COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STATE GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE PUBLIC HEARING

STATE CAPITOL HARRISBURG, PA

IRVIS OFFICE BUILDING ROOM G-50

MONDAY, OCTOBER 15, 2018 9:06 A.M.

PRESENTATION ON ELECTION INTEGRITY AND REFORMS

BEFORE:

HONORABLE DARYL D. METCALFE, MAJORITY CHAIRMAN

HONORABLE CRIS DUSH

HONORABLE SETH M. GROVE

HONORABLE KRISTIN HILL

HONORABLE JERRY KNOWLES

HONORABLE BRETT R. MILLER

HONORABLE BRAD ROAE

HONORABLE FRANK RYAN

HONORABLE RICK SACCONE

HONORABLE TOMMY SANKEY

HONORABLE CRAIG T. STAATS

HONORABLE JUDY WARD

HONORABLE JEFF C. WHEELAND

* * * * *

Debra B. Miller

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BEFORE (continued):

HONORABLE MATTHEW D. BRADFORD, DEMOCRATIC CHAIRMAN

HONORABLE DONNA BULLOCK

HONORABLE MARY JO DALEY

HONORABLE PAMELA A. DeLISSIO

HONORABLE ISABELLA V. FITZGERALD

HONORABLE STEPHEN McCARTER

HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER M. RABB

HONORABLE JARED G. SOLOMON

COMMITTEE STAFF PRESENT:

SUSAN BOYLE

MAJORITY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

KAREN PRIEGO

MAJORITY RESEARCH ANALYST

GLENDON KING

MAJORITY RESEARCH ANALYST

MIKE HECKMANN

MAJORITY RESEARCH ANALYST

PAM NEUGARD

MAJORITY LEGISLATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

BRIDGET LAFFERTY

DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

MATT HURLBURT

DEMOCRATIC RESEARCH ANALYST

KATHY SEIDL

DEMOCRATIC RESEARCH ANALYST

SHARON HOUSSOU

DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT

I N D E X

TESTIFIERS

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	* * *
3	MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: This meeting of the
4	House State Government Committee is called to order.
5	Today we are having a public hearing on election
6	integrity and reforms.
7	We'll take the roll, and before we say the
8	Pledge, we received some sobering news, some sad news this
9	morning from the Democratic side of the aisle, that
LO	Representative Mike O'Brien has passed away.
L1	So if I could ask everybody to please stand,
L2	and we'll have a moment of silence for Representative
L3	O'Brien.
L 4	
L 5	(A moment of silence was observed.)
L 6	
L 7	MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you.
L 8	Yeah; Mike and I were always on different sides
L9	of the issue, but we always had a cordial and civil
20	relationship, and I enjoyed knowing Mike. So he will be
21	missed. It's sad news for a Monday morning.
22	So if I could ask our Member-Secretary to call
23	the roll, and then afterwards, we'll say the Pledge.
24	
25	(Roll call was taken.)

1 REPRESENTATIVE HILL: Thank you.

2 MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you,

3 Representative Hill.

If I could ask everyone to please rise, and Representative Ward, would you lead us in the Pledge, please.

(The Pledge of Allegiance was recited.)

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you,
Representative Ward.

As I had mentioned, today's public hearing is on election integrity and reforms, and our first testifier was scheduled to be Mr. Jonathan Marks, Commissioner with the Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and Legislation. And up until this morning, at around 8:30, I was still under the impression that he would be testifying today.

And I had actually asked my staff to ask our legal counsel questions that I should avoid asking the Commissioner, because we have a hearing, as I understand it, set before the court with this Department, on behalf of the Wolf Administration, to have a hearing on my Right-to-Know Law appeal that I was granted by the Open Records Office. Because myself and other Members had sent a letter to the Administration early on, earlier this

year, and this has been an issue that has been over the last couple of years and that we have had hearings in the past regarding individuals who are present in the United States legally, but foreign nationals that are here residing in the United States that have also registered to vote, and some of which have voted.

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And I had asked the Department to give us information, and some of my colleagues have joined me in asking for this information. We had asked to have the Department identify for us between comparisons within the SURE system, which is the voting system for the State, and the driver's licensing system that has also utilized to issue ID cards for individuals that don't drive, on how many people are issued driver's licenses and ID cards that have INS indicators. Their immigration status is something that is captured when they are being given a driver's license while they're a foreign national residing here legally in the United States. And we have asked for a comparison between those databases and how many foreign nationals do we have in Pennsylvania that are actually registered to vote, registered to vote illegally, and then from there, I would like to find out how many of those individuals have been voting.

We know, based on testimony from Jonathan in the past, that they have found that there is individuals that

are foreign nationals registered here across multiple counties. And the county that had first sparked the interest and was brought to our attention was Philadelphia, and since then, one of our testifiers today has done some work in Allegheny County also that has identified some of this. So we were hopeful that the Commissioner would be here to answer other questions that we had today, but he withdrew on advice of counsel. This morning, I was informed about a quarter of 9, before the hearing, that he was not going to testify on advice of counsel.

So we had a lot of questions for the Commissioner. I want to read some of those, since we do have a little extra time before we get started with our first testifier. But questions that we had for him were as follows:

The Department of State has, in its rush to respond to concerns of foreign election interference, begun to block access to its website from outside of the United States, impeding the right to vote for Pennsylvanians living abroad, including our military, Service members, and their families. Despite reports of this issue, as early as 2016, the Department claims that it only became aware of this issue at the end of September of this year. Why was this problem allowed to go unresolved for so long, despite numerous complaints from this year's primary and prior

regarding the issue?

Further, why did the issue need to be reported at all? Shouldn't the Department of State be aware of a broad-based voter's need to access its website and capable of anticipating that they will be unable to do so if it blocks international access to that site?

Although the issue has been resolved, it remains the case that international voters will be unable to vote through the same process they were used to in the past.

What initiatives can the Department undertake to minimize the disruption this causes to Pennsylvanians living abroad, especially our military personnel?

Another question we had was, as you know,

Commissioner, this Committee has a great interest in making sure that only eligible voters are on the voting rolls and voting in the elections of Pennsylvania. I have been trying to get an answer from your Department since October of 2017 regarding the total number of record matches obtained by comparing driver's license numbers and PennDOT ID card numbers of registered electors in the SURE system database with driver's license numbers and IDs with an INS indicator. This is what I was mentioning, but actually, I was thinking it was earlier this year. It was already at the end of last year, October of last year, so a year ago.

I sent the Department a letter on this issue,

October 4th of 2017, and did not receive a response. I sent

two more letters to Acting Secretary Torres, who did not

respond. And it should be noted that in between that, the

former Secretary, Pedro Cortes, was fired about a week

after I had sent my first letter, the letter that I believe

some of the Members of the Committee had signed with me,

some of the Republican Members.

You testified at a hearing, Commissioner Marks, and could not answer this question. Finally, I was forced to file a right-to-know request on this topic, which should not happen. As an elected official representing the public, especially somebody in the balancing branch of government and the Legislature, we should have access to this type of information when we ask for it instead of having to file a right-to-know request.

In March of this year, the Open Records Office granted my appeal after the Department denied my right-to-know request. And he granted it in part. We had asked a lot of questions, and he granted the request in part. Instead of providing me with the information, the Department filed an appeal to the Commonwealth Court. It should be noted that they waited the full 30 days they had to give me the information and filed the appeal to the courts on the 30th day.

It is my understanding that the hearing is scheduled on the topic in December. Why can you not provide this information, and what are you hiding? And I think that's something that the Commissioner certainly wanted to avoid answering this morning. And on advice of counsel, as I mentioned, we were notified about 15 minutes, 20 minutes before the meeting this morning that he would not be coming to testify today or to take any questions from us.

What has your Department been doing to maintain the integrity of the voter rolls? Regarding the directive you have put in place requiring counties to put in place voter verifiable paper audit voting machines by 2020, it is my understanding that you intend to decertify the voting machines currently in use by next year. What authority do you have to take this action?

If you feel these machines are unsecure in some way, why are you allowing them to be used in the elections next month?

If you do not feel the machines are unsecure, then why are you rushing to make the counties buy new machines so quickly?

We've heard from some counties that the timeline to replace their voting machines is unrealistic and even dangerous, considering the first time many of these new

voting machines may be used is a very important 2020

Presidential election. Why the rush?

It is my understanding that you only have one of these new machines certified that counties can choose from at this point. Is that correct?

How can counties be expected to make a decision or get a good price on a machine when there's no competition at this point?

When will other voting machines be certified?

Could you provide an update on your transition to the new SURE system?

Are you facing any challenges making this transition?

Members would have additional questions if the Commissioner would have been here with us this morning. But since he has withdrawn on advice of counsel, we won't get to have the answers that the public deserves on any of these questions, questions that I know that our counties have related to what authority the Department believes they have to actually force them in this direction on new machines, and then when you only have one machine that's certified, it appears, as to how that's going to affect them with the cost and whether or not they'll be able to afford it.

But I think the most important question for me is, how many foreign nationals are registered to vote in Pennsylvania? We know there are foreign nationals here. We know that they are here legally. We know that they are registered to vote. We know that some have voted, because they have self-reported to get off the voting rolls, and that's how we found out about it, because they want to obtain citizenship, and then when they're told that that could affect their application to become a citizen, they self-report to the various bureaus of elections in the counties to have their names removed, hoping that will save them in the process of applying for citizenship.

Now, some people certainly might apply to become a voter through the process of motor-voter, that was dictated by the Federal Government, that will end up going through PennDOT, and some people have become registered through that and never cast a vote, and that's a mistake that they made. They didn't intend to get on the voter rolls. They never cast a vote. But some people registered and then they voted, and they voted in election after election and multiple elections. That's a serious problem.

When you have somebody registering to vote that is not eligible, that's an illegal voter, then they're nullifying the votes of legally-cast votes by our citizens, and we want to make sure that the votes that are being cast

are being cast with integrity and that every legally-cast vote is being counted.

So I continue my pursuit of this information, and I know a lot of Members share my concerns. It appears that we're not going to be granted the hearing before the court until December, even though we have been battling this, as you know, since, from what I just read, since last October. And with the election in 3 weeks, we're going to have an election where foreign nationals potentially could be influencing the outcome of this election.

And they're not just Russians. I mean, all of the talk about Russia's interference with our elections, there's real interference with our elections by foreign nationals in the State of Pennsylvania. And those foreign nationals are here legally but registering illegally and voting illegally, and we need to bring that to an end, and Wolf's Administration should not be covering it up. They should be working with the Legislature to identify it and fix it and to let the public know what the ramifications and consequences are of it.

We do have Members that would want to ask questions of the Commissioner, and we had scheduled him until 9:25, so we have 7 more minutes. We have got Representatives Hill, Dush, and Roae, and Representative Bradford has been trying to get my attention.

So Representative Bradford for a question to the Commissioner, who is obviously not in his seat.

MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Thank you.

And I think the Chairman obviously touches on an issue that has been dealt with for some time by the Administration.

When it came to light, obviously the motor-voter bill and PennDOT, how it was interacting with their system and was allowing those who were obviously legally in the country and allowed to have driver's licenses but were presented with the ability to register to vote, obviously over several Administrations, there has been a glaring error that has been brought to light, and it is the responsible thing to address it in a nonpartisan and nonpolitical way.

I think the Administration deserves a lot of credit for what it is doing in that regard. It is unfortunate that one of the litigants and the litigation that is going on resolving this matter was invited to testify and puts Commissioner Marks in a very difficult position to talk about ongoing litigation.

But again, I know the Department of State in being proactive is actually having a forum this afternoon on election modernization. I think we should not kind of raise the specter of something very sinister when there was

obviously a clerical error that needs to be addressed in a forthright and responsible and bipartisan manner.

So I would just hope that -- the issue may be charged by emotion, but it should be infused with fact and reason, and I would just hope that that is the way that this issue is addressed from this moment forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you, Representative Bradford.

The majority of the registrations have occurred through PennDOT. I think it was in the 70 percent range. But there has been an additional 20 to 30 percent that have occurred through other forms of registration, including some of the voting drives that go on regularly on college campuses and other locations. So there's a problem beyond just a technical glitch with the software, which should have been corrected throughout many years ago and throughout many Administrations.

But we have brought this to the Administration, to this current Administration's attention more than once now, and instead of getting answers that we can all work together on resolving the ultimate problem, we've had nothing but a cover-up going on.

Representative Hill.

REPRESENTATIVE HILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, in anticipation of this morning's meeting, the York County delegation met with our York County commissioners. They have a lot of concerns with regard to the timeline to replace their voting machines, with regard to what machines are certified for future use, and if there has been any attempt by the Administration to negotiate better, you know, price for the counties in purchasing these new machines and several other questions.

Will we have an opportunity at some point to send a letter, get answers to those questions in some way, shape, or form, because I think if we're hearing it from our York County commissioners, that there are 66 other counties that they're probably expressing similar concerns.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: I agree with you. I think we should follow up. Since the Commissioner didn't join us this morning, I think that we need to do some additional follow-up to try and get those answers and demand those answers.

REPRESENTATIVE HILL: I know that our county commissioners would really appreciate it.

Thank you very much.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you.

Representative Dush.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: Thank you, Chairman.

Given what transpired this morning with the Commissioner and the intransigence over the last several years -- it's not like it's something simple. Well, there are some simple solutions, obviously; we have been able to take care of some.

But my point is, I believe that because of the intransigence of the Commissioner and his predecessor and the right-to-know appeals and this morning's events, as well as the court pushing the date off until after the election, I would request that we seek from the Speaker of the House the ability to subpoena the Commissioner for testimony next week and that he produce the documents that are necessary to answer all of these questions.

Under Act 19 of 1842, if he fails to do so, he could very easily, if he refuses, he could end up in the Dauphin County jail. I'm hoping that we start using that leverage that is given to us under the legislation.

Thank you.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you, Representative Dush.

Representative Roae.

REPRESENTATIVE ROAE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am very, very upset. This meeting was scheduled September $24^{\rm th}$, and 15 minutes before the meeting is supposed to start, Commissioner Jonathan Marks from,

you know, the Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and
Legislation of the Department of State says he's not going
to come, and that's just very, very bad.

I think we should send, I don't know, a

Sergeant at Arms or House Security or somebody to go get

him, because when we're having a meeting like this, you

know, the Committee Members and the public deserves to have

this information.

But the question I would ask him is, if PennDOT has a list of all the noncitizens that have a driver's license and the Department of State has a list of all the registered voters, why won't the Wolf Administration let the two lists be compared and make sure noncitizens aren't on the voter registration lists?

I mean, it's a pretty simple thing. And, you know, months and months and months and no answer from them and then they don't show up at the meeting? I mean, this is about making sure that U.S. citizens are the only people that vote in elections, and I just think it's a disgrace that he's not here. And I don't know; I think somebody should go get him.

Thank you.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: I nominate you, Representative Roae, to go get him.

REPRESENTATIVE ROAE: Okay.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: I'm just kidding,
Representative Roae. I know you probably would. You would
try to. Then who knows what kind of trouble you could get
me into.

Thank you, Representative Roae.

Well, we are going to move on with our testifier who is actually here, and we appreciate Major Pierce joining us this morning: Major Christine M. Pierce, and she is with the Pennsylvania National Guard's Cyber Defense — she is the Pennsylvania National Guard's Cyber Defense Branch Chief and Defensive Cyber Operations Element Team Chief, and we appreciate the Major joining us.

And, ma'am, you can join us at the microphone if you choose to there. You can spin that mic around, if you like, and you can begin when you're ready, ma'am. Thank you for coming.

MAJOR PIERCE: Good morning, Chairman Metcalfe, Chairman Bradford, and Committee Members.

Is it on? Can you hear me? Yeah? Better?

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: That's better now.

MAJOR PIERCE: Yeah? Okay. I am loud, but not that loud.

Ladies and gentlemen, as mentioned, I am

Major Christine Pierce. I am the Pennsylvania Cyber

Defense Branch Chief and the Defensive Cyber Operations

Team Chief for the Pennsylvania National Guard. I am honored to be here today to testify, it was supposed to be alongside the Department of State, on elections security and reform. But particularly, I want to share how the Pennsylvania National Guard is supporting the Commonwealth with elections cybersecurity.

Our preparations for the upcoming November elections date back to the 2016 Presidential election.

Because of the attention that the 2016 elections drew in the media, National Guard Cyber Teams were being called upon to provide cybersecurity support to their State's electoral systems. The Pennsylvania National Guard Cyber Team supported the Office of Administration and the Department of State throughout the duration of the election.

As you know, the Department of State is responsible for voter registration and processing of election results, and many of these processes could now be done through web applications, servers, and databases that, if not properly protected, could be susceptible to cyber-attacks and potential hackers trying to disrupt Pennsylvania's electoral process, and those risks dramatically increase during the election cycle.

In order to mitigate the risk of interference with our electoral process, the Department of State, the

Office of Administration's Office for Information Security, and the Pennsylvania National Guard Cyber Team worked together to proactively monitor our electoral applications and systems during that 2016 election.

The Pennsylvania National Guard Cyber Team worked closely with OA's enterprise security specialists, forensics analysts, network administrators, and incident response teams to monitor and investigate any cybersecurity incidents that could have impacted the Department of State's voter registration applications or election-night returns. We have also assisted with the monitoring of the public facing elections reporting site while continuously helping back up the elections system servers.

The Pennsylvania National Guard Cyber Team also supported the midterm elections in May of this year and is ready to support the Commonwealth during the upcoming November elections, just as we have always done in the past.

In addition, the Pennsylvania National Guard

Cyber Team has been actively involved in other efforts to

secure our voting systems, including participating in the

Election Security Interagency Workgroup. Through this

Department of State initiative, the Pennsylvania National

Guard, the County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania

representatives, county election directors, Department of

State staff, and county and State IT directors discuss security issues, share training resources, and conduct county-level self-assessments to improve the county's security posture.

This collaborative effort has allowed the Pennsylvania National Guard Cyber Team to tell our story, to engage with the counties directly, to raise awareness about our team's capabilities, and offer our cybersecurity assistance. Some of that assistance that our team provides is penetration testing, vulnerability assessments, and security assessments to any State agency and local government networks.

We can also provide vulnerability remediation, cyber incident response, and general cybersecurity assistance and support, like election support and cyber exercise development and those sorts of events. We provide training and education, and we provide, we have a joint cyber training facility at Fort Indiantown Gap where we can test software before purchasing, and we can use that as a test bed if any counties want to come and test any potential electoral systems that they want to put in place. We have that facility there.

The Pennsylvania National Guard was also a key player in the cybersecurity election tabletop exercise hosted by the Department of State a few months ago and the

election security tabletop exercise hosted by the

Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency last month. These

events provided an opportunity for participants involved in

any part of the elections process to test their internal

processes, exercise their incident response plans,

collaborate with each other, share experiences and

information, and just walk through all of those "what if"

election security scenarios.

With everything that is heard in the national media regarding the vulnerability of our election systems, gaining the confidence of our voters has been a top priority in Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania is doing a lot of great work to ensure the security of its elections, and voters need to hear that story.

For example, Acting Secretary Torres and I participated in a voter roundtable discussion in August in Philadelphia. That roundtable was hosted by the National Commission for Voter Justice, and our participation in the event gave us the opportunity to share information about what the Commonwealth is doing for election security and to answer questions from the Commission and the public.

The feedback that we received at that event was positive, and the Commission appreciated the information that we shared. They indicated that they have a better understanding of what is actually going on for security in

the election process, and that gains greater confidence in the security of our process. And it indicated that they now have the reliable information that they need to go ahead and share this story and to tell their members regarding Pennsylvania's efforts to secure our elections.

From my perspective as the Commander of the

Pennsylvania National Guard Cyber Team providing election

security support for the last couple of years, I can attest

to the fact that Pennsylvania has a great team of local,

State, and Federal partners who truly care about

maintaining the integrity and security of our elections,

and they do their absolute best to ensure that our votes

are secure and accurate.

The team works vigilantly to ensure that we have multiple layers of security in place, constantly assessing any potential vulnerabilities, implementing the necessary technical controls, sharing resources, sharing information, training and exercising plans, and building relationships with stakeholders and subject matter experts. Transparency and communication are the keys to our success as we continually strive to ensure the security of the elections process.

Thank you, and I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you, ma'am.

1 MAJOR PIERCE: You are welcome.

2 MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Representative Roae 3 for our first question.

REPRESENTATIVE ROAE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you so much for your testimony today.

We appreciate it.

I don't know that much about computers, but you are obviously a computer expert, you know, IT, a technology kind of a person. My question is, from a computer standpoint, an IT/technology standpoint, how hard would it be if you had a list of people with their names and their driver's license numbers, and then there's a field, you know, a noncitizen, and there's like an X in the field to mark noncitizens. If you're a citizen, there wouldn't be an X there. If you had to compare that list to a list of registered voters, should it take months and months to do that, or from a computer standpoint, is it relatively easy to sort something like that, basically just trying to print a list of all the people's names that have an X in that one field?

MAJOR PIERCE: I can't speak on behalf of the Department of State, but from a just strictly computer point of view, it's a database, and a database you can pull information from and you can write scrips to compare that information if you have the right expertise to do it.

1 REPRESENTATIVE ROAE: So rather than taking like 2 a whole year, like the Department of State has done, they 3 should be able to, you know, PennDOT should be able to print a list of all the noncitizens that have driver's 5 licenses, and then it seems like that would be pretty easy 6 to compare that with the voter registration lists. 7 So it's very disappointing that the Department of State, you know, wouldn't be here today. I wish the Wolf 8 9 Administration would take election security more seriously. 10 But thank you for your answer. I appreciate it. 11 MAJOR PIERCE: You're welcome. 12 MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you, 13 Representative Roae. 14 Representative Dush. 15 REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: Thank you, Chairman, and 16 thank you for showing up, Major. 17 As the former Chief of Information Protection for 18 the Air side of the Guard, I know what you guys are capable 19 of, and I'm grateful for your testimony. 20 Just a couple of quick questions. 21 You had mentioned about vulnerability 22 assessments. Have there been any conducted on any of the 23 county voter registration machines, and if so, have you any 24 results to share?

MAJOR PIERCE: I know that the counties have been

doing them internally. We have provided -- we went out to the counties and we have told them about our resources. We have not been out to the counties at this point, at least my team, to conduct a vulnerability assessment.

Going forward, I think our resources will be used, you know, much more moving on into the future. But for this November $6^{\rm th}$ election, we have not.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: And it's the same with your capabilities with the testing of the equipment. Has any county taken you up on that?

MAJOR PIERCE: We have, we have talked through the processes. So they're thinking about it; they're talking about it. Now it's just doing it, so.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: All right.

MAJOR PIERCE: We have the facilities.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: One last question.

Are you involved at all with the overseas registration in the sense that when the absentee ballot requests are sent and the processing of them, because I'm actually getting, over the last several elections, I have received complaints from people, family members of people who are in the military, but I have yet to receive any complaints for, like, my foreign service officers, from family members, from people from the State Department, but I do receive the complaints on the military side.

1 MAJOR PIERCE: I don't know. I mean, I can just, 2 from my own personal experience, I have been deployed 3 several times to Iraq, and it was obviously during election 4 time, and I never had a problem getting an absentee ballot 5 and getting it submitted through the Federal Voter 6 Assistance Program. It has always been a process that 7 worked, that I have seen work, so I don't -- I can't -- I don't know. I can't answer that, why there's a -- if 8 9 there's a gap somewhere. 10 REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: I know I didn't experience 11 any problems before either, 4 ½ years in England plus my 12 deployment to Iraq. But it seems now that I am starting to 13 receive something here over the last couple of years, 14 complaints. 15 But thank you very much for your answers. 16 MAJOR PIERCE: You're welcome. 17 MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you, 18 Representative Dush. 19 Representative Saccone. 20 REPRESENTATIVE SACCONE: Thank you, and thank 21 you, Major Pierce, for your testimony. 22 Two questions. 23 One, what vulnerabilities have the roundtable 24 group discovered that you can share with us; and number 25 two, have you looked at or are you looking at the

programming of the machines, because we have had literally thousands of complaints of voter flipping. In other words, a candidate pushes a button for candidate A but candidate B shows up. And, you know, sometimes the machines are shut down. Sometimes they just, the judge of elections will, you know, try to, I don't know, do something with the machine. I don't know the computer technology of that.

And we have never been able to resolve why that happens. It happens intermittently. Maybe it happens on every 50th vote, maybe every hundredth vote. But is someone looking at the programming of this to see if there's some pattern to that?

MAJOR PIERCE: I mean, at the county level, they are the ones who are doing those security assessments currently on their voting systems. We have not gone out yet to assist with that. We have offered our resources to every single county in the Commonwealth; they just haven't made a formal request yet for us to actually come out.

As far as your first question about sharing any vulnerabilities that we have seen, we did do, the Department of Homeland Security, they did do a penetration test on the Department of State electoral system back in June, and my team had the opportunity to shadow the Department of State and the Homeland Security team and kind of walk through that process. And there were no -- I

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       didn't -- from the end result, I don't know how much I can
       share about the final report. I didn't even see the final
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       report. But what we did see, there were no critical
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 4
       vulnerabilities that were found.
                                          Thank you.
 5
                 REPRESENTATIVE SACCONE:
 6
                 MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE:
                                              Thank you,
 7
       Representative Saccone.
 8
                 Representative Daley.
 9
                 REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
10
       and thank you, Major Pierce, for being with us today.
11
                 So in your testimony you talked about you and
12
      Acting Secretary Torres participating in a voter roundtable
13
       in August in Philadelphia, and it was hosted by the
14
      National Commission for Voter Justice. So we received
15
      written testimony for this meeting today from the co-chairs
16
       of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Pennsylvania's Election
17
       Security. So that Pennsylvania Blue Ribbon Commission,
18
       does that have anything to do with the National Commission
19
       for Voter Justice?
                 MAJOR PIERCE: I'm not aware of that. I don't
20
21
       know.
22
                 REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Is that a group that you
23
      have had anything to do with?
24
                 MAJOR PIERCE: I have never heard of them, so I
25
       would say no.
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1 REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Never heard of them? 2 MAJOR PIERCE: No. REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Oh. Well, that's 3 4 interesting. So you can't really comment on any of their 5 activity. 6 MAJOR PIERCE: I cannot. Sorry. 7 REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: All right. Well, thank 8 you for your testimony. 9 I guess my question was, if there's ranking of 10 what the issues are that your group and the national group 11 see as the greatest threats to election integrity and 12 security, is there some way you could just list those in 13 kind of a rank order? 14 MAJOR PIERCE: I think just the number one would 15 just be getting updated systems, and that's with any computer system. If you have, you know, a Windows XP 16 17 computer, you're going to have more vulnerabilities, and if 18 you have an outdated voter system, there is going to be a 19 greater chance of vulnerabilities. So my number one would be just updating the 20 21 systems, whether it's software or a new voting system, 22 whatever needs to be done. Just, the more updated the 23 system is, the better secure it will be. 24 REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: And has your group been

active at all with the State Department's certification of

1	the newer machines?
2	MAJOR PIERCE: Not yet.
3	REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Not yet. And do you
4	anticipate that you will be?
5	MAJOR PIERCE: I anticipate that we will be
6	working closely with them for any services that they may
7	need. We have, you know, a team of really strong
8	cybersecurity experts, so. And it's a resource to
9	Pennsylvania, so we offer our services.
10	REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: That's great. I really
11	appreciate your time.
12	And is there a timeline that you are aware of for
13	certifying the machines?
14	MAJOR PIERCE: I
15	REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: The new machines.
16	MAJOR PIERCE: I have not. I don't know yet.
17	REPRESENTATIVE DALEY: Okay. Thank you.
18	MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you,
19	Representative Daley.
20	Representative Hill.
21	REPRESENTATIVE HILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
22	Thank you for being here today.
23	Exactly who is securing our voter databases?
24	MAJOR PIERCE: That is the Department of State.
25	REPRESENTATIVE HILL: It's the Department of

State.

MAJOR PIERCE: And the Office of Administration, because the Department of State network runs off of the Office of IT, OIT.

REPRESENTATIVE HILL: Okay.

So we have had a lot of breaches. We had the ransomware attack over on the Senate side. We have had breaches at the Bureau of Vital Statistics, the Department of Human Services, the Department of Corrections. If there is a data breach, who is the entity that is in charge of recovery, and do you know what their recovery point objective would be and do you know what their recovery time objectives would be?

MAJOR PIERCE: I know the Office of

Administration's IT department does incident response every
day, so I believe it would be them that would be the first
incident responders. And if it's something that goes above
their -- if they need to call in our team, we will be
on-site with the Office of Administration on Election Day
and working with them side by side throughout the duration
of the process in case of an event.

REPRESENTATIVE HILL: So the National Guard does not have primary responsibility for securing our databases?

MAJOR PIERCE: Uh-uh.

REPRESENTATIVE HILL: Okay.

1 All right. Thank you very much. MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: 2 Thank you, 3 Representative Hill. 4 Representative Solomon. 5 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 6 Thank you, ma'am, for being here today. 7 How many folks are within your shop that are in the cyber unit? 8 9 MAJOR PIERCE: On my particular team, the 10 Defensive Cyber Operations Element, it is a 10-person cyber 11 team. Two of those personnel, myself and my technical 12 expert, we're full time. The rest of them are traditional 13 Guardsmen, so they get called in when there's an incident, 14 if necessary. And then we also have the 112th Cyber 15 Operations Squadron out of Horsham, and that's about an 80-percent cyber element, and we can call upon them if we 16 17 need additional support. MR. SOLOMON: So in theory, all of them could be 18 19 called upon to deal with election security issues. 20 MAJOR PIERCE: If we had to. We never had to do 21 that before, but we have, you know, a call roster of 22 personnel that can be called upon. 23 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: You mentioned, ma'am, a 24 collaborative effort with county commissioners, with the

Department of State, that you all come together and talk

about possible threats. How frequently do you all get together?

MAJOR PIERCE: The Election Security Interagency Workgroup I think began, oh, about 6 months ago, so we have been coming together since then.

In the past, most of the cybersecurity personnel at the State level -- the Office of Administration, the Governor's Office of Homeland Security, PEMA, the Public Utility Commission, ourself, and the National Guard -- we have been meeting regularly, at least monthly, or quarterly, since, for the last 3 or 4 years.

ma'am, because you had mentioned the guidance was put out to counties to contact you if there was any kind of perceived threat, what have they brought to your attention?

MAJOR PIERCE: We have just started working with the counties within the last few months. We were traditionally just working with State agencies, and we have brought into our scope now the counties and local governments. But that has been an initiative that has been ongoing for just, like I said, about the last 6 months, and they have not brought anything to our attention yet.

I go out and I go to the CCAP meetings and I brief the capabilities and the services we can provide.

And some have contacted me and they want us to come and do

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1
       a penetration test, not necessarily on their electoral
 2
       systems but on their local government networks in general.
 3
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: So, ma'am, when
       Representative Saccone was mentioning the judge of
 4
 5
       elections, flipping machines, going roque, have you guys
 6
      heard of that one before?
 7
                MAJOR PIERCE: I have not personally.
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: And how about
 8
 9
       Representative Roae; he's talking about undocumented.
10
       you heard about that?
11
                MAJOR PIERCE: I can't speak to that.
12
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON:
                                          Thank you, ma'am.
13
                MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE:
                                              Thank you.
14
                 That's all the time that we have for this
15
       testifier.
16
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: I have some
17
       questions real quick.
18
                MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: We're out of time.
19
      We have to move on to the next testifier. It's 9:45.
                 But thank you, ma'am, for your testimony.
20
21
                MAJOR PIERCE: You're welcome. It has been my
22
      pleasure.
23
                MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you very much
24
       for joining us today. Have a great day, ma'am.
25
                MAJOR PIERCE:
                                Thank you. You, too.
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1	MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: I don't think
2	Representative Roae mentioned undocumented at all. For
3	Representative Solomon's benefit, I think Representative
4	Roae was referring to the same issue that I have been
5	talking about since the beginning of the meeting when I
6	brought up that there are, factually, foreign nationals
7	that registered to vote in Pennsylvania. Some have voted.
8	The Department knows that. We just don't know how many, so
9	we're trying to get that number. That's why we have a
10	hearing date set in December.
11	Our next testifier will be Mr. Gerald Feaser,
12	Jr., Director of Dauphin County Elections and Voter
13	Registration.
14	Thank you for joining us today, sir.
15	MR. FEASER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
16	MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Good morning. You
17	can begin when you're ready, sir. You can begin when
18	you're ready. Thank you.
19	MR. FEASER: Greetings, Chairman Metcalfe,
20	Chairman Bradford, and Members of the House State
21	Government Committee. I thank you for the opportunity to
22	speak about election integrity and reforms.
23	With the General Election a mere 3 weeks away, I
24	have accepted this unique invitation to offer my assessment
25	about the integrity of our election process, which I define

as the voting systems, voter registration, and website election results, as well as the possible election directors' support for various reforms.

Given all that is stated and misstated in the public arena about the integrity of our election process, the only clear and concise message that I can offer is simply this: Pennsylvanians should rest easy knowing the official election results in Pennsylvania are secure and reflect the will of the people. Under State law, all 67 counties follow strict requirements to keep our voting systems that record and tabulate the official election results secure and offline.

Specifically in Dauphin County, not only are our voting machines not connected to the Internet, our machines are incapable of being connected to the Internet. Looking for a Wi-Fi or Internet connection on our machines is like looking for a turbocharger on a Model T Ford. It simply is not there.

We use the same voting systems as does Berks,
Bucks, Delaware, Monroe, and Philadelphia Counties. And
given the security and safety features built into our
current system, including the chain of custody of the
machines, materials, and memory cartridges, I could drop
off one of my sealed voting machines in the middle of
Red Square in Moscow, and the only way the Russians could

hack into it is by using an ax.

One thing I want to specifically point to, using some show-and-tell from my days in kindergarten, this is the memory cartridge for the voting machines for the counties that I referenced. As you can see, and I'll be happy to pass this around, it has a unique series of pinholes. It is not something you're going to find on the store shelves of Staples.

This is proprietary information. It runs on proprietary software and is not something that if you were to steal from a judge of elections you could do anything other than use it as a paperweight or a doorstop. So the security of our machines are unique to the creation of the machine and the system itself.

I would be happy to pass that around. I just need it at the end of the day.

Voting systems consist, again, as I had mentioned, of proprietary software, which is maintained on a single-use computer in my office, and that computer is literally not connected to the Internet or even the county's network. It is a self-contained system. It runs on Windows XP, but the only thing I use it for is to program the cartridges and print the ballots for our machines. I don't use it for email. I don't use it for playing Solitaire -- nothing. The hardware consists of

nearly 500 programmed, tested, and sealed machines.

registration rolls, and thanks to the Wolf Administration, voters now have greater control over their voter registration status via online voter registration. When a voter uses OVR, the application arrives through the SURE system in my office literally within 16 minutes. So a voter has enormous control over changing their voter registration in terms of party of choice, name changes, or address changes.

As OVR was in place for the 2016 Presidential election, we were able to keep on top of the volume of registrations, and we did not have to record nearly as much overtime or hire additional workers to keep up with the applications, as my office did during the 2012 Presidential election.

I was going to defer to Commissioner Marks on the security of the SURE system, as it's a system our counties tap into and we don't have control over. But I can tell you that despite some of the user issues, we are very confident in that system being secure as well, both from the Department of State and through the Office of Administration.

There are times where the system goes out, and the other Thursday before the last day to register to vote,

the system was unavailable for about 6 hours. Again, I believe some of that is due to the security upgrades. But, you know, we do work through those things.

The last piece of the puzzle, I think, to integrity is where things can become a little confusing, and that's the website election results. The news media and the public have come to rely on the Department of State and the counties for election-night results. They are great systems. But from time to time, we hear about a wide variety of public and private websites where things are being altered by someone other than the authorized users. So it's expected that the possibility exists that someone could get in, transpose numbers, change a candidate's name, change the candidate's party affiliation, but again, those are all unofficial results that you see on those websites at night. They are not the official results.

In fact, the election doesn't end at the close of Election Day. There is a 2-week period where we go through and certify the results and communicate with the Department of State on paper the actual results.

Now, sometimes the media is duped into what exactly is at stake, too. CNN recently covered some conference of computer technical people, let's just call them. It was called DEF CON, and a pair of 11-year-olds were able to hack into and alter a website and change some

votes. But not only did these youngsters not hack into an election system, it wasn't even a real election website.

So again, some of that information is misinterpreted by the

media, intentionally or unintentionally, and it gives the public a false perception of what's really at stake.

And to be clear -- I want to be very clear on this -- I am not aware of anybody hacking into any county website or Department of State website and changing any numbers, names, but there is that possibility, I will grant.

As for election reforms, there are several items the 67 county election directors have in mind to both save taxpayer money and improve on the delivery of elections. It won't belabor the whole issue of voting machine changes. It's contained in my public testimony. But suffice it to say that right now, we are very concerned of the timeline that the Wolf Administration has laid out.

We are not opposed to the objective of changing and upgrading and updating to new machines. Our concern is the aggressive timeline. And as many have information, right now there is only one certified system in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

The Department of State has promised to work hard, and I believe they will, to certify more systems by the end of this year, but that still gives us only one very

busy municipal year in which to select a system. And there are no funds provided for these systems. I estimate in Dauphin County, it will cost about \$8 million to change over to a new voting system. Without the funding for that, I don't know how we're going to be able to do it in that time frame.

Other things are, you know, we have talked about election modernization, and it's not just new voting systems. There are other technologies out there that we think will enhance the ability to conduct and deliver elections. E-poll books are a great system that can be used to smooth out and streamline and expedite the lines that we hear about forming at Presidential elections, long lines, because you have right now paper poll books that are printed, and people have to get into line where their name appears in that book, and the lines are long sometimes. If you have e-poll books, you can expedite that line like a self-checkout system at a grocery store.

Absentee ballot reform. You know, keeping in mind 1937, there's a lot of things that have changed since the Election Code was put in place. Absentee ballot deadlines are something we have talked to the Senate State Government Committee about, because the Postal Service no longer has next-day delivery. So having a deadline for receiving a civilian absentee ballot of the Tuesday before

election and then have to have that voted ballot back to us by Friday, there is no physical way possible that you're going to have us get an application on Tuesday, mail the ballot to the voter, have the voter mark it up, and mail it back to us. It's just not reasonable. So things need to be looked at in that regard.

Also, times have changed in our society, and we as election directors believe maybe it's time for "no excuse" absentees. Frankly, not only is it none of my business why a voter wants to vote by absentee, by the current requirements under law, those lists must be posted for public review. Do you really want to provide somebody who may not have well-intentioned reasons for getting ahold of a list of absentee voters to find out who's not at home, who's taking a trip.

Polling place reform. From our country's founding, at many of our polling places the only thing that was required was to have a hitching post for the horses.

Well, guess what? Things have changed a lot, and for good reasons, too. We now have to follow the Federal ADA requirements, which can cost thousands of dollars to upgrade some of our old facilities. Many of our rural municipalities where we use the municipal buildings or even outbuildings for vehicles, things like that, they're not technically ADA compliant.

If you look at the ADA Federal requirements, some of them, I would think, were written as if people lived in Delaware and Kansas where the State is flat. When you have places like Penn Hills and others, Mount Pleasant and places like that in Pennsylvania, you arguably have to understand that the typography is going to be a little challenging to meet with all the ADA requirements. So we need to have some of these changes for polling places.

One of the things I would like to see is vote centers, and I give you two examples in my written comments about how I could use vote centers without greatly inconveniencing voters.

I have a borough that has four wards, because that's how they elect their council people. They are unwilling to merge the wards because they don't want to lose their council people. But yet, I have to find people in each one of those wards to work that poll, and it's -- I mean, technically, I'm actually putting in there two or three times more equipment and resources than I really need to responsibly run an election in Penbrook Borough.

In Lower Paxton Township, I could merge several of the election districts into one, have them go to one building, and run it in a smoother fashion.

So again, giving us the option, not the requirement that we use vote centers, but the option would

be greatly appreciated.

And then last but not least is the poll workers. These folks are the linchpin in all the elections. We could buy the newest, greatest, shiniest, most secure equipment that you envision, but if we don't have the people there on the ground to run the polls on Election Day, it will just sit there unused.

And frankly, if you look at the Election Code as to how you actually fill vacancies on Election Day, it's a curbstone election among the voters who are present to fill the vacancies on a local election board. I certainly believe you will receive many calls in your offices if we ever had to get to that point.

As you can tell, I'm a little passionate about this. I have a lot of other things I would love to say. I have the greatest respect for this Committee. I'm a former House employee. So I really welcome this opportunity and look forward to possibly having more exchanges with this Committee, with the Members individually.

And as I close my remarks, I would also note that both the Senate and the House have bills that would create election advisory committees. I would lend my voice of support to whatever you could do to enact legislation like that.

Thank you, and I welcome the questions.

_	into ottiii omiiitmuv iibi omiib. Iiiaiix you,
2	Mr. Feaser, for joining us. We appreciate it, appreciate
3	the information you have provided today and your expertise
4	and sharing that with us.

Thank vou

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE.

We have about seven Members that want to ask questions within 6 minutes, so less than a minute per Member. We'll get through as many as we can. We're going to need to move on to the next testifier at some point, so all Members won't have a chance.

I'm going to start with the list as they came in. $\label{eq:Representative Roae.}$ Representative Roae.

REPRESENTATIVE ROAE: Thank you, sir, for your testimony.

I was just thinking, if we could make it so that PennDOT would send you a list of all the Dauphin County driver's license people and there's an X by the ones that were not citizens, would it be that hard for you to purge your list of the noncitizens?

MR. FEASER: We have actually received such a list and began to reconcile. We have mailed letters. Many of the counties have mailed letters to these individuals. Because of their movements, the letters are coming back to us undeliverable.

As some of you note, I mean, many of these people got registered to vote by error---

REPRESENTATIVE ROAE: Right.

MR. FEASER: ---and they have never voted.

I had an individual just the other day come into my office who is a regular voter, and she is not a citizen, and we have received a request to be removed. We removed her from the voter rolls, and I warned her that if she goes through with the naturalization process, this could become an issue.

I have dealt with impassioned phone calls from residents who are here legally but not citizens, who are in the process of being deported because of that issue. So whatever we can do to rectify it, I would like to see that done.

I think the Department of State, in working with PennDOT, has made the upfront change for those initial applications. But I have warned Commissioner Marks already that I have received requests for change of address from noncitizens yet, and they're working on trying to rectify that.

But I will tell you that I also have paper applications in my office where someone has checked the box, yes, I'm a citizen, and I think it's just a matter of confusion, not necessarily understanding the nuance between resident here legally and not a citizen.

REPRESENTATIVE ROAE: All right. Thank you, sir.

1 MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you, 2 Representative Roae. 3 Representative Knowles. Representative McCarter. 4 5 REPRESENTATIVE McCARTER: Thank you, 6 Mr. Chairman. 7 Again, thank you, Mr. Feaser, for your testimony 8 today. 9 MR. FEASER: You're welcome. 10 REPRESENTATIVE McCARTER: And again, I share a 11 lot of your concerns about the needed reform, especially in 12 the absentee-ballot area, that has become somewhat 13 problematic, I think not only because of the timelines that 14 you mentioned in that last week, which are absolutely 15 impossible to follow, but things dealing with emergency absentee ballots as well, dealing with people who may have 16 17 to go into the hospital before they're able to vote and 18 having that opportunity. 19 And so when we look at last year's elections and 20 the year before and looking at the number of absentee 21 ballot problems that we had in many counties throughout the 22 Commonwealth, I would hope that, you know, your suggestions 23 and so forth can be the subject of something that we look

at in a very detailed way here in the Committee here, along

with your polling place ADA requirement issues as well.

24

25

And I know surely in the voting area that I voted, we have major problems in finding locations that can meet those needs at this particular time. And along with your poll worker suggestions as well.

I would strongly suggest that the Committee take up this issue in the future of trying to make some, you know, significant election reforms to help the process for people like yourself who have been trying to carry this out for years in a very nonpartisan way.

Thank you.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you, Representative McCarter.

Representative Dush.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Feaser, just a quick note on what you had said about the inability to hack. I have got actually two counties; one has some paper ballots and the other one that are read by a machine and another one the computers.

But just recently in Bloomberg, and as mentioned before, I am former Chief of Information Protection for the Air National Guard. The motherboard for our servers that were being used for drone footage to the CIA, the International Space Station, et cetera, have a chip about the size of a grain of rice. If that stuff is hardwired in it, I would like to have more information on who is

1 | producing the motherboards, who is producing those cards.

There are significant ways to gain access to some of these systems, so it's not outside the realm of possibility. In fact, there are a lot of motivated foreign actors who are definitely interested in doing just such a thing.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you.

MR. FEASER: If I could respond quickly, sir?

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: We have several other Members, but they have questions. Representative Dush, you didn't have a question there, right?

Representative Saccone for a question?

REPRESENTATIVE SACCONE: Yes, sir.

So is the software for the voting machines in that little device you passed around or is it in the general machine itself?

MR. FEASER: There are three chips in that cartridge. There are three chips on the machine. If the cartridge is lost or damaged in transit back to my office on election night, I can take a blank cartridge, go back out to the machine, and download it with a series of codes and retrieve that.

REPRESENTATIVE SACCONE: Yeah. So what I'm worried about is not so much hacking by the Internet but dealing with this vote flipping, that the actual program

itself may have come in with that in it, with that virus in

it.

MR. FEASER: Well, again, that is not, that is not likely in our system. Our system uses electromagnetic switches rather than a touchscreen.

It is my understanding that touchscreens may be susceptible because of a calibration issue that may or may not have been performed properly in the morning or at the beginning of the day. So those types of things are unique to a different system than the one at Dauphin County and the other counties that use our system that we maintain.

REPRESENTATIVE SACCONE: Thank you.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: And just for Representative Saccone and the issue you brought up a couple of items.

After the last election, we had reported a number of times, especially out west where some of those machines are being used in my district, we actually, my staff and I, had the vendor on the phone, one of the engineers from the vendor, and they explained that from their perspective what they thought was occurring was a lack of calibration on some of those machines. And depending on the age and the movement -- moving; the storage time -- there's a lot of variables there that when you place the machine, it needs to be recalibrated to make sure that the screen is

reflecting where somebody is touching and that they
thought, that was their assessment on why we were seeing
that vote flipping.

MR. FEASER: Right. And again, that's the touchscreen. Ours are electromagnetic switches.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you.

Representative Solomon, for what appears to be our last question for this testifier.

REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to thank you for your remarks. I think they bring out that election security is a broader conversation, a comprehensive one, about reforming our antiquated Election Code.

Can you specifically identify, what would be the number-one thing that we can do as Legislators to support your work?

MR. FEASER: Oh, that would be hard to narrow it down to one. The four reforms I list are basically the four that are universally supported by election directors across the State: funding for modern technologies, especially if we're going to be forced to make the switch to new systems; absentee ballots; poll workers; and polling places. Those are the four things.

And they all go hand in glove, because if those things are not altered before we are changing to a new

1 system, all we're going to end up doing is just turning the 2 page to a new set of challenges. 3 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Thank you, sir. MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you. 4 That's all the time we have for this testifier. 5 Thank you, sir, for your testimony today. 6 7 MR. FEASER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm always available the day after Election Day if you need me again. 8 9 MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you. you. Well, we look forward to working with you in the 10 11 future, sir. 12 Our next testifier is Mr. David J. Becker, 13 Executive Director and Founder of the Center for Election 14 Innovation & Research. 15 Thank you, Mr. Becker, for joining us, and you 16 can begin when you're ready, sir. 17 MR. BECKER: Good morning, and thank you, 18 Mr. Chair and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the 19 invitation to testify before you today about the important 20 issue of election integrity and security. With voter 21 confidence at risk and foreign adversaries intent upon 22 weakening democratic institutions, this issue is more 23 important than ever. 24 My name is David Becker, and I am the Executive

Director and Founder of the Center for Election Innovation

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& Research. CEIR is an innovative nonprofit with a proven track record of working with election officials from around the country and from both sides of the aisle. We work to build voter trust and confidence, increase voter participation, and improve the efficiency of election administration.

at the Pew Charitable Trusts for many years, and before that, I served as a trial attorney in the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice under both the Clinton and W. Bush Administrations.

Overall, I have over two decades of experience working to improve the efficiency, security, and integrity of elections in States across the political spectrum.

The good news is that voting in the United

States, and Pennsylvania in particular, is easier and more
secure than ever before. More voters than ever have an
easier time registering to vote, voting with more options,
and can be assured their vote will be counted properly.

But we're going to need to keep improving to ensure
security, integrity, and access for all voters, and
Pennsylvania is on that path.

First, we know that foreign adversaries have attempted to attack our election infrastructure. The threat from Russia and perhaps others is real. Russia

attempted to infiltrate voter registration databases in 2016, and while almost all of those efforts were unsuccessful -- only the Illinois voter database was successfully breached, and no records were altered or deleted -- our intelligence services and the Department of Homeland Security agree that the threat remains, and we must be vigilant to secure our systems.

But while vigilance is important, we must also not be so hysterical about potential vulnerabilities that we cause voters to lose confidence. In just the last few weeks, media reports have included claims that election officials are to blame if Russia attacks our election again, that voting systems are more vulnerable than ever, and that nobody is trying to fix them. These claims are all demonstrably false, and there remains zero evidence that votes in any past U.S. election were interfered with or changed, despite substantial investigation.

progress that has been made since 2016. Most election experts, including myself, advise that the best defense against interference with the vote itself is to use paper ballots with a robust audit of those ballots to ensure any mechanical count was accurate. We're close to that goal nationwide. Already 80 percent of all U.S. voters can cast a paper ballot, the highest percentage of non-punch card

paper ballot availability since computers were introduced to voting.

Since 2016, the State of Virginia has moved to entirely paper, and other States like Delaware are moving to paper right after 2018. And thanks to efforts from the Secretary of State's office and local election officials, Pennsylvania is likely to have paper well before 2020, as will other States who still use paperless systems.

A majority of States have audits of their paper ballots, and a growing number of States are leading the way to even more robust audits of their paper ballots.

Pennsylvania requires a small audit of ballots, but as it implements paper statewide, it may be advisable to consider a more significant routine random audit of ballots to ensure confidence in the outcome. My organization and others are working with States on helping them implement such audits.

Congress has stepped up with a one-time,
\$380 million appropriation to the States, including over
\$13 million for Pennsylvania. The State is using these
funds to help the counties with better security protocols,
as most of the States are.

All 50 States and over 1,000 local election offices and the Federal Government are sharing information on potential election cyber threats as never before through

an organization called the Election Infrastructure

Information Sharing and Analysis Center, or EI-ISAC. The

EI-ISAC didn't even exist until earlier this year, and

already every State is participating. Pennsylvania and

virtually every other State has partnered with DHS to also

hold tabletop exercises simulating a variety of possible

cyber-attacks to election infrastructure.

So voters should note that their votes will be counted and counted accurately. But what about the one area where we know a vulnerability has been exploited -- our voter databases. CEIR has worked with States on this important issue and recently surveyed the States to determine whether States are adopting best practices for security of their voter lists. A majority of the States responded, although Pennsylvania did not. Our findings are that States have made significant progress, though further improvement is needed.

For instance, there are several security protocols we recommend which can help prevent an attack on a voter database from occurring, detect any attempted intrusion, and if necessary, mitigate the effects of any successful infiltration. These recommendations include:

Secure password requirements, requiring
 authorized users to use uncommon, sufficiently

1 long and complex passwords and to change them 2 regularly; 3 Multi-factor authentication, which requires an identifying factor other than a password to 5 log in, such as a confirming text message or use of a token which can generate a separate 6 7 password; Regularly training voter registration database 8 9 users, including county and local staff with 10 access, to detect cyber threats like spear 11 phishing; 12 Deploying tools like Albert sensors in 13 partnership with the Center for Internet 14 Security and DHS and other tools to 15 consistently monitor for improper access to 16 the voter database, including checking for 17 things like unusual volume of activity or 18 activity originating in a foreign country; 19 Use secure HTTPS for websites with sensitive 20 information; 21 Employ tools to prevent distributed denial-of-22 service attacks, or DDoS attacks; 23 Utilize email protection tools; 24 And regular backups of the voter database, 25 daily if possible, and regular tests of those

backups so the system can be restored quickly if necessary.

Based on our survey, it's clear that a significant majority of States are utilizing most of the recommended tools. Indeed, over 90 percent of voters live in jurisdictions protected by Albert sensors. However, there are areas for improvement. For instance, States can do better when it comes to implementing more secure password requirements and further adopting multi-factor authentication.

As for Pennsylvania, I'm not aware of whether all these recommendations and the others made in the report are being followed, but knowing their approach to security, I think it's likely that Pennsylvania is implementing most of these, and you can confirm that directly with the Department of State.

Finally, I would like to discuss one key area of election integrity related to the voter database, and that's the accuracy of the voter lists themselves.

Election officials from across the political spectrum agree that it is important that the voter lists are as accurate and up to date as possible and represent only those who are eligible to vote, and I know you have discussed that already here today.

States are doing better than ever before in meeting this goal, thanks to three key strategies which we recommend, all of which Pennsylvania has been at the leading edge of implementing.

First, online voter registration. This is a basic system that allows voter registration to enter the 21st century. Though there were only two States offering online voter registration 10 years ago, now nearly 40 States do, including Pennsylvania, of course. And it's only a matter of a few years before every voter can register to vote securely online, 24 hours a day, reducing the amount of paper to process, reducing errors in data entry, and reducing possible voter registration fraud.

Second, automating the motor-voter process. When a citizen experiences a life event, a move, a name change, or coming of age, the agency they are most likely to tell first is Motor Vehicles. When Motor Vehicles can efficiently and effectively pass on information about new voters or updates for existing voters to election officials, the lists are more accurate and up to date. This should be a fully electronic process, eliminating paper to maximize efficiency. Pennsylvania has been a national leader in modernizing its systems, and many other States are looking to Pennsylvania's model as they consider more automation.

Last, membership in the Electronic Registration

Information Center, or ERIC as it's called. ERIC is a

sophisticated data center run by the States that choose to

participate that helps States improve the accuracy of

America's voter rolls and increase access to voter

registration for all eligible citizens.

As of this summer, ERIC has helped its 24 member States, including Pennsylvania, identify over 7.2 million voters who moved within the State but the voter record hadn't yet been updated, over 2.2 million voters who moved out of the State and were therefore no longer eligible to vote in that State, and over 220,000 voter records for individuals who had passed away since they last voted. All totaled, ERIC is responsible for correcting nearly 10 million voter records that were no longer accurate since its inception in 2012.

Pennsylvania and other States have made great strides in election integrity in the last several years, but there is more work to be done, particularly in election cybersecurity. Election officials stand ready to continue to make improvements, but they need resources.

There is no finish line in cybersecurity. As we improve our defenses, those who would seek to undermine our democracy will improve their attack capabilities.

Therefore, election officials will need a more regular

stream of funding to ensure that they can continue the progress to secure our election systems.

Funds are needed to purchase new technology and hire and train staff. I am hopeful that the States will step up to provide these needed resources, perhaps in partnership with Congress, to ensure that voters can have confidence that their votes will count.

Thank you, and I'd be happy to answer any questions.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you,
Mr. Becker.

Our first question is from Representative
Bullock.

REPRESENTATIVE BULLOCK: Thank you, Chairman.

Thank you. How are you doing this morning?

MR. BECKER: Good. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE BULLOCK: Great.

So I just wanted to follow up on what I saw as sort of the juxtaposition between two recommendations, that we move to a paper ballot system for voting but then increase our reliance on electronic and online registration and other systems. And so how do you balance those two sort of seemingly opposite directions of recommendations?

MR. BECKER: Yeah; that's a really good question.

So registration and the vote itself are very

different processes. For voter registration to be effective, it has to be linked and associated with an individual who has been identified, and so that link to that individual is always there. It's much like a lot of the other online transactions that we have, so it's more similar to what we might do on our smartphones and our laptops any day.

We know that can be secure, because we've had a long history of securing those kinds of transactions. The vote is a very different kind of transaction. For a vote to be effective in the United States, at some point we need to separate that vote from the individual who cast it and thus completely delink it to the identifying information, because we want the vote to be secret.

In order to have an auditable record of that, it's very, very difficult, and the best way to do that is paper right now. So to have some kind of record of the ballot that we can't link back to the individual after the individual has left and still be able to confirm this is how a vote was cast and we're sure of it, paper is the best way right now.

REPRESENTATIVE BULLOCK: Thank you.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you,

Representative Bullock.

Representative Dush.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: Thank you, and I happen to concur. I have got now two different types of voting machines. As I said before, in one county it's paper, much more secure and also much easier to audit.

MR. BECKER: Mm-hmm.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: My question for you is, you had talked about the ERIC system, and you had some significant numbers there on a number of people who have moved out of the State and are thus no longer eligible. Since Pennsylvania is a member of that, do you have the number on how many you have informed the Pennsylvania Department of State were not eligible?

MR. BECKER: So I should first say, I don't run ERIC.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: Okay.

MR. BECKER: I led the effort to create ERIC and I sit on ERIC's board, but I don't run ERIC. ERIC is an independent 501(c)(3) that is actually run by the States that participate. So Pennsylvania sits on the board and participates as well. I think the best source of that would be the Department of State, although I can get you that information if you need it.

I should also note that all of those States, almost all of the States in ERIC -- and it's almost exactly evenly divided between States led by Republicans and States

led by Democrats. All of the States with the exception of a couple are subject to the National Voter Registration Act, as is Pennsylvania. So the process of removing those voters would still need to comply with that Federal law, requiring usually some kind of notice and a period of time if you don't hear back from them. But the ERIC system has been able to effectively identify those voters for mailing and notices.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: When the States get that notification, are you aware of what the process is for eliminating them from the rolls? Do they contact the counties and have them eliminated, or---

MR. BECKER: So I can speak generally to that. I can't speak specifically to Pennsylvania. But from my knowledge of what most of the States do, the States get a record, a report sent to them, and then depending upon the State, either the State, or it's delegated down to the counties, mails out notices to all of the people identified on the report. And they wait to see whether some of those notices are returned, which, of course, would enable a transaction, or whether the voter does not respond to those, which would then enable the State to inactivate that voter for, under Federal law, two Federal election cycles before they remove them.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: Thank you very much.

1 And, Mr. Chairman, I would just request that we 2 make a request for that information from the Commissioner. 3 Thank you. MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: We might have to go 4 5 to court to get it, but we could do that. 6 Representative DeLissio. 7 REPRESENTATIVE DeLISSIO: Thank you, 8 Mr. Chairman. 9 This may be more of a quick comment than a 10 question. 11 I had an aunt who died in July -- 99; a good 12 life. Within short days, if not hours, everything she had 13 financially was frozen, boom boom. You know, the 14 funeral director needs to notify Social Security and it 15 goes out from there. So I have always been fascinated how, you know, this technology exists to cross-reference 16 17 databases to ensure, you know, where somebody is filing tax 18 returns. You know, this alert goes out within, and when my 19 dad passed away, I swear it was within hours. 20 So are these the types of systems that ERIC is --21 I mean, if it does exist, I am always wondering sometimes 22 why we're recreating the wheel and/or why we're not 23 leveraging something that's already in place. 24 MR. BECKER: Yeah. So that's also a very good

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question.

So ERIC exists on top of existing systems. And it's different, death reporting exists differently depending upon where someone dies. So if someone dies in State, it's very likely the State agencies are going to learn about it very quickly. But if someone from Pennsylvania dies in Florida, it might take a long time. And there are some networking systems called, like, for instance, there's one called STEVE that helps coordinate that.

What ERIC does, Social Security creates a database called their death master list, and that death master list tries to incorporate all of the data from all of the States and all of the systems and put it all in one place. ERIC subscribes to that list, as certain organizations are allowed to, and incorporates that list into its matching process.

And then very, very importantly, it has a very, very sophisticated matching process that is highly accurate. So we can be sure that if we get the right John Doe rather than -- because you don't want someone showing up to vote and having been removed from the list and saying, you marked me as dead; I'm standing here; I'm not dead. Local news always seems to be there when that happens. So it's important to get that right, but I think ERIC has a pretty good system for doing that.

1 REPRESENTATIVE DeLISSIO: Thank you. 2 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 3 MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you, 4 Representative DeLissio. 5 Representative Bradford. 6 MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Similar to actually 7 what the last speaker said. I was very impressed by your testimony, because 8 9 something you said really struck home, where you said that 10 vigilance is important, but we must not be hysterical about 11 potential vulnerabilities, and some of the last few 12 speakers I think this is true of. 13 When you really lay it out, this isn't a 14 Democrat/Republican thing. We are all in this together. 15 We do have to bolster election confidence, and I just 16 really appreciate kind of the thoughtfulness that can be 17 brought to this when you get away from the kind of one-offs 18 or the issues that are needlessly divisive. 19 This is, you know, this is the fundamental stuff. 20 Elections are the key to making this system work, and we've 21 got to bolster that confidence, not tear it down. So I 22 really appreciate what you had to say. 23 MR. BECKER: I appreciate that. And I just want 24 to say that I have unlimited respect for people like the

staff at the Department of State and the county and local

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election officials all over the country, especially in Pennsylvania, who have to walk this fine line of trying to secure their process and, you know, up their security game while at the same time communicating to all their voters that they should have confidence that they can come out and vote and know their vote will be counted as it was cast.

MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: You know, and if I could, real quick, and I should have ended with the commentary and started with this.

One of the things, I know I was at a conference about this issue, and one of the things I was quite impressed with is, it's not just in Pennsylvania. It's not just the professionals. Through all 50 States, D, R, you know, blue, red, whatever, everyone is kind of saying the one thing -- the same things. Everyone seems to be hitting the same points.

But it always reminds me of something, and I remember this was in the 9/11 Commission Report, was the failure of thinking about what no one else is thinking about, the failure of imagination, which is a horrible way to think about it. But what are we not thinking about? Like, because it seems like everyone is saying the same things, and that's comforting, but it also makes you think there's a little bit of group think that's going on, and are we missing it.

MR. BECKER: Yeah.

MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Because no one thought up until 2016 this is the direction it was going.

MR. BECKER: So I think -- it's one of the things
I think about a lot, and it keeps me up a little bit at
night. And I worked with others to red team the election
ahead of time. Imagine if we were sitting in Moscow or
somewhere else, if we wanted to interfere with democracy,
what we would do.

I won't share with you my worst-case scenarios, but I think we're prepared for many of them. And one of the things that we need to do is, there are a lot of things that an adversary or a criminal could do to cause frustration and chaos in our system, but as we move to paper, as we move to very robust audits, as we move to secure voter registration databases and other technology that we use in our election system, we can mitigate any possible problem.

I usually focus on three things: prevention, detection, and mitigation. You want to prevent it as much as possible; if someone gets in, you want to detect it; and if something bad happens, you want to mitigate it. Things like provisional ballots really help with that, which Pennsylvania and every other State has under Federal law for Federal elections.

Again, we can -- as long as we can educate voters and get them prepared and be ready in a worst-case circumstance, our democracy should be resilient against attack. And there are a lot of smart people at places like the Department of Homeland Security, which has acted incredibly responsibly and been very helpful during this whole thing, and in all of the States working on those kinds of things.

9 MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Thank you,
10 Mr. Chair.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Representative Saccone.

REPRESENTATIVE SACCONE: Yes. Thank you.

Is the Department of State on the notification list from funeral directors if they have to notify Social Security, or are they on the list to be notified so that they can be taken off the rolls? I say that, again, having the same experience. My father died, and for every, you know, for like 5 years, until I actually told them, please take him off, he's not in there; he shouldn't be in your little box there.

MR. BECKER: The short answer is, I don't know, and the Department of State would know better. I know the Department of State does get a death list from ERIC.

I should also say that one of the real challenges

here isn't just getting notified about people who have died; it's then matching that information to the voter list, and so much of government relies upon being able to take information on John Doe from one list and information on John Doe from another list and match it together and say, we know for sure this is the right person, because you don't want to get that wrong, right?

So getting the information is just one part of it, but being able to successfully match it is the second and most important part, and that's what ERIC does very well. It does both. So if States are getting regular ERIC reports, as most are, it should be just a few month lag between the death and the notice to a State, from ERIC at least.

REPRESENTATIVE SACCONE: Chairman, I think we should find out if they are on that list, and maybe that's a piece of legislation we could do, is that, add them to the funeral directors' notification list with some matching information like a Social Security number or whatever it is so that we can make sure it's the right person when they're purging the list.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: We'll research that further.

Thank you, Representative Saccone. I agree with you.

Mr. Becker, in all of what you talked about, it's kind of on the back end of the process, protecting the vote. On the front end is what I was addressing when we first opened the hearing, I think before you had arrived, when Commissioner Marks had declined to comment. We may actually have a hearing set, that I'm supposed to have a hearing regarding information I've asked for from the Department that they have not come forth with, and I asked for it a year ago, and that's comparisons between our SURE system and our driver's licensing system to see how many foreign nationals are registered to vote in Pennsylvania illegally, and then from there, I would like to find out how many of them have been casting illegal votes. So we know that they have been doing it. We know there are foreign nationals registered.

And one of the occurrences that occurred kind of around that same sphere was that a constituent of mine complained that his wife was a foreign national and received a letter from the Department wanting her to vote, wanting her to register to vote. And when we contacted the Department, I think at the time Secretary Cortes actually talked to the individual that had called from my district about this, and in part he blamed that letter on the requirements they had to comply with from ERIC for sending out a mailing to all these individuals in Pennsylvania that

weren't registered to vote, and many of them, I think there was a number of them that were not eligible to vote but they were getting letters saying that they should vote.

So in that sense, ERIC's process was doing kind of what PennDOT was doing, because their software wasn't set up correct to discourage people from illegally voting. So when you get a letter and you're a foreign national and it tells you to register to vote from an official department, I think that's a problem.

So do you know, what's ERIC doing regarding this, because the front end is where I'm concerned about.

Because I feel confident that we have the right security in place to stop the cyber-attack kind of scenario that has been talked about this morning. My concern is the front end, and that's why I have been asking for this information for over a year now from the Administration, and they're not forthcoming. And after a year, you have to say cover-up. Why aren't they giving this information to the public?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ BECKER: So I'll address both the ERIC and the DMV side of this.

I think one thing I know from talking with election officials all around the country, no one wants those who are ineligible to register to vote. That is not a good situation for anyone. I don't care if you're a

liberal Democrat or a conservative Republican; that is a bipartisan position.

The way -- I should start with Motor Vehicles.

So when someone goes into Motor Vehicles in almost every

State -- and I can't say this is true in Pennsylvania, but

I'll bet it is -- you generally have to show a form of

identification from two or three columns, usually to prove

both legal presence and residence in the State of

Pennsylvania, for instance. And some of those forms of

identification will document either your citizenship or

non-citizenship status. So, for instance, I go in. I

happen to be a citizen. I may show my passport or a

U.S. birth certificate. That's pretty clear on a U.S.

citizen at that point.

I may also come in and I might be a Green Card holder. It's probably legal to get a driver's license here in Pennsylvania if you're a Green Card holder and legally present.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: It is.

MR. BECKER: You show your Green Card. Then you would have documented non-citizenship contemporaneous to the time when you might be registering to vote.

And then there's a third category in almost every State, which is, they have not shown documentation of either citizenship or non-citizenship, and in those cases,

we're not sure whether they are citizens or not. We know overwhelmingly they are by percentage, but we don't know which ones are and which ones may not be.

So when ERIC uploads that data -- or sorry -- when the State uploads that data to ERIC, what they do is they eliminate those who have documented non-citizenship at the time, but they don't know whether the people who have documented either citizenship or non-citizenship are citizens, and so those are included in the upload.

They get that information back, and the letter that goes out -- and I have seen it both for Pennsylvania and for all the other States. Actually, it's very carefully worded. It says, it appears you may not be registered and you may be eligible. It usually lists the requirements and then directs them to the online voter registration system.

As you all know, when you go to the online voter registration system, you need to certify that you are a citizen affirmatively at that time. So it doesn't register you; it will direct you to the online voter registration system. And if you are not eligible, there will be — there's an opportunity there for you to back out because you can't certify all of the eligibility requirements.

Now, from the Motor Vehicles' perspective, I think it's really good policy, and this is not uncommon in

1 the United States. Pennsylvania has had this problem.

Other States have had this problem. I have worked with other States on this problem.

Motor Vehicles, it is advisable to create a process whereby that person can never get asked to register to vote at that time. And most States have kind of jerry-rigged their system for voter registration, and this is what I'm talking about when I talk about automation of the process. The front end is actually incredibly important. When you're interacting with the individual, if you got information that they are a noncitizen at that point, they should be put into a virtual lane where they never see that question. If they naturalize at some further point in time, they will have opportunities. Of course, the online voter registration system in Pennsylvania has been around for quite some time. They can then register to vote completely

But we want to make sure that we have a process whereby -- because most of these people that have gotten registered, and I have done a lot of research on this, are doing so accidentally. They are not trying to put in peril their legal status in the United States.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Mr. Becker?

MR. BECKER: Yeah.

legally, and that's wonderful.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: We're pretty much out of time. But just to cut to the quick of it is, everybody knows, except for the public, that there are foreign nationals that have registered and that some of those foreign nationals are voting. So when they vote, they nullify legally cast votes.

So I think really to get to -- and that's what I would ask you to take back to the board of ERIC, the concern that we have, many of us, that we would like to see, as our State being a participant in ERIC, that we would like to see something done on the front end that is going to stop the foreign national interference with our elections. It's happening through these registrations where people are voting.

I mean, we just had the Dauphin County Elections
Bureau Director testify that he had one person that was a
frequent voter, and he had warned her that this could
impact her becoming a citizen.

MR. BECKER: So again, I just want to say a couple of things.

First, I have done research about this nationwide. It is undoubtedly true that there are some people who are noncitizens who get registered, and a small percentage of them vote. Those numbers nationally can be counted in the dozens, not even the thousands. We're

1 talking about a very, very small number.

That being said, ERIC and all of the States have a great interest in reducing that to zero or as close to zero as possible. And I think one of the things---

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you,

Mr. Becker.

MR. BECKER: Can I just follow up, because--MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: We do have to move
on, but I would say, I would say the information that I
have---

MR. BECKER: Typically what---

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: I would say the information I have shows that maybe all those voters are in Pennsylvania, because we have had dozens in Pennsylvania.

MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Why don't we let him finish? We normally let people finish their sentence.

MR. BECKER: I would just say that ERIC is dependent upon the data that the States share. So if a State DMV allows people to come in and not identify whether they're a citizen or not, which most States do, then ERIC is going to only be dependent upon what it can take in. What it puts out can only be dependent on what it takes in. So if it's ambiguous as to whether the individual is a citizen or not, ERIC can't tell you whether that person is a citizen or not.

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                 So there might be ways that you can accomplish
       that here, but ERIC is going to be dependent upon what the
 2
       DMV here can do.
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                MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Well, if you could
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 5
       take it back to the board. But you said you're on the
 6
      board?
 7
                MR. BECKER: Yeah.
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                MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Then ultimately you
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      would like to see something on the front end with States
10
      working together to stop the registrations on the front end
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      that are threatening the integrity of the system.
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                MR. BECKER: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
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                MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you, sir.
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                MR. BECKER: Thank you.
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                MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: We appreciate it.
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       Thank you for being with us. Have a good day.
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                 Our next testifier is Mr. J. Christian Adams,
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       President and General Counsel of the Public Interest Legal
19
      Foundation.
20
                 Good morning.
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                MR. ADAMS: Good morning.
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                MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: You can begin when
23
      ready, sir.
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                 MR. ADAMS: Chairman Metcalfe, Democratic Chair
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      Bradford, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
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invitation to testify today.

I am the President and General Counsel of the Public Interest Legal Foundation, a nonpartisan charity devoted to promoting election integrity and best practices for election officials.

I was also a member of the Presidential Advisory
Commission on Election Integrity, and like your previous
witness, a trial attorney in the Voting Section of the
Department of Justice.

My organization has produced two reports detailing several system failures involving noncitizens that are registering and voting in the Commonwealth, one for Philadelphia and one for Allegheny County, which is called *Steeling the Vote*.

Almost 2 years to the day have passed since my last appearance before this body. Then I warned that we were finding preliminary indications at the time that noncitizens were in fact registering and voting here in the Commonwealth. Some of my warnings from 2016 have yielded subsequent proofs on a large scale within Pennsylvania's electoral system.

It is not true that there are only dozens of people who are noncitizens who are voting nationwide and casting ballots. We now know 2 years later the situation was far worse than we predicted. We now know that for

decades, problems in the voter registration systems were failing to screen out aliens in PennDOT's motor-voter system.

But there are some things we do not know, because State officials have hid the full extent of the problem from our organization, the public, and even you, the Legislators with the power of oversight over State election officials. My organization has had to file a Federal lawsuit to obtain basic public records regarding the extent of this problem. Instead of transparency, the Commonwealth has vigorously defended against the lawsuit and against public disclosure.

I appear before you today because even though more than a year has passed since the Commonwealth disclosed this "glitch" inviting non-U.S. citizens to vote, the general public remains in the dark about the extent of the problem. Instead of opposing our lawsuit, the Commonwealth should be transparent about the mistakes made over the last 20 years that allowed noncitizens to register and vote, because Federal law grants you and the public a right to this information.

I know my Foundation is not alone with its frustration with the Department of State. Even the Philadelphia Inquirer's editorial board has registered its unease about how the Commonwealth is handling this affair.

The Federal lawsuit continues at the preliminary stages, and I will certainly offer this body updates as they are available.

Now, my Foundation was able to dislodge some information from a minority of counties across the Commonwealth, offering only a glimpse of how noncitizens are becoming registered to vote, how they are discovered, and canceled. As I mentioned, we have this report -- and I have extra copies for you or anybody behind me who would like one -- called *Steeling the Vote*. It only focuses on Allegheny County; hence, the black and gold.

According to my Foundation's research, noncitizens were invited to the DMV to register and vote.

I want to point out two examples from this report.

The first is a woman named Karen. Karen wrote a letter which we obtained through a records request from Allegheny County. Remember, the State won't give us these records. It says:

"To Whom It May Concern:

"I am writing to request that my name be removed from the voter registration list.

"I am not eligible to vote as I am not an American citizen."

It says, when I came to the United States in 1996, registering to vote was part of the driver's license

application. I asked the attendant if I should fill it

out. I told her I did not think I was qualified to vote

because I wasn't a citizen. She thought that I should fill

4 it out anyway and I would be rejected if I was not

5 qualified.

The point is, that's not true, because there's no back-end verification of citizenship.

Let me share another example in the report. It's number 1 in the report of multiple examples. This is a person named Alister.

Alister was a university student at the University of California, Pennsylvania. He said that he had inadvertently signed up to vote during a "get voters to the poll drive."

"I was not aware at that time that legal aliens were not permitted to vote. I only did so as part of the 'drive' on campus to get college students registered." I voted in the 2004 election, and I understand now that it was very wrong and I am sorry.

We have found example after example after example like this in counties across Pennsylvania, including in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and other counties. It is not happening only by the dozens nationwide; it is happening by the thousands, at least.

About 71 percent of noncitizens removed from the

Allegheny County voter rolls were discovered because they reported their own status. Remember, these are self-reports. These are confessions. These are people who actually write in and say, take me off the rolls. We don't know the extent of the full problem, because we have a tiny little sample size. Of them, 63 percent occurred because of PennDOT transactions over the last two decades -- 63 percent. Noncitizens sat on the rolls -- the ones we found -- for an average of 6 years before removal.

Transparency into these failures of the past is not alone going to resolve this matter. The Commonwealth's alleged efforts to reach out to noncitizens before November is a one-off fix, not a course correction.

The fact remains, when a voter applicant checks the box on the voter registration that they are indeed a U.S. citizen, that claim is not verified in Pennsylvania. It is an honor system, and the honor system has failed.

As I told this body 2 years ago to much skepticism, the number of illegal votes occurring in Pennsylvania by noncitizens doesn't matter when the integrity of the process is at stake. The integrity is at risk because it invites illegal participation and sets otherwise law-abiding immigrants up to fail.

Thank you very much for your time and attention.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you, sir.

Questions from Members?

2 Representative Dush.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: Thank you, Mr. Adams.

One of the things that Mr. Becker brought up on the database entries, during the testimony over a year ago, PennDOT came in and tried to explain away the computer database issue and tried to say that it wasn't as simple as an "if-then" statement on the computer program: If the person is an illegal, or I mean, here legally as an alien, then they would not be eligible to actually take a look at that screen to even sign up to vote.

That is the type of thing that has precipitated the actions of the Chairman to gain this information. How many other counties have you been able to gain access to information from? I mean, for me, it's appalling that we don't, as having oversight, we don't have access to this. But you said Allegheny County. How many other counties have been helping you out?

MR. ADAMS: We have looked at about 10 other counties in Pennsylvania, finding similar numbers, particularly in eastern Pennsylvania, on the eastern side of the State.

But the fact that there's no transparency is what is most amazing. It's the only place I can think of in the country where there's this level of stonewalling by the

election officials.

You know, the public ought to have confidence in the process, and they ought to open up the windows and let the public in. I have never seen a Legislature that has been stonewalled that has oversight authority. That's the most astounding part. The Commonwealth, the Department of State, should make this all transparent so you guys can fix the problem and not just rely on them to operate behind the curtain.

REPRESENTATIVE DUSH: Thank you. You just answered my follow-up question. So, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you.

And Mr. Becker had mentioned toward the end that there were dozens or so in the country, which was when I interrupted and took exception with that, because I know just from the information that you had provided us 2 years ago from Philadelphia, that I think Commissioner Schmidt also had discussed with myself and some of my Members. In fact, he had come here to the Capitol. I think he testified before the Senate State Government Committee, after the point that we had talked.

But when you talk about dozens, and we had thought even from the testimony of Commissioner Marks, I think last year, there was a recognition of well more than

dozens that had registered illegally in Pennsylvania. And these are just people that are self-reporting. So we're only finding out about these registrants because they're applying for citizenship.

So, I mean, do you happen to know what the percentage of those individuals are compared to the percentage of people who are here that aren't applying for citizenship?

MR. ADAMS: Yeah.

In other words, we don't know the other side of the equation because it's trying to prove a negative.

We're only finding, just to be clear, we're harvesting information across the country about aliens who have self-reported their status to election officials. They're usually in the immigration process. They want clean hands, so they get off the rolls. And so we have been harvesting that tiny little part of this.

We have another report called *Safe Spaces*, which we looked at sanctuary cities around the country for the same phenomena, and I can assure you, there's a lot more than dozens around the country that have been voting.

And these are only -- some of them are voting a dozen times, one individual. And so it's not true that there's only a few dozen people.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Now, the question

that was asked earlier from Representative Roae to the Major, I think at the time regarding databases, and that's what we have asked for, is what's the comparison between the SURE system and the PennDOT driver's licensing system.

And once again, this would only identify those individuals who are here as resident aliens, legally, with a Green Card or on a student visa or something like that, where they have been here and they have applied for a driver's license or a Pennsylvania ID card of some sort, so they had some additional ID. So it wouldn't identify those foreign nationals who are here that are not driving, that are not applying for a driver's license, using an international driver's license, using a driver's license from another State that has been issued, that have come here as a student or are working or whatever the scenario. So you're still not going to capture the whole, you know, the whole atmosphere of those individuals that are here, resident aliens.

But if we compared those two databases, is that something, are you aware, have other States run those comparisons, and what numbers have they seen and what action have they taken to resolve the issue of having these foreign nationals that they know of on their voting rolls?

MR. ADAMS: That's a great question, because a few other States are in fact doing this. Top among them

are Texas and Michigan. They are finding astounding numbers in Texas of foreign nationals who are on the voter rolls by comparison of the driver's license Real ID compliant database and the voter rolls.

I would hope that every State election official in the country would do that, because it's a great tool.

Now, does every match automatically pan out? No; you have some follow-up you have to do. But doing the matchup is the first process.

Doing the matchup transparently, informing the oversight committees and law enforcement officials, ought to also be part of the process. And doing that matchup is a great tool to find defects in the system, especially when you have got the situation you have here with two decades of bad practices involving PennDOT.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Now, it seemed like some of the reasoning or excuses that we were receiving at the last hearing a year or so ago was that the data might not actually be correct and that that individual might now be a naturalized citizen. But there are dates associated with those databases, so they could tell if that person who is now naturalized had registered before being naturalized, I would assume. Isn't that correct?

MR. ADAMS: Absolutely.

And look, we have found over and over and over

again examples of people who remained on the rolls. So there are going to be plenty of people who are on the rolls illegally. So just because somebody might have become a naturalized citizen later doesn't mean that you hide the research.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Now, I had read through the Steeling the Vote report that you had issued, and as I was reading it, I was thinking, this is something that everybody here in the Legislature should read, because as Mr. Becker had proffered that he doesn't believe that this is a partisan issue; he believes that, you know, Democrat, Republican, Independent, that nobody wants to see anybody who is not legally eligible to vote registering to vote, although I just saw something being played on the news this morning. I think she's a Congressman who was talking about some individuals making up the blue wave that she thought would be undocumented. So it seemed like she might actually want somebody to be registered to vote that's not supposed to be.

But it seems like if this is a nonpartisan issue, that we would have cooperation with the Administration, and we have not seen any cooperation, either from what you have asked for, which you said that you filed a Federal lawsuit to obtain that. When was that suit filed?

MR. ADAMS: Sometime in the spring.

The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the case. That's pending before the judge right now. We have had a scheduling conference. I'm confident the Federal law is so clear, that the public has a right to this information, that we will eventually get it, even if it's at the command of a Federal judge.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: That's what's baffling, is that if you want to find out how your neighbor is registered to vote and what their voting frequency is and what their date of birth is and if they voted absentee at all over the course of the last, you know, 5 years or so, for whenever the records are made available to the public, you can get that information. It's public records.

You can go to your local election bureau. You can go through the SURE system. You can get the data. You can get the disc from the SURE system for like, I think, 20 bucks or something from the Department, and they'll make you a disc of the whole State. And you can, you know, do your own -- if you are computer savvy, unlike Representative Roae, you could actually do some querying and figure out who's been voting and all of that. The only thing that we wouldn't have access to is to find out if that individual actually has an INS indicator associated with their file that's in the PennDOT system, which the State has.

And I believe they have already done the comparison. I believe they know. I believe the number is so high that they don't want the public to know how high the number is, and I think that's why we're seeing the cover-up.

MR. ADAMS: Well, don't forget about the bipartisan nature of this. Frankly, candidly, Democrats have a reason to be against noncitizen registration, because these are people who may end up deported, may end up in jail. These are Federal felonies. And they may have family members who are citizens in their districts, because a lot of these are concentrated in the eastern part of the State. And so Republicans have a reason to oppose it. I think it is in fact a bipartisan issue, maybe for different reasons.

But I recall when I was here 2 years ago to testify, and when I first started talking about this, you would have thought that I had indicated there were elves and unicorns running around in the Poconos. It was as if this was a complete fantasy. And then slowly the data has been extracted across the State, and we are now finding, finally they admitted there is a problem. They just won't tell you how bad it is.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Right.

Representative Solomon.

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REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 1
 2
                 So what's your number right now? How many
 3
       noncitizens do we have that are registered to vote in
 4
       Pennsylvania?
                MR. ADAMS: Well, we don't know, because---
 5
                MR. SOLOMON: No; but you've got all these little
 6
 7
       footnotes, anecdotes.
 8
                MR. ADAMS: Right.
 9
                MR. SOLOMON: How many have -- and I notice it's
10
       only in Philadelphia County and Allegheny County.
11
                MR. ADAMS: Yeah. In Allegheny, there were
12
       139 self-reports. Remember, these are people who took the
13
       time to write in and essentially confess to a Federal
14
       felony.
15
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON:
                                          139.
16
                MR. ADAMS: 139.
17
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: And what do you have in
18
       Philadelphia?
                MR. ADAMS: Ah, Philadelphia, I think the number
19
20
       was -- let me see if I can get it for you.
21
                 317.
22
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: All right.
23
       conflicts with what Commissioner Schmidt said.
24
                 But of those, how many are still actively voting?
25
                MR. ADAMS:
                            That I don't know. I'm sorry.
```

1	REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: So how many of those
2	have been corrected by either Allegheny County or
3	Philadelphia County?
4	MR. ADAMS: That would be part of our records
5	request that we have made to the Department of State that
6	they have stonewalled. And so it's not we don't have
7	the answer to that.
8	REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: So what has been your
9	study through the other counties in Pennsylvania? How many
LO	there?
L1	MR. ADAMS: Well, I will tell you and forgive
_2	me. You're from the western part of the State, I believe?
L3	REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Philadelphia County.
L 4	MR. ADAMS: Philadelphia. Okay. I'm sorry.
L5	Smaller numbers. Obviously we have looked at
L 6	Westmoreland. We looked at Fayette. They are not going to
₋ 7	have numbers that are similar to Philadelphia or
L 8	REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: How many?
_9	MR. ADAMS: Four or five, I think.
20	REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Four or five everywhere
21	else throughout the Commonwealth.
22	MR. ADAMS: No, no, no; that's not accurate. I
23	said Westmoreland County or Fayette.
24	I'm from Westmoreland County.
25	REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Right.

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1
                MR. ADAMS: And I can assure you there are vast
 2
       differences between Westmoreland County and other parts of
 3
       the State. It's not exactly an immigrant magnet.
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: An immigrant magnet.
 4
 5
       Where?
 6
                MR. ADAMS: In other words -- Westmoreland.
 7
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Right. But, so Steeling
       the Vote---
 8
 9
                MR. ADAMS: Allegheny only.
10
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Allegheny only.
11
                MR. ADAMS: Only.
12
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: So you've got Allegheny.
13
       You've got Philadelphia. But you don't have specific
14
      numbers throughout the rest of the counties.
15
                MR. ADAMS: Well, I do. I just don't have them
16
       off the top of my head.
17
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Well, because you were
18
       saying thousands.
19
                MR. ADAMS:
                            No.
20
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: So where are they from?
21
                MR. ADAMS: No; thousands in other places around
22
      the country. The previous testimony you heard was there's
23
       only a few dozen around the country that are illegally
24
      voting, and that is plainly not true. We have found
25
       thousands across the country.
```

REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: And is this a concerted effort to register people, or do you think this is by accident?

MR. ADAMS: As I indicated, 63 percent of the ones who are registered went through the PennDOT system.

And so "concerted effort" I don't think is an accurate description of what was going on at PennDOT.

One of the things you do when you get the raw data is you can start to see whether or not there's concerted effort. Were they coming in through third-party registration drives? Were they coming in a different way? Once we get the data from the Department of State, we'll be able to answer the question you just asked.

REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: But the 63 percent through PennDOT, it would be fair to say that would be by accident.

MR. ADAMS: Well, I mean, you can call it accident, incompetence. There's a lot of words that might fit. We would know if we knew more about the problem.

REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: And you also mentioned that this goes back decades. Have you been receiving anecdotes for 10, 20 years about voter improprieties throughout all 67 counties?

MR. ADAMS: The conclusion that it's a decades-long problem is from admissions by State officials.

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1
       It's not our assessment.
 2
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: And where's that report?
 3
                 MR. ADAMS: It's ubiquitous. They have said that
 4
       this was a motor-voter---
 5
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: No; where's the report
 6
       to quantify your claim?
 7
                MR. ADAMS: Well, motor-voter was implemented in
       '95-96. Or excuse me -- '94-95.
 8
 9
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON: Right.
10
                 MR. ADAMS: And so 2018 minus '95 is
11
       approximately two decades.
12
                 So this is a problem that existed in
13
      motor-voter's implementation, and that's easy to understand
14
      that it's two decades long.
15
                 REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON:
                                          Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
16
                 MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Representative Ryan.
17
                 REPRESENTATIVE RYAN: Just a very quick comment.
18
                 And first of all, thank you for your testimony.
19
                 One of the comments that comes to mind as someone
20
       who does processes and sees process flaws, anytime -- and
21
       the group I worked with in the military, we would
22
       specifically exploit areas of vulnerability in the system.
23
                 And I just wanted everyone to be aware, as of
24
       right now, there's 6.5 million active Social Security
25
      numbers of people who are at least 112 years old, and that
```

was as of 3 years ago, when there's only 35 known people in the process who are that age.

Of those, however, only 13 of those individuals are claiming benefits. However, approximately 1.7 million of those people, according to the Social Security

Administration, are still reporting earnings and other things under those Social Security numbers in the process.

And the reason I bring this up is that the purpose of all these things is to identify flaws in the system. And I agree with you 100 percent as to PA, and whenever you see flaws, you have to say, where will this thing be mishandled?

We have got so many issues and so many systems that are problematic that if we don't start to look at them individually, and the lack of transparency is so prolific throughout our government in this area that the probability of us knowing for sure about the amount of data and where it comes from and all those types of things would be very difficult, and I'll give you an example.

I tried to see if I could get the information on the redistricting algorithm that was used by the Supreme Court, and they're not subject to open records laws.

So, you know, we have got a long way to go.

MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you,

Representative Ryan.

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1
                Representative Bradford.
 2
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Thank you.
 3
                 Real quick. In the interests of transparency,
 4
      what is the Public Interest Legal Foundation?
 5
                MR. ADAMS: A 501(c)(3). It's a nonprofit, just
 6
      like the previous witness's organization.
 7
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD:
                                             Yeah.
 8
                No, no, that wasn't a trick question.
 9
                MR. ADAMS: Yeah. A 501(c)(3).
10
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Who funds it?
11
                MR. ADAMS: Who funds it? Private donors across
12
      the country.
13
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Great.
14
                MR. ADAMS: A wide variety of organizations. You
15
      can ask for our 990.
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Yep.
16
17
                MR. ADAMS: I'll have to send you a copy. As
18
      soon as I get back to Washington, I'll send you one.
19
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: You don't have to.
20
                No; I was actually amazed. This is really well
21
      done. Like, it's very high-glossy stuff.
22
                 Real quick. You mentioned the eastern part of
23
      the State, that you had been stonewalled. Which election
24
      officials in what county?
25
                MR. ADAMS: No, no, not the eastern part of
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1
       the State that has stonewalled. It's the Department of
 2
       State, the actual State election officials.
 3
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: I thought you said
       you were having issues with counties, too, though.
 4
 5
                MR. ADAMS: No, no, no. No, sir. We had great
       cooperation from the eastern part of the State, as a matter
 6
 7
       of fact.
 8
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD:
                                              Okav.
 9
                MR. ADAMS: And then they deserve a great amount
10
       of commendation for compliance.
11
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Democrat and
12
      Republican counties?
13
                MR. ADAMS: Absolutely.
14
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD:
                                              Great.
15
                MR. ADAMS: They followed Federal law. It's the
16
       Department of State that has refused to follow Federal law.
17
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Let me ask you this:
18
       Why do you think that your numbers are so different than
19
      Mr. Becker's?
20
                MR. ADAMS: Well, because Mr. Becker hasn't spent
21
      much time looking at the problem. Mr. Becker and I have
22
      known each other a long time, and let's just say,
23
      noncitizens voting on the rolls is not exactly Mr. Becker's
24
      priority. To his credit; that's not what he does. That's
25
      what I do.
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1
                 MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD:
 2
                 And explain to me the lawsuit that you're
       involved in and your organization is involved in in
 3
 4
       Virginia right now.
 5
                 MR. ADAMS: Quite good research, sir.
                 We reported on Virginia, and much like
 6
 7
       Pennsylvania, Virginia was a State that was compiling lists
       of 5,000 caught aliens.
 8
 9
                 It turns out that their data---
10
                 MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: When you say
11
       "aliens," legal aliens?
12
                 MR. ADAMS: It doesn't matter; both.
13
                 MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Okay. No, no.
14
       I'm---
15
                MR. ADAMS: They---
16
                 MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Sir, I'm just asking
17
       for clarity.
18
                 MR. ADAMS: Right.
19
                 And Virginia produced records showing that they
20
       had upwards of 5,000 aliens who had registered to vote who
21
       were removed.
22
                 Last week, since you asked about the lawsuit, we
23
       filed a claim against the Commonwealth of Virginia for
24
       improperly removing citizens from the voter rolls. No
25
       State officials should be removing citizens from the voter
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1
       rolls, and we have sued the Commonwealth of Virginia for
 2
       improper removal of aliens.
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: But the original
 3
       litigation, though, is you're the defendant.
 4
 5
                MR. ADAMS: Correct.
 6
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: You're being sued or
 7
       called out -- your organization is being sued for voter
 8
       suppression.
 9
                MR. ADAMS: No, no, no, sir. That's not
10
       accurate. It's not voter suppression.
11
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: But---
12
                MR. ADAMS: It's for defamation, the Klan Act,
13
       and---
14
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: The Ku Klux Klan
15
      Act; yes.
16
                MR. ADAMS: --- and Section 11(b) of the Voting
17
      Rights Act.
18
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: Yes.
19
                MR. ADAMS: Voter suppression is not in Federal
20
       law. And so those statutes are, and they sued us because
21
      we published records showing that these individuals are
22
      noncitizens.
23
                MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: And are they
24
      noncitizens?
                MR. ADAMS: Well, we don't know. But we know
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1	that the Commonwealth of we know the Commonwealth of
2	Virginia made a mistake removing them. That's why we sued
3	the Commonwealth of Virginia.
4	So removing these
5	MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: And so you
6	published
7	MR. ADAMS: May I finish?
8	By removing these voters improperly, we sued the
9	Commonwealth of Virginia for violating Federal law by
10	removing genuine citizens from the voter rolls.
11	MINORITY CHAIRMAN BRADFORD: And respectfully, I
12	understand that's your contention, but they're suing saying
13	that you defamed them.
14	MR. ADAMS: Because we published public
15	information that the government published. And so we are
16	now suing the Commonwealth of Virginia for removing
17	citizens from the voter rolls.
18	Thank you.
19	MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you.
20	Thank you, Representative Bradford.
21	Thank you, Mr. Adams, for testifying with us
22	again. Thanks for coming to Harrisburg, and we really
23	appreciate the work you have been doing.
24	MR. ADAMS: Thank you.
25	MAJORITY CHAIRMAN METCALFE: Thank you.

1	A motion by Representative Roae to adjourn,
2	seconded by Representative Dush.
3	This hearing is adjourned. Everyone have a nice
4	day.
5	
6	(At 11:01 a.m., the public hearing adjourned.)

	101
1	I hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings
2	are a true and accurate transcription produced from audio
3	on the said proceedings and that this is a correct
4	transcript of the same.
5	
6	
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