is a contract that goes out for ten years -- which there's actually ten-year aggregation programs in Ohio -- and what would happen is, at any point in that ten-year period, if that customer sees a better deal out in the market, they could incur an

early termination fee in order to go and switch.

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If you have -- if you have an opt-out in 2000 and you don't have another one until 2010, then you really do have customers who are going to be in there going: Wait a second, I didn't really know I was in this program. Now you're telling me three years after I enrolled, I have to pay you a hundred dollars to go get a better rate?

So our take on it is slightly different. We'd actually like to see the community contract term, the municipal aggregation term, limited to three years, but customers get the opportunity to opt out without penalty every year. So that does two things. One it continues their ability to shop every year. Just like with your cell phone contract. I know every two years when it goes closer, I get excited because I get to shop again, right? But I know it's every two years.

In this situation, that customer knows, all right, maybe I can't leave six months into it without paying an early termination fee, but at the end of this year, I can. So I'll shop again, I'll shop before I make that decision. It's educating them. It's getting them engaged in their bill.

The supplier to the aggregation program

gets some certainty. They know that within that one-year period that if that customer leaves, they have the ability to charge a fee to recover any losses, but they get that certainty of one year. I know for one year, my supply has to go for that year.

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The other thing is, you hear about the default service. It provides the default service providers with the knowledge that during that one-year period they're not going to see huge swings in their load.

So the idea is to keep the competitive market going, you know, provide that certainty to the supplier to ensure that those communities can get good rates without, you know, having a bunch of risk costs added into their pricing and to protect the market.

The last item is something that -- that I thought about adding, but I wasn't sure how specific you wanted to be on these issues. And Chairman Preston had talked about the commission has given some authority in the legislation to look at these programs and to do some review process. And if -- if the committee isn't willing to put in detailed language on these two issues, what we had

suggested was passively punting them to the 1 2 commission and saying, Commission, in order to protect the competitive market, you should 3 promulgate rules that deal with these issues. 4 that it gives anyone who doesn't make it to the 5 legislative hearings or is a supplier who maybe 6 7 isn't really engaged in the legislative process the opportunity to participate in a case or rule making 8 9 before the commission and really vet these issues. 10 So those are my two items on behalf of And, again, I thank you for giving 11 Direct Energy. us this opportunity to speak with you. 12 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Good suggestions. 1.3 14 Questions from members? 15 REP. ELLIS: I'll go first again. 16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 17 Thanks for your testimony today. 18 Going back to your first point where 19 you say customers who are already in a contract 20 with suppliers are excluded from enrollment. As I 21 read down in your suggestion of how we fix that, 22 you have the statement in there: May not market to 2.3 the customer. Okay. The supplier cannot do that. 24 So I need you to walk me through this.

There's somebody who's already in an agreement, and

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you want to allow them to opt in, but there's going
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     to be no way of the providers contacting them or
     marketing to them to suggest it. So what makes you
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     think that people are just going to go ahead and
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     start looking?
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                 MS. RINGENBACH: The idea there was,
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     your neighbor got a notice, and he came to you and
     said, "Look I get four cents with our city, don't
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     you?" And you're sitting there going, "No.
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     are you talking about?"
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                  So the idea is they find out about it,
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     but your not -- you're not having these opt-out
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     programs actually attacking the existing customers
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     who've made that choice and are already engaged in
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     the process.
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                 REP. ELLIS: I understand the second
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     point, but my confusion is, where is the major
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     problem with the energy providers marketing to
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     people that are already under contract?
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                 MS. RINGENBACH: I think it depends on
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     how they market to them. I will tell you --
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                 REP. ELLIS: Because this says "may not
     market."
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               So it's not depending on how they market.
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                 MS. RINGENBACH: Internally -- I'll
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     tell you what the conversation at Direct was.
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have a residential retail program. We like municipal aggregation because it's a way to educate customers, but, ultimately, we want customers to sign up with us on what we call organic contracts. We want them to go to the commission's website. We want to them to see our general organic market offering and put them on contracts that way.

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So, from our perspective internally, we don't want a municipal aggregation marketing to our customers that we already have, and that was a sales decision made within Direct.

Do we do it in our existing programs?

Do we have the community send out a letter that

goes to everyone that isn't an opt-out notice that

makes them aware of the program? Yes. But do we

aggressively market to them? No. And I think

that's what that was meant to address. Again, I am

not an attorney so needs to be tweaked.

REP. ELLIS: I mean, I just think, you know, that we got to be careful if we're taking the ability for anyone to not market a product. I mean that's how our country works. We market products; people buy them. And so I'm very skeptical of language that says: You cannot market to customers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1 2 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Thank you. 3 Yeah, and I want to thank you really for suggestions because we're getting close. 4 announce a little bit at the end of this meeting 5 how close we are in dealing with this. 6 7 Two questions I guess I'm going ask you and every other provider. First, relative to the 8 9 issue, has been some concern about the contract 10 being three years. Would you have any objection if it's five years? 11 12 MS. RINGENBACH: No. 1.3 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: The other thing, 14 there was a question -- and, again, I'll ask this 1.5 for every other provider too -- in the dealing with 16 the issue of small business, and I think that's a 17 very good -- concerns a lot of us here just as well 18 to be able to take advantage of it. Currently, I think it's thirty-seven, Gail? 19 20 MS. DAVIS: Twenty-five. 21 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Twenty-five. 22 Do you have any objection, since it was 2.3 raised, and two hundred fifty to five hundred for small businesses? 24

MS. RINGENBACH: I'll have to take it

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back. My gut reaction is probably yes.

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to ask everybody, so I can take a little poll on that and raise it to include, to be able to give some — there is no real clear definition of always what a small business is, and sometimes, you know, a small sheet metal manufacturer or car dealership that might fall within that to be able to take advantage of that. That's my thought.

And I think for the members, when she was talking about the Public Utility Commission notice, even within the language -- and I think starting around pages ten, eleven, and twelve, it kind of gives you a definition of the contract, what has to happen, what should be included to the consumer, that the ordinance itself has to be published and -- ninety days before they can vote on it and has to be public discussion on it. even then, and I -- and I partially agree with it even more so, as we start looking at some of these things, that the PUC makes sure that the public comment and the efforts that was publication were done and the public notices were done for residents to be able to get the information before the ordinance is even voted on, to see what I'm talking

about. 1 But I want to thank the members' idea, 2 3 and we'll be looking at that. We've also been joined by a couple of 4 other members. Like you to introduce yourself and 5 the county that you represent. 6 7 REP. REICHLEY: Doug Reichley from the Lehigh and Berks County area, 134th District. 8 9 REP. EVANS: Good morning. I'm Rep. 10 John Evans. I represent parts of Erie and Crawford 11 Counties in the 5th Legislative District. 12 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Thank you very much 1.3 for coming. 14 REP. ELLIS: Mr. Chairman, before we 15 move on, could I ask one more question I just 16 thought of? CHAIRMAN PRESTON: 17 Sure. 18 REP. ELLIS: You said Direct Energy has parts of the PPL service area right now. 19 20 MS. RINGENBACH: We serve residential customers behind PPL. 21 22 REP. ELLIS: And currently it's my 2.3 understanding that you do have termination fees and you're advocating against them? 24 25 MS. RINGENBACH: No, no. We're not

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advocating against them. We're advocating that
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     there is allowed an early termination fee for
     opt-out aggregation so customers get an opportunity
3
     to leave every year.
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                  REP. ELLIS: Okay. So you're okay with
     the fees.
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                  MS. RINGENBACH: Yes.
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                  REP. ELLIS: But you want three opt-out
     periods -- or if it's a five-year contract, five
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10
     opt-out --
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                  MS. RINGENBACH: An annual opt-out
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     period, yes.
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                  REP. ELLIS: I just wanted to make
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     sure.
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                  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Chairman Godshall.
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                  REP. GODSHALL: I just want to say, on
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     the termination fee, like in PPL territory, which
     I'm in, everybody that -- I know, probably you can
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     forget it down the road maybe, but everybody that's
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     been promoting and -- their electricity, their
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     energy into your area has been very clear on that
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     there is a -- there is a -- you know, a fee
     involved or there isn't a fee involved.
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                  So I -- you know, I know that down the
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road you can probably forget that there is that,
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     but when you sign up, it's been very clear, and
     I've had -- living in that territory, I've had no
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     complaints on that, at least as of this time.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Representative
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     Beyer.
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                 REP. BEYER: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman.
     You said that you haven't had any complaints on
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     termination fees? Is that what you said?
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                 REP. GODSHALL: That's right.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON:
                                     So far.
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                 REP. BEYER: Do you have any issue,
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     though, if the bill is altered that there are no
     termination fees?
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                 MS. RINGENBACH: Direct wouldn't oppose
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        We, actually, in our municipal aggregation
     it.
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     programs, don't. And keep in mind, that's gas in
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     Ohio, which is a really thriving market, so the
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     market's actually pushed it to that.
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     communities actually demand no termination fee.
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                 REP. BEYER: Okay. So that's not a
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     problem for Direct Energy at all.
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                 MS. RINGEBACH: No.
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                 REP. BEYER: Great.
                                       Thank you.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: And that's one of
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the things I'm saying now. They have an option
now. All I'm saying, if someone wants to charge it
right now, currently under this bill, they can.

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But in our area, in Harrisburg, for example, half the companies that are out there marketing don't charge a fee for cancellation.

Some do. So you have competition still in existence.

Thank you very much.

MS. RINGENBACH: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Next we have Irwin Sonny Popowsky, who's the consumer advocate from PA's Office of the Consumer Advocate under the auspices of the Attorney General.

Good to have you here again, my friend.

MR. POPOWSKY: Thank you, Chairman Preston, Chairman Godshall, and members and staff of the committee. As always, it's an honor and pleasure to appear before this committee.

This is actually the second time I've testified on the issue of municipal aggregation.

And as I did at the last hearing back in March in Harrisburg, I want to commend you, Chairman Preston and Chairman Godshall and all the committee, for the proactive and careful and deliberate approach

that you have taken on this issue.

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Now, as the members of this committee, I think, our painfully aware, the last of the generation rate caps that have protected PA consumers for the last decade will be coming off at the end of -- at the end of this year, 2010. I think, though, that Act 129 of 2008, which was passed, in large part, through the efforts of this committee, I believe through that act, the general assembly has established a strong framework that, if it's implemented correctly, will continue to protect electric consumers from unwarranted generation rate increases in the future.

And it does that through a combination of regulation or effective regulation of the utility default service suppliers and competition from unregulated generation marketers.

Specifically, under Act 129, electric consumers are free to switch to alternative competitive generation suppliers, and more than 30 percent of PPL residential customers have, in fact, already made such a switch since rate -- since PPL's rate cap expired at the end of 2009. But, at the same time, our regulated electric distribution companies are required to purchase a mix of generation

resources in the competitive wholesale markets that are designed to provide nonshopping customers with adequate and reliable generation service at the least cost to customers over time.

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Now municipal aggregation would, in essence, create a third path for residential and small commercial customers to receive their generation service. That is, customers would not be required to shop as individuals for an alternative to the their utility service, but they might be able to benefit from a form of shopping that is done on their behalf by their elected municipal officials.

is that by aggregating the buying power of a large number of small customers, a non-profit municipal entity can get a better deal for those customers than if each of those customers had to go out and shop for electricity on an individual basis. In addition, we know that many customers, particularly residential customers, may not -- may have neither the sufficient interest or sufficient understanding to choose their own supplier for a product that they have never had to shop for.

To the extent that municipalities can

aggregate their customers as a way of achieving electric rate savings for customers within their municipalities, then I believe that option should be available. At the same time, though, I believe that municipal aggregation must be established in a manner that complements the existing choices for electric customers under Act 129 and that does not increase the costs for customers who do not participate in the municipal aggregation programs.

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Now, at this point, I think it's important to distinguish between two different types of aggregation, both of which are permitted under House Bill 2619. Under the first type of program, opt-in aggregation, individual customers voluntarily and affirmatively choose to have their municipality purchase generation on their behalf. Under the second type of program, opt-out aggregation, customers are automatically included in the municipal aggregation program unless they choose to be removed from the program.

In my opinion, the opt-in provisions of House Bill 2619 could be implemented immediately and fairly easily and would not have any negative impact on PA's existing customer choice and default service programs.

Opt-in municipal aggregation is similar to the type of buying groups that are already being formed on a voluntary basis by local and county business groups and agencies, and I see really no objection to municipalities performing that role as well, on behalf of their residential and small business customers, for those customers who would like to have, hopefully, a less expensive alternative to their utility default service but, again, who don't want to shop on their own behalf.

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I also think that opt-in municipal aggregation is clearly consistent with the current default service framework we have under Act 129 of 2008. The electric distribution companies, through their mix of competitively procured wholesale generation contracts, will continue to serve all customers except those customers who voluntarily and affirmatively choose to be served by an alternative provider.

Now, other retail marketers can continue to compete for individual customers and then they also compete to provide service on an aggregated basis to customers who are part of a municipal aggregation program.

The more difficult questions arise

under opt-out aggregation. First of all, it must be recognized that under opt-out aggregation, customers are switched to an alternative supplier without their prior affirmative consent. That's why, I think, House Bill 2619 correctly, at page twenty-three, exempts municipal aggregators from what we call the anti-slamming provision of the 1996 Electric Competition Law.

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That law required that before a customer was switched, they would have to -- the electric distribution company would have to obtain their actual consent, either oral or written, to be switched. And under opt-out aggregation, if you're part of municipal aggregation, under this bill, that would not -- that would not have to occur.

I think that makes some sense, for the reasons that you stated, Chairman Preston, which is that these are not simply private companies slamming customers. These are elected municipal officials who must pass an ordinance, who must say, This is what we're going to do, and the voters of that community have the opportunity to say, No, we don't want that, or, No, we don't appreciate what you just did. But in any case, I think that's an important consideration.

The reason for that, the benefit of opt-out aggregation, of course, is, as I said in our last -- at our last hearing, it's just a matter of human nature. That if you're really looking to aggregate a large number of customers, you're more likely to do so if you do it on an opt-out default basis, rather than if you require all the individual customers to sign up.

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But I do have a continuing concern with House Bill 2619 with respect to the timing of opt-out aggregation. That is, I think it's important to ensure that the establishment and the timing of any opt-out aggregation program does not undermine the ability of our existing electric distribution companies to provide least-cost service to the customers who do not participate in the aggregation programs.

Now, as I said earlier, under Act 129 of 2008, we require our utilities to acquire a mix of generation resources to provide default service at the least cost to customers over time. Now, since Act 129 was passed, we have had a series of proceedings before the Public Utility Commission, complex, difficult proceedings, most of which have resulted in settlements, negotiated agreements

among all the parties -- the consumer advocates, the utilities, the retail suppliers, the wholesale suppliers -- that have been approved by the Public Utility Commission.

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And under those agreements -- under those agreements, the utilities already, as we speak, are in the process of purchasing generation, entering into contracts to serve their customers during the period starting on January 1, 2011. And in most cases, those default service plans run until June 2013. So those plans have already been approved. Contracts have already been written and signed to acquire power for customers.

Now, when those contracts were entered into, and not all of them have been entered, some of them were continuing over the next two years, but when those plans were created, it was — they were created under the existing law, Act 129 of 2008. The utilities and the wholesale generators who entered into these contracts were certainly aware that customers could switch from their utility at any time, and they may lose customers or gain customers over the period of that two and a half years.

What they didn't anticipate was that

during that two-and-a-half-year period, entire municipalities could be taken out of the service territory en mass. That can create a problem.

If -- if these -- for the generator, for the wholesale generation, for the utilities, and ultimately for the customers who have to pay the costs, because if those companies have already gone out to acquire that power, entered into contracts based on the old law, and then the rules are changed in the middle of this default service plan, we could be treating those people unfairly and raising costs to consumers.

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what I would suggest at this time as what I think would be, at least, a partial solution to this problem, which I think is a very serious concern, is that the general assembly could go forward immediately with the opt-in provisions of House Bill 2619, but to state that the opt-out provisions, even if you want to go forward and approve those provisions, that they would not be implemented by any companies until the end of the current default service period, so we wouldn't interrupt or interfere with the existing plans. So that you could start work on these plans perhaps now but have them timed such that they would begin

at the beginning of the next default service period.

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At that time, the utilities and the wholesale competitors, the wholesale marketers, would know, well, we have a number of -- we have a number of municipalities that we don't have to serve, so we won't worry about them, and then you'll just enter into contracts to serve the rest of the customers.

So my suggestion, respectfully, is that you go forward. You can go forward immediately with the opt-in aggregation but not permit the opt-out aggregation to occur until the end of the current default service period, and then the aggregations would be timed in a way that you could coordinate with the utility's default service plans.

One final point which I made at the last hearing as well, is, I think, to the extent that costs are incurred by a utility to create these aggregation programs, the costs should be paid by the aggregate, the municipalities that participate in the programs. Under the current law, under the current bill, those costs would be spread to all customers, including customers from

the municipalities who do not participate.

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So with that, I'll close my testimony.

As always I look forward to working with you and your staff as you go forward with this important legislation.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: I think what's important, that you raise a valid point, because we are aware of the default issue. And some of the staff here were discussing it very much so yesterday, and when we go back today, we'll be in the car, discussing it just as well. Wanted to raise that to you.

You raised a good issue, because I know there was some issue concerning what -- the language in there about opt in. I put it in there anyway. Because of the way our town, thousands of towns that we have here, I was trying to imagine how long it would take if we used or put the words, so I didn't include the issue of referendum but made sure that the issue of ordinance and publication and public meetings.

And I think one of the things that, I guess for the members of the committee and to your fellow colleague, one of the issues that we look at, all of us have municipalities now that are

doing energy surveys and looking for a way to be able to cut their costs and do their plans. One of the things included in aggregation that we can look at is, they would be able to move from a pool, once they come to an agreement for the next three years, from a budget item of what that cost would be, which gives them, as we work with things, whether it heart/lung or other things, but they would know what the electric bill's going to be. And I think that is something that our municipalities have been trying to come across with without having to buy here or buy there or look here or look there that they would be able to know and work further.

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So that's one of the things I'm looking at, a way from just an individual consumer, because I think we have to think about the local municipalities, but I think all of you -- I mean, I have a borough with only three thousand people in it in my district. I have another borough that is nineteen thousand people. And I remember when we first had the hearings -- and I want to, again, commend you, because when we first had the hearing, I intentionally had not even introduced the bill. You remember? We were dealing with a concept, because I wanted to hear from people.

And we put a lot of ideas. There was going to be some additional changes. But I just wanted to be able to raise that to you, because we did hear you, looking at the issue, the opt-in issue, that's still is an option that a municipality can do, if it so choose. I know everybody's looking at the opt-out area, because that gives them a guaranteed pool when they first start. So still looking at it.

Sometimes you almost wonder if -- we have some towns that only have a hundred fifty people. If they happen -- you know, it is a question that is -- one town only has opt-in, wants to do an opt-in ordinance and ten towns around want to do an opt-out, and they all need part of that. So maybe that one town only as a rate, maybe the borough may be big and may have -- you know, make money from a plant. Can they do that? That's something else to be able to look at just as well, which I haven't thought about.

But I appreciate, thank you for your comments.

Questions?

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, always.

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REP. GODSHALL: 1 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 2 3 You know, your comment on page two: At the same time, I believe that municipal 4 aggregation should be established in a manner that 5 complements the existing choices for electric 6 7 customers under Act 129 and does not increase the costs for the customers who do not participate in 8 9 municipal aggregation programs. 10 How would you go about doing that? 11 MR. POPOWSKY: I think the key is 12 timing. 1.3 REP. GODSHALL: Pardon. I'm sorry. 14 MR. POPOWSKY: The key is timing. If, 15 let's say -- if we had passed this bill a year ago, 16 we could have had -- as part of default service plan, we would have -- we would have -- we would 17 18 have known that there was also certain 19 municipalities that would not have to be served, 20 and, therefore, the utility's plan would have taken that into account. 21 22 The same thing can happen in June 2.3 If, before we have the next round of proceedings where we established the default 24 25 service plan, if we know that there are going to be

municipal aggregation plans, let's say, if you're

-- if you're PPL, and you know that Allentown and

Scranton are going to be served by a municipal

aggregators but that Harrisburg and Wilkes-Barre

are not, you would develop a plan to serve the

default service customers for your remaining

customers, but you wouldn't include the customers

who are part of the default service plan as part of

your overall assumption of what customers you're

going to serve.

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So timing, to me, is critical. That's how I think it could be done.

wondering about your comments pertaining to Act 129 and the requirements of Act 129. It's going to be a monumental task to -- if you don't know what electric customers you've got, you know, most -- you know, most of that -- those alternative energy credits are bought in advance, for not knowing what your base is going to be.

MR. POPOWSKY: I think one way we've dealt with that, and I think it's a good point, is some utilities have actually taken it -- have suggested that they would acquire alternative energy credits for -- even on behalf of the

competitive suppliers as well. That's one way to address the alternative energy credits.

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But -- but even with Act 129, I mean, we know that some customers are going to shop. We don't know how many. We know -- and that the generators, the marketers and the utilities, can take that into account, but what they never took into account was the possibility that, let's say your PECO, and suddenly -- and you go out and enter into all these contracts to serve all your customers, and suddenly the city of Philadelphia decides, Well, we don't want your service any more. What are going to do at that point? Or if you're Duquesne and the city of Pittsburgh moves out.

So all I'm saying is, if you know -- if you -- if you time these programs so that if the city of Philadelphia says, Hey, we're going to do municipal aggregation, then the next PECO plan is going to look a lot different from the last PECO plan because they will only be -- they will know that there's a aggregator that is going to serve the bulk of the people in Philadelphia.

But you're right, alternative energy credits are a complicating factor as well. And one way to address that is to have utility default

supplier acquire the credits and then charge the marketers for their share of the credits.

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REP. GODSHALL: Thank you very much. I appreciate your comments.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Rep. Beyer.

REP. BEYER: Just really quickly, so you're saying timing. Are you suggesting then a phase in of the aggregation program across the state? Is that what you're suggesting, based on as the rate caps come off?

MR. POPOWSKY: The rate caps will all be off as of January 1, 2011. What's interesting is that, I think all -- I think virtually all of the default service plans that we have for all of the major utilities, the major utilities, extend until June of 2013. The reason you pick June is because that's the end of the -- what we call the PJM year, which is -- our wholesale market runs from June to June. So all of the -- the current plans run till June 2013, so that would be the opportune time to begin the actual implementation of a municipal aggregation program.

I mean, you could begin to do the work almost -- you know, you could begin next year, if you want, to start developing these programs, but

you wouldn't implement them until June of 2013. 1 2 From then on, I think, ideally, you would want the municipal aggregation plans to be the same length 3 as the default service plans, so that every two or 4 three years, I think, ideally, you would want both 5 of these opportunities to kick in at the same time. 6 7 REP. BEYER: Thank you. 8 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 9 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Thank you. 10 remember, as I said, currently under the -- in the 11 legislation, it's three years. It doesn't mean 12 that someone can't do one, two, three years. 1.3 I'm thinking about changing the language in the 14 amendment to make it five years, but it doesn't 15 mean, again, that they couldn't do two years, three 16 years, four years. 17 And let's also remember, it's the 18 people who elect the elected official who are going to do the ordinance. Okay? 19 So Rep. Reichley. 20 21 REP. REICHLEY: Thank you, 22 Mr. Chairman. Just real brief, and I apologize if 2.3 24 this was covered. Has this kind of system been

implemented anywhere else in any other state or

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even in another field other than municipal electric
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2
     aggregation?
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                  MR. POPOWSKY: Yes.
                                       They've had, I
     think, very successful municipal aggregation
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     programs in Ohio and in Massachusetts.
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                  REP. REICHLEY: How long have those
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     been in effect?
                  MR. POPOWSKY: We are going to hear
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     from --
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                  REP. REICHLEY: Oh, okay.
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                  MR. POPOWSKY:
                                 The only thing I would
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     say is, one of the benefits of what they did in
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     Ohio is that, I think that municipal aggregation
     was sort of in there right from the beginning. It
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     was sort of built right into the competition act in
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     the beginning, and all I'm saying is, if you're
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     going to start a program like that, you want to
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     make sure you start it at the right time. And in
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     PA, I think that would probably be when our next
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     default service plans kick in.
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                  REP. REICHLEY: Okay.
                                         Thank you.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON:
                                     Thank you.
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                  You know, I hear what you're saying so
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     that every -- what you're saying so that everybody
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     would have to be at the -- even playing field at a
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particular time in respective areas in all phases. 1 2 MR. POPOWSKY: Right. 3 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Thank you. Appreciate it. 4 5 MR. POPOWSKY: Thank you very much. CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Next we have Robert 6 Barkanic, senior director, energy policy, PPL 7 Energy Plus. 8 I'll say this now, because -- give some 9 10 people some time and thought, as we get more to the 11 distribution companies in a minute. I have every 12 intention that we will -- for our committee meeting 1.3 on Tuesday, that this bill will be added to the calendar, so that I would -- people, today, start 14 1.5 thinking about any thoughts you may have about --16 relative to that, because I have every intentions that we will vote on this. 17 18 REP. BEYER: Do we have an amendment 19 prepared then? 20 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Amendment prepared, staff talked to each caucus. I want to be able to 21 22 deal with this. This is the third of a series 2.3 being considered. And I think before you, on the 24 committee, I had an open meeting, as you heard me

say earlier. I didn't even introduce the bill.

wanted to talk about aggregation, so I could hear everybody's opinion. So they weren't talking about what was in the bill, what was not in the bill, what would be included or not.

We have continued to start hearings.

you're already hearing some changes that are going

to be happening. As I said, going to hear from

everybody how they feel about the three years, five

years, the issue essentially about small business

as we can look at this.

We'll -- we'll look at issue of some of the school districts. There have been talks about whether or not the school districts would want that, because currently right now they're saying they already do it and negotiate as a bulk with some of the things. And as you heard the consumer advocate, this is kind of like a third process in choice, so we are creating even more competition. And I wanted to say that, as we would also hear eventually from the Chairman of the PUC, as we look at this too for consumer issues.

Set? Okav?

How you doing today?

MR. BARKANIC: Very well, thank you.

Chairman Preston, Chairman Godshall,

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members and staff of the committee, good morning, and thank you for holding this hearing on the important topic of municipal aggregation.

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My name is Bob Barkanic, and I'm senior director of energy policy for PPL Energy Plus in Allentown. And it's a great honor for me to be testifying on behalf of the PPL Energy Plus.

PPL Energy Plus is the competitive
Wholesale and retail supplier of electricity and
natural gas. We are a subsidiary of PPL
Corporation but not the same company as PPL
Electric Utilities, which is the regulated public
utility that provides electric delivery service in
twenty-nine counties in northeastern and central
PA.

There's a lot of clarification, a lot of people don't even understand it. And I think, some of conversation that we're hearing here, I think we will be hearing in the near future some of the same phraseology from other different companies in the near future.

MR. BARKANIC: There is strong evidence to show that electric choices opened new opportunities for PA consumers. According to

1 | Public Utility Commission's website,

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PApowerswitch.com, a website we would encourage all consumers to explore, nearly six hundred seventy-five thousand consumers and businesses have chosen alternative electricity suppliers.

In the territories served by PPL Electric Utilities, more than four hundred eighty thousand customers have shopped since generation rate caps expired at the end of 2009. And two-thirds of the electricity delivered by PPL Electric Utilities is from alternative suppliers.

As generation rate caps expires in other markets at the end of this year, specifically PECO, Met-Ed, Penelec, and Allegheny, millions more Pennsylvanians will be able to choose competitively priced electric supply.

House Bill 2619 contains provisions that would extend the benefits of competition to an even greater number of residential and business customers across the Commonwealth.

PPL Energy Plus supports the concept of allowing municipalities to buy power as an aggregator for their residents and businesses.

Municipal aggregation would enable competitive electric suppliers to work with municipalities to

provide alternative supply options for customers who may not have, for whatever reason, selected their own supplier.

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House Bill 2619 represents an effective way to overcome consumer inertia and give consumers a third option, as Mr. Popowsky mentioned, along with choosing an alternative supplier on their own or accepting default supply from their local utility.

Municipal aggregation supports a robust competitive market by reducing customer acquisition costs, which might otherwise present an obstacle for suppliers to enter in the PA market. The goal of municipal aggregation should be to beget the best possible combination of price and service for consumers.

must be complete transparency in the process municipalities use to select an electricity supplier. House Bill 2619 includes a transparent procurement process with PUC oversight, which PPL Energy Plus supports.

An issue we have with the legislation as drafted is the limit on business participation in municipality aggregation, the very question that

you asked, Mr. Chairman. The bill would not allow small businesses with a maximum peak demand of more than twenty-five kilowatts to take advantage of the municipal aggregation option. Increasing peak demand limit to five hundred kilowatts will give many more small and medium-size businesses an opportunity to benefit from this new competitive option for their supply. A larger limit will include more restaurants, retail stores, and other businesses that could reduce their business costs with an alternative electricity supplier.

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We also encourage the committee to resist language in the bill that dictates terms and conditions in municipal aggregation supply contracts. Competitive suppliers that enter into aggregation contracts with municipalities should understand and accept the risks inherent in such contracts.

Efforts to legislatively mitigate risks to suppliers could result ultimately in higher costs and fees for consumers and would not advance competitive markets.

PPL Energy Plus appreciates the work of the committee in supporting the growth of electric competition in the commonwealth and exploring ideas

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to advance opportunities created by electric
1
2
             Municipal aggregation, done right,
3
     represents one more option for residents and
     businesses to benefit from electric choice.
 4
5
                  Once again, thank you for the
     opportunity to speak with you today, and I would be
6
7
     happy to answer any questions.
8
                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Rep. Beyer.
9
                  REP. BEYER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
10
                  Good morning.
11
                  MR. BARKANIC: Good morning.
12
                  REP. BEYER: Love, love, love, love
     it. Love the five hundred kilowatt. I think it's
1.3
14
     great.
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                  What language is in here, in the bill,
16
     maybe you can point it to me, that benefits the
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     supplier?
                Can you specifically direct me to it?
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     You make a point that we should resist -- wait a
19
     second here. We should resist language that -- I'm
20
     sorrv.
             I've now lost it.
                  Do you know what I'm referring to?
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22
                  MR. BARKANIC: I believe so.
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                  REP. BEYER: Can you just elaborate on
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     that?
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                  MR. BARKANIC:
                                 There might be
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amendments introduced to try to dictate terms and 1 2 conditions that would be better negotiated, as the 3 Chairman even said --REP. BEYER: At the municipal level. 4 MR. BARKANIC: At the municipal level. 5 So if a supplier wants to have a termination fee, 6 7 that's their choice. Me, as a competitive supplier, I might not want to have a termination 8 9 fee, and that would allow me to have a competitive 10 advantage. So we don't think that the bill should 11 12 limit the choices that the municipality can gain in 1.3 negotiations. 14 REP. BEYER: And then you're also 15 suggesting that there shouldn't be any time limit 16 at all either, say five years or three years or --I think the idea 17 MR. BARKANIC: Yeah. 18 that Mr. Popowsky mentioned about coordinating them 19 with the default supply contracts is a good one. 20 don't -- but, again, I think the municipalities should have the right to negotiate that. If they 21 22 can negotiate a longer or shorter deal and get a 2.3 better price, more power to them. 24 REP. BEYER: That's it, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Rep. Ellis. 1 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: 2 REP. ELLIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 3 Just real quickly, on the small businesses. What -- what would be the effect of 4 inclusion going from twenty-five to five hundred? 5 What kind of companies are we now talking about? 6 7 mean, you said restaurants. MR. BARKANIC: There's -- I know one in 8 particular, a doctor's office, that has not been 9 10 able to get any suppliers to -- to provide offers 11 for them because they're not quite big enough to be 12 a large industrial and their not -- certainly not a small or residential customer. 1.3 14 So a doctor's office would be that way. 15 You know, gyms, but larger restaurants as well. 16 REP. ELLIS: So at five hundred 17 kilowatts, that would basically take everybody up 18 until they're considered a large. 19 MR. BARKANIC: And it's not as black 20 and white as that. They overlap. 21 But when you look at the number of 22 people who -- the residents who have shopped, those 2.3 numbers are fairly solid in the 32 percent in PPL 24 Electric Utility service territory. This would 25 help them tremendously.

The large industrials have 95 percent, 1 2 94 percent of that load has already switched in PPL 3 service territory. The one that seems to be missing is that middle piece 4 5 REP. ELLIS: Okay. Thank you very much. 6 7 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: For example, I have a company in my area that does nothing but sharpen 8 9 knives, so the machines are going all the time, but 10 it's not a heavy -- it is not 220. It's regular 11 110 line, but they're always going, but kind of 12 includes a lot of them and that's what we can look 1.3 at. 14 REP. ELLIS: Mr. Chairman, I was just 15 really seeing if car dealerships would be covered 16 under that. CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Depends on how big. 17 18 REP. ELLIS: For instance, a one-acre car lot with seventy, you know, brand-new cars and 19 20 forty used cars like there may be in Butler, PA, a friend of mine, brother, may participate in. 21 I'm 22 curious if he would be able participate. 2.3 That's all. 24 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Any other 25 questions?

There being none, thank you very much.

We are going to invite the chairman of the PUC to come forward, but what I'd like to do is first to give the stenographer just a little break, so we're going to take a -- I want everybody to hear this -- a four-minute break. Four-minute break. So, run now. Four minutes. Okay.

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(Whereupon, a brief break was taken.)

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: I wanted to do this while she's not here. When she comes in, I'm going to announce it. It's Gail's birthday. So this works out even better. I always like to surprise people.

Next person to testify is the chairman of the Public Utility Commission, Mr. James H. Cawley.

Thank you very much for coming,

Mr. Chairman. We really appreciate you spending
the time here and coming to Bethlehem to go over
this issue. I think you've had a chance to hear
some of the conversation just as well and we look
forward to hearing your testimony.

MR. CAWLEY: Thank you, Chairman

Preston and Chairman Godshall and members of the

committee.

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CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Pull that closer.

MR. CAWLEY: To be here with you, and to discuss House Bill 2619.

I'm not merely giving you lip service when I compliment the sponsors of the bill and this committee for rolling up its sleeves on this issue. We eat and sleep this sort of thing every day, and it's -- it's a genuine pleasure to have an oversight committee that takes the time to educate itself. And this bill shows the -- the fruits of your labors.

I have gone over this bill with a fine tooth comb, and as an old legislative staffer, I appreciate fine work. This is an elegantly drafted bill. The necessary definitions are there. The cross references are correct. The bill is structurally sound.

So, let me, on behalf of my colleagues, say that we support this bill. We think it's going to -- if enacted, is going to go a long way to getting the next group of electric customers to switch from their higher-priced default service to lower-priced suppliers.

And let me, by way of introduction, remind the committee and everyone present here what the legislature intended when it enacted customer choice in Pennsylvania. The idea was to get as many customers off default service and onto an alternative supplier so that they could receive lower prices than they would otherwise receive from the default supplier, and they would receive innovative products that the default supplier can't or won't do.

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And, in fact, the design was that the default supplier would provide essentially plain, vanilla service, not with all the bells and whistles that an electric generation supplier could provide. So the hope was that there would really -- if this all worked properly, there would only really be a small residue of customers who, for some reason, stayed with the higher-priced default service.

So when we consider anything bearing on electric choice, and in this case, municipal aggregation, what we are concentrating on is a design which will enhance customer choice. Enhance customer choice. If it doesn't do that, then we shouldn't enact municipal aggregation.

My colleagues and I are convinced that only -- even with the best of opt-in programs -- which is what we have, what electric choice in PA is, it's an opt-in -- you have to program, you have to affirmatively choose an additional supplier -- even with the best programs, you're only going to get about a third of the customers. And for whatever reason, chiefly, I think, apathy and just plain misunderstanding or mistrust or misguided brand loyalty of staying with the distribution company, people don't switch.

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So how do you get the other two-thirds or a good chunk of the next two-thirds? Municipal aggregation is the answer. It's worked in Ohio. It was started in Massachusetts and doing very well there. So how do we design a program?

Under the bill, I think -- I think the bill should be changed in one significant way. I don't think that there should be any restrictions whatsoever on switching. None. And there should be no early termination fees.

Now, you're probably wondering, well, isn't it the chief inducement for an electric generation supplier to enter into this contract that it's going to get a captive block of customers

at a fixed price for a substantial term? Well, that probably is an inducement for an electric generation supplier, but -- it's great for an electric generation supplier, but it's not for the customers.

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If you really have as your chief goal promoting electric choice, then you shouldn't restrict the customer in switching at any time or you shouldn't charge them any early termination fees. They should be able to come and go as they please.

Will an electric generation supplier still enter into contracts? You're darn right they will, because the biggest benefit to an electric generation supplier is saving on customer acquisition costs. They get a block of customers instead of having to attract them individually. And it can cost as much as a hundred fifty dollars a customer to try to attract them individually.

Once the municipality, through its officials, enters into a contract like that -- like this, customers tend to be sticky. They stay where they are. They stay where they are. Most of them stay. Even if they're allowed to switch, most of them will stay where they are. They trust their

municipal officials. They may or may not educate themselves to other alternatives, even if they're allowed to switch during the term. I think that would be the biggest benefit to improving this bill. And it would promote, I think, the legislative intent in the first place, which was to promote electric choice at all costs.

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I would allow the electric generation supplier to renegotiate the contract to lower the price or add other inducements to keep the customers even more stickier than they are, but I wouldn't let the supplier raise the price during the term. I think that's within the good judgment of legislative official -- or of municipal officials.

But, to me, that's the biggest change I would make in this bill. I mean, if we're really serious about giving customers a choice, that's what you got to do. Clear the barriers to switching and give full choice.

Now, I notice the bill doesn't have anything to say about the duration of a contract that a municipality may enter into.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: That was -- unfortunately, as I say, was the original intent.

It was three years, maximum. This version we just noticed it, in printing, like I say, a printing error that we caught up. One of the amendments — look at the overall amendments that we're looking at, thinking about going from three to five years. That's why I was asking the opinion of everyone.

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MR. CAWLEY: Well, the question is, should there be a term limit of some kind, one or more years? I don't think you should have any more than a two-year-period limit.

Why do I say that? Because the longer the term that can be entered into, the more the migration risk to the energy supplier.

Now, I've already said you should let customers switch if they want to with no early termination fee. So there's already somewhat of a risk, but the longer you make a -- the term of a -- a contract, the more likelihood, over that period of time, is that a lot of customers are going to eventually find a better deal and they'll leave. And even more practically speaking, nobody's crystal ball works very well beyond two or three years.

It's been our experience, in talking with various suppliers, that they are exceedingly

reluctant to enter into supply contracts beyond two or three years, because they don't know what their generation costs are going to be in two or three years. They don't know how many customers are going to switch in two or three years. They don't know if there's going to be another hurricane in the gulf that is going to drive up natural gas prices and, therefore, wholesale electricity prices because of federal pricing mechanisms. They don't know what's going to happen in national, international events which is going to have an adverse effect on their fuel costs.

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So they -- just put it at two years. The longer you make it, it's probably not going to be availed of anyway. And I fear that you're liable to have municipal officials who will not have the knowledge that I've just described, and they'll be tempted to enter into a five-year contract, and it's a good chance, within that five-year period of time, that market prices are going to go below the locked-in price in the contract, and you're going to have captive ratepayers, and you're going to have very unhappy electors come municipal election time.

Now, that's assuming that you don't

restrictions. I think eliminating the switching restrictions cures a lot of problems. And if you really want to make it five years, fine, but don't prevent people from switching. But don't be surprised if the premium in the bids is more substantial because of the risk that the supplier foresees with a contract of that length.

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So you want these bids to be as low as possible. Don't be putting provisions in the bill that are going to drive up the risk premium.

Of course, the opposite could occur.

You could -- municipal official could be a hero if suddenly market prices go way above the locked-in price, but I -- again, I just don't think anybody's crystal ball is that good, and I want municipal officials to undertake these programs. I don't want to create disincentives for them to do so by having to make, perhaps, in their minds, the Hobson's choice between a market price that may go above or below the locked-in price.

Again, eliminate the switching restrictions and my concerns would be -- would be significantly diminished.

Opt-in as well as opt-out, you've

added opt-in. I'm going to quibble with you here a little bit on this. Maybe if a municipal official has the opportunity to implement an opt-in program, he or she will be more willing to do that than an opt-out program, if the official sees an opt-in program as locking up the customers and giving them the impression that they're captive, but, on the whole, I think it complicates the bill needlessly.

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I would -- I will tell you, frankly -- and I'm sure you already know this -- opt-in programs are much more effective than -- I mean, opt-out programs are much more effective than opt-in programs. As I said, we have opt-in already in PA, and you only get about a third of the customers. What makes -- what makes us believe that another opt-in program is going to have a significant effect on making or convincing people they should switch?

I -- again, I'm not going to quibble with you too much on this. But I think you should look at page seventeen, line twenty-seven, about the exclusions, which for some reason apply only to opt-out programs but not opt-in programs. I don't see why. I think those exclusions should probably apply to opt-in programs as well, but I may be

missing something here.

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Coordination of the electric distribution company default supply procurement programs with aggregation programs. The consumer advocate's point is well taken. This is a concern because it -- when the commission approves these default supply programs ahead of time, we know very well that the suppliers are counting on a certain number of default customers. And if you add municipal aggregation to the mix, particularly if it grows over -- substantially over time, then you, again, add to the risk premium that the wholesale bid is going to be made.

In other words, if you're the supplier -- and there are two ways of going about this. There's -- an electric distribution supply may have a full requirements program where the wholesale suppliers bid to provide full requirements, everything. And, therefore, if -- and always included in those bids already is a risk premium for certain amount of customer migration. They know a certain number of customers are going to switch. This would accelerate that risk potentially significantly.

So you can't have those wholesale bids

be made and the supplier counting on a certain level of customers when the supplier has to suffer the shortfall if too many customers leave. The supplier then has to try to get rid of the power that it's lined up to serve an anticipated number of customers, and the market may not allow that excess power to be sold at a profit, and they'd have take a loss, so they're going to up the risk premiums more. You don't want that because what the bids are for is default service, those who don't switch. You don't want to drive up the default service prices.

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The goal here is to get the default customers to switch, but you don't want to be onerous on them by driving up their cost intentionally to get them to switch. That's not the game we're playing here.

What we're trying to do is to keep the default prices as low as possible through wholesale competitive bidding, which we require, and then once that cost is determined by competitive procedures, that value is passed through to customers dollar for dollar, no markup. That's why the EDCs don't care if you switch. They can't make any money on electricity because we won't let them.

They would just as soon that they not have to get any default supply and that everybody is switching, and that whole having to get default supply would be off their backs.

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But, anyway, you have to coordinate these programs. I would suggest to you that, under the broad language you've given us in the bill, to promulgate regulations to implement this act, that you leave this up to us. We are going to have to sort this out. And I think we would hold hearings, and we would figure out how to coordinate the plans for advance procurement with the times when municipalities can enter into agreements. Because if you don't coordinate it, you're going to have problems. There's no doubt about it.

So what I call aggregation windows, we may have a period of time when we say, Okay, municipalities, if you're going to enter into a aggregation program, you got to do it within this period of time, because we, the commission, are keeping track of how many aggregation programs there are going to be so we can coordinate it with how much default supply the EDCs have to acquire. I mean, that's the only sensible way to do it, but please don't be too prescriptive in the bill. Give

1 us a little play in the joints so we can sort this 2 out.

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I'm going to stop talking, and ask any questions.

Again, it's a pleasure to be here. My colleagues and I support this bill. We look forward to working with you as the bill goes through the legislative process.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: I want to thank
you. I think because, even in your last several
paragraphs, comment that there may be a way that we
can try to handle the situation, and we did have a
concern in dealing with it not a total level
playing field with everybody as we go through
this.

The other thing is, when we were in Johnstown, and I think Rep. Beyer and I, when we were — the three-year basically was shorter than an average four-year term for the local elected official. Looked at two year, four year, sort of the situation, you know, when you have different groups facing in with local elected officials.

Doesn't mean they can't do two years.

But at the same time, when you go into a two-year agreement, you got to have borough

council come in, the other half coming for election two years later, about keeping the onus on the local elected officials just as well, it means that almost after twelve months they have to start negotiating again. And a lot the small towns, you know, they have a solicitor, borough manager, controller, and maybe one or two other clerks. And that's one of the things I was looking at, because I'm lucky enough where I represent -- 70 percent of my district is a city that has a lot of staff, but then the boroughs that I have a lot of, I look at what they have between the clerk, manager.

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That was part of the reason why, you know, looking at the issue of the five years. I see your point just as well because sometimes we fail to forget how fast technology in the world has been changing with things and how things do fluctuate, so something I agree with looking at.

The issues, I don't know if you were here or not when I explained that a lot of people weren't happy about putting in the opt-in. So sometimes you say, perfect bill is either where everybody disagrees on everything or there's parts of it that everybody disagrees with but none of the same people disagree on the same parts. So it

means everybody has to be a little bit more accountable. That's what's the issue there, because, you know, in other states, they have referendums, and I didn't want -- so I wanted to give another option. That was the reason behind that. I just wanted to explain it. I'm not for or against one way or another. And we'll deal with that.

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So I just wanted to explain that to you, especially dealing with the three years, because it came to my attention, even -- I guess there are some townships where the supervisors are elected up to six years. So it is -- it is just, you know, a variance of what we're dealing with small towns as compared to the bigger companies, and I think it gives the companies some type of advantage that is shorter, little short terms.

The local boroughs, if you have -imagine twelve or fifteen towns where there's only
anywhere from four hundred to five thousand people
in the town that have a -- have an agreement,
unless they decide, if they're fortunate enough to
be close to a bigger city where they form an
aggregation and might be able to give extra support
staff, but also causes to affect their operating

I just wanted to explain that to you. 1 costs. 2 Ouestions? 3 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Rep. Ellis. REP. ELLIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 4 Chairman Cawley, thank you for coming 5 I just have a question. You had promoted 6 7 the concept of no termination fees or penalties for switching, but, at the same time, you suggest that 8 one of the problems we may be stuck with is the 9 10 risk premiums going up because of heavy migration. 11 If there is no way to offset the costs 12 of somebody switching and losing that customer, wouldn't that also possibly raise the risk factor? 1.3 14 That whenever they are making their initial bid, 1.5 they're going to say, Well, we're not going to be 16 able to collect anything and we're going to have 12 17 percent of the people during the contract opt-out 18 or, you know, migrate to another provider, we have to factor that in. 19 20 I mean, it seems to me like they're going to do that. So on one end, you want to stop 21 22 it, and on the other end, you're promoting it. MR. CAWLEY: You can't avoid some risk 2.3 But you're -- you're dealing primarily 24 premium. 25 here with residential customers who don't switch

much. I wish they did but -- I think experience has shown that once people make a choice, very few change. They're happy with the program. So, sure, there's going to be some risk premium in there, but they can live with that. They can live with that, particularly when they're getting such a big block of very likely what I call sticky customers.

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And that is why I would not legislatively raise the small commercial customer above twenty-five-kilowatt-hours demand, because above that, business customers do switch. They're in the business of watching their costs very carefully, and they will switch. That will significantly add to the migration risk and I think would add to the risk premium.

On top of that, I don't think you need, by the way, to raise it above twenty-five-kilowatt-hours demand because that market is significantly served already.

I didn't catch the figure from PPL, but --

22 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: It was five hundred.

MR. CAWLEY: I thought -- I thought there was some description of middle level commercial businesses that have not switched. But

the -- if you look at the number of licensed electric generation suppliers, there are probably at least two or three dozen that are after the commercial market. It is highly, highly competitive. You don't need, I don't think, to include that level or that size of businesses in these programs. They're already getting offers right and left already, and if -- and the competition is really working.

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So, yes, you're going to have some risk premium, but the non -- the residential customers is a fairly low migration risk and, therefore, a fairly low risk premium, but if you include too many larger businesses, you raise the migration risk and you raise the risk premium.

REP. ELLIS: Okay. And I appreciate that, and I was going to actually ask you about the raising it from twenty-five kilowatt hours, because I -- I have run a small business, and I've experienced, whenever we did with the telephones a decade ago, and AT&T, one day we switched to them, and realized a month later we didn't like them and switched to MCI and did all that. And what I find specifically with my business, we have -- we are mindful of the bottom line that we have. And we

are constantly looking, but once you get -- you make a bad switch once, then you're less likely to look.

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So I mean, I think -- I mean, there is a tail off of the -- the small business customers searching, and I think what you'll find is we are trying to make a profit in these tough times, and so we're looking at it, but eventually we get comfortable, just like the residential consumers.

So if you do have any kind of migration numbers that you may be able to provide to the committee, how many residential versus how many small businesses are switching companies, I don't know if you have that information or have access to it, but I'd like to see it.

Mr. Chairman, I don't know if we have access to that or maybe staff could provide that for us, but I'd like to see that.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Chairman Godshall.

REP. GODSHALL: Pertaining to your comments about the capabilities of negotiating contracts at municipal level, I have, in my district, a couple municipalities that did do a five-year deal, lock-in deal, starting at 17.6 cents a kilowatt for five years. That's -- I'm not

sure -- and, unfortunately, in those situations, they are captive customers. So that's a lock-in type deal, and I think that displays a danger, and also sometimes of -- we have of the knowledge that I may have or some of my municipal officials may have pertaining to the actual markets and what's going to happen in the future, and nobody knows. I don't know. I'm not sure that they know.

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And you mention in there pertaining to certain risk premiums, if there's too many people that migrate out, we know what's going to migrate out, basically we have an idea, but municipal aggregation holds promise for significantly more customer migration, thus even higher risk premiums added to default supply bids.

Could you go into that just a little bit?

MR. CAWLEY: Well, municipal aggregation has the promise of significantly adding to migration, which is good. That's what, I think, the legislature wanted, again, to get as many people to switch as possible. It's not a problem for the suppliers and will not add to the risk premium if the suppliers know ahead of time or have a pretty good idea of what aggregation programs are

going to be implemented. That's -- and that's why I -- towards the end of my testimony, I suggest that you leave this in our hands to implement or adopt what I call aggregation windows, where we are -- and data collection from the EGSs and the EDCs about, what are your plans -- and municipalities, what are your plans? Are you planning to do this? Because if you are, we need to know about it so that when we approve the default supply procurement plans, we can take into account that there's going to be a certain level of migration that is going to be likely because of these aggregation programs.

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And in a perfect world, of course, everybody would have perfect knowledge and the bids that were made for default service would have absolutely accurate numbers of how many people are going to switch. That's not possible. The closest we are going to be able to come is to try to coordinate the information and approve the plans accordingly, so that we don't approve too high a bids and the suppliers know what to bid.

So it's a question of coordination, which I entirely agree with.

And, by the way, I would disagree with my friend, the consumer advocate, on one point. I

don't want to wait until 2013 to implement these programs. And I don't think we need to wait quite that long.

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If you will let us implement this, I think we would do it on phased-in basis, and it's going to take a while to get the -- the regulations hammered out so that it works properly, so that the coordination is going properly.

But -- don't put us off to 2013.

There's too many people who need to save money between now and then.

REP. GODSHALL: And at the same time, all these contracts have to fit into the Act 129 requirements.

MR. CAWLEY: They do.

 $$\operatorname{\textsc{REP}}$.$  GODSHALL: Which is a little bit more complicated.

MR. CAWLEY: They do, but, again, we can sort that out. I don't have any problems saying that. Just so you don't lock us in to too many restrictions.

You do a very good job of overseeing us. So -- and if we really get off the track on this, I'm sure that you would have us in for a little chat.

REP. GODSHALL: 1 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 2 3 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Rep. Beyer. REP. BEYER: Good morning, Chairman. 4 5 Cawley. MR. CAWLEY: Good morning. 6 7 REP. BEYER: All right. So I admit it, I'm a sticky customer, because when the rate caps 8 came off here -- I live just a few miles from 9 10 here -- but my home was inundated with calls, 11 choice, but, you know, I just stayed with PPL. 12 It's just -- I don't know what it is. You know, 1.3 PPL's been a great company. And so I'm one of those folks that don't -- not a switcher. 14 15 I completely agree with you that there 16 should be no switching requirement and no early 17 termination fees. I completely agree with you on 18 that. 19 I guess my sticking point with you 20 would be, why not have it to five hundred kilowatt? 21 You know, why not -- even though there's 22 much more competition, as you suggest, in that 2.3 medium business group, there's a risk. And they're going to move in and out, but so are customers when 24 25 they start getting savvy on this.

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municipalities could be able to do that.
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     could negotiate a one-year contract with one group
     and then turn around and do another the following
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            So I'm not sure that there's a real strong
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     case not to include or expand at least the small
     business base.
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                  I'm interested in putting school
     districts in this. I have DeSales University in my
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     legislative district. I'd love to put colleges and
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     universities in this.
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                  So those are my comments.
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                  MR. CAWLEY:
                               Number one, you should
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     switch.
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                  REP. BEYER: Why should I switch?
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                  MR. CAWLEY: Because I say to people --
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                  REP. BEYER: Save money?
                  MR. CAWLEY: -- if you -- this is
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     probably a poor example for a lady. But I say, if
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     you can afford to light a cigar with a hundred
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     dollar bill or two cigars with a hundred dollar
     bill every year, then don't bother to switch,
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     because obviously a hundred or two hundred dollars
2.3
     doesn't mean anything to you. But if that's
     serious money to you, you should switch.
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                  REP. BEYER: I should switch.
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1 MR. CAWLEY: And PPL does not care.

They don't care. They don't make any money in electricity.

REP. BEYER: Who do you recommend then?

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MR. CAWLEY: Really, it doesn't matter which one you take. You're going to save somewhere between 10 and 15 percent a year.

REP. BEYER: Okay.

MR. CAWLEY: And PPL has remained under PUC-regulated distribution rates all along, right from the get-go, and that's the way it's going to continue.

But anyway, let me answer your question more directly. You will, I think, add to the migration risk if you put bigger businesses in there and that will add to the risk premium. And that will drive up default prices. You don't want to do that.

You don't need to include those bigger companies, I don't think. Now maybe we need a real study to really get this absolute. But these people are already getting lots of offers. And I suspect that if a larger company said, "Wait a minute. I'm legislatively not included here, but

I want that good deal too, " the winning supplier 1 2 would probably include him. And if they won't -if that company won't do it, I'd bet you one of the 3 three dozen other ones will. 4 So I just don't think you need to add 5 to the risk by including more, bigger customers. 6 7 I -- I'm willing to be convinced otherwise on that point, but I'd let the marketplace take care of 8 9 that problem. 10 REP. BEYER: Is it too personal to ask 11 you who your provider is? Do you mind? 12 MR. CAWLEY: I don't mind, no. 1.3 jumped in real early. 14 REP. BEYER: I would think that you had 15 the inside track on it. 16 MR. CAWLEY: No, really. I looked at 17 lowest price with no switching fee, and I signed up 18 with ConEd Solutions. And I saw their market -their number dropped, and I went to them, and I 19 20 said, Hey, I'm a customer. How come I don't get 21 the lower price? And they thought about it for a 22 And I said, Don't you want to keep me 23 rather than having me go to another EGS for a lower 24 price. And they thought about it, and they said,

you know, you're absolutely right.

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REP. BEYER: They're here today too. 1 2 MR. CAWLEY: Well, Richie Hudson left. 3 So -- but it doesn't matter which one you go with, you're going to save. 4 5 REP. BEYER: Right. MR. CAWLEY: You should do it. 6 7 REP. BEYER: Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 8 Mr. Evans. 9 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: 10 REP. EVANS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 11 And in contrast to my colleague, the 12 lovely lady from Lehigh Valley, I won't ask any 1.3 personal questions about your accounts, personal 14 accounts. 15 I did want to try to clarify a little 16 bit on the term limits. And from a layman's point 17 of view, you know, if you are a local elected 18 official, the feeling would be, I would guess, that 19 the longer term limit you have, the better in the 20 way of saving money, but in your testimony, you 21 mention that there are some other factors that 22 perhaps could allow a shorter term to be more 2.3 beneficial from a cost basis for that 24 municipality. 25 I wondered if you could expand on that, and in looking at some of the other risk factors that a long-term contract would -- would create a disincentive.

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MR. CAWLEY: Well, the markets go up and markets go down. And if you legislate that a municipality can enter into a contract with a supplier at a fixed price for, let's say, five years, it is highly likely that during that five-year period, the available market price, other offers are going to be above and are going to be below that locked-in price.

The -- the disincentive for an elected official to take the risk that the market is going to drop substantially below the locked-in price may be so great that the elected official will say, You know, I'm not going to take the chance. I know if we -- if we do this right, customers can save some money and we might be able to get them a better deal than they can get individually, but I'm going to just let them individually try to get the best deal. I'm not going to take the risk that I'm going to enter into a price that is going to be too high come election time.

So I want elected officials to enter into these programs because it gets people to

switch. People have faith in their elected officials to make a good judgment, to look into the programs that are available and to make a good choice. And that overcomes the -- the current distrust, the misconceptions, the apathy. None of which any member of this committee is guilty of, I'm sure.

So that's the deal.

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REP. EVANS: From the utility's point of view, looking at risk, you mentioned some possible scenarios that don't know in the future what could happen, the failure of the grid, of natural disaster, those types of things, so the provider also would be looking at risk in a long-term contract as well, would they not?

MR. CAWLEY: Oh, they are. And, as I said, their crystal ball isn't any better than yours or mine. And our experience is, is that they're going to put a risk premium in there. If they sign a contract for five years when they don't know what their generation costs are going to be, they would be -- they would be very foolish businessmen not to try to protect themselves, They'll try to -- if I were they, I'd try to put a provision in the contract that allowed them to

renegotiate it if the contract price varies 1 2 significantly over the five-year period. Maybe the 3 municipal officials would want to do that. But -- now, again, you cure a lot of 4 this if you eliminate the switching restrictions 5 and the early termination fees. 6 7 So if a municipal aggregation program is for five years and the bottom falls out of 8 9 natural gas prices and the contracted price is way 10 above market prices, the customers, I hope, even 11 though they're fairly sticky, it's going to get 12 around that they can get a much better deal elsewhere, and they'll leave, and then the 1.3 14 municipal officials have egg on their face. 1.5 So I would leave that out -- that out 16 to let customers have real choice here and create 17 incentives for municipal officials to enter into 18 these programs. 19 REP. EVANS: Thank you. 20 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Rep. Reichley. 21 REP. REICHLEY: I will make this real 22 I know we are about twenty minutes over

schedule now.

MR. CAWLEY: That's my fault, not you.

REP. REICHLEY: You're answering a lot

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of questions.

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Going to try to combine two questions into one. On page seven of your testimony, in the middle paragraph, the middle sentence: If too many customers migrate, the supplier may be stuck with excess wholesale generation that cannot be resold profitably.

And that sentence stuck out to me. Is the way that that gets solved with the risk premiums that they're going to incorporate in the bid price, or do we need to be concerned that -- with the prospect of mass migration of wholesale, with the -- excuse me -- municipal aggregators, we are going to be stuck the companies that are all of a sudden now becoming unprofitable, and then we've got a market declining in terms of competitive providers?

And the last part is, is there anything, as the regulator of this, anything controversial about this topic that we should also be aware of?

So with that I'll --

MR. CAWLEY: First of all, there certainly will be a risk premium that will be higher than otherwise would be if municipal

aggregation starts cutting in to the amount of default supply that's needed.

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If the wholesale supplier who's bidding is not given better knowledge than we currently give them about the amount of migration that is likely — that was a long sentence. Let me try to say it simpler. The way you cure it is, as I tried to deal with in my testimony, is — is to gather information about who's going to municipally aggregate, and we share that with the suppliers so their bids can be more educated and they see this is coming, the amount of default supply is not going to be as high as it normally would because of the aggregation. We don't have to bid to supply as much power, and we have a pretty good idea what the level of customers are going to be.

If you do that, then it will be more educated bids and there won't be as high a risk premium involved. It's -- it's fairly, fairly easily dealt with, I think.

And as far as whether there's anything controversial here, to me, the only thing controversial about this legislation is -- is giving municipal customers the idea that you're putting them in jail for a period of time that

they've got to pay a price.

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I think, even if it is a better price than the default price, or even better than they've been able to get individually from suppliers, the whole idea that "I'm locked" in rubs people the wrong way, and the municipal officials are smart enough to see that and, therefore, they may be reluctant to enter into these programs because they just don't want to deal with this.

So, again, the way you cure it, in my view, is I wouldn't -- I wouldn't even bother with opt-in programs. I would have opt-out programs only but eliminate the switching restrictions and the early termination fees. Therefore, you're not locked in. We have an opt-out program that gets everybody in; you don't have to do a thing. I trust you, public official. You've looked into this. And if I don't like it, I can get out any time.

Municipal official's more likely to enter into the program and the customers are more likely to stay. And, therefore, we reduce down to hopefully a very small residue of those who haven't switched.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Thank you very much,

Commissioner. We really appreciate it. 1 2 MR. CAWLEY: My pleasure. 3 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Next we have Brian Crowe, vice president, energy acquisition for PECO 4 5 Energy Company. Before you get started, I will just 6 7 simply say this real quick. Today is Gail Davis's birthday. She is old. We all want to wish her a 8 9 happy birthday. (Applause.) 10 That being said, Mr. Crowe. MR. CROWE: Thank you, Chairman 11 12 Preston. 1.3 Chairman Preston, Chairman Godshall, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me 14 15 here today. I am Brian Crowe, the vice president of energy acquisitions for PECO. In that role, I 16 17 oversee the purchasing of power for default service customers as well as the interaction with all the 18 retail suppliers who serve customers in the PECO 19 20 territory. 21 I appreciate the opportunity to testify 22 here today on behalf of PECO on House Bill 2619, 2.3 introduced by Chairman Preston. PECO believes that municipal aggregation legislation, if properly 24

structured, can provide a complementary option to

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support competition and choice in PA, as you've heard.

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PECO's committed to successfully seeing its customers through the transition period, as we come out of rate caps at the end of this year and we're moving into the competitive market structure. We believe competitive markets provide the best opportunity for customers to procure reasonably priced power.

Over the past year, we've worked to educate customers about the end of rate caps on January 1st and encouraging them to shop for electricity from alternative suppliers and understand what their choices are.

In addition to promoting shopping among customers, we also are procuring energy from the competitive market for customers who do not select an alternative supplier. And to date we've completed three of four scheduled procurements for 2011. That's about 72 percent of the supply we need for the residential customers in the PECO territory. The remaining 28 percent we'll be procuring shortly, on September 20th, and that will complete our procurements for 2011.

There's basically two elements in the

bills that go to customers that delivery rates, and PECO has a pending settlement before the commission effective January for the delivery rates. And we also have the generation supply that we talked about. And while they both are still pending in terms of the final outcome, we anticipate at this point that PECO customers would see an increase of less than 10 percent when the rate caps expire in the end of this year. So, for the average customer, that's about eight dollars on a residential bill.

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approach legislation on municipal aggregation in PA, members of the committee and the general assembly should ensure that it meets a couple of criteria. One, that customers are informed and that adequate consumer protections are involved; consistency of municipal aggregation procurements with the competitive market model; and then protection against cost shifting from one group of customers to another in the market.

While we support the concept of municipal aggregation and many provisions of House Bill 2619, we continue to have a few areas of concern about the legislation as it's currently

written, which I'd like to briefly discuss, and there's three.

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The first is assurance of a competitive process for aggregation procurements that includes a requirement for least-cost procurement. So when municipalities and the folks working with them go out, we want to make sure they're getting the best possible price for the customers and requiring that they do that on a least-cost basis through a competitive model.

This is similar to the competitive market models that we use that are approved by the commission that ensure the best possible prices for the customers that are on default service.

This is important because there is a potential with the legislation to have some longer-term contracts that bind customers for a number of years, potentially, and particularly on an opt-out basis, and if there are penalty fees associated with that, the customer should at least have had the opportunity to get the lowest price at the time that it was procured.

Second item is what was discussed earlier about integration of the aggregation plans with utility default service plans. PECO believes

it's essential to include language that would coordinate the electric distribution company default service plans with any municipal aggregation programs that municipalities may implement.

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Opt-out procurements, unlike opt-in procurements, are folks, you know, signing up with suppliers themselves, can cause large blocks of load, customer load, to move in and out of the default service programs. And it is difficult for the wholesale suppliers who provide service to us over a period to determine how much that load is. As was discussed earlier, that would involve, then -- they're going to price in a risk premium for that.

Synchronizing the municipal aggregation programs with the default service programs would reduce this under an opt-out model, and we would want to make sure that they sync up so that the customers who remain on default service are getting the best price they can and the municipal aggregation customers are getting the best price they can.

The third item I'd like to discuss is to give the PUC the authority to limit the duration

of the municipal aggregation contracts and determine the terms and conditions under which customers in opt-out programs are required to pay exit penalties. So we've talked about whether they're required or not required. The commission might have this latitude and do it. For a certain period of time, they may be allowed longer contracts; they may be allowed for the initial period but not later in the period. So we think there's some options there.

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When you look at longer term contracts, obviously, over time, market prices do move, and there will be pressure from customers to exit the program early, if the price that they're paying, they can find a cheaper price in the market. So, you know, the PUC should have the ability to determine the maximum allowed length of the municipal aggregation programs and the duration at which customers may pay penalties, if they're allowed.

Finally, we believe the PUC should be authorized to establish financial security requirements of energy suppliers for aggregation programs, so having the aggregation supplier post some type of financial security to make sure they

don't walk away from the contract. So if these contracts go a couple of years — obviously if market prices go up and it costs them more to serve those customers then is in their contract, you don't want them to walk away and send the customers back and the customers not to see their discounts. So we think that that security should be there for the term of the contract.

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So, in conclusion, we support the concept of a well-structured municipal aggregation program. And we think the key to this is really to have the consumer protection and make sure it's consistent with the competitive market model.

I'd like to commend Chairman Preston for his leadership on this issue as well as Chairman Godshall and the rest of the committee for their willingness to consider the elements that we've raised today.

So we hope that the members of the committee and the members of the general assembly will strongly consider these issues as we move forward, and I thank you for your time and be happy to answer any questions that you have.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: I don't have any questions other than the fact to say, as you've

watched today, and, you know, what we had last week and the conversation's been going on, you can see us listening and trying to work things out even as we're going through here and then hearing the chairman in his statements.

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I think that some of your concerns, doesn't mean that everything can happen, but we're going to -- you know how I am, we're going to see what we can really try to do.

And it will not -- it will not be blindsided by everything. We will see what we can do. That's the best I can say.

MR. CROWE: Thanks for your consideration. We appreciate the opportunity to be here.

trying to see, because we knew this problem was coming and trying to figure it out, but hearing the conversations gelling today, I think it gives us more of a chance to look at it, and I think that the members themselves, and as you have had a chance to feel that too. And then we'll be able to hear that, you know, the people who come after you, be interesting to hear the give and take.

Okay?

Thank you, Chairman. 1 MR. CROWE: 2 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Thank you very much. 3 We're go to -- I'm sorry. Chairman Godshall. 4 REP. GODSHALL: You mentioned briefly 5 something that was brought up before pertaining to 6 7 the rising costs of customers remaining in a default service pool. How do you -- I mean, what 8 9 are your thoughts on that as far as a bill? And 10 what would -- how would that affect your company at 11 this point? 12 MR. CROWE: Well, when the --1.3 REP. GODSHALL: With the bill, if it, 14 you know, would go through as it is. 15 MR. CROWE: If it would go through 16 without synchronizing the default service plans 17 with the municipal aggregation programs, two things 18 will happen. First, the suppliers who are already 19 serving us, who have locked in prices to serve us, 20 they're going to be -- have additional risk because 21 there are now chances of larger customers -- large 22 groups of customers being moved in and out. 23 they've got some risk with the current plan they've 24 committed to. 25 I would say the other piece that

happens, is future bidders, whether the ones on September 20th, into our last procurement, or future procurements that we're doing, they're going to have to factor that in and say, there's a potential for a large group of customers to leave and — and they're only going to leave if the price is better somewhere else. Right? So it's clearly a risk premium.

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If the price, you know, in market goes higher, and they've committed to a price, they're -- you know, the customer's going to stay with us. So there is a risk premium that they're going to factor into their bids, if legislation passes or even pending legislation, that they're going to have to anticipate what's going to happen in the future with these opt-out programs. And it does provide price risk that gets back and then gets paid by the people who remain on the default service plan.

REP. GODSHALL: This was mentioned by both PUC and Sonny as a -- as one of the concerns.

And the other thing I wanted to ask about was something that was unique about the authorized -- PUC authorized to establish financial security requirements for energy suppliers for

aggregation programs. Is that true today in any 1 2 form? 3 No.Today's suppliers MR. CROWE: 4 pay --REP. GODSHALL: I know PECO's not there 5 yet at this point, but, you know, with the other 6 7 companies, do any of these companies that are coming in, like -- as I said, I'm PP&L, and I have 8 9 fourteen, fifteen different companies that 10 contacted, you know, me concerning that. Are any 11 of those -- any of those customers have any kind of 12 a backup? 1.3 And I guess I'm looking at Enron a few years back. 14 15 MR. CROWE: We actually had a program 16 in the earlier part of the decade that resulted 17 from our restructuring settlement in 1998, and we 18 agreed to do something called competitive default 19 service, where we agreed to take 20 percent of the 20 residential customers and have them bid out for a discount off PECO's rate. And I believe at the 21 22 time the discount was 2 percent. 2.3 The winning bidder was a company called 24 New Power, which was a combination of AOL, and 25 Enron was involved in that as well. And basically,

during the period of the contract, when market prices rose, they walked away. And they turned the customers back. And in the PJM power pool, those customers immediately went back to PECO's load, so PECO had to, you know, through its default service at that time, had to absorb the risk of getting those customers back during the period of rising prices.

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So it is possible that folks -- if they see the end of the contract and they're out of money on the contract, there is a risk that they could send those customers back, and we'd like to see some type of financial security that's at risk for them in order to keep them in the market when prices go out of the money. Obviously, they'll stay if the customers are profitable, but if, for the remainder of the term, you know, it's going to cost them, potentially, more to serve those customers than they can charge, we want to make sure they fulfill those obligations to the customers.

REP. GODSHALL: I totally agree with that. I was one of the ones that signed up with Enron. You know --

MR. CROWE: It was Enron, AOL, and IBM

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were the three. So three big -- pretty big
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     companies.
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                  REP. GODSHALL: It was a good deal at
     the time. And -- so I really -- I think that's an
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     excellent suggestion. You know, there should be
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     some kind of a quarantee, and there should be some
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     security requirements to back those contracts up.
                  Thank you. That's all I have,
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     Mr. Chairman.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Thank you.
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                  Thank you very much.
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                  MR. CROWE: Thank you.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Next, Tony Banks,
     vice president of product and market development,
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     FirstEnergy Solutions; and Sharon -- do I pronounce
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     that Noewer?
                  MS. NOEWER: Noewer.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Noewer, director,
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     mass marketing and product development, FirstEnergy
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     Solutions.
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                  See you twice on both sides of the
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     state.
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                  MR. BANKS:
                              That's right.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Just so everybody --
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     I got certain limits where they're going to kick me
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out of this building and so on. But now that you, come in -- like I said before, now that you've heard some of the things going on, and I guess you, being a marketer and producer, gives us a good chance to hear your opinions on these.

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MR. BANKS: Okay. Look forward to your questions after our presentation.

Chairman Preston, Chairman Godshall, members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to address this committee today on legislation to create opt-out municipal aggregation in PA, legislation we believe is timely and will promote greater competition and savings for residential and small business customers in the commonwealth.

As already mentioned, I'm Tony Banks, vice president of FirstEnergy Solutions, a competitive energy supplier, serving business and residential customers here in the commonwealth and in five other states in the region.

With me today is Sharon Noewer. She's our director of mass marketing and product development for FirstEnergy Solutions. And Sharon's been involved in Ohio's governmental aggregation program for purchasing electricity

since its inception ten years ago. She'll be available to answer any detailed questions about how governmental aggregations work in Ohio and how we anticipate that it could work here in PA.

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As you may know, FirstEnergy Solutions is a wholly owned subsidiary of FirstEnergy Corp., which announced in February a proposed merger with Allegheny Energy, an investor-owned utility based in Greensburg, PA. FirstEnergy Solutions currently sells competitive electric generation to commercial and industrial customers in PA, and we'd very much like to see larger numbers of residential and small business customers enjoy the benefits of savings afforded larger commercial and industrial customers.

So let me assure you that FirstEnergy Solutions will remain an active participant in PA's competitive marketplace for electricity following the FirstEnergy's merger with Allegheny.

So, opt-out municipal aggregation. We have talked about this a few times before, but we feel it is one of the most effective options to bring savings to larger numbers of small businesses and residents in PA. That's why FirstEnergy Solutions strongly supports House Bill 2619, which

would make this effective rate mitigation tool a reality for communities and customers through the commonwealth.

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We also believe that now is the time to move forward with this bill, because the longer we wait, the longer residential and small business customers will pay more for electricity than they need to. With rate caps expiring for Penelec, Met-Ed, West Penn Power, and PECO at the end of this year, nearly three and a half million, or more than 60 percent, of utility customers in the commonwealth will experience electricity price increases beginning January 1, 2011.

House Bill 2619 gives us an opportunity to help those customers offset the impact of those price increases. And we can look right next door to Ohio to see that customers are receiving real benefits and savings on their electric bills as a result of governmental aggregation.

In my previous testimonies, I provided a basic explanation on what municipal aggregation is and what it is not, so I'd like to quickly cover those points again.

Opt-out municipal aggregation is a way for local communities to combine their residents

and small businesses into a single, large buying group. This will attract participation from more electric generation suppliers and will promote greater competition in the retail electricity marketplace.

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And the concept is pretty straightforward. Rather than compete for individual customers, which drives up marketing and administrative costs, electric generation suppliers would compete to serve the larger buying groups established by the local municipalities on behalf of its citizens. And the lower cost to enroll these customers allows the supplier to pass these savings on to customers in the form of lower prices.

A very important point to make here is that opt-out municipal aggregation does not take away choice from the customer. It merely provides another alternative for customers to shop for electricity. Even if a local government elects to provide opt-out municipal aggregation opportunities for their residents, customers have several opportunities to opt out of the municipal buying group and choose a different supplier for their electric generation. Customers who do not choose a

different supplier would remain in the larger buying group and receive savings on their electric bills.

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So simply put, by being part of the municipal aggregation buying group, customers will save money on their electric bill even if they do nothing at all.

We also believe that opt-out municipal aggregation is the most efficient method to provide greater retail choice to residential and small business customers, since it works very well within PA's existing structure for default service.

Today, if customers take no action to shop for electric generation service, they automatically receive default service from their local electric utility.

Similarly, under opt-out municipal aggregation, customers who take no action will automatically default to the electric generation supplier with whom their municipality's negotiated a price. And that price, presumably, would be lower than the default service price of their local electric utility.

In both cases, the prices that customers pay are established through a competitive

procurement process, but customers are not obligated to stay with the municipal program and will still have the opportunity to choose, since they can opt-out of a municipal program, they shop with a different electric generation supplier, or take default service with their local utility.

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So opt-out municipal aggregation simply establishes an additional option within the existing structure that should result in a lower price than utility default service price, even if the customer takes no action at all.

This process also enables
municipalities to set the parameters of their
competitive procurement process. For example,
communities that value energy-related products and
services such as energy-efficiency programs or
renewable generation could request that suppliers
provide those value-added services along with lower
electricity prices as part of their bids.

So, again, with opt-out municipal aggregation, the average customer will have the same buying power and opportunity to save as a group of larger business and industries. And for those residential customers or small businesses who don't have the time, expertise, or desire to shop

for electric generation themselves, they will benefit from being part of a buying group that should be able to negotiate a better deal than an individual customer could get on a stand-alone basis.

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Another important point about opt-out municipal aggregation is that a municipality is not obligated to become an aggregator. Under the proposed legislation, the municipality's merely provided an opportunity to make opt-out electric aggregation an option for its citizens if there's a benefit in doing so. Presumably, a muni, a municipality, would aggregate on behalf of its citizens only if there is an opportunity to reduce their electric bills.

So here's how we see opt-out municipal aggregation working in PA under House Bill 2619. First, municipalities would adopt an ordinance in order to apply for an electric generation supplier license with the PA Public Utility Commission. This license would enable that entity to act as a municipal aggregator of electric generation supply service on behalf of its citizens.

The aggregator would then conduct a competitive process and negotiate with various

electric generation suppliers to eventually enter into a contract with a supplier with the most attractive offer. Once a contract is signed by the municipality and the winning supplier, all eligible residential and small commercial customers within the municipality's boundaries who do not opt out of the municipal aggregation program would be enrolled and served by the selected generation supplier.

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If no action is taken by the customer during the defined thirty-day opt-out period or the additional ten-day utility recission period, the customer would remain a participant in the municipal aggregation program and pay the lower price negotiated by the municipality.

Customers who choose to opt out of municipal program and take default service from the local utility or select another generation supplier of their choice, the same two options they have today with municipal aggregation legislation -- I mean, without municipal aggregation legislation.

In addition to being able to opt out of the municipal aggregation program during the defined opt-out periods just mentioned, aggregated customers would receive additional notices every

three years regarding their right to opt out of the municipal agreement at no charge.

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So if we take a look at Ohio, where FirstEnergy Solutions has hands-on experience, municipal aggregation, called governmental aggregation in Ohio, is providing more choices for customers while supporting a strong and robust market for electricity.

More than two hundred counties, cities, villages, and townships have implemented governmental aggregation for their communities.

And today, more than one million customers served by those groups receive savings every month from a variety of qualified suppliers.

that a residential customer using eight hundred fifty kilowatt hours of electricity is saving up to one hundred ten dollars annually through governmental aggregation. And Ohio's two largest governmental aggregators report that residential and small business customers in their member communities have saved more than one hundred million dollars through these programs.

In fact, governmental aggregation is responsible for about 90 percent of the shopping

activity among residential customers as well as 70 to 80 percent of commercial customers switching to competitive generation suppliers in Ohio. It's safe to say that this level of shopping and savings for residential and small business customers would not occur without opt-out municipal aggregation.

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So, to summarize, I'm convinced that opt-out municipal aggregation, as proposed in House Bill 2619, will provide significant energy savings to residential and small business customers here in the commonwealth through increased customer shopping with a variety of generation suppliers. And with price increases just around the corner, timely passage of House Bill 2619 will help residential and small business customers offset those increases.

Finally, I'd like to reiterate the very important fact that the proposed legislation would simply give local officials the opportunity, not the obligation, to decide whether municipal aggregation is the right choice for their community. Nothing in the bill would mandate that municipalities pursue aggregation.

So we commend Chairmans Preston and Godshall for their leadership on this issue and

urge timely passage of this legislation so that the benefits of electric competition in PA can be more fully realized by the small customer groups.

FirstEnergy Solutions looks forward to working closely with this committee, the general assembly, and the commission to make opt-out municipal aggregation a reality in PA.

So I want to thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. And my colleague, Sharon Noewer, and I are available to answer any questions you may have.

Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Chairman Godshall.

REP. GODSHALL: And your Ohio contracts, are they basically -- is that -- I mean, is everyone, every municipality, is it a different contract, or is it within law, specifically a law that prescribes the ins and outs of, you know, the contract? Is it unique to every municipality?

MS. NOEWER: No, it's not prescribed -CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Want to move that
closer to you.

MS. NOEWER: No, it's not prescribed by law. The community contracts between us, as a supplier, and the community can be unique. I would

say, for the most part, though, they're pretty standardized contracts that we have for each of our community groups. And it can vary, depending upon the type of product that the community decides to use for their particular community pricing. The term can be different. The price and the product can be different. But the terms of the contract are pretty standard.

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REP. GODSHALL: How about the opt-out provision? As you say here, you were talking about -- we're talking about three years and opt-out. Does that mean if you opt -- you're automatically in to begin with unless you opt out?

MS. NOEWER: Right. The way --

REP. GODSHALL: So the bulk of the people are going to be in the contract, if we look at what happened before in PA with opting out of existing -- you know, from an existing supplier, we had about 30 percent. You know, so the bulk of those people will be in. And once they're in, say because they didn't take the option to opt out, are they automatically in for the duration of the contract, or can they opt out at any time after the contract starts?

MR. BANKS: The one point to be made is

that the length of contract is separate and apart from the opt-out period. So you can have a contract for twenty years, if you want, but the customers get a chance to opt out, in our case, every three years with no penalty.

REP. GODSHALL: But you're automatically in for three years.

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MR. BANKS: You're automatically in. In our case, in Ohio.

REP. GODSHALL: PUC just testified, and I -- of opting out at any time that you decide to opt out, and that's different from what you have in Ohio.

MR. BANKS: That is different. And, you know, we've heard a lot of different views about how often people should be able to opt out and whether or not they should have fees associated with opting out earlier than the contract allows, and I'll just say that the bulk of our contracts in Ohio have a twenty-five-dollar fee for residents to opt out. We have had residents opt out at twenty-five dollars, like has been indicated. If prices drop low enough, it's pretty easy to cover that twenty-five dollars.

We also have contracts with other

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communities where we don't charge a fee because the
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     competition has dictated that we can't charge a fee
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     and be competitive. So you'll see a variety of
     those kinds of things, but I think one of the
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     comments I heard earlier that I fully subscribe to
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     is that the negotiation and the terms and
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     conditions of that contract should be allowed to
     happen. And competition will dictate whether or
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     not you can include fees or not include fees.
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                  Market prices will dictate whether a
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     customer will start to migrate away because of more
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     competitive offers out there. And in our case, the
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     twenty-five dollars, I mean that is an exit fee but
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     it's enough of a fee if there's a good enough
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     price --
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                  REP. GODSHALL: So you can opt out the
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     contract by paying with that --
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                  MR. BANKS: With the twenty-five
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     dollars.
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                  REP. GODSHALL: By paying an exit fee
     to leave?
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22
                             Yes.
                  MR. BANKS:
                                    In our case, it's
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     twenty-five dollars.
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                  REP. GODSHALL: So it's not an
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     automatic, you're stuck for three years. It's --
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you have at least an option of getting out by 1 2 paying that exit fee. 3 MR. BANKS: Yes, that's correct. REP. GODSHALL: Okay. That's what I 4 5 wanted to clear up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 6 7 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Thank you. You know, this is the third time you've 8 been here in the state of PA. 9 10 MR. BANKS: Yes. 11 CHAIRMAN PRESTON: And I want to thank 12 you. As you can see, we're getting close. And 1.3 like I said, I plan on having this up for a vote on Tuesday. I want to say that enough so everybody 14 1.5 hears it, that we plan on having this vote on 16 Tuesday. And if you know our rules, the issue 17 18 about amendments, I would suggest that people get 19 in touch with staff, because we are going to be 20 talking, I think both of us are going to be talking 21 on our way back on the highway as we look at these 22 things, because of the print in dealing with the 2.3 legislative reference group. 24 But we really thank you very much for 25 your comments.

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You're welcome.
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                  MR. BANKS:
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Next we have Divesh
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             Did I pronounce that right?
     Gupta.
                  MR. GUPTA:
                             Almost correct.
                                               Divesh
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     Gupta.
                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON:
                                     Divesh.
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                  MR. GUPTA: Yes.
                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON: Senior counsel for
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9
     Constellation Energy Commodities Group. I always
10
     get nervous when companies send an attorney.
                                                    But
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     don't worry about it, I'll just --
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                  MR. GUPTA: To ease your fears, I'm
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     just filling in for David Fein, who couldn't be
14
     here today because of the Jewish holiday.
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                  CHAIRMAN PRESTON:
                                     Thank you.
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                  MR. GUPTA: Thank you, Chairman
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     Godshall and Chairman Preston, for giving me the
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     opportunity today to speak in front of you.
                                                   This
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     is the first time that we are testifying live about
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     the opt-out aggregation bill.
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                  So a little bit of background on our
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                 I'm with Constellation Energy and
     companies.
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     representing Constellation Energy Commodities
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     Group, Inc., and Constellation NewEnergy, Inc.
25
     Constellation Energy Commodities Group is one of
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the largest wholesale suppliers of electricity in the country, supplying municipalities, wholesale requirements to municipalities, cooperatives, utilities, and other wholesale customers. This includes through procurements of the types of the utilities here in PA hold, and we've been very active in the commission's proceedings to determine those plans and develop those plans, and we've been looking at the opportunities for bidding in those as well.

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of the largest retail suppliers in the country to commercial, industrial customers throughout all competitive markets. We also recently have entered into the residential market in New Jersey and getting our feet wet there, so that is a new market that we're excited about, getting familiar with, and hoping to grow.

You've heard a lot of background about default service, and hopefully we can provide a bit of a different perspective in that of a -- both a wholesale supplier who's very active as well as a retail supplier.

I won't go into too much background about how default service is structured. For

instance, I think Mr. Popowsky from the OCA did a very good job of giving some background on that, and you're familiar with it anyway.

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So, to get right into it, then, you know, it's with that background, with our experience on both the wholesale and retail side that we can provide some insight into our thoughts on municipal opt-out aggregation in particular.

To a large extent, we see House Bill 2619 as a solution in search of a problem. We think that PA's been very effective in developing competitive markets here and in setting up the proper framework so those markets can grow. You have very competitive wholesale markets that are serving the utilities in PA. And we've seen those, the procurements that have been set up, be very competitive and the prices that come out be very competitive, so that even those customers that aren't choosing retail electric supply from competitive EGSs in the state are still receiving the benefits of competition through wholesale competition in the markets.

You've also seen the rules and structures for the retail markets be developed, again, very effectively, where rate caps have come

off, for instance in PPL Electric, we've seen a lot of success.

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I think -- you know, you've heard some of the statistics, but almost four hundred thousand residential customers are shopping in PPL's zone right now, and that's about 32 percent of their residential load. When you look at the commercial, industrial customers, it's about 85 percent of their -- of their C and I load, their commercial, industrial load is taking service from competitive EGSs.

So those are the metrics that show that, okay, well, competition is working. Given some time to work, it's taken hold. So, you know, we do think that that kind of success will also see its way into the other communities throughout the commonwealth as rate caps expire, in particular in PECO Energy Company's, in the West Penn Power Company, and in the Met-Ed, Penelec zones.

With all the success to date and the continuing ongoing work of the PUC to bring the benefits of competition to everyone, again, those that choose and that don't, we really wonder whether consideration of this bill -- of a bill of this type should be held in abeyance until

competition is given some time to take a foothold and grow.

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The question bears further weight in particular when the potential risks of such programs are carefully considered, including the detrimental effects that they may have on utility's existing, well-developed, and successful default service plans. And we've heard some of those risks, but, as well, to any of the utility's customers that remain on default service.

To explain, under House Bill 2619, two types of municipal aggregation are addressed, opt-in and opt-out. And we've talked about both of those today.

With respect to opt-out aggregation, in particular, all residential and small commercial customers in a particular municipality within a utility's territory are bundled together and requested to take their service from an EGS that's chosen by the municipality.

However, as it's currently structured, even where municipal opt-out aggregation is in place, utility's still on the hook to provide default service. And that's -- in the case that customers opt out of the program before its run, or

in the case that customers return to default service if something happens to their EGS provider for them. For instance, if the EGS walks away, say in the case that we talked about with PECO, for instance, those customers come back to the utility and must be served by default service again.

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And that's something that hasn't been talked about as much. We talked about the risks of load shifting away from default, but from the perspective of a wholesale provider, it's very important to also talk about that risk that comes back, of customers coming back, because we see that as really an option. It's a large amount of load that could return very quickly, not a gradual amount of load that would return quickly as individual customers decide to return to service for whatever reason.

As a result, the creation of municipal opt-out aggregation programs, under current well-established default service structures in place in the commonwealth, will impose significant risk to existing, successful default service structures, risks that will be borne by default service suppliers, utilities, and customers likely in the form of increased rates for those customers who

remain on default service.

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You could imagine the scenario, for instance, where there are two municipalities that are in the same utility zone and that are -- that border each other where one municipality has implemented municipal opt-out aggregation and has one particular rate because the rates for default service are increasing. You know, there could be an increasing disparity between those two municipalities' rates, if the other one either wasn't able to implement municipal aggregation or just chose not to.

If the general assembly, nevertheless, adopts legislation to allow for the creation of municipal opt-out aggregation programs, such new policy should not alter existing commission-approved default service plans and should honor any and all wholesale supply contracts that have been entered into for such plans.

Furthermore, to the extent that a municipal opt-out aggregation program is created, the operation of any such program should be considered in a context of any future default service plans.

And let me go into a little bit of

detail now about what those risks are. You've heard some of them from other folks, but I'd like to give you our perspective as well.

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As I mentioned, municipal opt-out aggregation substantially changes the nature of each utility's default service. For instance, problems arise in a scenario in which the utility uses a commission-approved default service plan that relies on full requirements contracts. And that's the case for almost all utilities, the large utilities, in the commonwealth currently. And that's where the utility holds competitive procurements for wholesale suppliers to serve a load-following percentage of the utility's default supply requirements.

Wholesale suppliers, bidding to serve that utility's default service, are on the hook and accept and account for the fact that the utility's load will change as customers, at their own election, choose to leave default service for competitive retail supply from an EGS, and that such individual customers again, individually, may at some point in time return to default service.

Municipal opt-out aggregation, however, fundamentally changes the patterns and ways in

which customers both leave and return to default service. If the general assembly establishes municipal opt-out aggregation policies, or if it seems that such policies are likely to be implemented in the near term, bidders in procurements under default service plans already approved by the commission will recognize and account for the significant load variability differences that municipal opt-out aggregation programs present with respect to serving even a portion of the utility's load.

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In order to address those, you know -and we've heard this -- bidders are going to either
account for those risks through increased premiums,
or the other way that they're going to do that is
just by limiting their participation in those
procurements. And we've seen very robust
participation in procurement to date, and that
could change.

Either of these ways of accounting for that risk is going to be to the detriment of customers that remain on default service, again those customers that either choose to opt out of municipal aggregation or don't have the opportunity for that or customers that are returned to default

service because the EGS defaults on its requirements.

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I'm not going to go into detail about, you know, the other structures that other utilities may use throughout the commonwealth, because those also pose risks in very similar ways, and, in some cases, in greater ways, when municipal opt-out aggregation is implemented.

So, in summary, the implementation of municipal opt-out aggregation represents a new default product for certain municipalities' customers that will increase the cost of the utility's statutorily mandated default service product for all customers.

Potentially wide and growing disparities between customers, including between municipalities, that may result in municipal opt-out aggregation would be harmful to the commonwealth's energy future.

For all these reasons, Constellation urges the commonwealth to carefully consider these risks associated with these programs and address them appropriately if such policies are approved.

I'd like to just touch on a couple of the ways that we think you can address some of

these risks, if you do, nevertheless, intend to go forward.

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First, there are steps that you should take to ensure that the timing of any newly created municipal opt-out aggregation program won't affect the existing commission-approved default service plans and already-executed contracts. And we've talked about some of these methods today already.

Additionally, the existence of any municipal opt-out aggregation program must work within the framework, timing, and other aspects of any future default service plan. For instance, specifically with respect to such future plans, the general assembly should enact measures that allow for the exclusion of any customer load included in the municipal opt-out program from the default service procurements and supply for all other customer load within a utility's territory. Again, that's to protect from the premiums that would need to be included for customers returning to default service.

So it's key and necessary, in our opinion, that House Bill 2619 include amendments such that, first, any municipal opt-out aggregation procurements and enrollments must occur prior to

any procurements under default service plans; that the commission is provided with explicit authority to enact administrative rules that govern the operation of any of these programs; to ensure consistency with default service plans and protect consumers; to ensure that customers, under the municipal opt-out program that return to default service may not return to a fixed-price service with the electric utility, instead they should default -- or at least the existing fixed-priced service for that utility, instead they should default into some sort of hourly or day-ahead pricing; and that any municipal opt-out aggregation program must utilize a competitive procurement process, overseen by the PUC, for EGSs seeking to serve the program through which an EGS offer is chosen to serve that municipality.

Finally, EGSs should be prohibited from providing financial inducement to municipalities utilizing municipal opt-out aggregation programs, and customers served by an EGS should be excluded from any municipal opt-out aggregation programs.

With that, you know, that concludes my remarks, but, you know, definitely open to answer any questions that you may have from our

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perspective.

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CHAIRMAN PRESTON: The only thing I'll say is, first relationship, Constellation's been in front of the committee and always had a great relationship, so glad to have you back because it's been a while.

The other thing is, and I think about like this, Mr. Chairman, currently right now, the seventy-four municipalities across this state, there are -- I think at least thirty-four or thirty-five of them, most of them are home rule, and the question is, you know that they can do this now.

So I think what we're trying to do is give the little and middle guy an opportunity to do the same thing that the big guys can already do right now. Part of the concern that I'm looking at is, if they can do it all right now, it kind of makes you wonder what it is that they're negotiating, and we're hearing about some of the situations that we're having to do, you know, to create more of a playing field and also to create certain protections for the smaller people.

And that's why I was saying to the chairman of the Public Utility Commission that they

don't have all the staff that the Pittsburghs and the Philadelphias and the Eries have in -- even the question is, can a home-rule county -- for example, in Allegheny County currently now, would they have to have all hundred and thirty municipalities do it, because they have a home rule? Or do they -- can they negotiate that now and then ask the counties, Do you want to opt in? I don't know that yet.

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And that's part of the issue that we're trying to give the smaller person the same chance, and it's no different than we have a river with a -- you know, there's a county border. This person's over here, that person's over there were they can't get together; where, in Johnstown, I met with elected officials and gave them the ideas, and one thing they thought, Well, we can either come together ourselves, we can come together with the city of Johnstown, but we would never come together with the county.

But part of the function, I think, of a legislator is to give people an opportunity to try to set their own destiny but also to try to set up the same amount of protections that are necessary.

And I think that that's one of the things we're

trying to do, because it makes me nervous to think that you have all these towns out here that can do it right now without what kind of protections that we're talking about today.

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And that's one of the things I wanted to think about, because you raised some very valid issues here and things about those other towns that can go ahead and do it, and you wonder what they're negotiating.

MR. GUPTA: Certainly. And for those reasons, it is important that the default service continues to be provided appropriately, because until those other municipalities can figure out what they're doing, if they're able to, you want to make sure that they're provided competitive electricity prices.

example, I say our City of Brotherly Love, I guess, already been talking about it, and to my knowledge I don't know if they've passed an ordinance or scheduled to pass an ordinance -- they have passed an ordinance already. I'm just giving you an example, so if they're doing it, so it's only fair to let the mom and the pops, per se, at the table, but I think what we are here talking about is

protection, and it's going to be an issue that we're going to have to be able to deal with going forward for the bigger municipalities just as well.

Yes, sir.

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REP. GODSHALL: Your comment about the City of Brotherly Love, my neighboring municipality, also has a gas company, Philadelphia Gas Works, that they're likely to sell to Montgomery County or any other takers, so I'm not going to worry about that right now.

But, you know, I do have -- this is about the third or fourth time about existing contracts that you brought up, which I do have a concern about, and the -- I'm not sure that 2011 or 2013 is a magic number or anything else. I -- PUC has testified that they can work things out and phase in, you know, working with those existing contracts, which I think are important, because, as you say in here, I have, the life of me, can't figure out if you -- because of existing law, you purchased electric to service a certain area as a default provider and at the same time you've got to get rid of that electric someplace and somebody has to pay for it.

So, you know, if -- those are a couple things that I think we have to work out.

And do appreciate your testimony as

well as everybody else that's here today. I think it's -- have been a rewarding set of hearings for me and gained a lot of knowledge of things I had no idea existed as of a year or two ago.

So thank you and appreciate your testimony.

MR. GUPTA: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN PRESTON: I'd also like --

REP. GODSHALL: Like the City of

Brotherly Love, you know --

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CHAIRMAN PRESTON: What did I say yesterday? Chill out.

I'd also like to say for the record that we have received testimony from Amy Sturges, director of governmental affairs, PA League of Municipalities and Cities; and also Thomas Chiomento, III, director of governmental affairs for Exelon Generation.

I'll be able to say that. And again, it's interesting, because you have a letter of the Pennsylvania League of Municipalities, which also has a brief statement about they encourage us to be

1	cautious but already they're already advising and
2	have other people advising their own municipalities
3	that have the privilege of being able to do
4	something that we haven't given the another couple
5	of thousand of towns to be able to do so.
6	At this point, I look forward to it.
7	Don't forget, as I said, this we
8	have every intention, the legislature, for very
9	dramatic change to vote on this this coming
10	Tuesday, next week. So look forward to seeing
11	everybody there, and get your comments in. Don't
12	hesitate. But have a safe trip home.
13	And we are adjourned.
14	(Whereupon, the hearing concluded
15	at 12:30 p.m.)
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1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	I HEREBY CERTIFY that I was
3	present upon the hearing of the above-entitled
4	matter and there reported stenographically the
5	proceedings had and the testimony produced;
6	and I further certify that the foregoing is a
7	true and correct transcript of my said
8	stenographic notes.
9	
10	BRENDA J. PARDUN, RPR
11	Court Reporter  Notary Public
12	NOCALY FUBLIC
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